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
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
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
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THE
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SECOND SERIES, NO. XVII.—WHOLE NO. XLIX.

ARTICLE I.

BENEVOLENCE AND SELFISHNESS.

By Jeremiah Day, D. D. L. L. D. President of Yale College, Connecticut.

It is asserted by many, by some even who appear to be exemplary Christians and able divines, that *self-love* is the moving principle of all voluntary action; that it is common to saints and sinners; that it is an essential element in benevolence itself. By others, it is considered as identical with selfishness; as directly opposed to benevolence; as the radical principle of all iniquity. Is it not high time, that Christian brethren should come to some understanding, with respect to the essential characteristic of the religion which they profess? If the existing disagreement, on this all important point, is in *appearance* only; if it is nothing more than a difference in the interpretation of certain words and phrases, while there is a real harmony of belief, with respect to the nature of the distinction between virtue and vice, benevolence and selfishness; strenuous efforts ought to be made to dispel the mists which the ambiguities of language have thrown around the subject; that those who are brethren in profession should no longer be alienated from each other, on account of supposed differences of opinion, which are, in reality, only verbal; and on the other hand, that those who have adopted erroneous and heretical tenets, should not have the

privilege of veiling their errors, under vague and deceptive phraseology.

If there is either a *kind* or *degree* of self-love which is virtuous, and another kind and degree which is sinful, the distinction should be drawn, in characters which cannot be easily mistaken. The want of such distinction may be, to multitudes, the occasion of fatal delusion. Those who hold the truth themselves, and yet express it in dubious language, may be unintentionally instrumental in leading *others* into ruinous errors. If we say that self-love is, in *some* sense, the moving principle in all moral action, while we do not distinctly show in *what* sense it bears this relation, the selfish man will be sure to give to the assertion a construction in his own favor.

The more specious any selfish theory of morals is, the more nearly it copies the language in which the truth is expressed, the more dangerous will it be, if it be radically erroneous. It may escape the detection to which the grosser forms of error are exposed. This is not a subject of barren metaphysical speculation, having no practical relation to the duties and responsibilities of life. It may have a determining influence upon the judgment which we form of the essential elements of Christian character. Many may be fatally deceived, by mistaking a refined selfishness, for the impartial benevolence which the divine law and the gospel require. Though all classes have a deep interest in the practical applications of the subject; yet a correct understanding of its nature and relations, requires a greater nicety of discrimination than is consistent with the loose, metaphorical style of a popular address or essay.

In attempting to draw the line of distinction between benevolence and selfishness, we have to encounter not only the almost endless perplexities of ambiguous phraseology, but what Dugald Stewart significantly denominates the "ambiguity of *things*;" the apparent identity of mental states, or objects of thought, which are really distinct, but which are so intimately blended, that we find it difficult to separate them, especially when the same terms and phrases are indiscriminately applied to them.

1. We have an example of this, in making the inquiry, whether, in all our actions, we are influenced solely by a *love of happiness*. There have been, at least, *four* different ap-

plications of this expression. It has been used to signify our present *enjoyment* of happiness,—or our regard for the present happiness of *others*,—or our desire for their *future* happiness,—or a desire of our *own* future happiness. The first of these uses appears to be an improper one. The other three may be correct, if due caution be observed in keeping the different significations distinct.

Without taking for granted any point respecting benevolent affection and action which may, in the course of our inquiry, come under examination, let it be supposed, that a Christian minister has a sincere regard for the spiritual welfare of his people, that his labors have been blessed to the conversion and increasing sanctification of numbers, and that he hopes to be the instrument of bringing others into the kingdom of Christ, in whose recovery from the bondage of iniquity he may hereafter rejoice. Here are, at least, *three* different states of feeling which may be termed a love of happiness; his joy in the *present* welfare of a portion of his flock, his desire of the *future* spiritual prosperity of these and others, and the hope that *he* himself will be a partaker of their joy, that his happiness will be promoted by witnessing theirs. He may also expect to receive a reward from his Father in heaven.

But there appears to be no propriety in applying the expression “love of happiness” to *present enjoyment*, without reference to the good of others, or our own future good. Yet many a specious argument has no other foundation, than the artful, or undesigned substitution of this, for one of the other three meanings. Love is an affection which always *has an object*; an object distinct from itself. It is true, that it is a *pleasing* emotion. There is enjoyment in love. But this enjoyment is distinct from the good which is the object of the emotion. To love, is to be pleased with something. But this something is not the pleasure itself. The act of loving is not simply loving to be happy; being pleased with being pleased. If I rejoice in the happiness of another, *his* joy is not *my* joy, but the *object* of my joy. My love of his happiness is not a love of my own happiness. The pleasure of loving is as distinct from the object loved, as the pleasure of viewing a landscape is distinct from the landscape itself. It is true, that present enjoyment is accompanied with a desire for the *continuance* of the happiness. But continuance

refers to the *future*. Our own future good may be the object of our present love or desire. This may, properly enough, be denominated *self-love*. But what propriety is there in applying the term to present gratification, without any reference to the future? The expression self-love and a desire of happiness are not always synonymous. For, although all self-love may be a desire of our own happiness, yet all desire of happiness is not self-love. There may be a desire of the happiness of *others*.

2. In the discussions respecting benevolence and selfishness, it is important to distinguish between different mental states which are considered as *voluntary action*, or *choice*. The inquiry is made, What is the immediate cause, reason, or motive of such acts? Is it something *within*, or *without* the mind of the agent? Is it *subjective* or *objective*; an *internal*, or an *external* motive? Before we can answer this inquiry understandingly, we must know what is intended by the terms voluntary action, choice, &c. Are they used to denote simply an *emotion*, a *being pleased* with an object, without any effort to obtain it; or do they signify a *purpose*, or an *imperative act*, to secure the object desired? In the former case, there must be an *external* motive, some object of thought, which, if not actually existing, is yet apprehended by the mind, as distinct from its own present act. The influence of this object upon some sensibility of the agent, is the immediate antecedent, cause, ground, or reason of the emotion.

But if any thing with which we are pleased is now in our possession, we desire its *continuance*. If it is not yet in our possession, but is considered as attainable, we may form a *purpose* to do something to secure it, and at the proper time of acting, we may put forth *imperative* or *executive* volitions, in reference to its attainment. The immediate antecedent of the purpose, and of the imperative acts, is desire, an *internal* or subjective motive. This desire implies that *we are pleased* with the object sought, either for what it is in itself, or as a means of obtaining something else which we love. Objects of *pursuit* are such, because they were previously objects of *affection*. If I rejoice in the present happiness of my child, I shall desire that this happiness may continue, I shall purpose to do something to promote it, I shall put forth imperative acts, to carry this purpose into

execution. My joy in the present welfare of the child, is a present gratification. My desire, my purpose, and my imperative volitions, all have reference to *the future*; to something which is *to be obtained*.

If the inquiry be made, What is it that immediately *prompts* a man to act? the answer must depend upon the *kind* of act to which the inquiry relates. An executive act is prompted by some purpose or desire. Purposes and desires are prompted by the love of some object, either real or imaginary. But this love is excited by the object itself, presented to some sensibility of the agent. That which we *dislike* may also prompt us to action. If it be a present evil, we desire and endeavor to remove it. If it be something future which we dread, we make exertions to avoid it. In this case, also, the evil, whatever it be, excites aversion, and this prompts to desires and efforts to prevent the injury which it threatens.

3. This brings us to a still more important instance of ambiguous phraseology. What is the *ultimate end* of voluntary agency? The term ultimate has a reference to some kind of succession. If it is applied to a series of *events*, it denotes that which is last in the order of *time*. But it frequently relates to the order of our *inquiries*. In our investigations in the physical sciences, we often begin with a particular phenomenon, and reversing the natural order of succession, *trace back* the series, from effects to causes. The first of these causes which we are able to observe, is sometimes called an ultimate fact, or ultimate principle, as being the last at which we arrive in the course of our investigation. The same fact may be called either primary or ultimate;—primary, in reference to the natural order of succession;—ultimate, in reference to the order of our inquiries. So in the case of voluntary agency, a specific act of will is owing to a desire; the desire, to a previous emotion; and that emotion, to some *object* of affection and desire. This object is sometimes considered, so far at least as our observation extends, the ultimate ground or cause of the particular volition; because it is the last, in the order of our inquiries, though first, in the natural order of succession. But by the ultimate ground or cause of an act, some writers appear to mean the *immediate* antecedent on which the act depends;—in a series of causes, the last in the order of time. In this sense, the ultimate ground of a particular executive volition

may be a *desire*;—of that desire, an *emotion*;—of that emotion, some *object* of affection.

Perhaps the principal reason, however, why the term ultimate is applied to the object of our choice and pursuit is, that it is that which we are aiming to attain, and which, when attained, will succeed, even in the order of time, the series of feelings and acts which lead to its attainment. It is especially ultimate in relation to subordinate objects, which are sought only *as means* of securing a good that is desired on its own account. If in this application of the term there is any ambiguity, it would seem that the expression *ultimate end* must be sufficiently definite. An end of voluntary action is something which the agent *seeks* or *aims at*, in what he does. An *ultimate* end is that which is sought *for its own sake*, and not for the sake of some farther end. It is carefully distinguished, by President Edwards,* not only from subordinate ends, but from the *chief* end at which an agent is aiming. "A chief end," he observes, "is opposite to an inferior end; an ultimate end is opposite to a subordinate end. Though the chief end be always an ultimate end; yet every ultimate end is not always a chief end. The chief end is an end that is most valued, and therefore, most sought after by the agent, in whatever he does. Two different ends may be both ultimate ends, and yet not be chief ends. They may be both valued for their own sake, and both sought in the same works or acts; and yet one valued more highly, and sought more than another." An object of pursuit may be *an* ultimate end of an agent, in particular acts, without being *the* ultimate end, that is, the *only* ultimate end at which he is aiming in those acts. "Some subordinate ends," says Edwards, "may be more valued and sought after than some ultimate ends;—though a subordinate end is never more valued, than *that* ultimate to which it is subordinate. A thing sought may have the nature of an ultimate, and *also* of a subordinate end; as it may be sought *partly* on its own account, and partly for the sake of a further end." A man may seek a good reputation, both as an object desirable in itself, and as a means of sustaining and extending his influence; partly as an ultimate end, and partly as a subordinate

* End of Creation.

end. He may seek the enjoyment of health, both as a good in itself, and also as giving him strength for the duties of life.

On the supposition, that the glory of God and the welfare of our fellow men, are primarily chosen for their own sake, and on this ground are made ultimate objects of pursuit by the Christian, his own future happiness may *also* be an ultimate object with him ; not his *only* ultimate object, nor that which, in his desires and pursuits, he *chiefly* regards. While he seeks the welfare of others principally on its own account, he may, at the same time, have a reference to the satisfaction which he himself will experience in seeing them happy. He may seek their prosperity both as a good in itself, and as a means of promoting his own enjoyment. It may be to him partly an ultimate good, and partly subordinate to another ultimate good. His own happiness, and the happiness of others, may each be an ultimate good, in the sense of being chosen by him for its own sake. It is conceivable, however, that the mind of an individual *may be so* intently fixed upon the interests of another, as to have, at the time, no thought of the enjoyment which he himself may find, in the gratification of his desires. A father's heart may be so absorbed in rescuing his child from a house in flames, as to preclude all consideration of the joy which he himself is to experience, in the deliverance of the child. This does not imply that he is the subject of no uneasiness, at seeing the imminent danger of one whom he tenderly loves. But the uneasiness which prompts him to exertion, is a *present* feeling ; not the future *object* of his efforts.

From the fact that *mere inanimate matter*, which is incapable of enjoyment, is commonly sought as a *means only*, some appear to have inferred, that this is the case with every other good, except the agent's own happiness. But if the welfare of others may be an object sought for its own sake, it may have the nature both of an ultimate, and also of a subordinate end. Delicious fruit is desired, because it *is* delicious ; for the sake of the gratification which we expect from eating it, and not for any pleasure which the fruit will enjoy in being eaten. But we may seek the welfare of our fellow men, not merely for the sake of our own gratification, but also for the sake of the good which *they* are capable of enjoying.

4. To the term *disinterested*, meanings are frequently

given very different from what is intended by the advocates of disinterested benevolence. In their use of the word, it does not imply that the benevolent man is *uninterested* ; that he is in a state of *indifference* with respect to the objects of his benevolence ; that he takes no interest in their prosperity. On the contrary, the more benevolent he is, the more deeply is he interested in the welfare of others ; the more readily does he sympathize with them in their joys and their sorrows.

Neither does the expression disinterested imply, that there is no enjoyment in the exercise of benevolent affection. It not only seeks the good of others, but is itself a most delightful emotion. The happiest of men are those who are the most intently engaged in promoting the happiness of others.

Disinterested benevolence does not imply that he who is the subject of it has no regard for his own individual interest. As the good of others is not inconsistent with our personal welfare, the most benevolent man may make provision for his own future happiness. Even those efforts in which he has a primary reference to the interests of others, *may* be accompanied with an expectation of reward to himself. He is not destitute of all regard to his own happiness. In loving his neighbor *as* himself, he does not cease to love himself.

But what is meant by those who adopt the expression "disinterested benevolence" is this ; that the direct and proper *object* of benevolent affection and pursuit, is the happiness of others ; that love to God, and love to men, are not exercised merely because they are subservient to our own private interest ; that personal gratification is not the only ultimate end of all our actions ; that the welfare of others is a good which we may seek for its own sake, and not merely for the sake of promoting our individual enjoyment. This is so far from being a forced and unusual signification of the term disinterested, that it is the very meaning commonly given to it by men in the ordinary walks of life. It is an expression in frequent use in the familiar intercourse of society, and is well understood in the sense in which it is adopted by the advocates of disinterested benevolence.

A man's present gratification may be the highest, when his thoughts are least directed towards his own future good ;

when his mind is so engrossed with nobler and more exalted objects, that his individual interests are, in a great measure, out of sight. The pleasure which we experience in the exercise of the affections, bears some proportion to the magnitude and excellence of the object upon which they are fixed. The benevolent man brings within his view far higher interests than his own individual happiness. The value of his private good is not to be compared with the welfare of a nation, the salvation of a world, the bliss of the countless myriads of heaven. When his thoughts are most intently fixed upon these objects, they are turned off from his personal interests. And yet this is the time when his enjoyment is the greatest. He is the most happy when he thinks least of himself; when his attention is not divided between what is immeasurably great and excellent, and what is comparatively unimportant. David Brainard, in giving an account of his own conversion, makes this statement: "As I was walking in a dark, thick grove, unspeakable glory seemed to open to the view and apprehension of my soul. I stood still; wondered; and admired. I knew that I never had seen before any thing comparable to it for excellence and beauty. My soul rejoiced with joy unspeakable to see such a God, such a glorious Divine Being. My soul was so captivated and delighted with the excellency, loveliness, greatness, and other perfections of God, that I was even swallowed up in him; at least, to that degree, that I had no thought, as I remember, at first, about my own salvation, and scarce reflected that there was such a creature as myself."*

5. *Self-love* is too often confounded with *selfishness*. All selfishness is self-love; but all self-love, all regard to our own happiness, is not selfishness, in the usual and proper acceptance of the term. To love ourselves as we love our neighbor is not selfishness. It is justifiable self-love. Selfishness is *exclusive* self-love. It is the loving ourselves more than our fellow men; more than God, and the welfare of his kingdom. It is a disposition to sacrifice all other interests which we deem inconsistent with our own private interests.

It has been said, indeed, that *all* self-love is criminal; that

* Edwards' Works, vol. x. p. 44.

it is of the same nature with selfishness ; that it is condemned, in an unqualified manner, in the Scriptures ; that no worse character is there given of men than this, that they are "lovers of their own selves." But if loving ourselves is self-love, then there is a self-love admitted by the divine law, which requires us to love our neighbors *as ourselves*. It is urged, however, that self-love differs from the love which is enjoined in the Scriptures, not merely in *degree*, but in *kind*; that in its very nature, and in every degree, it is criminal. If this be conceded, in respect to that kind of self-love which is properly denominated selfishness, still it must be admitted that there is a state of the affections which the Scriptures call loving ourselves as we are required to love our neighbors. This is in accordance with the familiar use of the terms in common life. While selfishness is universally condemned, every degree and kind of love to ourselves is not considered criminal. If we are required to love others as ourselves, we are at least permitted to love ourselves as we love others. If by the term self-love, any mean a man's loving himself, as it is sometimes expressed, *as self*—that is, simply because it is himself, and not another, seeking his own interest merely *because* it is his own, always preferring it to the good of others, this is indeed criminal selfishness.

Agreement and Difference of Benevolence and Selfishness.

Selfishness is not only confounded with self-love, but is often mistaken even for benevolence. Though there is an essential difference between them, yet, in several respects, they resemble each other. To enable us to discriminate accurately between them, it is important to mark the points in which they *agree*, as well as those in which they differ.

In the first place, there may be gratification in the *exercise* of selfish affections, as well as of those which are benevolent. It is true that far *higher* enjoyment is found in the latter than in the former. It is also true, that some of the malevolent affections are painful in their exercise. Still, there is often a degree of pleasure in emotions which are altogether selfish.

There is also more or less gratification in the *pursuit* of the objects of our desire, however unworthy they may be. Though the benevolent man finds a richer pleasure in pro-

moting the welfare of others, than the selfish man does, in seeking to advance his private interests ; yet the latter may derive some enjoyment from the active engagement of his faculties, in carrying into execution his plans of ambition or avarice.

Again, benevolence and selfishness may both find satisfaction in *obtaining* the objects of their pursuit. Though disappointment is, sooner or later, the certain result of the aims and labors of the selfish man, yet he may experience a momentary pleasure, from the accomplishment of his designs.

Still farther, the benevolent and the selfish man agree in making some provision for their own welfare. The best of men are not divested of all regard for their own individual interests. In common with others, they take measures to preserve their lives, to avoid disgrace and suffering, to procure for themselves the means of a comfortable subsistence. Their own immortal interests are, at least, as dear to them, as endless happiness is to the sinner. Seeking the good of others does not eradicate all desire to benefit ourselves.

Once more, the most benevolent man, even in his most benevolent actions, *may* have respect to a *reward*, distinct from the object of his benevolence ; distinct from the gratification which he finds, or expects to find, in loving, pursuing, and attaining that object. The compassionate physician, who has a much higher regard for the lives and health of his patients, than for his own fees, may yet have *some* respect, in his practice, to the pecuniary compensation by which he and his family are to be supported. The true patriot, who makes great sacrifices for the good of his country, may look for some reward of his labors, in the gratitude and affectionate remembrance of those to whose interests he is devoted. The martyr, who yields up his life for the defence of the truth, may hope to hear, from his Saviour and final Judge, the approving sentence, " Well done, good and faithful servant."

Notwithstanding these several points of agreement between benevolence and selfishness, there is still a wide and radical difference between them.

In the first place, the happiness of *others* is the immediate object of benevolent affection. Their welfare is loved *for its own sake*, and not merely because it is subservient to the private interest of the individual who exercises this affection. He not only rejoices with those who rejoice ; but *their* joy is

the object which excites *his* joy. He not only weeps with those who weep, but it is the view of their suffering which, in itself considered, gives him pain. The man who is wholly selfish rejoices in the welfare of others only so far as it may be the means of promoting his own private interest. The merchant who is greedy of gain may contemplate with satisfaction the luxuriant fields and abundant harvests of the farmers in his vicinity, as promising to himself a ready and profitable market; while he envies the success of those who are competitors with him, in his own line of business. A prince may rejoice in the prosperity of his subjects, as constituting the glory and strength of his realm; while he repines at the welfare of neighboring and rival kingdoms. He may hate his enemies as cordially as he loves his friends.

According to some writers, benevolence consists in seeking our own happiness, by promoting the welfare of others. It is true, that the benevolent man takes pleasure in advancing the interests of others; for his benevolence essentially consists in his being pleased with the happiness of others. This his pleasure is what immediately prompts him to efforts for promoting their welfare. But it does not follow, that he seeks their good merely *as a means* of increasing his own enjoyment; that their happiness is not an ultimate object of his pursuit; a good which he endeavors to secure *for its own sake*, as well as for the gratification which he expects to experience, in accomplishing his purpose.

A man who is wholly selfish may do good to those who, in return, will do good to him. He may aim to purchase the favor of others, by services which he renders to them. He imparts to others, expecting to receive, in some way, an equivalent in exchange. But his kind offices are not extended to those from whom he has no hope of remuneration. The prospect of a reward *may be* a motive, even to a benevolent man. But it is not the *only* object of his pursuit.

Again, to the truly benevolent man, there is a *higher* object of affection and pursuit, than his own private interest. The good of his country, of the world, of the universe, he loves *more* than himself. The welfare of the divine kingdom is with him, not only an *ultimate* end, but his *chief* end. If he loves happiness for its own sake, wherever it may be found, he will prefer a greater good to a less, the welfare of thousands to his own personal gratification. When he apprehends

a competition between the two, he will not sacrifice the interest of multitudes, for the benefit of himself alone. Though he does not love his neighbor, his equal, better than himself, yet he regards the happiness of a nation as of more value, than the gratification of himself, a single individual.

Once more, the benevolent man's love is *impartial*. He does not prefer his own interest to an equal interest of his neighbor, provided the one is as distinctly in his view as the other. He may *do* more for his own welfare, than for that of a stranger; not because *it is his own*, but because he has a more particular knowledge of his private interests, and also because the charge of providing for them is specially committed to him by his Maker.

Reality of Impartial Benevolence.

The preceding observations have been made, not for the purpose of proving the *reality* of such benevolence as has now been described; but to explain the *meaning* of the expressions love of happiness, self-love, selfishness, disinterested benevolence, ultimate end, &c. Let us now inquire, whether the benevolence here spoken of is any where to be found among men; a benevolence which is not uninterested, but disinterested; which is not without enjoyment in its exercise, while it has for its object the enjoyment of others; which may aim at future gratification, in performing acts of beneficence, but which also seeks the welfare of others, as the direct object of these acts; which does good, not merely for the sake of a reward, but from the love of doing good; which makes the interests of the divine kingdom not only an ultimate end, but the *chief* end of its pursuits.

1. In the first place, if a man has no regard for the welfare of others, *for its own sake*, he cannot seek it on account of the happiness which *he himself* is to derive from its attainment. For, by the supposition, it is an object from which he can expect no gratification. If he takes no pleasure in the prospect of securing it hereafter, he will find none in actually attaining it, unless there should be a change in his disposition. Benevolence exercised from self-love only is a manifest absurdity. If an object is not loved for itself, it cannot be loved for the mere pleasure of loving it. When any thing is primarily sought for its own excellence, it may *also* be

sought for the sake of the gratification which it affords us. But this secondary motive can have no place, in reference to an object which is perfectly indifferent. The expectation of enjoyment, from the exercise of particular affections, presupposes objects adapted to the gratification of these affections. The pleasure resulting from the satisfaction of particular desires implies, that these desires were previously directed to some object different from the pleasure itself. This pleasure, which is the *effect* of the gratified desires, is not the *cause* of these desires; is not the object which excites them. If in the nature of a thing, there is nothing adapted to excite a particular affection in the mind, the mind has no power to call forth from itself this affection towards that thing. Loving an object is taking pleasure in the object; and not merely taking pleasure in the pleasure. If we could excite in ourselves, at will, pleasing emotions towards any object whatever, nothing would be of easier attainment than perfect happiness. All that would be requisite for this purpose, would be to resolve to be pleased with every thing which could possibly be brought before our minds. We might be as happy in the prospect of poverty and disgrace, as with the expectation of affluence and renown.

It may be said, that we can desire nothing but that which is the means of good to ourselves; present good, in the exercise of pleasing emotions; future good, in the gratification to be found in obtaining the object desired. But does this imply, that our own enjoyment is the *only* thing which we ever desire; that there is nothing else in the universe which we seek on its own account? Because we are gratified with the attainment of the objects of our desire, does it follow that these objects are in themselves *not* desired? Does our taking pleasure in witnessing the happiness of others imply, that our own pleasure is the *only* thing in which we take pleasure? When a pious mother's heart is filled with rapture, at the conversion of a beloved child, has she no desire for the everlasting salvation of the child, on its own account? Does the fact that she finds or expects a high gratification, in believing that one so dear to her has obtained a title to heavenly glory, imply that this self-gratification is *all* which she desired in seeking the momentous change? Is it not evident, on the contrary, that if the holiness and happiness of the child were not, in the first place, sought for their own sake, they

could not be sought, for the sake of the gratification to be expected from their attainment? It is one thing to assert that those objects only are desired by us which may, in some way or other, be the means of enjoyment to ourselves; and a very different thing to hold, that they are desired for the sake of this enjoyment *only*;—for the sake of the happiness of desiring them. The latter proposition does not follow as a logical consequence from the other.

Is happiness the *ultimate* end of all voluntary action? If an ultimate end is that which is sought for its own sake, and if we ever seek the good of *others* for its own sake, then our *own* happiness is not the *only* ultimate end of our actions. The welfare of others may be to us both an ultimate and a subordinate end; ultimate, as being a good in itself; subordinate, as contributing to our own gratification. Our own future happiness may be both an ultimate and a subordinate end. We may seek the salvation of our souls, as a good in itself, and also as a means of bringing glory and joy to the Saviour. Our own benefit may be *an* ultimate end, while it is not *the* ultimate end, that is, the *only* ultimate end of all our actions. To the truly pious man, the glory of God and his kingdom is not only an ultimate end, but his *principal* ultimate end. He places a higher value upon it, than upon his own personal gratification.

But is not our own pleasure our ultimate *motive* to benevolent action; that which immediately *prompts* us to act? If by action be here meant *imperative* acts of the will, put forth to obtain the objects of our desire, *these* acts are undoubtedly prompted by our *present* pleasure, in hope of obtaining what we desire. This is the internal, or subjective motive to voluntary action. But this present pleasure is not the *future* good which is the ultimate *end* of our action. The hope which a thirsty man has of soon drinking freely from the flowing fountain, is not the pleasure which he will find in the draught itself.

If by benevolent action be meant benevolent *affection*, pleasing *emotion* exercised in the prospect of good to others; this present pleasure is not the motive to itself. A man is not pleased, merely because he is pleased. If he takes pleasure in any object, the pleasure itself is not the object which he seeks. *Future* pleasure, or the *continuance* of present pleasure, may indeed be an object of pursuit. But

the *act* of loving is distinct from the object of love. It is also distinct from the *motive* by which it is excited.

What then is the motive, the external, or objective motive of benevolent affection ; the cause or reason why it is exercised ? It is the good which is the object of this affection ; primarily the happiness of others, secondarily the gratification which we expect to find, in securing this object. It is the same as the ultimate *end* of beneficent action. From the fact, that our present pleasure is that which prompts us to imperative acts of the will, we are not warranted to draw the conclusion, that our personal *future* gratification is exclusively the motive which excites our emotions and desires. If every thing which we love gives us pleasure, it does not follow that that pleasure, or the continuance of it, is the only ultimate object of our love. Because we cannot see without eyes, we do not infer, that we see nothing but our own eyes.

It is sometimes said, that although the selfish and the benevolent man agree in making their own happiness the ultimate end of all their actions ; yet that the difference between them consists in the *particular kind* of happiness which they seek ; that the latter finds his chief enjoyment in glorifying God, and doing good to others. But this implies, that the glory of God, and the good of others are sought on their own account. If they are not, no gratification will be found in advancing them. If the apostate spirits in the prison of darkness were admitted to heaven, with their present disposition, they would derive no pleasure from witnessing the transports of holy joy and praise around them.

2. The voice of *conscience* decides, that we are bound to seek the welfare of others for its own sake. *Their* happiness is as really a good in itself as *ours* is. It is as worthy to be sought for its own sake. We all desire that others should take an interest in *our* welfare. We are in distress, if we entertain a suspicion, that no one has any sincere regard for us. When we claim, that we are entitled to the benevolent affection of others, this is an acknowledgment that we are bound to reciprocate the disinterested good will which we ask from them.

That this is our duty, is evident also from the consideration, that nothing short of this will secure the harmony and highest happiness of a community of rational beings. A mere profession of benevolent regard, without the reality, will not

answer the purpose. Nor will the end be attained by an exchange of good offices, performed merely with a view of receiving an equivalent in return. There must be, on the part of each member of the society, as sincere a desire for the prosperity of others, in itself considered, as for his own personal welfare. This alone will prevent these conflicting interests and pursuits which, if not prevented, would fill the community with discord, and violence, and wretchedness.

3. The common voice and language of mankind make a marked distinction between benevolence and selfishness. All profess to have a sincere regard for the good of others. All agree in condemning selfishness, and approving benevolence. Even those speculating philosophers whose theories are inconsistent with a clear distinction between the two, would deem it an insult to be charged with being altogether selfish. The men who are the most exclusively devoted to their own private interests, endeavor to assume, as far as practicable, an *appearance* of regard for the public good ; well knowing that this is the only way in which they can escape the censure of their fellow men. It is true that in our fallen world, the appearance and profession of benevolence are too often false and hollow. But where there are so many counterfeits there must be something to be counterfeited ; some real excellence, which it is the aim of the dissembler to imitate. Who thinks of counterfeiting that which is commonly believed to have no existence ?

4. The *sacred scriptures* maintain the distinction which has been made between benevolence and selfishness. An impartial regard for the good of others is required in the divine law. We are to love our neighbor *as ourselves* ; with the same sincere desire for his welfare, which we have for our own. As our own happiness is the ultimate object of our love for ourselves ; so his happiness should be the ultimate object of our love for our neighbor. As we do not love ourselves merely for the sake of the pleasure found in the exercise of this love, so, if we are truly benevolent, we do not love our neighbor solely for the sake of the pleasure of loving him. His happiness may be as truly an object of desire to us, as our own. If we seek our individual welfare for its own sake, we are bound to seek his welfare for its own sake.

At the head of one of the darkest catalogues of vices, specified in the New Testament, we find this description : "Men

shall be *lovers of their own selves*.”* How can this be a distinguishing trait of a particular class of persons, if *all* men make their own happiness the only ultimate object of their affections and pursuits? “Charity,” says the Apostle, “*seeketh not her own*.”† How can this be true, if she seeketh, as an ultimate end, nothing else? If, as the same Apostle says, “None of us,” that is, no Christian, “*liveth to himself*,”‡ how can it be true, that every Christian makes himself—his own personal interest, the only ultimate end for which he lives?

The disinterested benevolence of *Jesus Christ* is exhibited in the scriptures, for the imitation of his followers. “We then, that are strong, ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and *not to please ourselves*. Let every one of us please his neighbor, *for his good*, to edification. For even Christ pleased not himself.”§ “Though He was rich, yet *for your sakes* he became poor, that ye through His poverty might be rich.”|| “Look not every man on his own things, but also on the things of others. Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus.”¶ When we were yet enemies, Christ died for us. His sufferings and death, for the salvation of a revolted and perishing world, are the most exalted exercise of self-denying benevolence which has ever been brought to our knowledge.

It is claimed, however, that like Moses, “He had respect to the recompense of the reward:” that “for the *joy that was set before him*, He endured the cross;” that because “He humbled Himself, and became obedient unto death, God hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a name which is above every name;” that He hath “set Him at His own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality, and power and might, and dominion.”**

It is true, that Christ is spoken of, in the scriptures, as having respect to a reward for his unparalleled benevolence. But are we justified in drawing the conclusion, that the reward set before him was the *only* motive of his actions; the only ultimate end which He was endeavoring to obtain?

* 2. Tim. iii. 2. † 1. Cor. xiii. 5. ‡ Rom. xiv. 7.
§ Rom. xv. 1, 2, 3. || 2. Cor. viii. 9. ¶ Philip ii. 4, 5.
** Philip ii. 8, 9; Ephes. i. 20, 21.

When it is said, that "for *our* sake He became poor," does this mean, that it was for His *own* sake only that He humbled himself, and became obedient unto death? Did He not seek the everlasting salvation of multitudes which no man can number, as a good in itself considered, as well as in reference to the reward which He was to receive? Let us look at the *nature* of this reward. What is "the joy set before Him?" Was it not, partly at least, the joy of seeing the heavenly world filled with innumerable hosts redeemed from perdition, and made perfect in holiness and happiness forever? But how could this be a source of joy to Him, if He had no regard to their everlasting welfare for its own sake?

It may be farther said, that even in the performance of the most virtuous acts, we are encouraged to look for a reward. "By patient continuance in well-doing, we are to seek for glory and honor, and immortality, and eternal life." "When thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and thy father who seeth in secret shall reward thee openly." "When thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed, the lame, and the blind, and thou shalt be blessed, for they cannot recompense thee; for thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just." But do these and similar passages imply that the good man has *no other* ultimate end in view, than a reward to himself; that there is nothing else which he seeks for its own sake; that when he invites the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind, to his house, he has no regard for *their* welfare, in itself considered; that a future benefit to himself is *all* which induces him to relieve them; that the promotion of his own glory is his *only* motive to "patient continuance in well-doing?"

5. We may appeal to the *consciousness* of the pious and benevolent, to decide whether their own individual interest is the *only* ultimate end of all their actions. Have they no regard for the happiness of others, for the glory of God, and the welfare of His kingdom, in themselves considered? The inquiry is not whether they have *any* ultimate respect to their own happiness; but whether this is *all* which they are seeking to obtain for its own sake. Ask the Christian who devotes his time, his talents, his attainments, and his possessions to the service of God, whether he is conscious of having no other final object of pursuit, than his own happiness, in the present or in the future life. Ask the sincere patriot,

who sacrifices his private interests to the good of his country, if he is seeking their prosperity *merely* as a means of increasing his own happiness. Has he no regard for the welfare of his fellow citizens, for its own sake? Ask the compassionate visitor of the destitute, the sick and the afflicted, whether his own gratification is the *only* end at which he is aiming, in his efforts to relieve them. He doubtless anticipates enjoyment, in witnessing their deliverance from suffering. But is his own enjoyment *all* the ultimate good to which his benevolent labors are directed? Has he no regard for the relief of the distressed as a good in itself considered? If he rejoices in their joy, then it is, on its own account, an object of his pursuit.

Ask the Christian missionary, who breaks away from the strong ties of family endearments and early associations, to toil and die in distant lands, whether the principal object of his pursuit is the salvation of the heathen, or the pleasure which he himself will find in witnessing their deliverance — *their* joy in being saved, or *his own* joy in seeing them saved. When a zealous and faithful minister, in a time of deep religious interest among the people of his charge, exhausts his mental and physical strength, in labors for the conversion of those who are yet in their sins, is it chiefly for *their* good, or his own, that he instructs, and warns, and fervently prays? When he arrives at the heavenly world, and from time to time finds one and another of his former hearers following him to the abodes of endless felicity, what is it that swells most the tide of his joy, the fact that so many are saved, or the consideration that *he* was made an instrument of their repentance and salvation?

Benevolence is liable to be confounded with Selfishness.

Notwithstanding the essential difference between benevolence and selfishness, yet they are, on many accounts, liable to be confounded. One reason why many deny the existence of any benevolent affection which does not spring from self-love, probably is, that not being *conscious* of any such affection in their own breasts, they are slow to believe that it is exercised by others. All *appearances* of disinterested benevolence in their fellow men, they think may be accounted for, in the same way in which they know from experi-

ence, that the same appearances in their own case may be explained. This impression is confirmed by the fact, that there are so many pretensions to purely benevolent action, where there is manifestly none in reality ; that those who are the most exclusively and notoriously selfish, are frequently the loudest in their professions of disinterested motives ; that those who have the public good forever on their tongues, are only aiming to make it subservient to their own private interests ; and that the most ardent patriots are often the most pertinacious in their demands of emolument and office. The hypocrisy which is known to belong to so many is, without consideration, applied to all.

Another reason which may lead some to doubt whether there is any radical difference between benevolence and selfishness is, that many of those who are truly benevolent are so *defective* in their exercise of this virtuous affection. Their disinterested feelings are mingled with so much that is of an opposite character, that it may be doubtful, even in their own minds, whether *all* their aims are not selfish ; whether all their actions may not be accounted for, from self-love alone.

Again, our *interest* and our *duty*, in the final result, commonly *coincide*. He who is the most faithful in the discharge of his duty, provides the most effectually for his own welfare in the end. Such are the appointments of infinite wisdom and goodness, that he who has the most benevolent regard for the interests of others, may expect from his Maker the highest rewards for himself. Who among glorified saints will wear a brighter crown, than he whose love of doing good prompts him to the most self-denying sacrifices for the salvation of his fellow men ? “ They that turn many to righteousness shall shine as the stars forever.”

The *misapprehensions* which are so often entertained respecting the nature of disinterested affection, may prevent many from having correct views of the distinction between benevolence and selfishness. By a misapplication of the term self-love, our *present* pleasure, which prompts us to imperative acts of will, is confounded with the *future* good which is the object of our pursuit ; and as the former is always an affection of our *own* minds, the inference seems to be drawn, that the latter must be so also. A similar conclusion is obtained, by confining the phrase “ love of happiness”

to our own individual happiness. Because a man, in all his actions, is influenced by a regard to future good, it is taken for granted, that it must be his own enjoyment, and not the happiness of others, that is the final object of his pursuit.

The term *disinterested* is frequently understood as if it were synonymous with *uninterested*; implying that we take *no* interest in the objects of our benevolent regard; or, on the other hand, that any respect to our own personal interest, is inconsistent with true benevolence; that all love of ourselves is extinguished by genuine love to others; that we take no pleasure either in the exercise of virtuous affection, or in attaining the end which it seeks.

No misapprehension on this subject has, perhaps, occasioned more perplexity, than the confounding of the *ultimate object* of our pursuit, with that state of mind which immediately precedes imperative volition; and to which also the term *ultimate* is, by some writers, applied. The latter is invariably our *own* pleasure or uneasiness, while the former may be the welfare of *others*. The one is a *present* feeling, in the prospect of good to be obtained, or of evil to be avoided. The other is this *future* good or evil itself. The difficulty of forming a correct opinion in the case may be increased, by the frequent use of the expression, *the* ultimate end of voluntary agency; producing the impression that an agent can have but one ultimate end of any of his pursuits.

Our liability to confound benevolence with selfishness, and to fail of keeping in our view the radical distinction between them, renders great caution necessary in the use of the ambiguous phraseology so commonly applied to this subject. The confusion of terms is such, that some writers who differ only in their modes of expression, are reputed to hold opposite views on the nature of benevolence; while the apparent agreement of others is nothing more than the use of the same language to express widely different opinions. There is reason to believe, that groundless jealousies and alienation of feeling are frequently to be found among Christian brethren, whose doctrinal belief is substantially the same, though expressed by different phraseology. It is highly important that measures should be taken to remove the occasion of those injurious apprehensions. On the one hand, the advocates of impartial benevolence ought so to guard their use of technical

phrases, as not to make the impression that *indifference* is an essential element in their definition of virtuous affection ; or that they agree with Shaftsbury in affirming, that all self-love, all regard to our own interest, all hope of reward, is inconsistent with true benevolence. On the other hand, if any maintain that self-love is the only immediate incitement to voluntary action, it is incumbent upon them to give such full and distinct explanations, as will leave no ground for the suspicion, that they consider the agent's personal benefit as the only ultimate object of his affection and pursuit ; the only good which appears to him valuable in itself ; the only end which he chooses for its own sake.

Desirable as it is, that mutual alienation among Christian brethren should be avoided, it is still more important, that men who are altogether selfish should not be able to quiet their consciences by the unguarded language of the truly benevolent ; that they should not be furnished with the plea, that they are no more selfish than all other men, as they are taught that self-love is the moving principle of action in all. The radical difference between benevolence and selfishness, should be kept so clearly and steadily in view, that it cannot fail to be seen, even by those who would gladly escape from the reproach and condemnation which it brings upon themselves. They will give a welcome reception to phraseology which serves to conceal the essential distinction between virtue and vice.

Benevolence of the Creator.

There is some reason to believe, that erroneous views of the ultimate end of right moral agency may have been more or less favored, by the language which has been used respecting the ultimate design of the *Supreme Being*, in His works of creation and providence. From the doctrine, that He makes *himself alone* His last end, in forming and governing the world, some may draw the conclusion, that by those whom He has made in his own likeness, their own future good must be the only object of final pursuit. It may, therefore, be proper, in this place, briefly to inquire how far the opinions which have been entertained on this subject, and the language in which they have been expressed, are correct.

The question is not, whether God, in all His works, does

as *He pleases*; whether it is His own *present* pleasure that prompts Him to acts of benevolence. On this point, it is presumed, there can be no difference of opinion among those who understand the nature of intelligent and voluntary agency. It is His "*own good pleasure*," and not the pleasure of some other being, that immediately moves Him to will and to act. In this sense, "He hath done whatsoever hath pleased Him." But the real question under discussion is, What is the *future* good, the prospect of which excites this present pleasure? What is the *objective* motive on which this subjective motive depends? What is the ultimate *end*, to which the aims of the Creator are directed? It is something to be *attained*, *promoted*, or *secured*, by the measures which are adopted for this purpose. If there is a reference to any thing which is now in possession, the object to be gained must be a *continuance* of the present good.

It becomes us to approach, with great caution and reverence, a subject relating to the purposes of that infinite Being whose "judgments are unsearchable, and His ways past finding out." With respect to His ultimate end or ends, in creating, preserving, and governing the world, there may be made three suppositions, at least; that the final results at which He is aiming, in all His works, will belong either to *Himself alone*, or to *the created universe alone*, or to *both together*. Is it His own advantage, or the good of His intelligent and holy kingdom, or both united, to which all the measures of His boundless wisdom and benevolence are directed?

President Edwards, in his elaborate dissertation on "The End for which God created the World," seems to incline to the first supposition; though some of his observations appear to be inconsistent with this view of the subject. Several of his arguments go to prove, that God makes Himself *one* ultimate end of all His works. This is the purport of the numerous passages of scripture which are adduced to "show that God's glory is *an* ultimate end of the creation;" that He made the world "for His great name's sake, and for His praise."—Sections iii. and iv. Other arguments are brought to prove, that God makes Himself, His glory, and His praise, the *chief* end of His works. "If God Himself," he observes, "be in any respect properly capable of being His own end, in the creation of the world, then it is reasonable

to suppose, that He had respect to Himself, as His last and *highest* end in this work ; because He is worthy in Himself to be so, being infinitely the greatest and the best of beings."

But the fact that He makes Himself *an* ultimate end of His operations, and even the *highest* end, does not prove that He does this, to the exclusion of *all other* ultimate ends. President Edwards, in the introduction of the work just referred to, distinctly states, that "two different ends may be both ultimate ends, and yet not be chief ends. They may be both valued for their own sake, and both sought in the same work or acts, and yet one be valued more highly, and sought more than another." "Though the chief end be always an ultimate end, yet every ultimate end is not always a chief end." "A chief end is opposite to an *inferior* end. An ultimate end is opposite to a *subordinate* end."

There is *one* argument, however, sometimes applied to this subject, which, if it were valid, would go to show, that in the work of creation, God could have in view *no other* ultimate end but Himself. It is said, that before God began to create, there was *nothing else* in existence ; and therefore, nothing else which could be made an end in creating. President Edwards observes, that "merely in this disposition to diffuse Himself, or to cause an emanation of His glory and fulness, which is prior to the existence of any other being, God cannot so properly be said to make a creature His end, as Himself." "This disposition or desire in God, must be prior to the existence of the creature, even in intention and foresight." Very true ; the *disposition or desire*, the *subjective* motive to create, must be prior to the existence of the creature. But how does it follow from this, that the ultimate end to be obtained must be in the Creator alone ? What absurdity is there in supposing, that a God of overflowing and boundless benevolence should purpose to give existence to intelligent beings, for the sake of the happiness which *they* would enjoy, if created and rendered obedient to His laws ? If the *good* which is aimed at, as the final result of a course of measures, be future ; why may not the existence of the *beings* who are to possess this good, be future also ? The *objective* motion to action is *always* future. It is some good to be *obtained* by acting, or the *continuance* of some good already in possession.

There is another argument of Edwards, which seems

almost to annihilate the good of the created universe, as an ultimate end of the Creator's works. He is "infinitely the greatest and best of beings. All things else, with regard to worthiness, importance, and excellence, are perfectly *as nothing*, in comparison of Him." "To determine what proportion of regard is to be allotted to the Creator, and all His creatures taken together, both must be, as it were, put in the balance. In this case, the whole system of created beings would be found as the light dust of the balance." All this is very true. But does it imply, that the created universe, comprising numberless systems of worlds, with their countless hosts of living and intelligent beings, is in any danger of being *overlooked*, in the benevolent regards of Him without whose notice, not a sparrow falls to the ground? Can we admit, that their highest welfare is too insignificant to be made an ultimate end by the Creator, "if we consider," as Edwards himself observes, "the degree and manner in which He aimed at the creature's excellency and happiness, in His creating the world; viz. the degree and manner of the creature's glory and happiness, during the whole of the designed *eternal duration* of the world He was about to create; which is in greater and greater nearness and strictness of union with Himself,—in *constant progression*, throughout all eternity?" "The good of the creature itself, if viewed in its whole duration, and infinite progression, must be viewed as infinite."

In endeavoring to show that God makes Himself His end in His works, he observes, that "He values and loves things accordingly as they are *worthy* to be valued and loved. But if God values a thing simply and absolutely for itself, and *on its own account*, then it is the *ultimate* object of His value. He does not value it merely for the sake of a farther end to be obtained by it." In connection with this he adds, "Whatsoever thing is actually the *effect* or *consequence* of the creation of the world, which is simply and absolutely good and valuable in itself, that thing is an *ultimate end* of God's creating the world."

These observations are applied, by Edwards, to the purpose of proving that God's last end, in creating the world, was His own glory. Are they not also applicable to the holiness and happiness of the *created* universe? Is not this a good which is valuable in itself, on its own account? Is it

not so regarded by God ; and not *merely* for the sake of a farther good to be obtained by it ? Is it not an effect or consequence of the creation of the world ; and therefore, according to Edwards' own mode of reasoning, an ultimate end of the creation ? This is not inconsistent with its being also subservient to a higher end, the glory of God. For, as Edwards observes, " a thing sought may have the nature of an ultimate, and also of a subordinate end ; as it may be sought partly on its own account, and partly for the sake of a farther end." He states that " the happiness and salvation of men was an end that Christ ultimately aimed at, in the labors and sufferings he went through, for our redemption, and consequently, by what has been before observed, an ultimate end of the work of creation." He holds, however, that " the glory of God, and the emanation and fruits of his grace in man's salvation," are not to be understood as *two distinct things* ; as we shall see more particularly as we proceed.

As Edwards endeavors to prove that God makes *Himself* His ultimate end in His works ; others hold that the good of the creation is exclusively the final object of what He does. The late Dr. Samuel Austin, in an able dissertation* "respecting the end which God had ultimately in view in creating the world," calls in question the supposition, that God *could be*, in any respect, " His own end, in the creation of the world." He fully agrees with President Edwards, in his representation of " the incomparable and ineffable excellence of God, and the worth of His being, as the original and immutable source of all other beings ;" and he adds, " It seems perfectly suitable, that *He* should ever respect this infinite worth and excellence of His own nature." " But the question is, whether this respect which God is allowed to have for Himself be not one thing, and the end He had in view in creating, another,—in perfect agreement with it indeed, but distinguishable from it, as any two objects are distinguishable. Could His respect for Himself be a respect to any thing *attainable* ? Is there any thing attainable in regard to God himself ? Could any thing be *added* to Him, from that which should wholly proceed from Himself ?—Is not His

* In a volume of Dissertations published at Worcester in 1826.

original, immutable all-sufficiency absolutely inconsistent with such an idea? His *happiness* is original and unalterable; it is incapable of increase or diminution. God's excellency inherently considered, and His respect to this excellency of His nature, were the same before creating, that they were afterwards."*

This is very true. But does it follow, as the writer affirms, that "they must have been the same, if He had not created; that His personal enjoyment or happiness, as, in any sense, a future and attainable object, could not have been more or less His end in creating?" Does not His excellency, in some measure, consist in His purpose to create, and in actually creating, for the sake of conferring happiness on the beings created? Does not His own blessedness consist, in part, in the prospect of the bliss which the obedient subjects of His immeasurable kingdom will forever enjoy? Have we any reason to believe that His *happiness* is independent of His attributes and works? "Let what will be God's last end," says President Edwards, "*that*, He must have a real and proper *pleasure* in; whatever be the proper object of His will, He is *gratified* in. He is not indifferent whether His will be fulfilled or not.—And if He has a real pleasure in attaining His end, then the attainment of it belongs to His happiness." This does not imply, that there is any *increase* of God's happiness, by His works of creation and providence;—any *addition* to what He has forever possessed. For His eternal purpose renders the glory and blessedness of His created kingdom *as certain*, as it will be when in actual existence; and His omniscience makes it as present to His view, to be ever the object of His complacency and delight. There is no *increase* of His happiness, as there is no addition to the objects of joy before His mind. According to Dr. Austin's own view of God's infinite benevolence, He takes great delight in the holiness and happiness of His creatures. But let it be supposed, that nothing had been created, would God then have possessed *this* joy which He now finds in contemplating the excellence and enjoyment of His creation? Or would this his joy *continue*, on the supposition, if it be not irreverent to *make* the supposition, that the created uni-

* Pages 35, 36, 37.

verse should cease to exist? President Edwards observes, that, "in some sense, it can truly be said, that God has *more* delight and pleasure, for the holiness and happiness of His creatures." May not the *continuance* of this delight and pleasure be one ultimate object of His works of providence and redemption? But how can He rejoice in the highest good of His creatures, without making *that* also an ultimate end to be attained?

This brings us to the last of the three suppositions before stated, concerning the ultimate end for which God created the world, viz. that it was either for *Himself alone*, or the good of the *created universe*, or *both together*. How could one of these be made an ultimate end, without the other? How can God make that in which He has no pleasure an ultimate end; and how can He fail of making His own future pleasure an ultimate end? "According to the Scriptures," says President Edwards, "*communicating good to the creatures* is what is in itself *pleasing* to God; and this is not merely subordinately agreeable, and esteemed valuable on account of its relation to a farther end—but what God is inclined to, *on its own account*, and what He delights in simply and ultimately." How could *communicating* good to the creatures be pleasing to God, if this good itself were not an object which He values on its own account? President Edwards, after quoting several passages of Scripture expressing strongly the love and grace of God to man, observes, "If *our good* be not at all regarded *ultimately*, but only subordinately; then our good or interest is, in itself considered, nothing in God's regard or love." Again, "The Scripture represents Christ as resting in the salvation and glory of His people, when obtained, as in what He ultimately sought, as having therein reached the goal at the end of His race; obtained the prize He aimed at." "That God uses the whole creation, in His whole government of it, for the *good of His people*, is most elegantly represented in Deut. xxxiii. 26. The good of men is spoken of as the ultimate end of the virtue of the moral world. If the good of the creature be one end of God in all things He does, and so be one end of things that He requires moral agents to do—these things may be easily explained; but otherwise, it seems difficult to be accounted for, that the Holy Ghost should thus express himself, from time to time." The way in which Edwards en-

deavors to reconcile these statements with "the Scriptures, which represent God as making *Himself* His own last end in the creation of the world," we shall have occasion to consider soon.

Besides the three suppositions which have been already stated, it may be thought, perhaps, that still another may be made; viz., that the ultimate design of the creation was a *display of the divine perfections*. This is very particularly dwelt upon by Edwards, in treating of the exhibition, emanation, exercise, manifestation, and communication of God's essential glory. But it is difficult to see how, under any of these forms of expression, the supposition can be made really distinct from each of those which have just been considered. As God and His creation comprise all the objects in the universe, it would seem that the ultimate ends of all voluntary agency must be found in one or the other of these, or in both together. The expression which is used in the Scriptures, more frequently perhaps than any other, to designate the ultimate end of the works of creation and providence, is *the glory of God*. It is used in two or three different senses, intimately related to each other. The *primary* meaning appears to be the divine excellence. In this sense, it expresses His whole character; all His glorious attributes, as they exist in *Himself*. But it is frequently used to signify the *manifestation* of His excellence; the *exhibition* of His perfections to His creatures. In this sense, the whole earth is said to be full of His glory. According to the former of these significations, the glory of God is wholly *within Himself*. According to the latter, it consists of effects produced among His *creatures*. President Edwards speaks also of the *exercise* and *expression* of the divine attributes, as an end greatly to be desired. But this exercise must either be within *Himself*, or it must produce its effects upon the creatures of His power. There are no other objects upon which it can terminate.

In his concluding section, Edwards undertakes to show, "that the ultimate end of the creation of the world is *but one*. It appears," he observes, "that all that is ever spoken of, in the Scriptures, as an ultimate end of God's works, is included in that one phrase, *the glory of God*." That all which is thus spoken of may be *included* in this single expression, may be very true; and yet it may be equally true, that there

is a marked distinction among the objects thus included. Things very diverse from each other may be comprehended under one general name. The whole created universe, with its numberless worlds, and its endlessly diversified orders of beings, is, in a sense, but one thing, that is, but one universe. Edwards himself observes, that "the whole of God's internal good or glory, is in these *three* things, viz., His infinite knowledge, His infinite virtue or holiness, and His infinite joy or happiness;" and that "His *external* glory consists in the communication of these." But he represents the knowledge, holiness, and happiness of the creature as *not distinct* from the knowledge, holiness, and happiness of the Creator; because the excellence of the creature is *communicated* from the Creator. If this be admitted as a valid reason, will it not lead us to pantheism; to the conclusion, that the Creator and his creatures *are not distinct beings*? The *existence* and *faculties* of the one have been communicated from the other. Are we to infer from this, that human existence, and the human faculties, are not distinct from the divine existence, and the divine attributes? If they *are* distinct, are not the *acts* of these beings, and the *exercise* of these faculties, their knowledge, their holiness, and their happiness, distinct from the knowledge, the holiness, and the happiness of God? It is true, that they are inseparably *connected*; and in all beings perfectly holy, there is an entire *harmony* of feeling, of design, and of action. But are not God and the creature distinct *objects* of thought, of knowledge, and of benevolent regard?

President Edwards repeatedly speaks of the knowledge, the holiness and the happiness of creatures as being *effects* of the Creator's agency. But does this prove that they are not *distinct* from Himself? Is the effect never distinct from its cause? Is the *material* world one with God, because He is its author? Even where effects are of the *same nature* as their cause, they may be as really distinct from it, as any one thing is distinct from any other which it resembles. Because man was made in the *image* of God, does it follow that they are not separate beings? Every thing which man or angels know, God also knows. But does this imply, that the creature's knowledge is not distinct from that of the Creator? Holiness in men is of the *same nature* with God's holiness. But can we infer from this, that men have

no holiness which is properly their own? The joy of a creature who is perfectly holy, may be the same in kind, as the joy of his Maker; and the character of each may be a ground of rejoicing to the other. But does it follow that there is no distinction between them?

According to Edwards, the thing signified by the phrase the glory of God, as an ultimate end of His works, is the *emanation* of His internal glory, the excellent brightness and fulness of the Divinity *diffused, overflowing*, or in one word, existing *ad extra*. The effect produced by God's exercising His perfections, is His *fulness communicated*; and the producing this effect is the communication of His fulness. These expressions seem to imply, that every excellence in the creature has flowed out from the Creator in the same manner as a stream of water proceeds from its fountain. Though this comparison may be a happy illustration, yet we are not to consider the resemblance as perfect in every point of view. The stream of water consists of that which was previously in the fountain, but which is now *no longer there*. The fountain is so far *diminished*, unless replenished from some other source. But the communications which are made from the Creator of the universe withdraw nothing from His infinite fulness. The holiness of creatures consists of *acts* of their minds. Are these acts the acts of God? Have they flowed out from Him to the creature. Admitting that He is their primary cause, the original source from which they proceed, are they nothing distinct from Him? Are all effects nothing else than a portion of the cause from which they proceed? When Christians rejoice in the immeasurable blessedness of God, is there no distinction between their joy and His?

"The glory of God," says Edwards, "is fitly compared to an effulgence or *emanation of light* from a luminary, by which this glory of God is abundantly represented in scripture." This is indeed a beautiful figure. But can we infer from it, that the parallelism is in all respects complete, between the material sun and the infinite source of spiritual light and joy; that the holiness and happiness of creatures have *come out* from the Creator, in the same manner as the solar beams have radiated from the visible sun?

We are brought, then, to the conclusion, that while God has a supreme regard to His own infinite excellence and

blessedness, He has also a real regard for the welfare of His moral kingdom, *for its own sake*. He values it for what it is in its own nature, and not merely on account of its relation to Himself. The happiness of His creatures, and His joy in contemplating it, though evidently distinct, are inseparably connected. If He had no regard for their prosperity in itself considered, what delight could He take in promoting it? But if He seeks their highest good for its own sake, how can He fail to rejoice at its attainment? He thus becomes an example of impartial benevolence, for the imitation of His creatures. He says to His people, "Ye shall be holy; for I the Lord your God am holy." "Love your enemies," says Christ to His disciples, "bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you—that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven." The same ultimate objects of pursuit are proposed to us, which He makes the end of all His works; the glory of His name, and the highest good of His kingdom. These we are bound to seek on their own account, and not merely for the sake of procuring benefits for ourselves.

ARTICLE II.

EXAMINATION OF PROFESSOR TAPPAN'S REVIEW OF EDWARDS ON THE WILL.

By Rev. Benjamin N. Martin, New York City.

THE "Inquiry into the modern notions of the Freedom of the Will," here brought under review, has possessed a degree of influence over the opinions of succeeding generations, rarely conceded to any psychological work. The concurrent testimony of friends and foes to the distinguished ability of its Author, has stamped Edwards as the prince of modern metaphysicians, and given him an authority, which has made his lightest sayings, to many minds, oracular. Scarcely could the philosophy of Aristotle have been more potent in its most flourishing days, than is the philosophy of Edwards at this day, over many a reflecting mind in this nation.

Under these circumstances, the announcement that Prof. Tappan had commenced his work on the Will, with a direct and hardy attack upon the Colossus that did thus "bestride our narrow world," invested that work with an unusual interest, and secured for it a very general and attentive perusal. If the reviewer has failed to secure a conviction of the soundness of his argument, he has not failed to impress upon his readers a highly favorable sense of his own critical abilities; for we believe that all who have alluded to his work, have made most respectful mention of it. The calm and philosophic spirit in which he has prosecuted his undertaking, the patient, and even profound reflection which many passages of the Review exhibit, the simplicity of statement, and the logical accuracy of many of his reasonings, have all received, as they certainly deserve, very great praise; and we rejoice to add our testimony to that of others, who have honored him as an earnest, fearless, and able investigator of the truth. But, while we thus cheerfully concede to Prof. T. no ordinary merit, we are not prepared, either to coincide with him in his views of Edwards, or to adopt his own statements of philosophic truth. We propose to confine ourselves in the present article, to an examination of his Review, and to inquire how far he has succeeded in loosening the hold, which this strong man of a past age yet has upon the public mind.

To whatever cause the fact may be attributed, it must, we think, be admitted as a fact, that, to form an accurate estimate of the great work of Edwards, is an exceedingly difficult thing. Notwithstanding the numerous efforts which have been made, no one, however he may have been dissatisfied with the "Inquiry," has yet been able fundamentally to overthrow it, or however he may coincide with its general tenor, satisfactorily to vindicate it. The opponents of Edwards acknowledge its merits, and his disciples admit that it has its defects; yet no attempt to discriminate between them, has been fortunate enough to meet with general approbation. His errors are like the specks we sometimes see in cloth; we know they do not belong to it, but they are interwoven with the very substance of the fabric so skilfully, that it is difficult to lay hold of them, and so closely, that it is still more difficult to extricate them.

It must be known to every one, who knows any thing of

the effect of the Inquiry on the convictions of the world, that no great work was ever the subject of more controversy in respect to its main design. By one party, Edwards has been esteemed the champion of human liberty; by another, his work is regarded (and our Reviewer seems to think with entire justice), as the text-book of fatalism. Now, whatever may be the respective merits of these claims, it would seem to require but a moderate degree of penetration to perceive, that there must be *something* in the work which gives plausibility to each of them. Neither party would have esteemed it so highly—neither would have appealed to it so confidently, without finding in it something which they deemed favorable to their views. These facts would indicate that any exposition of the Inquiry, in order to be successful, must include much cautious discrimination, not only between truth and error, but between the conflicting statements on the same subject, which these opposing parties adduce. There must be something of candid concession—the endeavor to ascertain the *design*, and to develop the *system* of Edwards, from statements, some of which are admitted to be inconsistent with either of them.

This view, we are persuaded, is the only one which promises a satisfactory settlement of this involved and protracted controversy. We regret that the Reviewer has not adopted it; he has proved himself competent to have done it ample justice, and we should have looked for some valuable results from so able an advocacy of it. He maintains a very different opinion. He considers Edwards a thorough and consistent fatalist—construes all his language in consonance with this idea—pronounces his theory a psychological “monster,” and meets it at every point with decided opposition. He does not, we believe, concede to his opponents a single disputed passage, nor acknowledge that he finds in the Inquiry any thing inconsistent with his own views of it. He has proceeded as though fatalism were so obviously designed in it, that nothing more was necessary than to exhibit the statements which avow it, and then to attack and vanquish the theory. Had he but contended that *some* of the principles of the Inquiry involve the fatalism he condemns, had he endeavored to distinguish these from the acute and forcible reasonings which have made that work so celebrated, we should have deemed the aim a happy one, and wished it all

success. But the effort to class Edwards with the deliberate defenders of this shallow and profligate scheme, is one which we think ought never to pass unnoticed.

The "Review" is divided into three parts. Of these, the first is a "statement of Edwards' system—the second, a reduction of that system to its logical consequences—and the third, an examination of his argument against self-determination." It is with the first and third of these; that we are at present more particularly concerned.

PART I. "*Statement of Edwards' System.*"

Prof. Tappan has here made a strenuous effort to identify the system of Edwards, with that which affirms the most rigid and unavoidable necessity of volition. This design is accomplished by the exhibition of certain important passages of the Inquiry, accompanied with explanations which the reviewer hopes "will serve to make Edwards better understood." Our opinion of these explanations has not been formed without all that respectful and patient consideration, which is due to the high standing and acknowledged abilities of Prof. Tappan; but we cannot agree with him. We are constrained to believe that his anxiety to reduce the various statements of Edwards to a correspondence with his view of Edwards' scheme, has led him to look beyond their obvious and real meaning, and to attach to them ideas which they by no means authorize, and to which they are in some instances decidedly opposed. We express this opinion with the less diffidence, because we find our views of the most important of those passages of the Inquiry, in the interpretation of which we differ from Prof. T., sanctioned by the high authority of President Day, in his recent interesting and valuable work upon Edwards.

The first point with which the Reviewer endeavors to connect his theory of fatalism, is Edwards' alleged identification of will and desire; which we are told differ in the system of the Inquiry, only as genus and species. The same idea is more fully developed in some subsequent remarks upon "the proper use of the term—most agreeable;" which the Reviewer says "is identified by Edwards in express terms with volition."

We notice these remarks, not to deny their correctness, but to say that Professor Tappan has scarcely, we think,

paid sufficient attention to the cautious hesitancy with which Edwards always expresses himself on these points. Of the first, he says, "I do not suppose that will and desire are words of *precisely the same* signification;" "but yet, I cannot think they are *so entirely distinct*, that they can ever be said to run-counter." In concluding the discussion of the topic, he says, "not to dwell any longer on this, *whether will and desire be precisely the same things, or no*, yet I trust it will be admitted," &c.—language which, we think, plainly indicates, that though he was inclined to the view here imputed to him, the precise mutual relation of these two things was by no means settled in his mind. Of the latter, he says, "they *seem, hardly*, to be *properly*, and *perfectly* distinct," which scarcely amounts to the *express* identification claimed in the review.

While, however, it must be confessed, that Edwards has affirmed the identity alleged, we deem the guarded phraseology of the affirmation worthy of some attention. Its importance arises from the fact, that Edwards does, in many instances, depart from this view, and with equal explicitness, authorize the opposite one. For example, in Part I., Sec. IV., he says, that moral necessity sometimes arises "from such moral causes as the strength of inclination or motive;" where inclination or desire, is obviously *distinguished from volition*, and classed with *motive*, as *the cause of volition*. The same idea is, we think, conveyed in all his language about volition "caused by *antecedent* bias"—about the "will *following* the last dictate of the understanding," under which he includes the mind's sense of the pleasure to be derived from the choice—about "the strongest appetite," which, he says, "it is agreeable to have gratified." This inconsistency would seem to have escaped the notice of our critic, who repeatedly states, that in the system of Edwards, volition, and the strongest desire, *are identical*; and then, as we shall hereafter show, charges him with making one *the antecedent* of the other, and argues with equal earnestness against this view also.

We notice next, the Reviewer's observations on the meaning of the phrase, "determination of the will." By this, Edwards informs us that he means, "causing that the act of will should be thus, and not otherwise;" "as by the determination of motion, we mean causing it to be in such a di-

rection rather than in another." Upon this, Professor Tappan argues, that Edwards intends to distinguish the *determination* of choice, from its *causation*, no more than the determination of motion can be distinguished from its *causation*; that in the instance of motion, *there is only one cause*, which both produces the motion, and determines its direction, and that therefore, in the case of choice, there is but a single cause, which both produces volition, and determines its particular character; and as Edwards maintains that it is motive which *determines*, he must be understood to maintain, that *motive produces volition*. Thus is the conclusion attained, that, in the philosophy of Edwards, motive *is*, and the mind *is not*, the efficient cause of choice. This, Professor Tappan imputes, throughout the review, as the cardinal principle of the scheme of his author. Every where he alleges, that *determination* of volition, means the *causation* of it; and as it is motive which determines, motive is also, the efficient, producing, and sole, *cause* of volition: a conclusion which, we suspect, will be regarded by the disciples of Edwards, generally, with very great surprise.

The validity of this reasoning depends upon the validity of the principle, that the cause which sets a body in motion, is the same cause which determines the direction of that motion; a position which we cannot regard as by any means unquestionable. On the contrary, it strikes us that the *fact*, and the *direction*, of motion, when either of them is distinctly specified, are *always* regarded as distinct effects, and assigned to distinct causes. For example:—What causes the *motion* of a balloon? *Its own buoyancy*. What now causes that motion to be "*thus, and not otherwise*"—east, and not west? Plainly, a very different cause—*the wind*. Are we not right in supposing, that men invariably distinguish thus between the *cause* of motion, and the *determiner* of its direction, and assign in answer one, or the other, as the inquiry respects one or the other of the two effects? The same reasoning applies to every instance of motion. The *motion* of a locomotive is due to the *steam*, its *direction*, to the *track* on which it moves. The motion of a planet was derived from Omnipotence; its elliptical direction from gravitation. That all common usage recognizes this distinction, is undeniable; that Edwards has appealed to it for illustration of his doctrine, is, we think, obvious. Of course, Professor Tappan

cannot, with propriety, deprive him of the benefit of this appeal.

Nor does it aid the Reviewer's argument to say, as he does, that when there are several causes, they constitute together one complex whole, which determines both the extent, and the direction, of the motion. This is perfectly true; they are very often, and very properly, so considered; but the remark does not apply to the present instance. Edwards inquires *not* generally for the complex whole, but specifically for one of the component parts; for that which determines the motion to be in *one direction*, recognizing, palpably, the distinction we have alleged. It would appear then, that determination, and causation, are not the same, either in themselves, or in their causes, in the instance either of motion, or of choice. Of course it follows, that the Reviewer's decision that they are, is unsustained by correct usage; and that the interpretation which this decision puts upon the language of Edwards, is unauthorized and unsatisfactory.

On pp. 50, 51, the Reviewer proceeds to consider Edwards' remarks on moral necessity. The language of the Inquiry is quoted thus:—"No opposition or contrary will and endeavor, is supposable in the case of moral necessity, which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself." "For it is absurd to suppose the same individual will to oppose itself in its present act, or the present choice to be opposite to, and resisting, present choice; as absurd as to talk of two contrary motions of the same moving body at the same time."*

On this passage, which the Professor says "is clear and full," he remarks as follows: "The cause of volition does not lie within the sphere of volition itself; if any opposition, therefore, were made to the production of a volition, it could not be made by a volition." "*Choice cannot exist before its cause, and so there can be no choice in the act of its causation. It comes into existence, THEREFORE, by no necessity relating to voluntary endeavor, but by a philosophical and absolute necessity of cause and effect.* It is necessary as the

* The necessary limits of our article require us to abbreviate somewhat our quotations, both from Edwards, and from his Reviewer. We shall endeavor, in doing so, to be guilty of no injustice to either party.

falling of a stone which is thrown into the air—as the freezing or boiling of water at given temperatures.”

It is worthy of observation, that Professor Tappan is here using, as he himself informs us, the peculiar language of Edwards, of course, in the sense which Edwards gave it. But explained by the usage of Edwards, his conclusion amounts only to this—that volitions come into existence *by an absolute certainty*. For philosophical necessity is defined to be “nothing different from certainty,” and the addition of the epithet “absolute,” makes the phrase express simply *absolute certainty*. The same observation applies to the phrase “sure and perfect,” as applied to philosophical necessity—it qualifies the idea of certainty alone. But it is most manifest, from the illustrations of the falling of a stone, &c., that these terms are employed *by the Reviewer*, to convey the idea of a necessity precisely similar to that by which physical phenomena take place; a use of them which we have always regarded as strongly indicative of a serious misapprehension of the whole phraseology of Edwards in reference to volition. The Reviewer attaches to all this language, ideas which the definitions of Edwards, we think, forbid, and against which the Inquiry contains repeated warning. “Philosophical and absolute necessity, as sure and perfect as natural necessity,” means in the usage of Edwards, if definitions can convey meaning, only *perfect and absolute CERTAINTY*; in that of the Reviewer, it means something more, viz.: certainty, with that absolute impossibility of the contrary, which constitutes necessity of the most rigid character.

Whether the conclusion introduced by the word “therefore” in this extract, was designed as a statement of the reasoning of Edwards, or as an inference of the Reviewer from the admissions of the passage, we find it difficult to decide. The former, which would perhaps be the more natural supposition, we cannot think the correct one. Edwards does not *announce* any such conclusion—he does not say that volition comes into existence by the same kind of necessity by which water freezes—he does not say that moral necessity has no relation to voluntary endeavor. We think, therefore, that we should wrong Prof. T. by saying that he presents this idea as the formal and designed conclusion of his author. It must be regarded as an inference of his own, from the passage in question—a conclusion which

he deems authorized by the language of Edwards. Viewed as such, his argument would stand thus—choice cannot, on the scheme of Edwards, affect its own cause in the act of its own causation, *therefore* volition is unavoidably necessary. The conclusion which affirms this dreaded fatality of volition, is formally drawn from the principle, that “choice cannot exist before its cause.” Of course if the alleged conclusion is contained in the specified premise, we can avoid it only by surrendering that premise, and admitting that choice *may* exist before its cause. There must be choice “in the act of its causation,” as well as in the act caused, or volition is physically necessary. But if there must be choice in the act of causation, as well as in the volition caused, then *this* choice, being itself caused, must have another act of causation, which again involves the necessity of still another previous choice, &c. &c., “in endless retrogression.” In other words, we have here the very error which, under the name of *self-determination*, Edwards so successfully opposed.

It strongly suggests itself as an explanation of the Reviewer's opposition to the very harmless language of the Inquiry, that he has overlooked that limitation of it, which confines it to *existing* volitions. Edwards speaks only of a *present* act of will, and says that it is absurd to suppose another volition to exist *with* it, and oppose it. But because an *existing* volition cannot meet with voluntary opposition, does it therefore follow that this existing volition could not have been prevented? that another could not have been made to exist in its stead?

This passage of the Review concludes with a reference to another statement of the Inquiry, which candor requires us not to leave unnoticed. It is that which declares that “the difference between these two kinds of necessity” (natural and moral) “lies not so much in the nature of the connection, as in the two terms connected!” This, we have ever regarded, as an unfortunate admission of the doctrine which Prof. T. charges upon Edwards. A minute criticism of the terms employed might, by virtue of the qualifying clause “so much,” maintain that Edwards intended even here, to indicate *some* difference between these two relations. We prefer, however, frankly to acknowledge, as we have had occasion to do before, that the passage is hostile to the view we maintain;

and that whatever weight it carries with it, is thrown into the scale of fatalism. We deem it a hasty and ill-considered expression, inconsistent with the general tenor and design of the work in which it occurs; and we rely upon our exhibition of opposite views in the Inquiry, to sustain our judgment, and set aside the sanction which this sentence would otherwise give, to the reasonings of our opponents. Indeed, we are somewhat surprised that Prof. T. has not constructed a more formal argument, upon a passage so much to his purpose. He has shown, however, his high appreciation of its value, by the frequency with which he has appealed to it. Again and again do we find it exhibited in significant quotation marks, and almost every argument employed to fasten his system of fatalism upon Edwards, is *clinched* with this brief but pregnant declaration. Whether it is sufficient to sustain alone the weight of such a system, our readers must decide.

As we proceed in the examination of the Review, the questions become somewhat more complicated. The Professor continues his explanations of the Inquiry, and brings to his aid the conclusions which he deems established by the arguments we have already noticed.

After his discussion of necessity, he passes to consider the view of natural and moral inability, which Edwards has given in the following passage: "It may be said in one word, that moral inability consists, in the want, or opposition of inclination. For when a person is unable to will a thing through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the same thing, as his being unable through the want of an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination." Upon this language he observes, that "The inability in this case does not relate to the connection between volition and its consequents; but to the production of the volition itself. This inability to the production of a volition cannot be affirmed of the volition, because it is not yet supposed to exist. The inability, therefore, must belong to the causes of the volition, or to the motive." The Reviewer is here speaking of "the production of a volition," and he says that the inability to produce it, belongs to its cause, that is, to the motive. Motive, then, is represented to be, in the philosophy of Edwards, the producing cause of volition—not a mere circumstance, or condition or reason, of the existence of choice, but its *producing* cause.

This representation our critic has made before, and has endeavored, as we have seen, to sustain it by some reasoning, upon the comparison Edwards has instituted between motion and choice. We cannot find, however, that he has adduced any new argument in support of it; it rests therefore, both here and elsewhere, on the logic of that passage alone. This could scarcely be considered a very ample foundation for an allegation so important, were the reasoning undeniable. But when it is remembered that the argument is by no means unquestionable, and that it stands opposed to the whole usage of Edwards, who *never once* calls motive the producing cause of choice, but always speaks of "the *soul exerting volition*"—of "the activity of the soul *enabling it to be the cause,*" it will be perceived how deficient is the proof of it.

There is, however, a passage in the Inquiry, which we cannot but consider absolutely decisive of all controversy upon this point; the one in which Edwards formally explains his use of the word cause, as applied to motive. On perceiving what statements Prof. T. had made in respect to this topic, we turned over the pages of his work with rather an eager curiosity, to see what explanation even the ingenuity of our Reviewer could frame to avoid its force. It was with equal surprise and disappointment, that we found he had omitted altogether to notice it. This unfortunate omission we take the liberty to supply. In discussing the question, "whether any event whatever, and *volition in particular,* can come to pass without a *cause,*" Edwards speaks (Part II. Sec. 3.) as follows: "I would explain how I would be understood when I use the word cause in this discourse, since for want of a better word I shall have occasion to use it, *in a sense which is more extended,* than that in which it is sometimes used. The word is often used so as to signify only that which has a positive efficiency, or *influence to produce* a thing. But there are many things which have *no such productive influence,* which yet are causes. Therefore I sometimes use the word cause, to signify any antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the *reason why* the proposition which affirms that event is true, *whether it has any positive PRODUCTIVE influence,* or not; and the word event for the consequence of that which is rather *an occasion,* than a *cause,* most properly speaking."

This passage indicates beyond a doubt, that Edwards used the word cause in its application to the antecedent of volition *in particular*, to signify that which has "no *productive influence*," but is a mere "occasion"—and yet Prof. T. affirms that Edwards intends to designate motive as the producing cause ; and says that on the scheme of his author, "motive as a cause must put forth a *causative act* in the *production of a volition*," (p. 183). The Reviewer's omission to notice this controlling passage of the Inquiry, renders his discussion incomplete, and unsatisfactory, in the most important particular—the grand and fundamental principle of the philosophy he opposes ; and we deeply regret, for his own sake, and for that of his argument, that a discussion otherwise so able, should be marred by such a material oversight.

In concluding his remarks on moral inability (which Edwards says consists in a want of inclination), Prof. T. expresses himself as follows :—"A want of inclination to one object (implying a stronger inclination to another), implies that the state of mind, and the nature and circumstances of the one object are not correlated ; but that the state of mind, and the nature and circumstances of the other object, are correlated. The first is, a want of sufficient motives ; the second, stronger motives to the contrary," "*Moral inability lies entirely out of the sphere of volition ; volition cannot produce or relieve it.*" This last idea occurs perhaps more distinctly in the appeal to consciousness which forms part of the subsequent portion of Prof. T.'s work—"this want of inclination" (implying of course, the stronger inclination to another object), "exists, according to Edwards, *antecedently to volition*, and is therefore absolutely necessary relatively to the individual."

These passages represent that, according to Edwards, moral inability to any volition, consists in a want of inclination to it, and a stronger inclination to the opposite ; which, as they exist "antecedently to volition," volition can neither "produce nor relieve."

Now if the reader will turn to p. 35 of the Review, he will find that volition, and the strongest inclination, are *there* alleged to be in the system of Edwards the very same thing. "*Volition, or choice, or preference, being at any given moment the strongest inclination,*" &c. ;—again, p. 76, "*The strongest desire at any given moment is choice.*" The inconsistency is palpable, even in the terms of the statement.

In one place we are told, that moral inability is produced by a stronger inclination to the opposite object, and that this stronger inclination exists *antecedently to volition*; in the other that the strongest inclination, is *volition*. There is not the slightest intimation throughout the Review, that *Edwards* has inconsistently authorised opposing statements on this subject; on the contrary, Prof. T. distinctly and constantly charges upon him *one* of these views, that which identifies inclination with volition; and opposes his theory on the ground of it. What is the value of all this oft-repeated argument, which alleges that Edwards identifies them, and imputes fatalism to his *system*, in consequence of the identification, the Reviewer's own inconsistent denial of his allegation will serve sufficiently to show. If Edwards did identify them, he had too much acuteness to persist in an error so manifest, and he relieved his system of its embarrassments by a happy inconsistency, for which his critic has not given him credit.

After some remarks upon general and particular inability, the Reviewer proceeds to comment on Edwards' discussion of the phrase, "want of power or ability." His treatment of this topic, we have not found marked with his usual clearness; while, as in some former instances, we are forced to dissent from the interpretation, which his comment places upon the passage in question. We quote it entire from the Inquiry, that our readers may judge for themselves of the validity of his construction of it; dividing it into two paragraphs for the sake of convenient reference.

1. "It must be observed concerning moral inability, in each kind of it, that the word Inability is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The word signifies only a natural inability in the original use of it; and is applied to such cases only, wherein a present will or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said to be unable, is supposable. *It cannot be truly said, according to the ordinary use of language*, that a malicious man, let him be ever so malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to show his neighbor kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be ever so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. *In the strictest propriety of speech*, a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his election: and *a man cannot be truly said* to be unable to do a

thing, when he can do it if he will. *It is improperly said*, that a person cannot perform those external actions which are dependent on the act of the will, and which would be easily performed, if the act of will were present. And if it be improperly said, that he cannot perform those external voluntary actions, which depend on the will, it is in some respects *more improperly said that he is unable to exert the acts of will themselves*; because it is more evidently false, with respect to these, that he cannot, if he will; for to say so is a downright contradiction; it is to say he cannot will, if he does will. And, in this case, not only is it true, that it is easy for the man to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing: when once he has willed, the thing is performed, and nothing else remains to be done."

2. "Therefore, in these things to ascribe the non-performance to want of power or ability, is not just; because the thing wanting is not a being able, but a being willing. There are faculties of mind, and capacities of nature, and every thing else sufficient but a disposition: nothing is wanting but a will."

We give now the Reviewer's explanation of the first of these paragraphs:

"It is still more improper to say that a man is unable to exert the acts of will themselves, or unable to produce volitions. To say that a man has power to produce volitions, would imply that he has power to will volitions; but this would make one volition the cause of another, which is absurd. But as it is absurd to represent the will as the cause of its own volitions, and of course to say that a man has ability to produce volitions, it must be absurd likewise, in any particular case, to represent the man as *unable* to produce volitions: for this would imply that in other cases he is able."

We feel bound to object to this exposition as a misconception of the meaning of the passage. We do so on the following grounds:

1. It substitutes an entirely different reason for the impropriety of the language under consideration, from that which Edwards formally assigns. He says "it is evidently false"—"it is a downright contradiction"—"it is saying he cannot will if he does will." Prof. T. says "it would imply that in some cases a man is able to produce volitions." Nor

does it help the Reviewer's construction, to show that the implication he alleges, involves an absurdity upon the scheme of Edwards ; for the absurdity, if it be admitted, is a totally different thing from the "downright contradiction," which Edwards has so distinctly specified. But,

2. The alleged implication is not logically involved. The Reviewer argues that "to say that a man has power to produce volitions would imply that he has power to will volitions." By no means. We cannot perceive that this is implied. The only authority for the Professor's statement is the decision we have already noticed, that Edwards does not distinguish between the causation and the determination of volition. On the contrary, Edwards does speak continually of the man's "exerting" or producing volitions without the suspicion that it implies willing them.

3. Even if involved, we cannot consider the implication an absurd one. "This would make" says the Reviewer, "one volition the cause of another, which is absurd." Here again we must dissent. Edwards does indeed maintain, that to make choosing a volition *essential to its liberty* is absurd, but not that choosing a volition is so." He says, "It is *no contradiction* to suppose that there may be desires and endeavors to prevent or *excite* future acts of will." Edwards here accepts, and affirms, as "no contradiction," the very thing which his Reviewer makes him reject as "a downright contradiction"—that one act of will may "excite" or produce another. Prof. T.'s anxiety to fasten upon the Inquiry the scheme of physical necessity, has led him to what we are compelled to regard as a most strange misapprehension of the meaning of Edwards.

Nor is this the whole of it. In his remarks upon the second of the paragraphs above quoted from Edwards, he makes another effort to maintain his theory. "In these things" (acts of will) "to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or to the want of motives," (for this is plainly his meaning), "is not just, because the thing wanting, that is immediately wanting, and wanting so far as the agent himself can be the subject of remark, is not a being able, that is a having the requisite motives or the moral ability, but a being willing, or the act of volition itself." According to this passage, the inability to which it is 'not just,' to ascribe non-performance, i. e. the non-exertion of a volition, is a *moral* inability—it is

not just to ascribe the absence of a volition to moral inability to produce it. To what inability, then, we would ask, is it justly ascribable? To natural inability? Edwards again and again says, that in this, the proper use of the term, it is absurd to apply it to volition. This inability, therefore, is not natural. Prof. T. says it is not moral; to what hitherto undescribed and unimagined species of inability is it just to ascribe the deficiency, or is there after all no inability of any kind in the case? The inability to which it is not just to ascribe the failure of the act of volition is moral inability; "this is plainly his meaning," says the Reviewer. Now, Professor Tappan is not in the habit of carrying his points by the mere assertion of them, and we should feel unwilling, therefore, even to insinuate that he has nothing to sustain his assertion here; at the same time it would have been far more satisfactory if he had given the reasons which have led him to the conclusion that this is the meaning of Edwards. We have been accustomed to entertain the conviction that his meaning in this passage is precisely the reverse—that it is natural inability to which the failure may not be attributed. In this conviction we know we are not alone. We must request our readers to refer to the passage which we have quoted entire for this purpose, and decide whether it is not ability in the original and proper use of the term, of which he speaks throughout it. The supposition that it is moral inability is not, to our mind, even plausible. We think we may appeal to every student of the Inquiry, whether it is not perfectly notorious, that moral inability is the very thing and the only thing to which, in the philosophy of Edwards, it is just to ascribe the non-production of a volition.

Nor can we help observing here, to what totally different issues the discussion of this topic is brought by Edwards and his Reviewer. "It is evident," says the latter, "that there may be an utter moral inability to do a thing—that is, *the motive may be wanting* which causes the volition which is the immediate antecedent of the thing to be done," &c.; the former says, "*the thing wanting* is, not a being able, but a being willing," "the act of volition itself," as Prof. T. explains it. "There are faculties of mind, and capacity of nature, and *every thing else sufficient* but a disposition; *NOTHING is wanting but a WILL.*" This positive and sweeping language, which Prof. T. has not quoted, seems to us to deny that it is "the

motive which causes the volition," that is wanting. We are unable to see how the Reviewer could so far overlook it, as to set forth such an exposition of the passage; but the urgencies of an untenable theory will account for some extravagances of logic, in the writings even of able men.

We have thus noticed the most important of the reasonings, by which Prof. Tappan would prove Edwards a fatalist; and we cannot think it too much to say of them, that they indicate a false conception in the critic's mind, of the meaning and system of his author. We are confirmed in this opinion, by the fact that he has nowhere intimated that there is a solitary passage which sanctions the views of that numerous class who regard Edwards as an advocate of liberty; for we cannot believe that a work which has been the subject of so much controversy, should furnish so little ground for it.

Let it be remembered, in determining what system Edwards designed to advocate, that, under the name of Arminian liberty, Edwards has stated that he opposed three things:—

1. *Self-determination*, or liberty as consisting in the previous choice of volition;
2. *Indifference*, or liberty as consisting in the absence of previous inclination;
3. *Contingence*, or liberty as consisting in the absence of all cause.

Now, if he designed to oppose also that view of liberty which makes it consist in power to the contrary volition, why has he not included this in his formal specification of the errors he opposes under that name? Instead of which, we find him saying, that to ascribe the *want* of a volition to the *want of power*, "is not just." Let it be remembered, that Edwards defines philosophical necessity to be, "nothing different from certainty," and moral necessity to be "a certainty of the will itself"—moral inability, which Prof. T. says "is a real inability," he declares to be improperly so called; and says that "natural inability ALONE is properly called inability." And if all this be not sufficient, then let it be remembered, that in defending his system from the perversions which the fatalists of his own day were not slow to make of it (the identical perversion of Prof. T.), he uses the following unequivocal language. "This author seems every where to suppose, that necessity, most properly so called, attends

all men's actions ; and that the terms necessary, unavoidable, impossible, &c., are equally applicable to the case of moral and natural necessity." "ON THE CONTRARY, I have largely declared, that the connection between antecedent things and consequent ones, which takes place with regard to the acts of men's wills, which is called moral necessity, is called by the name of necessity IMPROPERLY ; and that such a necessity as attends the acts of men's wills, is more properly called CERTAINTY than necessity ; it being NO OTHER than the CERTAIN connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms their existence." "Nothing that I maintain, supposes that men are at all hindered by any fatal necessity, from doing, and even willing, and choosing as they please, with full freedom ; yea, with the highest degree of liberty that ever was thought of, or that could possibly enter into the heart of any man to conceive."

This decisive language, with much more of the same tenor, is contained in his letter to a minister of the Church of Scotland, written, as he tells us, to vindicate himself "from the imputation of advancing a scheme of necessity," and published in all the subsequent editions of his Inquiry. Could language furnish a more comprehensive or more explicit disavowal of the system which the Reviewer has labored so hard to fasten upon him ? How far the reasonings he employed were always strictly consistent with this design, Edwards was not the proper judge. This, it is for his readers to determine ; and he who determines it successfully, will find occasion for the exercise of his utmost discernment, and will need to be free alike from the partialities of a disciple, and the prejudices of an opponent. The great metaphysician may occasionally have spoken, as in his definition of liberty, beside the question in controversy ; and his reasonings may sometimes have authorised the imputations which Prof. T. has labored to fasten upon his *system* ; and whoever cautiously points out such errors of the Inquiry, will do most useful service to the cause of truth. But the main pillars of that system rest upon a far different and a far stronger foundation ; and the work itself, we are persuaded, will stand even the severe ordeal of the Reviewer's searching examination.

PART II. *Consequences of Edwards' System.*

The second part of the review we do not propose to notice. If the Reviewer is wrong in ascribing to his author the scheme of fatalism, his reduction of that scheme to its consequences, however logically it may be effected, has no relation to the work from which it professes to be drawn, and we are not called upon to question its correctness. Nor are we at all disposed to seek for faults, in a discussion, with which, for the most part, we are highly pleased. Considered simply as an argument against the physical necessity of volitions, it is accurate, and cogent, in a very high degree; and forces upon the advocates of that scheme, consequences, which it will be found alike impossible, to evade, or to justify. Its absolute incompatibility with all our ideas of moral good and evil, merit and demerit, reward and punishment, in short, with all that belongs to responsibility, is pointed out clearly and impressively. Whoever adopts the system here attributed to Edwards, and has not the hardihood to adopt with it, a most appalling series of consequences, will meet in this portion of Professor Tappan's work, an obstacle over which he will find it impossible to carry his views.

PART III. *Examination of Edwards' Argument against Self-Determination.*

We commence our remarks upon this third part of the review, with some observations upon the Professor's use of the most important terms of the discussion. We find occurring throughout it, passages like the following: "Will is simply *cause*"—"volition is the effort of that *cause* which we call will"—"it is a *cause* per se." These, and similar expressions, occur on almost every page. If words can settle any thing, then, according to Professor Tappan, *will* is *cause*. Take now a different class of expressions: "The divine will is infinite *power*; the created will is finite *power*"—"the only escape from necessity, is in the conception of a will as above defined, a conscious, self-moving, *power*"—"we regard it as a contingent *cause*, a *power* to do or not to do." These passages clearly evince, that Professor Tappan does not distinguish between the two ideas of cause, and

power, in a question which respects only the *causation* of certain phenomena : with him they are identical. We can scarcely think it necessary to contend, that these ideas, however related, are perfectly distinct from one another ; nor can we help esteeming it an unfavorable augury for the results of a discussion, to find the controlling terms of it so indiscriminately applied. And here we are called to notice some indefiniteness in the Reviewer's use of the term will. " Let us conceive," he says, " of the will as simply and purely an *activity*, or *cause* ; a cause capable of producing changes, and conscious that it is thus capable." We are here required to appropriate to the will, two distinct conceptions ; that of a *cause*, and that of an *activity*, which is a quality of a cause. Consciousness also is claimed for it ; a faculty which belongs indeed, to the *mind*, but the claim of it for the *will* seems open to the charge of indistinctness of idea. " It is as conscious" says the Reviewer, " of power not to do, as of power to do ; it may be called a power arbitrary and contingent." A power arbitrary and contingent which is conscious of power ? Is not here a manifest identification of the conscious mind with the will ? the power, of which that consciousness takes cognizance ?

Indeed, will, is Professor Tappan's idol. He cannot magnify it too greatly, nor attribute to it too much. On p. 225, he says, " Let the will be taken as the chief characteristic of personality, or *more properly*, as the personality itself. By the personality, I mean the me, or myself. The personality, the me, the will, a self-moving cause, *directs itself* by an act of *attention* to the reason, and receives the laws of its action. The *perception* of these laws is attended with the *conviction* of their rectitude and imperative obligation ; at the same time, there is the *consciousness* of power to obey or to disobey them." The will is here affirmed to be, a thing which exerts acts of consciousness, of attention, of perception, of conviction ; there seems indeed, to be no department of the mind's action which is not monopolised by this all engrossing power, or cause, or activity, which we are finally told is the me or myself. Out of all this confusion of cause with power, agent with activity, *mind* with *will*, it is proposed to prove that the will may be a self-determining power. With such advantages, the effort cannot be considered a very difficult one.

It has been by no means uncommon with writers on this sub-

ject, to use the word will for the word mind ; to speak carelessly of the will producing effects, when they mean that the mind produces them by willing ; a negligence which Edwards censures with just severity. To Professor Tappan, however, this censure has no application. It is no negligence to which his use of these terms is to be attributed. He has a system of his own, the tendency of which is, to exalt the will, by confining all mental activity to it, and of course, to depreciate all other faculties of the mind. It is his studious conformity to this system which has produced the peculiarities we have noticed ; peculiarities which, in the subsequent volumes of his work, he laboriously seeks to justify.

The Reviewer's examination of Edwards' argument against self-determination, is of course controlled by the signification which in the former part of the review, the term self-determination has been made to bear. If our previous remarks on this subject are correct, that signification is unauthorized ; of course, in contending against the idea it gives, the Reviewer is not opposing the real doctrine of Edwards. Of the correctness of those remarks, this portion of the work furnishes additional evidence, as we shall now proceed to show.

We quote from the Inquiry the following passage as exhibiting the true issue between Edwards, and the advocates of self-determination. He contends that if the will determine itself to any act, it must do so by a previous act. To this it is replied by his opponents that the determining act is not before the act determined, in the order either of nature or of time, nor indeed distinct from it, but that the will determines the act in forming or producing it. Upon this evasion Edwards remarks as follows :

" If any should say that for the soul to exert a particular volition, is for it to cause and determine that volition, I would on this observe that the thing in question seems to be kept out of sight. *The very act of volition itself is DOUBTLESS a determination of the mind. But the question is, what influences, directs, or determines the mind or will to come to such a conclusion as it does? Or what is the cause, ground, or reason why it concludes thus, and not otherwise?*"

The evasion as Edwards terms it, has for its point, that for the soul to exert a volition, is for it to cause and determine

that volition ; to this Edwards fully responds with a "doubtless," admitting the claim in its length and breadth, but contends that it does not touch the point in controversy. We have here, then, the distinct affirmation, that to *exert* a volition is to *cause* it—that it is the *soul* which exerts or causes volition, and that this question of the efficient causation of volition, is not the one in controversy. The controversy respects only the question, why does the soul cause *such* an act, rather than a different one? The Reviewer affirms, however, that the question respects only the causation of volition, and that Edwards regards motive as the efficient cause. Though Edwards affirms numberless times, that *the soul exerts volition*, though he here explains, that by *exerts* he means *causes* it, our Reviewer steadily maintains his position, that the system of the Inquiry recognises only motive as the producing cause of choice, and that this is the question principally in controversy between Edwards and himself. This representation compels us to believe that the Professor has misconceived the scheme of his author, *capitally, essentially*, on the grand question of the whole controversy.

Prof. T. makes distinct allusion to a passage precisely similar to the one we have just quoted ; and it is somewhat curious to perceive, with what a cool deliberation he forces this system of fatalism upon Edwards, directly over it. He quotes the language of the Inquiry thus—"the question is not so much how a spirit endued with activity comes to act, as *why it exerts such an act*, and not another ; or why it *acts* with a particular determination." This does most manifestly assign the soul as the *efficient* cause, and the motive as only the occasion or reason, the *final* cause of the soul's action. Yet, explicit as it is, this language is not deemed worthy even of an "explanation." The Reviewer contents himself with a reference to the dubious principles, which he considers himself as having previously established, that volition is identical with the strongest desire, and that this desire is produced of necessity, like any other effect ; and concludes that *therefore this language* does not recognise the distinction which lies so evidently upon its face. "The distinction of final and efficient causes does not lie in his system." "It belongs to the opposite system to make this distinction in all its clearness and force."—p. 186. It would be impossible to state this distinction more palpably than Edwards has

done, both here, and in his explanation of the word cause ; or to claim it more distinctly as a part of his system. Yet these plain and forcible declarations are unscrupulously overruled, to a coincidence with what the Reviewer has elsewhere decided to be, the principles of Edwards' philosophy.

This very summary disposal, however, of the marked language of Edwards, does not entirely satisfy even the Reviewer himself. He evidently feels some lingering embarrassments, of which this reasoning does not entirely relieve him. He makes, therefore, a still more labored effort, to deprive Edwards of the benefit of this important distinction. With what a ruinous fatality to his own cause the effort is attended, we shall now endeavor to show.

The Reviewer contends against this language, as he has already done in the instance of the determination of motion, that there is no propriety in supposing two causes to be concerned in the production of an effect. "Every effect is particular and limited. It must necessarily be one thing and not another, have certain characteristics and not others ; and the cause which determines the phenomenon, may be supposed to determine likewise all its properties. The cause of a particular motion, for example, must, in producing the motion, give it likewise a particular direction." "Selection is the attribute of the cause, and answers to particular determination in the effect. There must necessarily be one object chosen and not another. Thus, if fire be thrown among various substances it selects combustibles, and produces phenomena accordingly." "Volition must have an object ; something is willed or chosen ; particular determination and direction are therefore inseparable from every volition, and the cause which really gives it a being, must necessarily give it character and particular determination." This language denies all influence of occasional causes. There is but one cause which influences the effect, and this determines both the phenomenon and those attending peculiarities, or properties, which Edwards has attributed to a totally different one. The nature of fire is a sufficient reason for its uniform selection of combustibles ; and so the nature of the will is a sufficient reason for its selection of the volitions to which it gives existence.

Now it must be admitted, that the nature of fire does constitute a sufficient account of the fact, that it always selects

combustibles ; and that, for the reason that its nature qualifies it to select nothing else ; and the implication is most obvious, that in Prof. T.'s view, the will as a cause is precisely similar, and selects the volitions it does for the very same reason—that its nature qualifies it to select no others. There is, in the view of Edwards, a difference between these two kinds of causes, which renders an account that is satisfactory in the one case, unsatisfactory in the other. The existence of this difference, the Reviewer denies. Edwards supposes that the soul is a *peculiar* cause, having power, in given circumstances, to produce either of two effects, and asks, when one is produced, for the reason why it did not produce the other ; Prof. T., on the contrary, considers that there is nothing peculiar about this cause, it produces its effect just as fire does, and it is inadmissible to ask for any other cause, to give to that effect its particular determination.

It certainly would be both idle and unjust, to assert that Prof. T. adopts the system of the physical necessity of volition, but his argument against Edwards on this point, does involve that doctrine. He distinctly denies the propriety of attributing any thing in the effect to any thing but the efficient cause, and maintains that it is by the necessity of its nature an attribute of every cause, to produce its effect, and determine all the attending properties of it, by itself alone, and that in this respect the will resembles all other causes. He studiously and repeatedly denies that any thing like an occasional or final cause is essential to volition. Again and again he declares, and apparently deems it highly important to declare, that the will “may act without reference either to reason or passion ;” (p. 226) and that when it does thus act, or when it obeys either of them, it is improper to ask for any reason why it did not act otherwise. He asks (p. 239) “What moves the will to go in the direction of the reason ? *Nothing* moves it ; it goes in that direction because it has power to go in that direction. What moves it to go in the direction of the sensitivity ? *Nothing*—it goes in that direction because it has power to go in that direction.” Why, when it “goes in one direction” it did not go in the other, is a question the Professor has not thought worthy of an answer ; or rather it is a question which he deems it improper to ask. So far is he from admitting that an occasional cause is essential to any act of volition, that he expressly denies it, and

labors to prove the contrary. He admits that it follows from his view of the will as "a power arbitrary and contingent," that it can act without any dictate of reason or any excitement of emotion to induce its action. In the example which he gives to prove this possibility, the selection of one of the sixty-four squares of a chess-board, he maintains that it is for the advocates of necessity to show a connection, between the square selected and the dictate of reason or emotion. His happy scheme is embarrassed with no such difficulty. "In making this selection," he says, (p. 246) "it appears to me that there is an entire indifference as to which particular square is selected; *there is no command of the reason, there is no affection of the sensitivity*, towards one square rather than another, and yet the will does select one of the squares." That is, *there is no inducement* to select this—no *motive* for its selection—no *preference* of it over another, and yet the will prefers it—in other words, that the will prefers without having any preference, or any ground of preference. Truly this "power *arbitrary* and contingent" is not inappropriately named. The Reviewer tells us too, on p. 226, that the only escape from necessity is in this conception of the will as a power which "may act without reference either to reason or passion"—that is, that whoever maintains that previous inclination, or inducement, is essential to voluntary action, maintains in effect the absolute, and unavoidable, necessity of volitions!

There can be no question here, which is on the side of liberty, Edwards, who deems no account of volition satisfactory, which does not specify the mind as the cause of voluntary action, and the motive as the cause, ground, or reason, why *the mind* exerts such an act, and not a different one, or his Reviewer, who affirms that an occasional cause is not essential to volition, but that volitions do actually take place without it; and that the will selects its effect, just as fire selects combustibles. There can be no question here, whose system admits the distinction between efficient and final causes, which Prof. T. denies to Edwards and claims for himself. We cannot help comparing with this loose and superficial talk, the manly and wholesome reasoning of Edwards—"Now let it be considered what this brings the noble principle of human liberty to—viz. a full and perfect freedom and liableness to act altogether at random. What dignity or

privilege is there in being given up to such a wild contingency as this ? to be perfectly and constantly liable to act unintelligently, and as much without the guidance of understanding, as if we had none, or were as destitute of perception as the smoke that is driven by the wind."

It matters not that Prof. T. has said that cases of this nature are rare and trifling ; he expressly admits the possibility of choice without any previous inducement, and expressly affirms that this possibility is essential to liberty of volition, out of which admissions this "wild contingency" must of necessity grow. Indeed, were the Reviewer correct in his view of Edwards, and were there no alternative between the two, we should hesitate to adopt the scheme of "arbitrary" volition here commended to our acceptance ; and should need to deliberate, before we could decide, whether the fatalism he has attributed to his author, gloomy and pernicious though it be, were not preferable to this emasculated scheme of aimless, unintelligent, hap-hazard contingency, which is all that Prof. T. would allow us in its stead.

The length to which this article has already grown, forbids us to protract it ; and therefore we leave unnoticed, with some regret, other representations of the philosophy of Edwards, the correctness of which we are quite as unwilling to admit, hoping perhaps to allude to some of them, in a future examination of those portions of Prof. Tappan's work, to which this is but an introduction.

We are consciously free from all intention to misrepresent Prof. T. ; for we agree with him in the general scope of his philosophy. Our remarks have been called forth by a simple desire to vindicate Edwards from charges which we are confident are unfounded, and to promote, in a degree which we are sensible is a very humble one, successful investigation. In the present state of our knowledge of this subject, every effort which calls to it the attention of thinking men, is a contribution for which science should be grateful. We rejoice therefore in the manly energy of the work before us, and honor its author for the independence with which he has forsworn all allegiance to Edwards, or to any other man. We cannot, however, consider him successful in this portion of his labors ; and we regret that an effort so vigorously made should have suffered so severely from the want of a sober discrimination. Whoever claims that *all* the truth is on either

side of this great and protracted controversy, will doubtless secure for his views a partisan advocacy, but doubtless also a partisan opposition, and will leave the subject as unsettled as he found it. There is too much of this about our author. He has allowed himself to be misled by that inveterate prejudice, connected with the words necessary, impossible, &c., against which Edwards so earnestly warns his readers; and has thus formed impressions of the Inquiry which it does not in justice authorise; and the ardent effort he has made to vindicate these unfounded impressions, has forced him into the fallacies we have exposed. His work is thereby deprived of much of its value. It comes before the disciples of Edwards with an original improbability upon its face, which renders it to them almost incredible, and absolves them in their own view, even from the necessity of giving it a hearing.

It is ever to be remembered, in investigations of this nature, that seldom does a man like Edwards frame a system which is *in all respects* erroneous; and that it is by a close examination of the systems of antagonist authors, and a careful discrimination of the errors from the facts of each, that the principles which all are laboring to discover, shall yet take rank among the ascertained certainties of metaphysical science.

ARTICLE III.

BAPTISM.

By Rev. Edward Beecher, President of Illinois College, Jacksonville, Illinois.

[Continued from Vol. VI., page 56.]

God in his providence seems to be exciting unusual attention to the long continued debate as it regards the mode of Baptism. On this subject, two opposing systems are in conflict. One based on the performance of a specific act—i. e. immersion—the other on indicating an effect, i. e. purification. Each of these systems tends to results peculiar to itself. By these results the true nature of each system will be evolved, and in consequence of them its soundness will be

tested. Such is God's mode of bringing false systems to a close.

§ 39. *Present Position of the Baptists.*

The system based on the performance of a specified act, is evolved. Let us look at its results, as seen in the present position of its advocates.

The denomination of Evangelical Baptists is large, universally diffused, and very active. It is in all the movements of the church, a constantly operating force. Of course the position they assume as it regards other denominations, is a matter of no small consequence. They have it in their power universally to affect the tranquillity of Zion. We shall therefore briefly consider the position which they do in fact assume. This can easily be inferred by carrying out logically the following principles,—that baptism is essential to church membership, and that the command to baptize is a command to immerse. From these principles, they infer,

1. That all other denominations are unbaptized, because unimmersed, and that they are therefore in a state of disobedience to God.

2. That other denominations cannot be recognised and treated by them as members of the Church of Christ, because unbaptized, and are therefore to be excluded on this ground from communion with them at the table of the Lord.

3. That other denominations are guilty of mistranslating the word of God, or at least of covering up its sense on the subject of baptism.

4. That to the Baptist denomination is assigned the great work of giving a correct translation of the Bible to the world, and of restoring the gospel to its primitive purity and simplicity.

These positions are not with them mere points of theory, but have been of late, with increasing vigor and decision, reduced to practice. They have also assumed a tone of uncommon decision and boldness in announcing their principles, as if their correctness were beyond all question. Nay, too often have many of them spoken with contempt and ridicule, not to say insolence, of those who hold the opposite opinions, as if they were holding on to exploded errors, in face of all the learning of the modern world, and even against their own better knowledge.

Prof. Eaton, of Hamilton Baptist Institute, in his speech before the Baptist Bible Society, at their anniversary in 1840, says, Report p. 74—"The translation" of the Baptist Missionaries "is so undeniably correct," that its incorrectness could not be "pretended," without committing the objector's character for scholarship and candor. "Who are they, sir," said he, "who cavil about the plain meaning of the original word whose translation is so offensive? Are they the Porsons, and the Campbells, and the Greenfields, and such like? No, sir. But the cavillers are men who, whatever may be their standing in other respects, have no reputation as linguists and philologists to lose. There really can be no rational doubt in the mind of any sound and candid Greek scholar, about the evident meaning of the word in question. I venture to say, at the risk of the little reputation for Greek scholarship which I possess, that there are no words of plainer import in the Bible. The profane tampering which has been applied to these words," &c. &c. See Hall's Baptist Errors, p. 39, for the preceding quotation—a very able work.

Mr. Hinton, after an argument on the import of the word βαπτίζω, and a professed history of the origin and progress of pouring and sprinkling, says, p. 196, 7—"May I respectfully ask the paedobaptist who reads this volume (Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Congregationalist, or Methodist), 1. Whether he has not been *kept in ignorance* of these facts? 2. Whether those clergy who withhold these facts from their flocks, do not take upon themselves an undue and dangerous responsibility? 3. Whether he will have independence enough to take every adequate means to ascertain if these statements can be denied? And finally, if they cannot be gainsayed, whether he will dare to remain unbaptized, and therefore in a state of disobedience to the King of kings?"

On the 28th of April, 1840, The Baptist American and Foreign Bible Society passed the following resolution: "Resolved, that the fact that the nations of the earth must now look to the Baptist denomination ALONE for faithful translations of the word of God, a responsibility is imposed upon them, demanding for its full discharge an unwonted degree of union, of devotion, and of strenuous, persevering effort throughout the entire body." Moved by Prof. Eaton, seconded by Rev. H. Malcom.

In their Report, this Society stigmatize the translations of all other denominations, as "versions in which the real meaning of words . . . is PURPOSELY KEPT OUT OF SIGHT, so that Baptists cannot circulate faithful versions . . . unless they print them at their own expense." They assert, p. 45, "It is known that the British and Foreign Bible Society, and the American Bible Society, have virtually combined to obscure at least a part of divine revelation, and that these Societies continue to circulate versions of the Bible, unfaithful at least so far as the subject of Baptism is concerned."—Hall on Baptism, pp. 27, 28.

Again, Prof. Eaton says, Report p. 79, "Never, sir, was there a chord struck that vibrated simultaneously through so many BAPTIST hearts from one extremity of the land to the other, as when it was announced *that the heathen world must look to THEM ALONE for an unveiled view of the glories of the GOSPEL OF CHRIST.*" "A deep conviction seized the minds of almost the whole body, that they were DIVINELY AND PECULIARLY SET for the defence and dissemination of THE GOSPEL as delivered to man by its heavenly author. A new zeal in their Master's cause, and unwonted kindlings of fraternal love glowed in their hearts; and an attracting and concentrating movement, reaching to the utmost extremity of the mass, began and has been going on and increasing in power ever since."—Hall's Baptist Errors, p. 38.

More facts of a similar kind can be found in a correspondence between the Rev. J. Davis Gotch, of the Baptist denomination, and the Rev. T. Milner, a Congregational minister, in which the latter declines attending the celebration of the first half-century since the commencement of Baptist missions, and assigns as a reason the ground taken by the Baptists towards other denominations.—See London Congregational Magazine, and the New England Puritan for August 18, 1842.

Indeed, their whole body has been rallied by a universal impulse, as if on the eve of a general victory, and as if their triumph was destined to usher in the glories of the millennial day.

§ 40. *Inferences from the opposite system.*

The logical consequences of the other system remain now to be stated. These can easily be inferred from its funda-

mental position, THAT THERE IS NO COMMAND TO DIP OR IMMERSE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT, BUT SOLELY A COMMAND TO PURIFY, IN THE NAME OF THE TRINITY; and that each denomination may select for itself what it deems the most decorous and appropriate mode of fulfilling this command. This, if kindly received, is a conciliating view, and tends to unity; for it gives Christian liberty to all. So I presented it, and I hoped for it a kind and a candid reception. My hopes have been disappointed. Efforts have been made to suppress it, by affected contempt of the view, and its advocate. Or it has been rejected with scorn, attended by unparalleled personal attacks upon the intellectual and religious character of its advocate. This I deeply regret, for I wrote with feelings of great kindness towards the Baptist denomination, and strong desires for unity in the love of Christ. But perhaps I ought not to be surprised. If the view I advocate is correct, *close communion must die*, and all the charges of Baptists against other denominations must be retracted, and their course as to the translation of the Bible, and the Bible Society, retraced. At all events, union and conciliation they reject; they still continue their attack. Hence logic must have its course.

Of this system, the logical consequences are clear, and no Christian charity calls for their suppression. I announce them soberly, calmly, and yet decidedly, and as in the presence of a holy God.

1. That other denominations are not unbaptized, though unimmersed, because they are purified.

2. They are not substituting human forms in place of a commandment of God—nor are they in rebellion against God.

3. There is no good reason to exclude them from the table of the Lord—nor

4. Are they guilty of mistranslating or obscuring the word of God.

5. The Baptists mistranslate the word of God—not only concealing its meaning, but putting in place of it, one entirely foreign to the mind of the Holy Spirit.

6. They are not divinely set apart to the great work of giving correct translations of the Bible to the heathen world; on the other hand, they are the only denomination

who are combined systematically to mistranslate it, and to hide its meaning from the world.

7. They are guilty of teaching for doctrines the commandments of men, and because others will not comply with uncommanded external forms, of charging them with rebellion against God, and of excluding them from the table of the Lord.

8. For the sake of this same uncommanded form, they have divided the Bible Society, and do still divide and agitate the church of God.

If the position on which this system rests is true, it needs no labored argument to show that these things are so. They are but its logical and necessary consequences. As such, I announce them.

In one point, however, this system does not reverse the position of our Baptist brethren. It does not pronounce them unbaptized, nor exclude them from the table of the Lord. It admits that immersion is baptism, not indeed because it is immersion, but solely because it is one mode of purification.

§ 41. *Translation of the Bible.*

Upon the question of translation, however, a few words may be needed. I remark, then, that to transfer words from one language to another, is not to mistranslate, but simply to take a word from the stores of one language, and by it to enrich those of another. The sense of such a word is to be fixed, as is the sense of all other words, by the association of ideas. For example, to dip, is of Saxon origin, and belongs to the native stores of our language. On the other hand, the word *immergo* did not belong to our language, but to the Latin. At length, from a form of this verb, the word *immerse* was transferred to our language, and *immersio* was transferred as *immersion*. In like manner, *baptize* and *baptism* have been transferred from the Greek. But these are not all. Characterize, scandalize, &c. have been transferred in the same way. Thus also the words, the Christ, the Messiah, and Jesus, have been transferred from the Hebrew and the Greek, meaning the anointed one, and the Saviour. Shall a clamor then be raised, because immersion, Messiah, Christ, and Jesus, have not been translated like

that which is made about not translating baptize? And shall we *translate* scandalize and characterize?

But it may be said that in the case of these words the association of ideas has done its work, and that their meaning is so fixed that they have become a part of our language. True, and what hinders the same result as to *baptism*, and *baptize*? Not the fact that they are transferred words, but that a controversy exists as to their meaning in the original, so that the natural operation of the association of ideas has been, and still is, interrupted. Let the controversy cease, let all think correctly as to the import of the Greek words, and baptize and baptism will soon become as significant as catechize and catechism, or exorcise and exorcism, or even as immerse and immersion.

All will know that BAPTISM means A SACRED PURIFICATION OR CLEANSING, and that BAPTIZE means TO PURIFY OR CLEANSE. And there are certainly advantages in not translating, but in transferring this word. Sacred purification, will then have in all languages one and the same sacred name. This, like Jesus and Christ, will be known and read of all men, in all languages, as denoting either an *external* sacred purification, or that one sacred purification of the *Spirit* which it symbolizes, and which is by the apostle associated with one Lord and one faith.

But if the word βαπτίζω is to be translated and not transferred, it should by all means be translated PURIFY and not IMMERSE. To translate it immerse, is but to perpetuate error and sectarianism, by a false translation of the word of God.

§ 42. *Commandments of men.*

As to teaching for doctrines the commandments of men, this is plain, that if God has commanded only the genus, no one has a right to limit the command to the species. If he says, go preach, no one has a right to limit us to one specific mode of going. If he says, cultivate the earth, no one has a right to limit us exclusively to digging, or to ploughing. So if he commands "*purify*," no one has a right to limit us to immersion, as the only mode. It is not indeed wrong to immerse, but to insist on this as the only mode, is wrong. And to yield to such a demand, is to sanction a groundless usurpation over the consciences of men. This is our answer to the inquiry of our Baptist brethren, "Why not join us and be on the safe side and thus unite the church? for you all admit that immersion is baptism." We reply, we might not in certain cases object to immersion,

it involved no concession of principle ; but if it does, we will not give place by subjection, no not for an hour, that the truth of the gospel may continue with us. All who come to spy out our liberty which we have in Christ Jesus, that they may bring us into bondage, we shall fearlessly resist, relying on the Spirit of God for his guidance and aid. Such are the opposing systems and their consequences.

§ 43. *State of the controversy. Mr. Carson's reply.*

It is an entire anomaly in the history of controversy, that consequences so vast should depend upon the meaning of a single word, yet such is the fact. All of these consequences hinge upon the meaning of the single word βαπτίζω. And as to this word, the whole question turns upon the simple inquiry : was there a transition in βαπτίζω from its primary sense to immerse, to the secondary sense to purify, irrespective of mode, and is that the sense in the command ?

Now the possibility of such a transition cannot be denied. For, as I have shown, nothing is more common than such changes. And of the fact that the change did take place, I have alleged what seems to me unanswerable proof.

If, therefore, my premises cannot be overthrown, the conclusions above stated of necessity follow. I had supposed that a position so serious in its bearings, would be at once and severely scrutinized in this country, but it has not been. A short time since, however, I heard, on coming from the west to the east, that Mr. Carson, of Edinburgh, had published a reply, and hoped soon to see it republished in this country. At last, I read in the Christian Watchman a notice taken from an English Baptist magazine, stating in substance that Mr. Carson, the celebrated Greek scholar, had totally annihilated my arguments. That they were both dead and buried, and that no one dared to appear in their defence. The editor of the Watchman also remarked that this might be necessary in England, and that Mr. Carson, with his vast stores of learning, was just the man to do it, but that in this country it was needless. My pieces are very harmless here, and would not probably have been noticed but for the respectability of the periodical in which they were published. As, therefore, our American Baptists are, in the judgment of this editor of one of their leading papers, so superior in intellectual acumen to those of Great Britain, I concluded that Mr. Carson's reply would not be republished in this

country at all, and after vain efforts to obtain a copy of it, I at last was obliged to send for it across the Atlantic. I did not see it till I had finished the whole preceding discussion, and hence I lost the advantage of certain lessons in rhetoric and logic, which, as I discover, Mr. Carson prepared expressly for my benefit.

I am glad, however, to receive it even at this late hour. Mr. Carson writes evidently under great excitement, but puts forth all his energy to defend his positions. And in reviewing his reply we shall be called to try the solidity of the foundation on which my whole argument rests. Mr. Carson, if any one, can destroy them, and if he fails his cause is lost.

As Mr. Carson's reply has not been republished here, I must needs give some account of it to my readers. It is a pamphlet of 74 pages, devoted entirely to the examination of my first two numbers. These, it seems, were republished in England under a mistaken impression that the discussion was completed, and Mr. Carson answered them as if they were a full exhibition of all the evidence I had to produce. Hence he answered an incomplete work; and yet his reply considers all the *principles* involved in a thorough discussion of the subject. It may be viewed in two lights—as a specimen of Rhetoric, or of Logic.—In both lights I shall consider it.

Much of it has nothing to do with logic at all. All this I shall put under the head of rhetoric. And as this is the most striking part of the performance, and that in which its greatest power lies, I think it well to bestow on it particular attention.

§ 44. *Mr. Carson's rhetoric. Its influence.*

In this part of the work Mr. Carson makes a very strong appeal for sympathy to his readers, in the unparalleled trials in which my work has involved him.

His own view of the case is this.

His gentle spirit shrinks from the use of severe language towards others, even in exposing their errors, but an imperious sense of duty urges him on to discharge the painful task. "I have no wish," he says, "to be severe," p. 13. "It is painful for me to use the knife so freely: but I must, for the sake of the Christian public, find out the disease under which my patient labors. It is better that one delinquent should suffer, than that a multitude should be drawn into error by his example," p. 11. "It grieves me to be obliged to write in this manner,

but I cannot avoid it," p. 52. The passages, to utter which, caused such grief to his gentle spirit, are these :

"Ignorant persons, in reading Mr. Beecher's work, will think that he is a deep philosopher, and that he is a profound philologist. But the smallest degree of perspicacity will enable any one to see that his philosophy is very shallow sophistry. No man ought with impunity to be allowed to trifle so egregiously with the disciples of Christ, and with the awful commandments of the eternal Jehovah," p. 13. "Is it not astonishing that gentlemen in eminent situations will risk the character of their understanding by pouring forth such crudities?" p. 11. "The author's philosophy is false, absurdly and extravagantly false. He gives us eight lines of philosophy. I will give a premium to any one who will produce me a greater quantity of absurdity in the same compass, under the appearance of wisdom. The only merit this nonsense can claim is, that it is original nonsense," p. 52. To be compelled to utter such language as this, concerning a Christian brother, must indeed be painful to a tender spirit, like Mr. Carson, especially as it is so liable to be misunderstood and ascribed to an entirely different frame of mind—for it is not obviously and upon the surface the language of grief. And if it is so painful to be compelled to utter a little of such language, what must be the suffering involved in the necessity of using it almost from the beginning to the end of a pamphlet of 74 pages; especially as he is called to the painful duty of charging upon a Christian brother, or upon his opinions, not only folly, stupidity, and nonsense, but also dishonesty, obstinacy, fanaticism, heresy, infidelity, and blasphemy? Indeed, there are cases in which, according to his own account, his trials exceed in severity those of the patriarch Job, and even exhaust his patience, great as it is. "It requires," says he, "more than the patience of Job, to be able to mention such an argument without expressing strong feelings," p. 10. "Am I to war eternally against nonsense?" p. 14. "I am weary with replying to childish trifling," p. 45. "It is sickening to be obliged to notice such arguments," p. 46.

His trials, indeed, must be severe, especially when we consider how far he is removed from all such intellectual and moral defects. I had spoken of a certain mode of reasoning, and said, "It assumes a violent improbability of the meaning in question, and resorts to all manner of shifts to prove the possibility of immersion, as though that were all that the case re-

quired." This is quite too much for Mr. Carson. "What shall I say of this?" he exclaims. "Is it calumny, or is it want of perspicacity? *Assume!* I *assume* nothing, Mr. President Beecher, but self-evident truth. My reasoning does not rest at all on assumptions. . . . *All manner of shifts!* I repel the charge with indignation. I never used a *shift* in all the controversy I ever wrote." Again: "I have no theory to support. I never use theories in ascertaining the truths and the ordinances of Christ. I interpret by the laws of language." "I never press an argument a hair's breadth further than it can go." "Fear of the result never in a single instance prevented me from admitting a sound argument. I do not fear the result; for truth is my object wherever it may lie," p. 7. On all these points, Mr. Carson is no doubt a competent and an impartial judge; and if so, it must indeed be an intolerable trial to be called on to deal with one who is "the dupe of his own sophistry, and that a sophistry childishly weak," p. 49, and whose mode of reasoning he cannot dignify with any other designation than that of perverse cavilling, p. 41. In reasoning with whom, he is called on to put obstinacy to the blush, and to overwhelm it with confusion, p. 37. Who proves himself ignorant of one of the fundamental laws of controversy, p. 31. Who gives the lie to the inspired narrator, p. 29. Whose artifice is just that of the Socinians, and a dishonest and uncandid way of escaping, p. 28. Whose rhetoric is Gothic rhetoric, p. 27. Who has not a soul for philological discussions, p. 19. Who is emboldened by his excessive deficiency in *perspicuity*, p. 18. Who uses resources of which no sound philologist would think of availing himself, p. 17. Whose argument proceeds on an amazing want of discrimination, p. 15. Whose cavilling is unworthy of a candid mind and a sound understanding, p. 14; than whose arguments nothing can be more extravagantly idle, p. 14. Whose arguments and objections are mere trifling, p. 12. In whose ideas there is great confusion, p. 12. Whose reasoning is to him a perfect astonishment, so that he has greater difficulty in conceiving how it can have force on any mind, than he has in refuting it, p. 11; and, in fine, whose argument manifests such a want of discrimination and such a confusion of things which differ, that the mind on which it has force must be essentially deficient in those powers that qualify for the discussion of critical questions, p. 10.

Mr. Carson, indeed, being excessively good-natured, p. 33,

has undertaken to give me lessons in rhetoric and logic, pp. 12 and 55, and is encouraged to think that he has forced one of his distinctions into my head, p. 55. But shortly after he seems discouraged again, and exclaims: "*Will!* (i. e. shall) I never be able to force this into the mind of my antagonist? If he would allow himself to perceive this distinction he would be delivered from much false reasoning. I will then try to make the thing plain to every child," p. 55. Surely this is exemplary patience and condescension.

Mr. Carson also seems to be distressed with a strange apprehension that, after all, my reasonings will affect the public mind extensively. They are indeed folly to him, but all do not possess his "perspicacity." "Careless readers will imagine that there is wonderful acuteness in Mr. Beecher's observations," p. 36. "Half learned people will think that this account of the phenomenon is an unparalleled effort of philosophy, and thousands will rely on it who cannot pretend to fathom it," p. 52. It must be painful to Mr. Carson to have so low a view of the capacities of other minds in comparison with his own, for he says, that "the smallest degree of perspicacity, will enable any one to see that his (my) philosophy is very shallow sophistry," p. 13.

However, out of compassion for the ignorant and those that are out of the way, he engages manfully in the work of exposing my sophistry, and, according to his own account, with very gratifying results. His grief at the necessity of dissecting me has passed away, and in rapture he exclaims: "I have now examined Mr. Beecher's arguments, and there is not a shadow of evidence that the word baptism signifies purification. I have met every thing that has a shadow even of plausibility, and *completely dissected my antagonist*. Am I not now entitled to send purify to the museum as a *lusus naturæ*, to be placed by the side of its brother *pop*?"

It would be cruel indeed to deny to Mr. Carson this small consolation as a reward for all his sufferings and labors. But I greatly fear that new conflicts await him before he can wear undisturbed the victor's crown. Such is Mr. Carson's rhetoric.

Let us now briefly consider its influence. On a certain class of minds it will produce revulsion and disgust. Can that be a true cause, they will exclaim, that needs to be defended by such weapons? Are these the teachings of the Spirit of God? Is this the meekness and gentleness of Christ? I will do the ho-

nor to my Baptist brethren to believe that there are many, very many of them who can feel no sympathy in such things. Their own spirit, their own style of writing, forbids the idea. Nothing of this kind have I ever seen in the writings of Professor Ripley, or Professor Chase, or President Sears. I do not, indeed, agree with them in opinion. But in any discussion with them I should confidently expect to find in them the honor and magnanimity of gentlemen, and the meekness and gentleness of Christ; and I rejoice to believe that those of the Baptists who sympathize with such men as these, are not few, and that their influence is not small; and until they disavow it, I will do them the honor to believe that their deep dislike of the spirit of Mr. Carson's reply, is the real reason that it was not republished in this country. When I hear them state that they approve the spirit of that work I will believe that they do, but never till then.

But the moral effects of Mr. Carson's reply, and of all his writings that I have seen, on another class of minds, I do fear. Novices, easily puffed up with pride, and predisposed to arrogant assumptions of superior intellectual power and to contempt of their opponents; and all violent and heated partisans will find Mr. Carson's rhetoric exactly to their taste. To use it requires no meekness, no forbearance, no humility, no aid of the Holy Spirit. The carnal mind will readily receive Mr. Carson's seed and bring forth an abundant crop. And partisan Christians, in whom the flesh is strong and the spirit weak, will come under its full power. Nor is this power small. It may be seen at this hour in the style of a certain class of Baptist writers in all parts of our land. There is in them a lofty tone, and a sprit of contemptuous invective and of fierce attack, that distinctly characterize the Carsonian school; and even in Christian newspapers we read of scalping their antagonists. This to be sure is an improvement on Mr. Carson's favorite figure of dissection, but the father of such a school must not be surprised if his children excel him: for the field opened is boundless; and such contemptuous expressions as "baby sprinklers," &c., will soon not be deemed sufficiently spirited and energetic to meet the exigencies of the case, and each new combatant will resort to the boundless stores of the Carsonian school.

If this were the first instance in which Mr. Carson had dealt in this style of rhetoric, I should regard it less, but it is not. It pervades all his writings that I have seen. Says an English author (Andrew Carmichael), "If they have not wholly and

to a point embraced his views, they are paradoxical, foolish, arrogant, untaught, impious, wicked, silly, presumptuous Protestant theologians; supporters of a very unholy cause; crude theorists, Pharisees and blasphemers. Yet, the person who can heap these epithets upon others, can venture to make this acknowledgment of himself:—*My way* is to endeavor to find what the Scriptures say, and to this I make every human dogma to bend. I will not allow philosophy herself to prate on the things of God.” If Mr. Carson should plead that he was writing against Unitarianism, or loose views of inspiration, as his justification, I have only to ask: When was not the cloak of zeal for God and the truth thrown over a bad spirit? This is no way to check error. It will confirm twenty Unitarians or skeptics, where it convinces one. For they will ask: Can that be the truth that breeds such a spirit?

Nor can any denomination long tolerate such a spirit in its writers with impunity. It may assume the form of zeal for God and the truth. It may delude multitudes with the idea that they are especially designated by God for the great work of defending the gospel. But this fire is not from the altar of God. It is strange fire. And let those who offer it take heed lest fire go out from the Lord and devour them. And if the leaders of the Baptist denomination in this country have any regard to their own moral soundness, let them stand between the living and the dead, and pray that the plague may be stayed; and everywhere meet a spirit so unholy, with stern and emphatic rebuke. It may be of great use in rallying a party for a partisan warfare. It may for a time augment sectarian power. But it is no preparation for the coming of the Son of God. It is no preparation for the baptism of the Holy Ghost and of fire.

§. 45. *Mr. Carson's logic. Preliminary remarks.*

We have considered Mr. Carson's rhetoric. Let us now look at his logic. In doing this I meet with two embarrassments: 1. His work has not been republished in this country. Hence I shall direct my attention at present mainly to principles, as my readers can better comprehend these than details. 2. I have already virtually answered nearly all of it in my last two numbers, though not having seen the work itself, I did not aim to answer it, and hence the application of the various parts of my discussion to Mr. Carson's positions may need to be pointed

out. But as I have not room to attempt this, I shall trust to the intelligence of my readers to do that work.

All of Mr. Carson's reply may be considered as relating either—1, To principles; or, 2, To fundamental arguments; or, 3, To subordinate points; the truth or falsehood of which is of some consequence, but not essential to the main question. Mr. Carson seems to labor very hard to accumulate upon me errors of all sorts, for the purpose, it would seem, of destroying my reputation as a scholar, by repeated charges of folly, stupidity, nonsense, etc. Often the errors charged are upon minute points, not at all essential in the decision of the main question. But they give him a fine opportunity of setting forth my amazing want of perspicacity. Such charges of error are a kind of logical mosquitoes. They have a sting; they irritate; but they have no fatal power; and are so numerous and minute that there is no time to pursue them, and little is really gained by their destruction. In the refutation of such charges, I shall not waste the time of my readers. If the main points are decided in my favor, they will die a natural death. I shall therefore first consider the question of principle, and then look at the fundamental arguments in the case.

Careful reasoners are wont to examine principles, and state definitions clearly at the outset. Mr. Carson ought to have done this. I stated clearly and fully my principles at the outset, presented definitely the point to be proved, and the nature of the proof required. Does Mr. Carson carefully examine this part of my argument? Not at all. He merely alludes to it for the sake of saying that he has no objection to much of it, and that I borrowed all the truth of it from him; and then passes on to his attack upon my examples. Does he anywhere fairly and fully meet and discuss my principles? Not at all. Let me then begin by considering both his principles and mine.

§. 46. *Mr. Carson's system, and canons.*

I will therefore now endeavor to do what Mr. Carson has nowhere done, to collect the scattered fragments of his system, and to present them in one view; for, above all things, it is essential to have clear views of the points actually in debate. Mr. Carson's system then involves four parts.

1. To establish clearly that βαπτίζω actually has the sense immerse in many instances. 2. To assume a canon of proof as to a secondary sense. 3. To provide a set of principles for

testing all alleged secondary senses, to see if they cannot possibly be reduced to the primary sense. 4. If it is possible, then to overrule all probabilities of a secondary sense, by what he calls the testimony of the word βαπτίζω, of which the primary sense has been established. With the results of this process he is remarkably well satisfied. In his preface, he says, "My dissertation on the import of the word βαπτίζω I submit with confidence to the *truly learned*. *If I have not settled that controversy, there is not truth in axioms.*" Mr. Carson has chosen to disregard the advice of an ancient king: "Let not him that girdeth on his harness boast himself as he that putteth it off." Whether he has done wisely in so doing, the result will show. Let us examine his process a little more in detail.

In establishing the first point, Mr. Carson has laid out much needless labor. No one, so far as I know, ever denied it. Yet Mr. Carson, in his work on baptism, has accumulated passage on passage as if the whole world denied that βαπτίζω ever means to immerse, till he thinks his position impregnable. Having thus firmly established what no one denies, Mr. Carson next lays down his canon as to proving a secondary sense. P. 106, "I will here reduce my observations on this point to the form of a canon. When a thing is proved by sufficient evidence, no objection from difficulties can be admitted as decisive, except they involve an impossibility." The "*thing*" in this case is of course the primary sense of βαπτίζω. For though the canon is general in form, yet it is made for a specific case. But the canon in its general form looks plausible, because it includes unlike cases, and is true of some and not of others. If a *particular fact* is proved by sufficient evidence, as for example, the being of a God, or the inspiration of the Scriptures, we are not to reject *that fact* on account of difficulties. So if the meaning of a word in a particular passage is fairly proved, we are not to reject it in that passage, because of difficulties. But proof of the meaning of a word in one passage, is not of course proof of its meaning in another; because the meanings of all words are liable to change. Now, in all places where the meaning immerse has been proved by Mr. Carson to belong to βαπτίζω, I do not deny that it so belongs. But this is not proof of its meaning in all other cases. Its meaning in each case must be decided for itself. Mr. Carson's canon then, so far as it applies to the case in hand, is merely this: where one meaning of a word has been proved in *certain cases*, no difficulties can be admitted as decisive against retaining it in

other cases, unless they involve an impossibility. Here it is then in all its nakedness. He attempts, indeed, to put this alongside of the impropriety of rejecting proof of the being of a God, and the inspiration of the Scriptures on the ground of difficulties. But who cannot see that the cases are totally unlike? If we admit a new meaning to the word βαπτίζω, on the ground of difficulties, we do not reject the old meaning in cases where it has been proved to exist; we merely prove that in other cases another meaning coexists with it. If, on the ground of difficulties, we reject the being of a God, or the inspiration of the Scriptures, we reject the identical thing which we had before proved true. Mr. Carson's canon then is in brief this: we cannot admit a secondary sense of βαπτίζω, unless we can prove that the primary sense is impossible; and it is in this form that he everywhere reduces it to practise. Mr. Carson next proceeds to lay down canons of trial by which to test alleged secondary senses, in order to discover whether the impossibility of the primary sense which he claims as essential, actually exists. Of these the most important are these:

1. P. 139, "I assert that in no language under heaven can one word designate two modes;" e. g., βαπτίζω cannot signify both dip and sprinkle. This he avowedly asserts, "without reference to the practise of language on the authority of self-evident truth." Another form in which he states it is this: "*A word that applies to two modes can designate neither.* The same word cannot express different modes, though a word not significant of mode may apply to all modes;" e. g., wash, stain, wet, purify, are effects which may be produced by pouring, dipping, or sprinkling. "But modes are essentially different from each other, and can have nothing in common. One word then cannot possibly distinguish them. The name of a mode is the word which expresses it, as distinguished from other modes. But it is impossible for the same word to express the distinction of two modes. It might more reasonably be supposed, that the word *black*, may also be employed to signify the idea denoted by *white*, as well as the idea which it is employed to designate, because black and white admit of degrees: but there are no degrees in mode," p. 139. All this is avowedly a priori reasoning, not deduced from facts, but resting on the assumption that it is impossible so to use a word, or at least absurd, and therefore no word is in fact so used.

2. In certain situations, two words, OR EVEN SEVERAL WORDS,

MAY WITH EQUAL PROPRIETY FILL THE SAME PLACE, THOUGH THEY ARE ALL ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT IN THEIR SIGNIFICATIONS, p. 81; e. g., a man who is immersed, and is wet, and washed, and purified by it, may, in describing the transaction, say truly, I was immersed; or I was wet; or I was washed; or I was purified; and yet it does not follow that all of these words mean the same thing. Hence if, in describing the baptism of Christ, it is said he was purified; it does not follow of course that purify is a synonyme of baptize. It may be that it is merely used in its place. Mr. Carson introduces this canon with great authority: "I do not request my readers to admit my canon. I insist on their submission: let them deny it if they can." Mr. Carson obviously looks upon this as a profound and original view; for he says, "it is from *ignorance* of this principle that lexicographers have given meanings to words which they do not possess," p. 32. Its truth I do not deny; of its profundity and originality let others judge.

3. "One mode of wetting is figured as another mode of wetting by the liveliness of the imagination," p. 48; e. g., "A cold shuddering dew dips me all o'er,"—MILTON. This canon is designed to exclude the meaning to wet from βάπτω, in the case where it is said of Nebuchadnezzar: ἔβαπτε ἀπὸ τῆς δρόσου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, i. e., his body was wet by the dew of heaven; according to Mr. Carson, his body was *dipped*, is a lively and imaginative mode of expressing his *thorough wetting* by the dew; which in fact was not a dipping. This canon exhausts its full force in disposing of this passage.

4. "Metaphor is not bound to find examples to justify its particular figures; but may indulge itself wherever it finds resemblance." Reply, p. 12. This canon is introduced, as we shall see in its place, to repel my allegation that there are no examples in the use of language to justify the figure, "immerse in the Holy Spirit."

5. We are to distinguish between the nature of the rite, and the meaning of its name: e. g., when Chrysostom says, "Christ calls his cross baptism, because by it he purified the world;" he may refer not to the import of the name of the rite, but to its nature as a rite of purification. "It is quite immaterial whether the idea of purification be found in the name or in the nature of the ordinance."—Reply, p. 55. Such are Mr. Carson's leading canons of trial.

It is plain on looking at them, that they are all designed for

one end, to explain away alleged secondary senses, by proving that the primary *may be* retained; they do not prove that *it is* retained, but that it *may be*,—that we are not compelled to admit a secondary sense.

Mr. Carson's final step is to introduce what he calls the testimony of the word βαπτίζω itself; i. e., the fact that it clearly has the sense immerse in *other cases*; this, and the fact that it *may have it* in this case, proves that *it actually has it*, however improbable it may be, from the nature of the subject spoken of.

But Mr. Carson commonly takes this last step by assuming the very point in debate; i. e., that he has proved that the word βαπτίζω *never* means any thing but immerse, in the whole range of the Greek language; when the very question in debate is: Has it not another meaning? For,

1. He has made only a limited examination of the uses of the word. Quite large, indeed, in one view of the matter. Far larger than was necessary if he merely aimed to prove that immerse is a meaning of βαπτίζω. But if he aimed to *exclude every other meaning*, far too limited. The word βαπτίζω and its derivatives occur in the writers of ecclesiastical Greek ten times, not to say a hundred times more frequently than in all the classic Greek writers taken together. For as a leading ordinance of Christianity, through which the forgiveness of sins, and eternal life were supposed to come, baptism was to them a subject of deep and incessant interest; it filled all their thoughts—it gave color to all their emotions—it pervaded all their voluminous works. For successive folio pages βαπτίζω or its derivatives meet the eye incessantly on every page. In them also the word is used with direct reference to the Christian ordinance of baptism—so that nothing can be more in point than their testimony. And Mr. Carson earnestly maintains that they must have known the sense in which it was used by the apostles. Yet from this part of the language, in his work on baptism, he produced few examples, yea, I had almost said none. Nor have I yet been able to find any proof that he had ever read the Greek Fathers on this subject—I do not say that he had not, but merely that he has since made assertions that I know not how to explain if he had, as I shall soon show.

2. On this limited examination of the uses of the word, he has based the affirmation that he has “by the use of language FOUND that the word has this meaning (i. e. immerse), and no

other." He says he has *found* this to be so. What does this mean? Has he examined every case of its usage in the Greek language? He does not pretend it. Nay, he clearly declares that he has not. "I regret," he says, "that I have not every passage in which the word occurs in the Greek language." (On Baptism, p. 22.) How, then, did Mr. Carson *find* that the word βαπτίζω means immerse in passages which, even according to his own showing, he never saw? There can be no way except that in which he establishes one of his canons, p. 139: WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE PRACTISE OF LANGUAGE AND ON THE AUTHORITY OF SELF-EVIDENT TRUTH!! Truly this is a convenient way of settling the meaning of words. If this is not the way in which Mr. Carson has found out the meaning of βαπτίζω in cases which he has never seen, I wait to learn by aid of what undiscovered principle he has found it.

3. Upon a basis so frail, Mr. Carson, with unparalleled boldness, makes assertions as to the use of the word in the whole range and history of the Greek language. P. 27, "Immersion is the only meaning of the word in every instance in the whole compass of the language." P. 28, "I tell Mr. Beecher it never signifies to purify. My authority is the practise of the Greek language." P. 47. He calls this "the *ascertained* meaning of the word." P. 31, "Its established meaning."

4. Incredible as it may seem, yet it is true, that on an assumption so totally devoid of proof, on such a mere *petitio principii*, Mr. Carson's whole argument against me is based. Having *thus* found out and ascertained the meaning of the word, he calls it "the testimony of the word known by its use," p. 31. "The authority of the word," p. 32, and gravely informs us, p. 40, that "probability, even the highest probability avails nothing against testimony;" and p. 47, "to allege probability against the ascertained meaning of a word, is to deny testimony as a source of evidence, for the meaning of testimony must be known by the words used." But what is this testimony? Is the word βαπτίζω a living intelligent being? Is it conscious of its own meaning? Has it testified to Mr. Carson as to its universal use? If not, and if Mr. Carson has seen but a few out of the multitude of its usages, how dares he to call the little that he has seen the universal, absolute and exclusive sense of the word, and then to personify it, as a witness in a court of justice, swearing down all probable evidence by direct testimony? Never was there a more perfect illusion than such

reasoning as this. It is neither more nor less than proving the point in question by incessantly and dogmatically assuming it. For until he has first assumed, without proof, that he has "found" or "ascertained," that βαπτίζω means immerse, and nothing else, "in every instance in the whole compass of the language," even in those cases which he never saw, how can he make the word testify to that point?

And yet this is his all-subduing argument in every case. First, by his canons of trial he makes the sense immerse possible, and then brings forward his witness, βαπτίζω, to testify that it has but one sense in the whole range of the Greek tongue, and that one immerse. He compares, p. 28, the meaning that he claims to a client *whose title to the whole estate is in evidence*. P. 30, "The couches were immersed because the word has this signification and no other." P. 29, "To deny this is to give the lie to the inspired narrators. The word used by the Holy Spirit signifies immersion, and immersion only." P. 32, "In fact, to allege that the couches were not immersed, is not to decide on the authority of the word used, but in opposition to this authority, to give the lie to the Holy Spirit. Inspiration employs a word to designate the purification of the couches which never signifies any thing but immerse. If they were not immersed, the historian is a false witness. This way of conferring meaning on words is grounded on infidelity." Again: "When the Holy Spirit employs words whose meanings are not relished, critics do not say that he lies, but they say what is equal to this, that his words mean what they cannot mean. This is a respectful way of calling him a liar." I had said, Bib. Rep. April, 1840, p. 359, "The question is not: Will we believe that the couches were immersed, *if the Holy Ghost says so*, but this, *Has he said so?*" and I decided that he has not. This, according to Mr. Carson, is a respectful way of calling him a liar. Now, in reply to all this, I totally deny Mr. Carson's whole groundwork in general and in particular—in the whole and in all its parts. There is no such testimony of the word βαπτίζω as he alleges. It is all a mere fiction of Mr. Carson's, sustained by no evidence but his own unproved assertion. It is a mere dream. Does Mr. Carson allege passages in which the meaning immerse clearly occurs? I do not deny the meaning in those cases: in other cases I do deny it, and claim that there is satisfactory evidence of another sense. And am I to be answered by such a mere figment as an alleged tes-

timony of the word as to its own use in all cases in the whole language, when in fact all that this testimony amounts to is Mr. Carson's unproved assertion? And on such grounds as these am I to be charged with giving the lie to the Holy Spirit? And yet this is the whole foundation of Mr. Carson's argument against me. His whole logical strength lies here. This mere *petitio principii* dressed up in all shapes, and urged with unparalleled assurance, figures from beginning to end of his reply. In this consists its whole heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, and life. It has no energy that is not derived from this.

Such, then, are Mr. Carson's principles—such is his system, and such the mode in which he applies his principles.

§ 47. *My principles—How Mr. Carson represents them.*

Of my principles he speaks fiercely; and calls them false, fatal, and subversive of all real truth. It is important, then, to inquire what are they, and has Mr. Carson truly represented them?

In answer to this, I reply, he has not.

He has nowhere fairly stated or answered my principles at all; and no one from his reply could imagine what they are. What then has he done? He discusses no principles at the outset. He merely says that I have proved no secondary sense of *βαπτίζω*, and that "my dissertation is no more to critical deduction than Waverly or Kenilworth to history. Indeed the relation is not so true; it wants that verisimilitude which is to be found in the novels of the illustrious Scott. To the ignorant there is an appearance of philosophy and learning, but sound criticism will have little difficulty in taking the foundation from under the edifice which he has labored to erect," page 4. He then takes up the passages on which I rely, and proceeds, *in his way*, to take out the foundation. That is, he assumes the truth of his own principles, though I had proved them to be false—suppresses or misrepresents mine, and then declares that all the evidence I have adduced is no proof—and is filled with unutterable amazement at my excessive want of perspicacity, etc. All of which amounts to merely this, that I rely on arguments which his principles reject, but which are sound and unanswerable according to my own. In other words, though I have proved his principles to be false, yet because I do not see with his eyes, therefore I do not see at all, but am stupid, blind, etc.

At length, on p. 46, he thus represents my principles:

“Mr. Beecher proceeds on an axiom that is false, fanatical, and subversive of all revealed truth—namely, that meaning is to be assigned to words in any document, not from the authority of the use of language, ascertained by acknowledged examples, but from views of probability of the thing related independently of the testimony of the word.”

Mr. Carson does not pretend that this axiom is stated in my words; but he gives it in his own words, and in italics too, as a condensed summary of my principles. To all this I have but one reply to make, and that is a direct denial. I reject this statement of my views as entirely delusive and totally unfair. Do I indeed avowedly disregard the authority of the use of language ascertained by acknowledged examples in assigning meaning to words? All of my principles are avowedly derived from the use of language ascertained by acknowledged examples, and rest upon this use.

What I actually do is this. In assigning secondary meaning to words, I regard three things at least, and not one alone.—I regard, 1. General laws of language, established by examples. 2. The original and primary sense of particular words. 3. The circumstances of the speaker, and the nature of the subject spoken of. It is by considering all these that I decide when a word has a secondary sense.

§ 48. *True statement of my principles.*

My principles are fully and carefully set forth in §§ 1—7, occupying in all nearly 18 pages. No one who will carefully read them can mistake them, or think that I hold the views ascribed to me by Mr. Carson. I cannot again go over all that ground; but for the sake of perspicuity I will here briefly recapitulate the most important of my principles.

1. In assigning secondary senses, we are to be guided, as just stated, by general laws of language; the primary meaning of the word, the circumstances of the speaker, and the nature of the subject spoken of.

2. One of these general laws is, that, inasmuch as in all languages, a large number of words have left their primary sense and adopted secondary senses, it is never a priori improbable that the same should be true of any particular word.

3. But whilst such transitions are common in all words, they are particularly common in words of the class of *παρτιζω*, denoting action by, or with reference to a fluid. This is owing to

the fact, that the effects produced by the action depend not on the action alone, but on the action and the fluid combined, and of course may be varied as the fluid or its application varies. And this I illustrated at great length by acknowledged examples of the use of language in the case of cognate words.

From this I inferred that the usages of language create no probability against a secondary sense of the word βαπτίζω, but that the probability is decidedly in its favor. Still further, I alleged,

4. That the existence of manners and customs tending to such a result, renders such a result still more probable; and that among the Jews such manners and customs did exist.

5. That this probability is still more increased according to the laws of language, by the fact that βαπτίζω refers to the work of the Holy Spirit, and that this is to purify, and that no external act has in itself any fitness to present this idea to the mind. For the effects of pouring, sprinkling, and immersion, depend not on the act, but on the fluid. The act being the same, ink, or oil, or wine, or pure water, or filthy water, would produce effects entirely unlike. The law of language in this case is, that in the progress of society new ideas produce either new words or new senses of old words—and that βαπτίζω when applied to the operations of the Holy Ghost was applied to a subject of thought unknown to the writers of classic Greek, and therefore had probably undergone a change to qualify it for its purpose, i. e., to designate his peculiar work.

Now all of these principles relate to general laws of language, and in proof of them I appealed to acknowledged facts in the use of language.

But I clearly stated that these principles do not of themselves prove that βαπτίζω means to purify, but merely open the way for such proof, and enable us to decide what, and how much proof is needed in order to prove the point. I also definitely stated that it was to be proved as other facts are, i. e., by appropriate evidence.

And here comes up the real ground of difference between Mr. Carson and me. This point deserves particular attention. The whole stress of this part of the battle rages here.

1. Mr. Carson assumes, against all these previous probabilities, that a secondary sense in the word βαπτίζω cannot be established except by the highest possible proof, i. e., a case in which the primitive sense is impossible. This I totally deny, and maintain that a lower degree of proof is amply sufficient

to prove a meaning, which the laws of language have already rendered so probable.

2. Mr. Carson totally disregards not only the lower degrees of moral evidence, but the laws of cumulative evidence also. He takes each passage separately, and if he can prove that it does not come up to his canon of proof, i. e., if it cannot be shown that the sense immersion is impossible, he sets it aside as a cipher, and so of every other one in detail. He then says, "each of the cases considered separately is nothing; all taken together, then, must be nothing. It is the addition or multiplication of ciphers."—*Reply*, p. 47.

All this I totally deny, and maintain that it is entirely at war with the laws of moral and cumulative evidence. Because the reasoning of philology is not demonstrative, but moral and cumulative, and an ultimate result depends upon the combined impression of all the facts of a given case as a whole, on the principle that the view which best harmonizes all the facts, and falls in with the known laws of the human mind, is true.

And where many and separate and independent facts all tend, with different degrees of probability, to a common result, there is an evidence over and above the evidence furnished by each case in itself, in the *coincidence* of so many separate and independent probabilities in a common result. And to prove that each may be explained otherwise, and is not in itself a demonstration, cannot break the force of the fact that so many separate and independent probabilities all tend one way. The probability thus produced is greater than the sum of the separate probabilities; it has the force of the fact that they coincide, and that the assumption of the truth of the meaning in which they all coincide is the only mode of explaining the coincidence.

Any one of the following facts may be true of a young gentleman and a lady, to whom it is not improper or improbable that he should be married without giving reason to believe that they are engaged. They may be seen walking together in one instance, or riding together, or in a store together, or looking at furniture together, or they may exchange letters in one instance with each other, or they may be seen examining a house together; and each act may be such as to prove no engagement; but can all these acts take place in connexion with each other, and each be oft repeated, and yet furnish no higher proof of an engagement than any one alone? Shall we say each is nothing, and therefore all taken together are nothing; it is the addition or multiplication of ciphers?

So, if there is no reason why βαπτίζω should not have the sense purify, and a strong probability that it should, and innumerable facts on all sides create each a probability of it, is the existence and coincidence of all these facts nothing, because each by itself does not demonstrate it? Such is Mr. Carson's position—such is not mine. Who is correct let the universal opinions and practices of mankind, and the laws of circumstantial evidence in all courts of justice decide.

Such, in short, are my principles, and my whole argument tested by these is sound and unanswerable. Mr. Carson in replying to me ought first to have stated them clearly, and to have shown their falsehood, if he could. This he has not done, nor attempted to do, and that for the best of all reasons, they admit of no reasonable denial, and they cannot be disproved.

§ 49. *Mr. Carson's course and his objections.*

What then does Mr. Carson do? Hear him. "To much of the former part of the work I can have no possible objection, because it is a mere echo of my own philological doctrines, illustrated with different examples. In a work controverting the conclusions which I have drawn in my treatise on baptism, it surely was very unnecessary to prove that words may have a secondary meaning wandering very far from their original import. Can any writer be pointed out who has shown this more fully than I have done? I do not question this principle. *I have laid it down for him* as a foundation." We have here an admirable specimen of Mr. Carson's usual modesty and humility. Does Mr. Carson indeed regard himself as the father of the doctrine, that words may have a secondary meaning wandering very far from their original import? If not, why does he call it his own philological doctrine? It is *mine* as truly as *his*. Does he indeed think that *he* has laid it down for me as a foundation? My teachers in college, yea, even before that, had anticipated Mr. Carson in that work. Even in my sophomore year, it never occurred to me that this was a discovery, a new idea. On what other principle have all sound modern lexicographers and commentators ever proceeded? I stated it not because I deemed it a new idea, but because I did not. Because I considered it a first principle of common-sense on the whole subject. I was, indeed, surprised to see it fully recognized by Mr. Carson; Baptists are so prone to forget it. But I should as soon think of calling the doctrine that there is a God, or that

every effect must have a cause, my own doctrine, as to call the doctrine that words may have a secondary sense, MY OWN.

But Mr. Carson says, "to much of the former part of the work I can have no possible objection." Very well. Of how much is this true? He does not say; he implies that to some he does object, but does not say to what. This again is a prudent silence. It would not answer to state fairly, and in my own words, what he does object to. For the mere statement of the principles on which my argument rests is their proof. And they are entirely fatal to his cause.

What then does he do? He proceeds to the discussion of the passages alleged by me, and silently assuming the truth of his own positions, in cases where we differ, he charges upon me ignorance of the laws of controversy, want of perspicacity, heresy, nonsense, blasphemy, etc., because my conclusions do not agree with his premises, though they follow irresistibly from my own. Would it not have been much better to show that my premises were false? Alas! that he could not do. Being determined not to admit the truth, he did the only thing that remained, first to misrepresent, and then to deny it.

Let it not then be forgotten that the real question at issue is not this, Shall a secondary meaning of βαπτίζω be admitted from mere views of probability, without reference to the usages of language, or to the primary meaning of the word? but this: A certain secondary sense of βαπτίζω being probable according to the laws of language and the human mind, how much evidence is needed to prove it, and of what kind shall it be? Mr. Carson says an impossibility of the primitive sense in some one instance, and rejects all degrees of probability below this as ciphers. I deny the necessity of such proof, and allege that a proof may be made out by lower degrees of probability, so coinciding, as to form a cumulative argument on the principles of circumstantial evidence.

But Mr. Carson may say that these degrees of probability arise, not from the words of the record, but from the nature of the thing spoken of. True, they do; and so does the impossibility that he demands. Why is it impossible to immerse a lake in the blood of a mouse? Not the word βάπτω, but the nature of things forbids it. Why is it highly improbable that all the Jews immersed their couches? Not the word βαπτίζω, but the nature of things makes it highly improbable that such a practice was ever universal *among all the Jews*, though it is

not absolutely impossible. Does Mr. Carson mean that, in assigning the meaning to words, we are not to regard the nature and properties of the things spoken of *at all*? Or that we are to regard them only when they render a particular meaning *impossible*? But why this distinction? On what is it founded? Here are nine cases in which a given secondary meaning is probable, in different degrees, rising one above another, till at last we reach a tenth, in which no other meaning is possible. Here says Mr. Carson is something worthy of being regarded; but all the nine preceding degrees must be dismissed as ciphers. Is this sound philosophy?

But Mr. Carson says that my principle is the same with that of the Unitarians. I reply, so is his. My principle is, that in assigning secondary meanings to words, we are to regard the nature of the things spoken of; and this is his,—and it is also a principle of the Unitarians, and of all persons of common sense. Does a truth cease to be a truth because Unitarians hold it?

But Mr. Carson says that, on the ground of *probabilities* derived from the thing spoken of, Unitarians and Neologists explain away the word of God. So they do on the ground of *possibilities* derived from the nature of the things spoken of. Has Mr. Carson never heard the argument, that three persons *cannot* be one God? and that the word God is therefore to be taken in a lower and secondary sense, when applied to Christ?

And will he reject a true principle of interpretation because it may be and has been falsely applied? The principle is true, let it lead to what results it may, that in the interpretation of all language we must look at the things spoken of, and regard all that we know of their nature, properties and laws, and not needlessly involve a writer in a contradiction of any of them; and especially is this true of the word of God, for it is inspired; and he who made the laws of mind and matter is not to be represented as contradicting them in his word. And yet, what principle have Unitarians employed more than this against the Trinity? Is it then a Unitarian principle? Nay, rather it is a true principle; falsely applied, indeed, but still true.

So the principle of regarding probabilities derived from the nature of the subject, in assigning secondary senses to words, may be abused; yet, it is nevertheless a true principle, and one of vast importance.

We are also to regard the primary meaning in assigning secondary senses. It would not be rational to assign to βαπτίζω

the sense to sing or dance, because no law of the mind, and no circumstances, manners or customs, led from the sense immerse to them, and no analogy illustrates such a transition: they are, a priori, and in every respect improbable. It is not so of the sense to purify. It denotes an effect of immersion in pure water. Such a transition is natural; it follows the analogy of language and circumstances, and renders it probable; of course it admits of an easy proof by probabilities derived from the nature of the thing spoken of.

Such is my answer to Mr. Carson's vaunted argument from the Columbo bridge. The case is this: Near Columbo is a school, on the bank of a river; over this river is a bridge of boats. It is related by Whitecross, that certain boys, too poor to pay the toll, were accustomed to swim across the river to attend the school. Here, says Mr. Carson, according to Mr. Beecher's philology, if we had only a general statement of the fact, that the boys so swam, a foreigner must take swim, as meaning to walk over a bridge of boats, for it is entirely improbable that the boys would swim when there was a bridge. To this I reply: Mr. Carson admits that no one who reads the whole story in Whitecross could make such a mistake. For he tells us that they *did not* cross the bridge, and why;—and why they swam, and carried their books, and how. As to *βαννίζω*, we have the whole story. If we had but a part of the story, as to the boys, still I reply, there is no relation between the sense to *swim*, and the sense to *walk on a bridge*, such as exists between *immerse* and *purify*. Immersion in pure water tends to produce purification. Does swimming in a river tend to produce walking over a bridge? Mr. Carson alleges that words denoting unlike modes, have nothing in common. How then can swimming in water tend to the sense, walking on a bridge? Can Mr. Carson refer me to such a transition in the whole range of the Greek language, or any other? Why then does he set this forth as a case parallel with mine, and adapted clearly to show my folly? Yet, he exults as if this case were an end of all controversy, and refers to it in his reply again and again. Miserable is that cause that drives its advocates to such shifts as these.

§. 50. *Appeal to facts.*

But all principles are seen most clearly in the light of facts. To them then let us turn.

Clement Alexandrinus (p. 387, Lugduni Batav. 1616,) says
 ἡ εἰκὼν τοῦ βάπτισματος εἶη ἂν καὶ ἡ ἐκ Μωϋσέως παραδεδο-
 μένη τοῖς ποιηταῖς ὡδεπῶς :

Ἡ δ' ὑδρηναμένη καθαρὰ χροὶ εἶματ' ἰλοῦσα, (Odyss. 4 : 759.)
 ἡ Πηνέλοπη ἐπὶ τὴν εὐχὴν ἔρχεται—Τηλέμαχος δὲ

Χεῖρας νηράμενος πολιῆς ἀλὸς εὐχεῖ Ἀθήνη (Odyss. 2 : 261.)
 Ἔθος τοῦτο Ἰουδαίων ὥς καὶ τὸ πολλάκις ἐπὶ κοίτῃ βαπτίζεσθαι.

On this I remark,

1. That Clement is in the context speaking of Christian baptism.

2. He states that "that may be an image of baptism which has been handed down from Moses to the poets, thus—

Penelope having washed herself, and having on her body clean apparel, goes to prayer, and Telemachus having washed his hands in the hoary sea, prayed to Minerva. This was the custom of the Jews that they also should be often baptized upon their couch."

Let us now look at the nature of things. Here is before us as a nation, the Jews. They were accustomed to recline on couches at meals. These couches were large enough to hold from three to five persons. Clement states that it was their custom to be baptized often upon their couch. We know that as a matter of fact it was their custom to wash their hands often during their meals whilst reclining upon their couches—and the frequent immersion of men on a couch during their meals is an unheard of thing. We look at the context. He had just spoken of Telemachus as washing his hands—using *νίπτω*—and of Penelope as washing herself, using *ὑδραίνω*, a word perfectly generic, and no more limited to one mode than our word wash. We look further on, and we find that these are spoken of as an image of baptism handed down from Moses to the poets. We reflect that these are rites of purification, and that Clement had been speaking of purity as essential in order to see God. And can we longer doubt? Washing the hands is a purification. Pilate used it to denote his innocence. The Psalmist says, I will wash my hands in innocence. All things point us to purity and purification. The sense is a priori probable—we adopt it. We believe that the Jews were in the habit of purifying themselves often upon their couch at meals, just as Telemachus did, that is, by washing their hands.

But was it not possible to have a fixed pulley over each couch in the dining room, and ropes attached to the corners of the

couch, and a baptistery in the floor below covered by a trap door, and was it not possible to elevate the couches, open the trap doors, and immerse guests and couches together, and to do it often during the same meal? But it would be excessively inconvenient. No matter for that, what will not superstition do? But washing hands is spoken of as an image of baptism. No matter, it is an image of it as to its nature, whatever may be the meaning of the name. (We shall hereafter see how much use Mr. Carson makes of this distinction.) Now all this may be said. Mr. Carson on his principles is obliged to say it. But whom will it convince? None but the man who has a cause to maintain which is lost so soon as he admits that the word βαπτίζω means to purify, irrespective of mode.

Now in this case, the probability is so high as to produce on every disinterested mind the impression of certainty, yet because it does not reach Mr. Carson's arbitrary canon it is to be rejected as a cipher. But who will dare to reject it? After the violence of party spirit has put forth all its energies, common sense will certainly resume her sway and cover all such evasions with merited disgrace.

Let us look at another case.

Justin Martyr (p. 164. London, 1772,) says, τί γὰρ ὁφθαλμοῦ τοῦ βάπτισματος, ὃ τὴν σὰρκα καὶ μόνον τὸ σῶμα φαιδρύνει; βαπτίσθητε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ ὀργῆς, καὶ ἀπὸ πλεονεξίας, ἀπὸ φθόνου, ἀπὸ μισοῦς καὶ ἰδοὺ τὸ σῶμα καθαρὸν ἐστὶ. "What is the profit of that baptism which purifies the flesh and the body alone? Be baptized as to your souls, from anger and from covetousness, from envy and from hatred, and lo! your body is pure." We look at the nature of things. An actual immersion for the sake of purity does not belong to the mind. We look at the usages of language. The mind is never spoken of as figuratively immersed, for mental purity. It is spoken of as immersed in cares, troubles, pollution, &c. We look at the language used. Βαπτίζω is followed by ἀπὸ preceding that from which the mind is to be cleansed—this suits the sense to purify, but not the sense to immerse. We say naturally be *purified from* anger—not be *immersed from* anger. We look at the context. Justin had been speaking of the atonement of Christ, and of its power to cleanse from sin. He had just spoken of the passage in Isaiah, wash you, make you clean, as referring to baptism. He has spoken of purifying, washing, cleansing, in various forms, but has used no undisputed equivalent of im-

mersion, such as *καταδύω*. Whether then we look at the nature of things, or the general usages of language, or the particular language of this passage, or of the context, all tends to one result. All things, with united voice, call out for the sense to purify. And it is the sense; and the true translation of the passage is this: "What is the profit of that purification, which purifies the flesh and the body alone? Be purified as to your souls, from anger and from covetousness, from envy and from hatred, and lo! your body is pure." And long after all the efforts of party spirit to wrest it to any other sense have found an ignominious grave, it will stand in its native simplicity and beauty, satisfying and delighting every candid mind by its inherent and self-evidencing power of truth. Another sense can indeed be forced on these words by the violence of arbitrary canons of logic and rhetoric. But the laws of language, and of the human mind, though for a time suppressed by force, cannot die. They will break through all rhetorical and logical chains, and assert and make good their indefeasible claims.

I do not advocate these principles so earnestly because there are no passages that can meet Mr. Carson's highest claims,—in my third number I have produced such, and I have many more to produce before I close,—but because I wish to repel his unreasonable claims of evidence, and to restore the usages of language to their true and inherent liberties, against his violence and force.

The human mind is an instrument of wondrous delicacy, and language is its mirror. The slightest influences of taste, circumstances, and subjects of thought affect its meaning. The manner in which it passes from sense to sense in the use of words is to be ascertained by observation, and cannot be fixed, *a priori*, by theory. And if it passes easily from sense to sense, in words of a given class, no man has a right to make the proof that it has so passed difficult, yea, almost impossible, for party ends, and by arbitrary canons of evidence. Yet this, Mr. Carson has done. He has provided rhetorical and logical cords and chains, for forcing back and confining to the primitive sense all usages of the word *βαπτίζω* which seem to have left it, and happy is that word which has energy enough to retain its inalienable rights of freedom after he has laid his hands upon it.

§ 51. *Mr. Carson's principles subvert themselves.*

But happily, Mr. Carson furnishes the means of destroying

his own principles. I have said that his practice is against his own principles. "Does he not admit that βάπτω means to dye or color when it is applied to the beard and hair? And is it impossible to dip these? Improbable surely it is, but not half so much so as the immersion of couches." Hear his reply. "Here I am caught at last. Surely my feet are entangled in my own net. But let the reader see with what ease I can extricate myself. The assertion of my antagonist arises from his want of discrimination" (of course, as I happen to differ from Mr. Carson). "I admit that βάπτω has a secondary signification, because each secondary signification is in proof, and instances may be alleged in which its primary meaning is utterly impossible," e. g., the immersion of a lake in the blood of a mouse. "Show me any thing like this with respect to βαπτίζω, and I will grant a secondary meaning. And as soon as a secondary meaning is ascertained on sufficient grounds, I do not demand in every instance a proof of impossibility of primary meaning before the secondary is alleged. The competition between rival meanings must then be determined on other grounds." So then all cases of probability are to be set aside as ciphers, till one case can be found to come up to Mr. Carson's canon; and, however numerous they are, to adduce them is only adding ciphers to ciphers, or multiplying ciphers by ciphers. But so soon as one case of the right kind is found, lo! all these ciphers at once assume a value. Mr. Carson is now willing to admit them on lower evidence. If he had not found the passage as to the lake and the mouse, or some one like it, he must have believed that the Indians *dip* their beards and hairs, not that they *dye* them—but now it is easy to see that they do not *dip* them but *dye* them. Is this sound philosophy? If it is, Mr. Carson has dug a mine under all of his reply to me. All my cases of probability, according to him, are as yet ciphers. But I may find the lucky passage at last—and lo! they spring into life and put in their claims for a new trial. Can Mr. Carson refuse it? If not, then all his labor is in vain. He must do all his work over again, and judge on new principles and with new results. Let us try and see if we cannot find a passage.

§ 52. *Cases. Clinic baptism. Purifying agents.*

In Routh's *Reliquiæ Sacræ*, vol. iii., p. 48, occurs a passage from Nicephorus, describing a clinic baptism, ὅστ' ἀποθανεῖσθαι προσδύκονον ὄντα τὸ ὕδωρ αἰτῆσαι λαβεῖν ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ,

κλίνῃ ἢ ἐκεῖτο περιχύθεντα δῆθεν ἑβαπτίζεν. "So that he, expecting to die, asked to receive the water, i. e., baptism. And he baptized him, even upon his couch upon which he lay." Did he then take up couch, man and all, and immerse them? Mr. Carson must say yes, if it is possible—and is it not? But stay, there is still another word, *περιχύθεντα*, which expressly defines the mode. It is by affusion! So then we have at length reached the mark, and immersion is pointedly excluded, unless affusion or sprinkling is immersion. And now Mr. Carson's labor is all lost, and it will be doubly and trebly lost on his own principles before I am through, for cases equal or superior to this in strength abound. Will Mr. Carson say, that the phrase, *εἶπε χεῖρ τὸ τοιοῦτον βάπτισμα ὀνομάσαι* follows? It does, indeed, and implies a doubt of the propriety of calling such a transaction a baptism; but could there be any doubt of the utter impropriety of calling it an immersion? Is it, indeed, doubtful, whether pouring or sprinkling is immersion? Let Mr. Carson look at his own canon, and can he doubt? What then was the doubt? Whether such a transaction was a real *purification*, or *remission of sins*. This was the point on which doubt existed, as the question proposed to Cyprian, and his answer alike imply. The common mode of purifying, i. e., remitting sins, was by immersion. In the case of those who were in danger of death another mode was used—all confessed that it was another mode. Did this, could it raise the question whether two modes, by the confession of all totally unlike, were yet so nearly alike that the name of one could be applied to the other? Or did it raise this question, whether the new mode was in fact effectual to absolve from sin, that is, was it an effectual purification, or remission of sins? It did, and Cyprian decided that it was. So then, no sense but purification is possible in this case. So that this is the true translation of the passage: "He, expecting to die, asked to receive the water, and he purified him by affusion, even upon the bed upon which he lay—if, indeed, it is proper to call such a transaction a purification." All my so-called *ciphers* are, therefore, at once restored to their full and true value.

The expression, "asked to receive the water," seems singular. Its singularity will cease when we consider another usage of the fathers. They were accustomed to call water itself a baptism. So they called blood a baptism. On what ground? On the same ground on which Christ is called our sanctification and salvation, because he sanctifies and saves us. On this

ground they called water a purification because it purifies. It is a purifier. On what ground could they call water an immersion? It is not an *immerser*. It does not immerse us—others immerse us in it, and it purifies us. If the fact that others immerse us in water justifies us in calling it an immersion, there is the same reason for calling it a sprinkling or a pouring—for others sprinkle us with it or pour it on us. But what shall we say of blood? Was there a rite of immersion in blood? Men were purified by blood, but it was by sprinkling, not by immersion. Why then call it an immersion? Here all possibility of the sense immersion is cut off. The truth is, that by a natural metonymy, means of purification were called baptisms, i. e., purifications, transferring the name of the effect to the cause.

So Tertullian (p. 257. Paris, 1634) says, speaking of the water and the blood, "*Hos duo baptismos de vulnere perfossi lateris emisit.*" "These two baptisms he poured forth from the wound of his pierced side." Did he mean to say that Christ poured forth two immersions from his wounded side? or that he sent forth two purifications? So Augustine uses such passages as these, "*baptismus, id est aqua:*" again, "*baptismus, id est aqua salutis.*" Isidore Hispalensis (*Monumenta Orthodoxographa*, p. 1774), speaking of the water that flowed from the side of Christ, says, "*baptismus est aqua,*" and gives as his reason, "*nullum aliud est elementum quod purgat omnia.*" That is, "water is a purification, because there is no other element that purifies all things." Once more: air was regarded as a purifying element and a type of the Holy Spirit; and thunder was regarded as a compound of water and air. The philosophy was false. But to what language did it give rise? Maximus (p. 459, vol. ii. Paris, 1675,) says that sons of thunder means sons of baptism. The reason is, *ἡ βροντὴ συνίσταται ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος*. Thunder is composed of water and air, and this he calls *μυσταγωγία τοῦ βάπτισματος*, i. e., a mystic intimation of purification; and sons of thunder means, on this ground, sons of purification. What has immersion to do with all this? Again, Anastasius speaks of baptism as poured into the water-pots; and the water-pots as baptized by pouring baptism into them, *Bibliotheca Patrum*, vol. v., p. 958. Does he mean that the pots were immersed by pouring immersion into them, or that they were purified by pouring purification, i. e., water, a purifier, into them? This transaction he regards as a type of the baptism of the Gentiles. Did he suppose that they were to be immersed by pouring immersion upon them?

These passages are in themselves sufficient to settle the case. But as Mr. Carson attaches so much importance to the proof of an impossibility of the sense immersion, I will add a few more passages.

§ 53. *Other cases. Expiation by sprinkling called baptism.*

The passages now to be adduced are designed to prove this position: that the fathers apply the word βαπτίζω to denote expiation by sprinkling, and, indeed, expiation however made, so that all the sprinklings and other expiations of the Mosaic ritual, and even of the whole heathen world, are spoken of as baptisms.

Before proceeding to adduce the passages, it will add to the clearness of our ideas, to recur to the usages of language on the subject of sacrificial purification, or expiation by atonement. We have seen, then, that ideas of absolution, expiation, forgiveness, are expressed in Greek by καθαρίζω, to make pure, to purify—also, that the actual removal of moral pollution by the truth and the Spirit are denoted by the same word. Now, in spiritual baptism, these things always co-exist, i. e., those who are forgiven are always made pure in fact, yet there is a logical distinction between the two ideas, and the word καθαρίζω directs the mind sometimes to one chiefly, and sometimes to the other. We see in English the same idiom in our use of the words clear and purge. They have a legal sense denoting to absolve, as when God says he will not clear the guilty; and sin or guilt are said to be purged away by the blood of Christ. So in law, we read of purging by an oath; and of compurgators, who freed accused persons from charges of guilt by an oath in their favor. In such cases the reference plainly is to acquittal from charges, not to an actual purification of the heart. The same idiom exists in the Latin words lavo, purgo—as lavare, or purgare peccatum—to give or to obtain pardon for sins. Thus, “venis precibus lautum peccatum”—you come to obtain by prayers the forgiveness of your sins. Literally, you come by prayers to wash, purify or purge, your sin.

For these reasons I shall not hesitate, in translating the sacrificial sense of καθαρίζω and βαπτίζω, to use as equivalents the words purify, purge, wash, absolve, expiate, atone for, clear, acquit, forgive, &c., as the case may require.

The most striking case of absolution by sprinkling in the word of God is undoubtedly that in which the Israelites were

saved by the sprinkling of the blood of the Paschal Lamb on their door posts. It was established to commemorate the redemption out of Egypt, and was the great type of atonement by the sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ, the Lamb of God who taketh away the sins of the world. In Ex. 12 : 21—28, Moses directs as to the sprinkling of the blood with a branch of hyssop, and says, when the Lord seeth the blood upon the lintel and on the two side posts, the Lord will pass over the door, and will not suffer the destroyer to come into your houses to smite you. And ye shall observe this thing for an ordinance for ever. This is the only case of sprinkling the blood of a lamb by hyssop in the Old Testament, and in this case there was no bathing, washing or immersion, as some allege in the case of sprinkling the ashes of a heifer by hyssop. I am so particular on this case, because Ambrose speaks of it directly as a baptism under the law. Much controversy has existed as to what the divers baptisms were of which Paul speaks. Of these Ambrose regards the sprinkling of the blood of a lamb with a bunch of hyssop as one,—vol. ii., p. 333. Paris, 1690. Speaking to the baptized, he says, “ye received white garments that they might be an indication that ye have laid aside the garments of sin, and put on the chaste robes of innocence, concerning which the prophet said, thou shalt sprinkle me with hyssop and I shall be cleansed. Thou shalt wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow.” *Adsparges me hyssopo et mundabor: lavabis me et supra nivem dealbabor. Qui enim baptizatur, et secundum legem, et secundum evangelium videtur esse mundatus. Secundum legem quia hyssopi fasciculo Moyses adspergebat sanguinem agni; secundum evang. etc.* “For, he who is *baptized*, both according to the law and according to the gospel, is made clean. According to the law, because Moses, with a branch of hyssop, sprinkled the blood of a lamb. According to the gospel,” &c. Here his main position is that *baptized* persons are *made clean*, both according to the law and according to the gospel. Of course there were *baptized persons under the law*. Of these baptized persons Ambrose gives one example, to prove his main position. Who were they? This is the point. Were they persons *immersed*? or were they persons *purified*, i. e., *expiated* by the sprinkling of blood? Plainly the latter; for he refers to a case in which there was nothing but *purification*, i. e. *expiation*, by sprinkling the blood of a lamb, and he does not even allude to immersion at all; and from these facts he proves

that *baptized* persons were made clean. All this is plain, and forcible, and logical, if baptize means to purify, i. e., to expiate; on any other supposition it is of no force at all. For suppose that Moses did sprinkle the blood of a lamb on the posts of the doors, and suppose that it did make expiation, and thus purify the people and make them clean, it only proves that *expiated* persons were made clean; but how does it prove that *immersed* persons were made clean according to the law? It does not, it cannot—and thus the sense immerse is excluded, and no sense but purify or expiate is possible. This, then, is the sense of the passage: "He who is expiated or absolved is made clean, both according to the law and according to the gospel. According to the law, because Moses, in order to make expiation, took a bunch of hyssop and sprinkled the blood of a lamb, and according to the prophet, this makes clean (*adsperges me hyssopo et mundabor*); according to the gospel, because he is made whiter than snow *whose sins are forgiven*." *Supra nivem dealbatur cui culpa dimittitur.* How clearly then does this passage exclude immersion as the meaning of baptism, and establish purification, or the remission of sins as its religious sense. The same sense we shall soon see in the formal definitions of Athanasius, Zonaras, and Phavorinus. It is seen no less plainly in another passage of Ambrose: "Unde sit *baptisma* nisi de cruce Christi, de morte Christi?" vol. i. p. 356. "Whence is *remission of sins*, except from the cross of Christ, from the death of Christ?" "Ibi est omne mysterium, quia pro te passus est. In ipso redemeris, in ipso salvaberis." "There is all the mystery, because he suffered for thee. In him thou shalt be redeemed; in him thou shalt be saved." How beautifully all of this applies to the remission of sins. It is *the remission of sins*, it is not *immersion*, that comes from the cross and death of Christ. Hence, we need not wonder to hear him speak of expiation by the sprinkling of the blood of the paschal lamb as a baptism, for it was a remission of sins; and the sprinkling of the blood of the paschal lamb was the great type of the sprinkling of the blood of the Lamb of God who taketh away the sins of the world. Here then, beyond all doubt, expiation by sprinkling is considered as a baptism under the law, and is one of the *διάφοροι βάπτισμοι* spoken of by Paul in Heb. ix. 10.

Nor is this the only case. Cyril of Alexandria, on Isa. 4: 4, vol. ii. Paris, 1838, speaks of the sprinkling of the ashes of a heifer as a baptism. He is denying the power of mere exter-

nal rites to purify the soul, and says, βαπτίσμεθα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐν ὕδατι γύμνῃ ἀλλ' οὐδὲ σπόδῃ δαμάλεως—ἀλλ' ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ πυρὶ. "We have been baptized not with mere water, nor yet with the ashes of a heifer, but with the Holy Spirit and fire." This implies that externally there was a baptism by water; and therefore, just as clearly, that there was an external baptism by the ashes of a heifer. What was this? Let Paul answer: "The ashes of a heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh." If any one should say there was a rite of washing or bathing connected with sprinkling; I answer—not in the case of the *sprinkled person*, as I have shown (§ 28, 11); and even if there were, still he was not immersed in or by the ashes of a heifer, and to this the word βαπτίζω is here limited. Besides, Cyril, in a parenthetic explanation after δαμάλεως, evolves his own meaning too clearly to admit of denial—εὐχραντίσμεθα δὲ πρὸς μόνην τῆς σαρκὸς καθαρότητα καθάψουσιν ὁ μακάριος Παῦλος. "We are sprinkled to purify the flesh alone, as says the blessed Paul."

According to Cyril then, the sprinkling of the ashes of a heifer, was an *external* baptism, but it did not effect real and spiritual purification, any more than a mere washing in water. The sprinkling of an unclean person with the ashes of a heifer was, therefore, another of the διαφόροι βάπτισμοι of which Paul speaks.

The same Cyril, on Isa. 1: 16, "wash you, make you clean," considers it as a command to baptize, and says, τοῦτο καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς νόμος αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐν σκίαις διέτυπον, ἔφη γὰρ, Num. 8: 6, 7. "This the ancient law imaged forth to them as in shadows, for he said, 'take the Levites and cleanse them, and thus shalt thou do unto them to cleanse them: *sprinkle water of purifying* on them,' &c. There is no immersion or bathing here. But sprinkling alone, εἴτα ποιὸν ἐτι τό ὕδωρ τοῦ ἁγιάσμον διδάξει λέγων ὁ σοφώτατος Παῦλος, Heb. 9: 13, 14. "What the water of purification is, the most wise Paul shall teach, saying: the ashes of a heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh." In this Cyril saw baptism imaged forth as in a shadow; and this passage throws light on the preceding, and shows that in all the various sprinklings of the old law, he saw some of the διαφόροι βάπτισμοι, of which Paul speaks.

Nor is this all. Tertullian speaks of the sprinklings and expiations of the heathen world, as the Devil's baptism, rivalling the ordinances of God. De Baptismo, p. 257. Paris, 1634.

He first unfolds the purifying power of water (as we have seen he calls it a baptism on this ground), and then the various uses made of it by the Gentile world. "At the sacred rites of Isis, or Mithra, they are initiated by a washing [lavacro]; they carry out their gods with washings [lavationibus]; they expiate villas, houses, temples, and whole cities, by sprinkling with water carried around. Certainly they are purified [tinguntur] in the Appolinarian and Eleusinian rites, and they say that they do this to obtain regeneration, and to escape the punishment of their perjuries. Also among the ancients, whoever had stained himself with murder, expiated himself with purifying water. In view of these things we see the zeal of the devil in rivalling the things of God, since he also practises baptism among his own people—cum et ipse baptismum in suis exercet. What can be found like this? The polluted one purifies [immundus emundat]. The destroyer delivers. He who is under condemnation, absolves others [damnatus absolvit]. He will destroy, forsooth, his own work, washing away the sins which he inspires."

Tertullian here traces the purifier water through all its uses in the heathen world in purifying, whether by sprinkling, or in any other way, for absolution, or for cleansing. And he sums it all up as the Devil's baptism. Words, denoting sprinkling, or purification, or absolution, pervade the whole passage—as lavacrum, lavatio, aspergo, purgo, expio, abluo, emundo, absolvo, diluo. But no word occurs denoting of necessity immersion. Mr. Carson may refer to *tingo*. I know that he has said in his work on baptism, p. 78, "*Tingo* expresses appropriately dipping and dying, and these only." Mr. Carson says this with his usual accuracy. Ovid was of a different opinion. Speaking of the ocean in a storm, he says, videtur aspergine tingere nubes.—Metamorph. 11. 497, 498. Did Ovid mean that the ocean seems to dye the clouds with spray, or to immerse them with spray? He means plainly to sprinkle them with spray. He also uses the expression, tingere corpus aqua sparsa. (Fast. 4: 790. See Gesner on *tingo*.) Does this mean to color or to immerse the body by sprinkled water? And what mean the common expressions, tingi nardo, tingi Pallade, tingi oleo? Is oil a coloring substance? or was it customary to be dipped in oil? We read of anointing with oil, or of pouring oil on the head. Who has recorded the custom of dipping in oil? Hilarius too, on Acts 19: 4, speaking

of a spurious baptism, says, *non tincti sed sordidati sunt*. Here the antithesis demands of us to translate, "they were not *purified* but *polluted*." Tingo, then, means to sprinkle, to wet or moisten, to wash, to purify—and in reference to baptism, this last is its appropriate sense. No word, then, occurs, denoting immersion. All kinds of purification and expiation are spoken of, including prominently those by sprinkling, and all are summed up as the Devil's baptism, i. e. the Devil's purification or absolution—and the closing contrast rests for all its force on assigning to the word this sense.

Nor was this idea of the Devil's baptism rivalling God's, peculiar to Tertullian. It is found also in Justin Martyr and Ambrose. After describing Christian baptism, Justin says, καὶ τὸ λουτρὸν δὴ τοῦτ' ἀκούσαντες οἱ δαίμονες διὰ τοῦ προφήτου κεκηρύγμενον ἐνέργησαν ῥαντίζειν ἑαυτοὺς τοὺς εἰς τὰ ἱερά αὐτῶν ἐπὶ βαινόντες. "The dæmons hearing of this washing, or purification, proclaimed by the prophet, caused those entering into their temples, to sprinkle themselves." He then mentions that they also used an entire washing of the body in certain cases. If the dæmons aimed to rival God's purification, they would naturally use sprinkling as well as bathing, for the Jews used both. But if they were merely trying to imitate God's immersion, why did they use sprinkling at all? Clemens Alexandrinus, as we have seen, takes the washing of hands by Telemachus and the Jews, as a baptism. And Justin as plainly regards sprinkling as part of the Devil's baptism.

Ambrose, taking a general view of Jewish and Heathen absolutions, thus sums up the whole matter—vol 2, p. 355.

Multa sunt genera baptismatum—sed unum baptisma clamat Apostolus. Quare? Sunt baptismata gentium, sed non sunt baptismata. Lavacra sunt, baptismata esse non possunt. Caro lavatur non culpa diluitur, immo in illo lavacro contrahitur. Erant autem baptismata Judæorum alia superflua, alia in figura." In order to translate this passage, we must notice that it is a contrast of ineffectual purifications with real purifications, i. e., remission of sins. I translate it thus:

"There are many kinds of purifications; but the Apostle proclaims one purification. Why? There are purifications of the nations, but they are not purifications, i. e., remissions of sin. Washings they are—purifications, i. e., remissions of sin they cannot be. The body is washed, but sin is not washed away, nay, in that washing sin is contracted. There were also

purifications of the Jews: some superfluous, others typical." Any one can see that the sense of this whole passage turns on assigning to baptismata in the second member of the antithesis, the sacrificial sense of καθαρισμός i. e., absolution, or forgiveness of sins. The purifications of the Gentiles were not purifications for this reason; they did not wash away sins. This is a good reason for denying to them the name purification in its highest sense. But it is no reason for denying that they were immersions. They could be immersions, whether they remitted sins or not—but they could not be real purifications unless they remitted sins. If any one wishes to feel the full force of this, let him try to translate the passage, and use immersions instead of purifications.

"They are immersions, but immersions they cannot be." Why not? "They are washings, immersions they cannot be." Why not? "The body is washed, but sin is not washed away; nay, in that washing it is contracted." But how does this prove that they are not immersions? It proves that they are not purifications. With immersions it has nothing to do. The sense purify is then fully and incontrovertibly established.

§ 54. *Passage from Proclus.*

Let us now look at a beautiful passage in Proclus, which presents this import of the word to the mind in various relations, and with the clearness of a sunbeam—p. 280. Rome, 1630. It is in an oration on the Epiphany, and is an expansion of the ideas contained in the reply of John to Christ: I have need to be baptized of thee, and comest thou to me? In expanding this question, the fathers took great delight, and their expansion always turned on the idea, how can the polluted purify the pure? How can one, under condemnation, acquit his judge? πῶς τολμήσω βαπτίσει σε; πότε πῦρ ὑπὸ χόρτου καθαίρεται; πότε πηλὸς πλύνει πηγῇ; πῶς βαπτίσω τὸν κριτὴν ὁ ὑπεύθυνος; πῶς βαπτίσω σε δεσπότη; μῶμην οὐ βλέπω ἐν σοι. τῇ κατάρᾳ τοῦ Ἀδάμ οὐχ ὑπέπησας ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ ἐποίησας. Πῶς βαστάσει ἡ γῆ ὀρῶσα τὸν τοῦς ἀγγέλους ἀγιάζοντα, ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρτωλοῦ βαπτιζόμενον; πῶς σε βαπτίσω δεσπῶτα τοῖς ἐκ γένεσως μολυσμοῖς οὐ προσομιλήσαντα; πῶς οὖν ἐγὼ κατάρχης ἀνθρώπος ἀγιάσω Θεόν; ! Θεὸν ἀναμάρτητον; βαπτιστὴν ἀπέστειλας δεσπῶτα, οὐ παρήκουσας τοῦ σου προστάγματος. I have abbreviated this passage somewhat, and yet, because of its beauty and varied use of language,

have retained more than I usually quote. Its main force lies in the expression, how shall I, who am under sentence of condemnation, purify, i. e., acquit my judge? *πῶς βαπτίσω τὸν κριτὴν ὁ ὑπεύθυνος*. How absurd, in such a passage, to inquire, how shall I, a culprit, immerse my judge? But take *βαπτίσω* in the sense purify, or acquit, and it at once harmonizes the whole passage. Nor is this all; the laws of antithesis demand this sense. Let us thus translate it. "How shall I dare to purify thee? When is the fire purified by the stubble? When does the clay wash the fountain? How shall I, a culprit, purify or acquit my judge? How shall I purify thee, O Lord? I see no fault in thee. Thou hast not fallen under the curse of Adam: thou hast committed no sin. How will the earth endure to see him, who makes pure the angels, purified by a sinful man? How shall I purify thee, O Lord, who hast never participated in the pollutions of birth? How, then, shall I, a polluted man, purify God? The sinless God? Thou hast sent me as a purifier, hast thou not disregarded thine own command?" On this last sentence, the editor says: the sense is, as I infer, thou hast made me a purifier, that I should baptize, that is, purify, from pollution, and expiate those defiled by sin. But since thou art polluted by no sins, why dost thou command that I should expiate and wash thee, if there is nothing in thee to be washed away? That is beyond the province of a baptist, i. e., a purifier. I have need to be purified of thee. The interchange of *ἀγίζω* and *βαπτίσω* in carrying out the antithesis is no less striking. He uses *πῶς βαπτίσω* till near the close, and then exchanges it in the question for *ἀγνίσω*—*πῶς ἀγνίσω Θεόν*: how shall I purify God—the sinless God. Yet, who does not see that the import of the question must be the same throughout the whole passage? So the antithesis *τὸν ἀγιάζοντα ἀγγέλους βαπτίζομενον ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρτωλοῦ*, requires *βαπτίζω* and *ἀγιάζω* to be taken in the same sense. This passage admirably illustrates the statements in § 28, 2. Jan. 1841. Giving to *βαπτίζω* the sense to purify, the passage is inimitably beautiful and brilliant. It loses all its beauty the moment we assign to it any other sense.

Have I not adduced evidence enough? In any common case it would be enough, and more than enough. But strange as it may seem, the life of a whole denomination depends upon denying this sense of this word. Mr. Carson says, if it were optional, he would never immerse. So says Mr. Hague. And if this meaning is established, all pretext for a separate Bible

Society is taken away. Nor will any valid reason for separate organic action remain. So fundamental an error will not easily die. It has, indeed, no logical life; but it has an organic life of tremendous power. In numerous periodicals this denomination utters its voice. Hundreds of thousands hang on them for the truth; and if they see it not in them, will not see it at all. They are the leaders. It is expected of them to defend the cause. And temptations, almost infinite, urge them not to see the truth. Before such temptations they will fall, unless God, in his mercy, aid them by a full illumination of his Spirit. So may it be. But as things are, the work of adducing evidence must still go on.

§ 55. *Definitions of βαπτίζω and βάπτισμα.*

I remark, then, that the sense to purify is established by direct definitions of the Fathers and of Greek Lexicographers, given in a manner most explicit and unambiguous.

On this point I shall first quote Basil. He is commenting on Is. 4: 4. "Ὅτι ἐκπλύνει κύριος τὸν ῥύπον τῶν υἱῶν καὶ τῶν θυγατρῶν Σιών, καὶ τὸ αἷμα Ἱερουσαλήμ ἐκκαθαρίσει ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν ἐν πνεύματι κρίσεως καὶ ἐν πνεύματι καύσεως." "The Lord shall wash away the filth of the sons and the daughters of Zion, and shall purge the blood of Jerusalem from the midst of them, by the spirit of judgment and by the spirit of burning." On this he remarks, *Τρανῶς τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ Ἰωάννῃ ὁ λόγος προαγορεύει περὶ τοῦ κυρίου λέγοντι ὅτι αὐτὸς ὑμᾶς βαπτίσει ἐν τῷ πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ πυρὶ· περὶ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν ὑμᾶς βαπτίζω ἐν ὕδατι εἰς μετάνοιαν.* "Plainly the word foretells the same things concerning the Lord, by John, who says, that he shall baptize you by the Holy Spirit and fire: but, concerning himself, he says, I, indeed, baptize you with water unto repentance." In one series of expressions, the words are, *πλύνω* and *ἐκκαθαρίζω*—in the other *βαπτίζω*. Basil says that the import of both modes of expression is plainly the same. Nor is this all. He proceeds, *ἐπεὶ γοῦν ἀμφοτέρω συνήψεν ὁ κύριος τὸ τὲ ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς μετάνοιαν, καὶ τὸ ἐκ πνεύματος εἰς ἀναγέννησιν, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀνίσταται ἀμφοτέρω τὰ βάπτισματα μὴ ποτε τρεῖς εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπίνοιαι τοῦ βάπτισματος.* "Since, then, the Lord has connected both (baptisms), namely, that from water to repentance, i. e., John's, and that from the Spirit to regeneration, i. e., Christ's, and the word (Is. 4: 4) alludes to both baptisms (i. e., Christian baptism, and that of fire), are there not three significations?" Here

he first speaks of baptisms in the plural (i. e., the baptisms of John, of Christ, and of fire), and as, in some respects, alike, in others unlike; and this seems to call for a definition of the senses of the word. He says they are three, and proceeds to give them. (1.) ὁ τὸ τοῦ ῥύπον καθαρῖσμος (2.) καὶ ἡ διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ἀναγέννησις (3.) καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ κρίσεως βάσανος. 1. The purification of filth. 2. Regeneration by the Spirit. 3. Trial or proof in the fire of the judgment. These are three kinds of purification. One external by water—the next internal by the Spirit, i. e., regeneration—the other a purgation in the fires of the judgment day. To this purgation by fire, the fathers referred the words of Paul: "Every man's work shall be made manifest, for the day shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire: and the fire shall try every man's work, of what sort it is; if any man's work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire." The man *saved by fire*, is saved by Basil's third kind of purification. Concerning this, Hilarius says, "*per ignem purgatus fiat salvus*," *being purified by fire*, he may be saved. Hence, Basil refers a part of the purification to this world, and a part to the next, but considers it all as baptism in one way or another, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐκπλύνει πρὸς τὴν ὥδε ἀπόθεσιν τῆς ἀμαρτίας λαμβάνεσθαι τὸ δὲ πνεύματι κρίσεως καὶ πνεύματι καύσεως πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι αἰῶνι διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς δοκιμασίαν. "So that the expression to wash away (in Is. 4: 4) refers to the laying aside sins in this world (by Christian baptism) but the expression, spirit of judgment and spirit of burning, refers to trial by fire in the world to come." How unlike all this is to immersion, I need not say. Can any thing be more to the point? Is it not enough to say, that to wash away filth, and to purge, in Is., and to baptize in the New Testament, are equivalent modes of expression? Is it not enough, that he uses *ἐκ* after βάπτισμα, a preposition at war with the idea immerse? For we are not immersed ἐξ ὕδατος, but ἐν ὕδατι—but we are purified ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ ἐκ πνεύματος, ἐκ denoting that from which the purification proceeds, and by which it is produced. Is it not enough, that he speaks of baptisms in the plural, and refers two to this world, and one to the next, and then goes on to define three corresponding senses of the word, and that each sense is a purification, and neither an immersion? What more could be asked, or received, if asked? Surely he who will not believe this, would not believe, even though old Basil himself were to arise from the dead and pro-

claim on the house tops: the meaning of βαπτίζω is to purify!

Nor is this all. Athanasius testifies explicitly to the same effect. Speaking of the expression: he shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit, he expressly states that it has the sacrificial sense to purify, i. e., to remit sins.—Montfaucon, *Collectio nova Patrum Græcorum*. Vol. 2, p. 27. Paris, 1706—and to express this sense, he uses καθαρίζω. His words are: Τὸ αὐτὸς ἡμᾶς βαπτίσει ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ, τοῦτο θελοῖ ὅτι καθαρίῃ ἡμᾶς. "The expression, he shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit, means this, that he shall purify, i. e., absolve you, or remit your sins." That this is the sense is plain, for he adds, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ τοῦ Ἰωαννοῦ βάπτισμα τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὅς καὶ ἀφίεναι ἁμαρτίας ἐξουσίαν ἔχει. "Because the purification of John could not do this, but that of Christ, who has power to forgive sins." This last expression fixes the sense of καθαρίει, and thus the sense of βαπτίσει to remission of sins, or sacramental purification. Athanasius, therefore, directly testifies, that this is the sense. Let us hear no more, then, of immersion in the Holy Spirit. Athanasius declares, that purification by the Holy Spirit is the sense.

Once more the lexicographers. Zonaras and Phavorinus define βάπτισμα thus, ἀφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν δι' ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος—ἢ ἀνεκλόμιστος ἀφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν—ἢ λύσις δεσμοῦ ἐκ φιλανθρωπίας δεδομένη. The remission of sins by water and the Spirit—the unspeakable forgiveness of sins—the loosing of the bond (i. e., of sin), granted by the love of God towards man. These are obviously all equivalents of sacrificial purification, i. e., remission of sins. They would be perfect definitions of καθαρισμός. Are not two words synonymous to which the same definitions can be truly given? These definitions are not the mere opinions of Zonaras and Phavorinus. They are taken from the ideas of the Fathers, and nearly in their words. They also give definitions of the moral sense of βάπτισμα, i. e., moral purification—thus, ἡ ἐκούσιος συνταγὴ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν δευτέρου βίου ἢ ἀναλύσις (ἀναλήψις in Phavorinus) ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον. The voluntary arrangement of a new life towards God, or according to the will of God. The releasing, or recovery of the soul (i. e., from sin), for that which is better, i. e., holiness.

All this certainly denotes moral purification, or the restoration of the soul to a new and holy life. It is equivalent to Basil's second sense, ἀναγέννησις. These last definitions would be perfect definitions of καθαρισμός, as denoting moral purification.

Again, I ask : Are not two words synonymous to which the same definitions can be truly given ? Nor are these last definitions the mere opinions of Zonaras and Phavorinus. As before they are taken from the Fathers, and are given in their phraseology and style. Is there no evidence in all this ? Is it nothing that two lexicographers, writing in Greek, define βάπτισμα thus, and say nothing of immersion ? Does this look as if immersion is the very essence of baptism, as some assert ? Why is all this ? The reason is obvious : they were giving the ecclesiastical, the religious sense of the word, and in so doing they could give nothing else. But who was Zonaras, and what the value of his lexicon ? He was one of the four leading Byzantine historians. He wrote annals from the beginning of the world down to 1118. Also a commentary on the apostolic canons, decrees of councils, etc. He was first a courtier in the court of Alexius Comnenus, then a monk on Mount Athos. Of his history, Tittman says it is not surpassed by that of any Byzantine writer. Of his lexicon : " I consider it, after that of Hesychius, the most learned of all others that survive, the most copious and most accurate ; so that by it we can correct and confirm Suidas, the author of the Etymologium, and others, and even Hesychius himself. Finally, it is invaluable for illustrating passages of authors—some before published, others preserved in him alone." The question is not as to the taste and rhetorical excellence of Zonaras. It is this : Did not a historian who wrote in Greek, and was perfectly familiar with the writings of the Greek Fathers, and who wrote commentaries in Greek on the apostolic canons, did not he know what βάπτισμα means ? And yet of immersion he says nothing ; every definition is an equivalent of καθαρismus. Does Mr. Carson say he is defining the nature of the rite, and not its name ? I reply : its name and its nature coincide. The Fathers define its name as purification, and its nature is the same. The definition of Basil is not a definition of *the nature of one rite*, i. e., *the rite* of Christian baptism. He is speaking of three baptisms, that of John, that of Christ by the Holy Spirit, and that of fire, at the judgment day. He cannot, therefore, be giving merely the import of one rite. Besides, the rite of Christian baptism does not import trial in the fires of the judgment day. Baptism by water does not import baptism by fire. It is the word, therefore, and the word alone that Basil defines. Nor is the definition accidental, but deliberate and formal. He fixes his eye fully and intently upon the point.

He brings up three cases in which the word is used. Purification is common to them all—purification by water, by the Spirit, by fire. There is a generic likeness but a specific difference, and so he defines: 1. Natural purification from filth—ὁ τοῦ ὅπου καθαρισμὸς. 2. Spiritual purification, i. e., regeneration, ἡ διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ἀναγέννησις. 3. Purgation by trial by fire, ἡ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ κρίσεως βάσανος.

§ 56. *Proof from the use of prepositions.*

But, as if to exclude all doubt, the prepositions that often follow βάπτισμα in patristic usage, require the sense purification, and exclude the sense immersion. They are διὰ, ἐκ, ἀπὸ, and in Latin, per. We find βάπτισμα διὰ πυρός, διὰ δάκρυων, διὰ μαρτύριον δι' αἵματος δι' ὕδατος. Purification by fire, by tears, by martyrdom, by blood, by water. Not immersion in fire, in tears, in martyrdom, in blood, in water. We find βάπτισμα ἀπὸ, or ἐκ, πνεύματος, or ὕδατος, or πυρός, purification from or by the Spirit, or water, or fire. Not immersion in the Spirit, or water, or fire. So we find baptisma per aquam, purification by water—not immersion in it. In making these remarks, I have my eye on numerous passages which, did my limits permit, I would gladly adduce. But the idiom, I think, no one will dare to dispute; but one beautiful illustration of it I will give from a translation, in a commentary of Hilarius. He is commenting on 1 Cor. 10: 1, ἐβαπτίσαντο ἐν τῇ νεφέλῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, and says, "their past sins were not imputed to them, but being purified by the cloud and by the sea, they were prepared to receive the law." "Non enim illis preterita mala imputata sunt sed per mare et per nubem purificati, præparati sunt ad legem accipiendum." Comment is needless. Who does not see that with him βαπτίζω means to purify in the sacrificial sense, i. e., to remit sins? Hence, he says, *their sins were not imputed to them*, but they were purified by the cloud and the sea.

§ 57. *Argument cumulative.*

Any one of the cases I have adduced is decisive; but taking them as a cumulative argument, their force is irresistible. But the force of no one argument is greater than of that which is derived from the usages of language as to clinic baptism. Mr. Carson at least ought to feel this. He says that we may as well call black white as to call sprinkling or pouring immersion; and yet, a man not immersed, but only purified by affu-

sion, is expressly said to have been baptized upon his bed on which he lay. Nor was this an unfrequent case. Hilarius says, on 1 Tim. 3: 12, 13—"non desunt qui prope quotidie baptizantur ægri." "There are not wanting, almost daily, sick persons who are to be baptized." Emperors were purified in this way. And yet, in formal histories in the Greek tongue, it is announced that they were baptized. Constantius ἀποθνήσκων ἔδοξε βαπτίζεσθαι "dying, thought fit to be baptized." Theodosius the Great was thus baptized by Ambrose, in his last sickness. Basil says that they were so baptized when they could neither speak, nor stand, nor confess their sins; and when those present could not tell whether they knew what was done to them or not. Gregory Nyss. calls it ἐντάφιον βάπτισμα—sepulchral baptism. In circumstances so entirely excluding all thought of immersion, yea, when it is expressly stated that they were not immersed, but that the rite was performed by affusion, it is said they were baptized. Did the Greeks proclaim a falsehood in their own tongue? Did they declare before heaven and earth that a man was immersed, when every man, woman and child knew that he was not? Yea, did they declare it, when out of their own mouth they could be convicted of falsehood, for they themselves declared that he was not? How would it sound in English to say that a man was immersed by affusion or sprinkling? And would it sound any better in Greek? See § 28, 5, and 15.

But take the other view and all is harmonious at once. A man sprinkled on his bed, was purified on his bed on which he lay. The sprinkling of water or of blood did purify. Hence, when Cyprian reasoned from the sprinklings of the Old Testament to prove that a man could be baptized, i. e., *purified* by sprinkling, his argument was in point. But on any other supposition it is totally devoid of force.

On this ground we see at once why Clement saw, in all the heathen purifications, an image of baptism handed down from Moses; and why he could say that it was a custom of the Jews to be baptized often on their couches. We see why Cyril could speak of baptizing with the ashes of a heifer; and Ambrose of baptizing by sprinkling the blood of a lamb with hyssop; and why water and blood were called baptisms, i. e., purifying agents, as before explained. We can see, too, why Tertullian and Justin Martyr looked upon all the aspersions and expiations of the heathen world as baptisms. Purifications they

were. Immersions they were not. Finally, we see why Justin Martyr said: be baptized as to your soul from anger, etc., for to purify the soul from anger, etc., agrees both with Scripture and common sense. To immerse the soul from anger is at war with both.

§ 58. *Mr. Carson's canons cannot weaken it.*

It would be foolish, even if it were possible, to try to destroy such a cumulative argument by trying to neutralize its parts in detail, according to Mr. Carson's principles. But it cannot be done. All of his canons and principles of trial are powerless here. I am not trying to prove that βαπτίζω means sprinkle or pour—but purify; and therefore the first touches me not. There is no room for his second canon, for my argument depends not on the use of καθαρίζω, in place of βαπτίζω, but on the use of βαπτίζω itself. There is no room for the third and fourth canons. For I do not deal in rhetorical uses of βαπτίζω, but in plain prosaic definitions of it, and prosaic illustrations of those definitions. There is no room for his fifth canon, for there is clear proof that the name and the nature of baptism coincide. Wherever the Fathers see the thing purification, they give the name baptism, whatever the form. I stated at the outset, that by looking at the result and end of immersion in pure water, i. e., purity, the word would lose its modal sense, and pass to the sense to purify, irrespective of mode. And I have given most decisive proof that it did so pass. And this proof is strengthened by ten thousand facts on every side. I feel as though I had hardly begun to adduce the proof that exists on this subject. Indeed, no man can see it fully who will not leave the sultry regions of modern controversy, on this subject, and enter into the patristic world, till its languages, feelings, and usages rise from the dead and surround him, and impress upon his mind the whole scene. He will then find that the modern Baptists and the ancient Fathers live in two entirely different worlds.

The position from which the inferences in § 40 have been logically derived, has been established by evidence most clear and unanswerable. It follows, therefore, that those inferences are also established as true; and if so, their practical bearings are numerous and momentous, and it might seem appropriate to disclose them here. But though the main position has been most clearly proved, yet its whole strength has not been presented, nor can it be till I have considered some of Mr. Carson's

attacks on my former articles a little more in detail. In doing this I shall have occasion to adduce still further evidence from the fathers, so various, pointed, and definite, that, in my judgment, no rational ground for doubt will remain. Having done this, I shall close by a more full exhibition of the practical bearings of the results at which we have arrived. It was, indeed, my intention to finish the discussion in this article. But the reception of Mr. Carson's violent attack, and the general interest now felt in the subject, seemed to indicate the propriety, not to say necessity, of a discussion more thorough and extended than is consistent with the limits of our article.

ARTICLE IV.

REVIEW OF MORMONISM IN ALL AGES.

By Professor J. M. Sturtevant, Illinois College, Jacksonville, Illinois.

Mormonism in all Ages, or the Rise, Progress, and Causes of Mormonism. By PROF. J. B. TURNER, of Illinois College. Platt & Peters, New York.

MORMONISM has of itself no claims to the respectful notice of the periodical press. The shameless imposture of Joe Smith and his associates is as naked of interesting incident, as it is devoid of any semblance of plausible argument. Its details are loathsome and disgusting, and present to the mind only those revolting views of human nature which one would gladly forget, after having been once called to contemplate them, that he might still retain some respect for his species. We doubt not even that the very respectable book, whose title stands at the head of this article, encounters no small prejudice in the minds of many persons, by being made itself to bear some portion of the disgrace, which appropriately belongs to the disgusting developments, which are found on its pages. There are forms of error and fanaticism which we can hardly attempt to expose, without suffering in public estimation some degree of personal degradation. But we are not sure that this feeling is not more the offspring of pride than of philanthropy. We are

ourselves encompassed by infirmity ; and we have no more right to be indifferent spectators of a spreading moral malady, than of a sweeping pestilence. If our feelings of compassion call out our active efforts to stay or to mitigate the evil in the one case, those feelings should no less be stirred, and those efforts elicited in the other.

Professor Turner has therefore only done his duty, in sketching in bold relief the disgusting features of this new religious monster, and holding it up to public gaze in all its naked deformity. He has thus placed the antidote within reach of every man who may be in danger of coming under the influence of the poison. This task he has certainly performed with a master's hand. We assure our readers, who may not yet have read the work, that it is in this respect worthy of perusal. They will find much occasion to admire the power of the author's painting, and the vividness of his colors. As a specimen we extract the following, taken almost at random. The author is speaking of the various classes of persons who were drawn into the delusion.

"Others were appropriately convinced that the Lord had chosen the weak things of the world to confound the mighty, and consequently took up their line of march for the prophet. Not a few admired the genuine and unaffected humility of a church which was ready to receive those as prophets and apostles who could not even spell the name of the divine office to which they aspired ; especially when they contrasted it with the arrogance and intolerance of those sects they were about to leave, many of whom, in the pride and folly of their hearts, would not submit to be taught things divine by those who could not read intelligibly the decalogue of Moses or the sermon on the mount.

"These drew along in their train a motley host of all shapes and sizes, some from one motive and some from another ; men gaping for marvels, and women ready to swoon ; some praying for an apostle's martyrdom, others for Smith's millennium ; some thinking of their sins, and others of Ohio bank-stock and Missouri lands ; some thinking the world was soon to be overturned, others hoping to overturn it ; but all expecting prodigies of some sort ; and to witness, if not to obtain, the gift of tongues, of prophecy, of healing, etc. ; in short, a multitude which everywhere abounds, who have been kindly gifted with all sorts of sense except common sense, and who possess a genuine power of faith, which enables them to believe any thing whatsoever,

for no other reason, save that it is absurd, and who have obtained those marvellous gifts of a spirit which infallibly teaches them all knowledge, except the very simple and obvious fact, that they never knew any thing; these all were sucked, with wonderful facility, into this new Maelstrom of faith, and drawn with becoming velocity towards the conjuring spirits at the centre in Kirtland, Ohio," pp. 36, 37. The information which the book furnishes is such as no intelligent philanthropist or christian ought to be without. Mormonism is not confined to Nauvoo and vicinity. It is gathering its deluded victims by thousands from every section of the United States, and no portion of our country seems to present a sufficiently elevated grade of religious intelligence, to secure its population effectually against this delusion. We have no right to remain ignorant of the nature, history, and true causes of such a moral malady. In this point of view, therefore, it seems to us, that this work has no insignificant claims to the general attention of the patriot, the christian and the philanthropist.

But the book has claims to the attention of the periodical journalist, on other, and, it seems to us, still higher grounds. Such outbreaks of fanaticism as have so often occurred in the history of the past (the history of Christendom certainly not excepted), bear a close analogy to unnatural excrescences in the body. As the latter result from some diseased action in the system itself, so the former are the consequence of some moral malady widely pervading the body politic. They are too generally the carrying out of false principles, extensively prevalent, to their natural and perhaps necessary consequences. A system of religious imposture, to be successful, must be adapted to the religious fallacies of the time, with as much care as the machinist adapts his machine to the medium in which it is to be worked; and on this adaptation must depend the success or the failure of every attempt at religious imposition.

In the work before us Prof. T. has endeavored not only to expose Mormonism, but, as his title intimates, to disclose those depraved principles of human nature, which have produced like developments in all ages of the world—and to indicate those popular errors now prevalent, through which this particular form of fanaticism derives its nutriment from the religious body politic. In discussing each of these topics he must needs traverse a region of thought, which is of permanent interest to the philanthropist, and the christian moralist and philosopher. The

unthinking man or the skeptic may perhaps pass by with indifference or contempt, the religious follies and absurdities of our brethren of the human family : but the wise man and the christian will surely regard them with a sympathizing solicitude, as the symptoms of that moral disease, which pertains in a greater or less degree to every specimen of human nature ; and endeavor so to trace them to their true moral causes, that if possible the disease may be cured by the application of a timely remedy.

In this point of view, the occurrence among any people, of a successful attempt at religious imposture, is an event full of interest and instruction to that entire people. How often, at such a time, are the great mass of a community looking with expressions of pity or contempt upon a few deluded men, whose only peculiarity, after all, is that they carry out to their logical consequences, false principles, which they hold in common with a community or perhaps an age. To any compassion which may be felt for a band of misguided fanatics, we make no objections : it is appropriate and right : the expression of contempt is unphilosophical and unchristian. There is, however, another view of every such case, which it is incumbent on every good man to take, and which a wise man will not fail to take. The occurrence of such a phenomenon reveals and proves the existence of a moral malady, wide spread through our religious body politic—proves it by an argument which is not subtle and abstract, but very practical and tangible. It does more than this. An examination of the first principles, the fundamental assumptions of any spreading fanaticism would generally lead us to a knowledge of the true nature and extent of that disease, by exposing to public view, some great religious fallacy, held by the deluded few, in common with millions who are preserved by the grace of God from being drawn within the circle of fatal enchantment, and who may be convinced that it is a fallacy, by tracing its effects in the deluded few, when carried out to its ultimate logical consequences. Such an examination of this and every other form of successful religious imposture is therefore important, not only as affording the only hope of a remedy for the particular evil, but as likely to be in a high degree instructive to the entire community.

To what extent Prof. Turner has succeeded in these inquiries we shall leave, for the most part, to the judgment of the reader of his book, without attempting to forestall his opinion by any remarks of ours. All will, we think, agree with us, that he

has presented much material for grave thought ; and if he has not in every instance "worked it up" to the taste of the reader, we hope he will at least have been successful in calling the attention of other minds to a class of topics, which, it seems to us, have been greatly neglected.

But there are two points upon which we purpose to examine the views of the author a little more in detail. The first of these is *the nature of the evidence on which we are to receive the Scriptures as the word of God*. This is a subject which Prof. T. was compelled to discuss, or fail in one of the leading objects of the book. There is in our country an immense mass of skepticism, which is the direct result of familiarity with a factious and sectarian religion. We have among us thousands and tens of thousands, who see nothing in religion but the conflict of opposing, and often, to a greater or less degree, fanatical sects. Such men regard religion as having little or nothing to do with argument or conviction, and as belonging altogether to the imagination and the passions. To their minds, all religious sects are only so many different forms of the same vulgar weakness—all alike devoid of any claims to truth, and destitute of any authority over such enlightened and liberal minds as their own. Hence, when a new fanaticism springs up, however gross, however devoid of one plausible argument in its favor, it seems to them only the rising up of a new sect ; childish and absurd, indeed, but no more so than each and every one of the "numerous crop" already in existence. Now to all this class of readers, what avails it to demonstrate a thousand times over, if you please, that Mormonism is false and absurd, and a base imposture ?—so they always regarded it : and to have demonstrated the falsehood, and absurdity, and hypocrisy of one form of religion, goes far to confirm their confidence, that all others would prove equally unworthy of confidence, if examined with equal thoroughness. All this class of minds will, therefore, be decidedly confirmed in their infidelity, unless at the same time that you demonstrate the falsehood of the newly risen imposture, you also demonstrate that the religion of the Bible rests on entirely another and more substantial foundation. With this army of skeptics the Christian church has to deal, and while she continues to present to the world her present aspect of schism, faction, and contention, will always have to deal with it. As often as she is called to encounter the outbreaks of fanaticism on one side, she will at the same time be forced to

repel the envenomed shafts of infidelity on the other. Both these hostile influences are the direct consequences of a distorted and factious Christianity; and the former will never be left to make its onset upon the Christian faith, without the full and vigorous co-operation of the latter. He who would expose the one, must, therefore, look well to it that he does not at the same time abet and encourage the other.

This numerous class of skeptics are accustomed to make their attack in the form of a definite and tangible argument, which, though it is exceedingly flimsy in the judgment of the well-informed Christian, is to unthinking thousands specious and convincing. *We have received, say they, one religion on the testimony of Jesus and his twelve apostles, and why not another on the testimony of Joseph Smith, Jr., and his eleven witnesses?* If human testimony was a foundation broad enough to support a new religion eighteen hundred years ago, why not now? This is indeed but reiterating the favorite argument of the Mormons themselves; and it cannot be successfully denied, that thousands of Christians are found in the several sects, who are unable to answer it; as well as thousands of irreligious men, intelligent on other subjects, who are ready to pronounce it sound and conclusive. It is no wonder then that Prof. T. felt the necessity of taking decisive ground on the relation of human testimony to the evidence of revealed religion. This he has done in the following language:

"The fourth false ground of religious belief is mere *human testimony*; on the naked 'dictum' of some one or more of our fellow men. This subject merits a careful consideration. We have already proved by reasoning from past experience, that, however worthy of belief the human race may be in all else, in matters of faith they have, as a race, proved themselves liars, and utterly unworthy of all credit." p. 117.

The word testimony is, perhaps, in some degree ambiguous. It may mean simply the evidence, which is conveyed to the mind, of the reality of any alleged fact, by the mere assertion of one or more individuals; or it may include along with that evidence, all the circumstances which tend to produce the conviction that the individuals spoke the truth. We might become convinced by various circumstantial evidence, that an individual had in a given case spoken the truth, though he was notoriously destitute of veracity; so that on his simple say-so we would not believe any thing. Perhaps in such a case we might, in a

loose and popular use of language, be said to believe the facts stated, on that man's testimony. But however that may be, Professor Turner has left us no room to doubt his meaning. He says, "*mere human testimony*, or the naked dictum of some one or more of our fellow men." The latter clause explains the former. When, therefore, he objects to the reception of any religion on mere human testimony, and declares such testimony utterly unworthy of credit when employed for the purpose of giving currency to a new religion, he is to be understood to mean by testimony, "the naked dictum of some one or more of our fellow men." He is also to be understood to speak of the direct testimony of friends to the system, and not of the indirect testimony of enemies. This might also be shown by quotations, but it is unnecessary. On another page we find the author making a distinction between believing "in" testimony, and believing "ON ACCOUNT" of testimony. He claims that we believe *IN* the testimony of the apostles, but not *ON ACCOUNT* of it. His meaning here is, we think, very obvious in view of the considerations already stated. We do not receive the facts of Christianity, because certain men have testified that they are true: the mere naked assertion of five hundred, or five thousand witnesses, could never have produced conviction. But we do believe *IN* the testimony of the apostles,—the circumstances of the case,—the attendant developments of divine Providence are such, as to render unbelief in the highest degree unreasonable. This we suppose to be the author's obvious meaning. Still it is evident that, in a certain sense, we believe *on account* of their testimony. That testimony is an indispensable link in the chain of evidence. Had they not testified, we should never have known the facts at all; and consequently could never have believed them. The notorious liar, who testifies before a court, may tell a truth of which the court could never have had knowledge without his testimony; and, although that fact would not be received on the simple ground of his word, attending circumstances may establish it beyond a doubt. This is what we suppose the author to mean when, on page 119, he admits the use of human testimony "in transmitting a genuine scheme of faith."

Is this, then, a just view of the subject? Does our belief in the facts of Christianity rest at all on *mere human testimony*, using the word in the limited sense in which it is used by Professor Turner? This is an important question, and we shall

endeavor to answer it. In order to do so, let us, if possible, form a conception of the case which must have been presented to us by the Christian witnesses, in order that our belief might have been challenged on the ground of such human testimony alone. Let us then suppose that the Christian scheme of religion bore no internal mark of divinity; that in its views of man and of God it stood on the same level as the philosophy of a Plato, or an Aristotle; that there were nothing in the character of Jesus, the personage around whom the whole clusters, to distinguish him from any of the sages of antiquity; that the alleged miracles did not claim to have been wrought in the midst of angry thousands, ready to imbrue their hands in the blood of the advocates of the new religion, and of course to prove them impostors if they could, but only in presence of the witnesses themselves, or at most of their friends and followers; that no voice of prophecy had ever predicted the coming Saviour, and that no general expectation had existed of the coming of such a personage; that the testimony of these men had either been rejected in the age in which they lived, or received, if at all, in such a way as to imply no argument in favor of the truth of the testimony; and that there were nothing in the subsequent history of the world inconsistent with the supposition that the whole was an imposition. Now, we ask the candid reader, if, on such grounds as these, our faith were challenged in the miracles of the gospel, would any sober-minded man think of believing them? Grant they were men of unimpeached probity; grant that they claim, and that collateral history proved them to have had the most intimate intercourse with the reputed author of the miracles, and consequently the best opportunity of detecting the fraud, if one existed. Grant that they were intelligent, sober-minded men, so far as history threw any light on their characters. Grant also that they had endured on account of their testimony the greatest sacrifices, and had finally all submitted to a cruel death, rather than abjure it; still, if they testified to miracles such as recorded in the Bible, and in circumstances such as we have supposed, would any rational man believe them? Would not every thinking man say, they might have been laboring under a fatal delusion? or they might have been impelled, by some secret motive of great strength, to practise on the credulity of mankind? Would not either of these suppositions appear far more probable than an interruption of nature's course?

If any one should be found to maintain that in such a case we should and ought to believe, we desire to propound to him another question:—Why then did God ever work miracles in presence of mankind at all? If in such circumstances as these, the testimony of a Moses, a Paul, or a Peter, is to be taken, why not receive the religion *directly on their testimony, without ever founding it on miracles at all?* The man who testifies that he has had a secret personal interview with God, asserts a thing no harder to be believed, than he who testifies that he has seen a dead man raised to life; or a violent storm hushed to a calm at the bare word of a human being: and if I can believe the latter, on the simple say-so of a fellow-man, in such circumstances as we have supposed, then why not the other? What in that case did our Saviour mean, when he said, “If I do not the works of the Father, believe me not?”* Does he not warn the Jews against resting even *his* claims upon his mere say-so, and refer them to his miracles as the only trustworthy witnesses in his favor? What does Peter mean, on this supposition, when he says to the Jews: “Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved (accredited) of God among you by miracles, and wonders, and signs, etc.”† Does he mean that, though the mere testimony of an apostle to a supernatural event is to be received as convincing evidence, the testimony of Jesus himself could *only* be received, when backed up by miracles, and wonders, and signs? To us this seems quite inadmissible. In view of these and other texts, is it not obvious that God did not intend that our faith should stand at any time on mere testimony? At least, do they not prove that this rule was acted on at the outset? And, surely, it would have been of little avail to have *started* the system under this rule, if it was after all immediately to fall back on mere testimony, so far as respected all subsequent generations. But this point is ably argued in the work before us, and to it we refer the reader.

Does any one object to this view of the subject, that it undermines the evidence in support of the divine authority of the Scriptures? Have we then no good and substantial foundation still left to rest them on? Is it no argument in their favor, that the only system of religion and morals ever taught on earth, which was either worthy of God, or suited to the wants of

* John 10: 37, quoted by Prof. Turner.

† Acts 2: 22, quoted by Prof. Turner.

man, is the very one in evidence of which these miracles are alleged to have been wrought? Is it nothing that the character of the personage in whose name they were wrought, was one of superhuman, yea, of superangelic purity and virtue; not only surpassing all other actual specimens of human virtue, but all other conceptions either of the poet or the philosopher, as much as the brilliancy of the noonday sun surpasses the faint glimmerings of the taper? Skeptics and self-styled philosophers may say what they please of this argument: we risk nothing in the prediction, that while it remains, though all others were forgotten, the Bible will be received as true, and as the book of God, by all the most enlightened and pure-minded of the human race. While these facts remain, virtuous and right-minded men will believe and *feel* that it is probable that God would work miracles in confirmation of such a system, taught by *such* a personage; and that it is more probable that a thousand miracles have been wrought, than that such a man has practised imposition in support of *such* a system of religion. While this argument remains unimpaired, we shall always believe that the man who deliberately rejects Christianity, does so because he wishes to avoid the salutary restraints of responsibility to the God of the Bible, and not because there is not evidence enough to produce conviction.

Again, is there nothing of argument in the fact, that the transactions recorded in the New Testament are boldly asserted to have taken place, in the midst of angry thousands, and sometimes millions, who might have disproved every fact stated in the writings of the apostles, had the statements been false, and yet they have never attempted to disprove one of them?—Nothing in the early reception of the faith of the crucified malefactor, in the midst of persecution the most bitter, and opposition the most formidable, by the most enlightened nations, and in the most enlightened age of antiquity?—Nothing in the fact that the life of Jesus was the fulfilment of a long line of predictions, uttered and recorded hundreds of years before his birth, and one of them designating the very time of his appearance?—Is there nothing in the subsequent history of the world, or in the monuments which have survived the wreck of nations for nearly two thousand years, or in the condition of the Jews, at this moment a standing fulfilment of predictions uttered thousands of years ago, or in the present condition and prospects of Christendom, inconsistent with the supposition that the religion of Christ is an imposition and a delusion?

Let it not be supposed, however, that we place the apostles as witnesses, on the same footing as the vile pretenders of other systems of religion. There are several points of distinction the most marked and the most honorable to the Christian witnesses. At two or three of these we will merely glance. In the case of pretenders to miracles under every other system of religion, we can distinctly see, in their circumstances and history, worldly and selfish motives of great power, impelling them to the practice of imposture: in the case of the apostles and first Christians, no such motives appear. There is, on the contrary, abundant evidence from history, both sacred and profane, that every motive of this nature impelled them to deny Christ, though having certain knowledge of his divine character. It is indeed supposable that they might have so used the belief of the people in the new religion, as to have made it subservient to their own ambitious schemes of personal aggrandizement: but there is an entire absence of all evidence that they did so use it, or that they had ever any such schemes. Indeed, there is the most decided evidence that they had not. Paul, and Peter, and John were, so long as we are able to follow their history, the servants of all men for Jesus' sake: they not only suffered the loss of all, but they neither received nor sought any earthly equivalent—they suffered the loss of all things that they might win Christ—they looked for their reward only in heaven. Compare these facts with the history of Joseph Smith and his witnesses. Fifteen years have not elapsed since the first pretended revelations, before we find the prophet, clad cap-a-pie in the costume of a military officer of the highest rank, and manoeuvring at the head of his armed Mormon legion. A Mormon community is organized,—a Mormon city founded,—a splendid temple is commenced,—extensive joint-stock companies are chartered. Joseph Smith and his immediate friends and supporters manage the whole; and all are to be sustained by heavy contributions levied on the faithful, and to be controlled by direct revelations from the Lord, through his *only prophet*. These are the true signs of an impostor: in the Christian witnesses they are entirely wanting.

Again, in almost or quite every other case of pretended miracles, the character of those who have claimed to work them, and of the religious system they taught, has been precisely consistent with the supposition that they were an imposition upon the credulity of mankind. In the case of the Christian

witnesses they are entirely inconsistent with such a supposition. The men were precisely such as we should never expect to be guilty of a deep-laid plot to deceive, and the system was one in defence of which we should no sooner expect fraud to be practised, than we should expect thieves to steal Bibles for their own use. Again, the Christian witnesses are the only pretenders to miracles, who have ever placed their pretensions on such a footing, as that an imposition admitted of easy detection, and that too in circumstances in which thousands were disposed to discredit them if they could. We only purpose to indicate this point of difference, that the reader may not suppose us insensible of it. It is a thought which is fully expanded in the various works on the evidences of Christianity, with which the English language abounds. It is a point too of great importance to the argument. Infidels tell us that history is full of pretensions to miracles, and would make the uninformed and unwary believe that the Christian miracles stand on the same footing with all the rest. No misrepresentation could be more gross. It is not only untrue that the world is full of *such* pretensions to miracles as those which are put forth by the sacred writers, but it is true that those pretensions are *wholly unlike any thing in the religious history of man*. No miracles of any pagan or papal wonder-worker, or of any modern impostor, can bear any comparison with them even in the pretensions put forth, much less in the fair opportunity they afford for detecting imposture. The two cases stand precisely contrasted—the Christian witnesses *sought* the scrutiny of enemies—all other pretenders have *shunned* it.

While, therefore, we deny that the Christian revelation rests at any point on the naked testimony of friends and advocates in its favor, we maintain that the Christian miracles stand contrasted with all other pretenders in this line, just as truth is contrasted with falsehood, and honesty with deception. No candid man can become acquainted with the former without respecting them, or with the latter without despising them.

If the principles thus far stated are just, we wonder not that Mormonism or any like delusion gains converts; or that skeptics are found to draw a parallel between the apostles and the witnesses of Mormonism. The statements of some of our most popular writers on the evidences of Christianity, are not clear or satisfactory in reference to the relation of human testimony to the evidence of divine revelation. In proof of this assertion,

we call the attention of the reader to the following extract from Paley's *Evidence of Christianity*, which has long been a text book on this subject in many of our colleges.

"If twelve men, whose probity and good sense I had long known, should seriously and circumstantially relate to me an account of a miracle wrought before their eyes, and in which it was impossible they should be deceived; if the governor of the country hearing a rumor of this account, should call these men into his presence, and offer them a short proposal, either to confess the imposture, or submit to be tied to a gibbet; if they should refuse with one voice to acknowledge that there existed any falsehood or imposture in the case; if this threat were communicated to them separately, yet with no different effect; if it were at last executed; if I, myself, saw them, one after another, consenting to be racked, burnt, or strangled, rather than give up the truth of their account: * * * * Now I undertake to say that there exists not a skeptic in the world, who would not believe them, or who would defend such incredulity." p. 14.

Now we put it to the candid judgment of the reader, whether miracles are credible on such evidence as here supposed? Is it not entirely supposable, that twelve men "of acknowledged probity and good sense" should be found, who would still be capable of conspiring together to deceive their fellow-men? Can we have that knowledge of the probity of any twelve men, which would, of itself, be a sure protection to any community against such a conspiracy? Can we ever know, that in such a case it was impossible for a part or all the twelve to be deceived? If there is not that, in the circumstances of the case, to render it probable that in those circumstances God would work a miracle, is it not far more probable that one or the other of these suppositions was true, than that the laws of nature should be arrested? In the case put by Dr. Paley, no such ground of probability exists. He arrays our belief in human testimony, directly in opposition to our belief in the uniformity of nature's laws, with nothing to strengthen the former, or weaken the latter: and where there is an equal conflict between these two kinds of evidence which must prevail? For ourselves, we can be at no loss for an answer.

But in the case of the Christian miracles, we have shown that such a probability of very great strength is inherent in the very circumstances. Hence, in this case there is no conflict between mere human testimony and the uniformity of nature's laws. In

such a case as that presented by Christianity, it is probable a priori that the laws of nature will be arrested whenever it occurs. The truth of this position is sustained by the judgment of the human race in all ages of the world. On this point, the very credulity of the many, and the knavery of the few on the subject of miracles, are important auxiliaries to our argument. Both combine to show, that it ever has been the judgment of mankind, that God would probably by miracles make known his will to man. Had there been no such acknowledged probability, there could have been no temptation to such knavery on the one hand, and no foundation for such credulity on the other.

Is it not then clear, that Dr. Paley, in the very outset of his work, makes a false issue with the skeptic? Our limits will by no means suffer us to enter into an analysis of Dr. Paley's work as it stands related to our argument, but we think it easy to show that, in the present state of the public mind on the question, this false issue in the outset, in a great measure deprives the book of its power to convince the skeptical inquirer, while those who do rest their faith on this form of the argument, will be very likely to be perplexed and baffled when called to meet a crafty impostor. Indeed, if such a man be devoid of mental independence, and not bound to Christianity by any strong ties of moral sympathy, he is in a fair way to become a victim of Mormonism, or some other equally groundless delusion. We think it not inappropriate in this place to suggest, that it is perhaps time that this book should give place, in our colleges, to some other work better adapted to the actual state of skeptical objection in this country. It is certainly a matter of no small interest to the cause of religion in our country, that the evidence of Christianity is a part of nearly every course of college instruction; and it is the duty of Christian instructors to spare no pains necessary to give that argument its full power over the forming mind of the nation. Care should at least be taken to employ a text book, which presents the argument in a form truly logical and unanswerable. We would not be understood, however, to intimate that Dr. Paley's work does not furnish materials for a triumphant vindication of our faith. Our objection lies wholly against his mode of stating his argument.

The only remaining point upon which we purpose to notice the views exhibited by Professor T., relates to certain false notions in reference to the *mode of divine influence over the*

human mind. That such influence is a reality, he does not question: but certain prevalent perversions of this great doctrine of Scripture, he exposes with great freedom and effect. We earnestly commend this portion of the book (the last chapter) to the careful attention of the reader. Its costume is, indeed, in some parts, ludicrous and amusing in a high degree; but there is a vein of thought running through it which is sufficiently grave and solemn to interest the most serious-minded. This chapter, like all the rest of the book indeed, bears internal marks of having been hastily written, and perhaps the author has not, in all cases, guarded his statements with as much care, as a due regard to the extreme sensitiveness of the public mind on this subject requires. But we think a careful consideration of this portion of the work will convince any candid mind, that there is in more than one of the prevailing sects, a great amount of material made ready to the hand of any enthusiast or impostor who may choose to work it up. We are not sure, indeed, that in the application of his principles the author is not a little too sweeping and indiscriminate, but in our opinion the subject is one which requires great plainness of speech. The fact is undeniable, that there are impressions widely prevalent on this subject, which find no support either from Scripture or reason, and which bring into constant jeopardy the religious sanity of him who entertains them.

Let a man assume that he can be conscious not only of his own emotions, but of a supernatural influence by which they are excited, and he is upon an open ocean, with neither sun nor stars to guide him. We are firm believers in the doctrine of the influence of the Spirit of God on the heart of man, in the great work of regeneration and progressive sanctification. But how are we to know that we are at any time under the influence of that Spirit? Can we be *conscious* of it as we are of our own emotions? Or are we merely to *infer* it from the fact, that the fruits of the Spirit are produced? And what are the fruits of the Spirit? Are they not those virtues of the Christian character, which are well defined in God's word? And can we have any evidence that this or that thought or emotion is a fruit of the Spirit, except its perceived agreement with the teachings of Scripture? To us the answer to all these questions seems very plain. Thus viewed, the doctrine of the influence of the Holy Spirit on the mind is rational, and tends to the happiest results. To this view of the subject we are persuaded Christians gene-

rally yield a ready assent, as accordant with both Scripture and reason. If so, then we ask the reader carefully to compare it with the facts and considerations adduced by Professor Turner in his last chapter: and then let him judge whether this doctrine be not extensively and alarmingly perverted. We might extract particular passages. We prefer to urge on the reader the perusal of the work itself, and especially the last chapter; and we assure him he will need no urging when he has once commenced. The author deals in *facts*—and they are facts from which a child can deduce the inevitable inference.

The simple truth is obvious. There are vast multitudes of nominal Christians among us, whose religion consists largely in a certain glow of excitement, which they consider as evidence of the presence of God's Spirit. It is not definitely any Christian virtue which is brought into exercise; but it is excitement—*religious excitement*—that is what they want and *will have*; and in their minds the man whose voice can produce it, is *God's ambassador*, and the doctrines which can call it forth, and roll it up mountain high, are *God's truth, whether they be Calvinism, Arminianism, or Mormonism*. Indeed, in the course of a few years all these, and a great many other conflicting forms of opinion, are likely enough to have their turn. We make these statements with no fear of successful contradiction. We are assured that they are corroborated by the personal observation of every intelligent reader.

Nor is this mere harmless delusion. It is this very delusion which is hurrying its thousands every year into the vortex of fanaticism, and driving back its tens of thousands into cheerless, heartless, hopeless skepticism. There are in this age not a few minds so strongly imbued with this love of excitement, that they will "compass sea and land" in the search of its gratification; and wherever they go they will carry along with them an undoubting belief, that where it is found there is *the truth*, there is the *felt seal of divine favor and approbation*. Such minds must not be expected to be shocked at any absurdity taught by a "Joe Smith," or any other enthusiast or impostor, provided that they find under his teachings their favorite religious luxury.

There is another class of minds, probably more numerous by far than these, who are utterly devoid of religious emotions and affections. They are as much too cold as those just described are too warm. It is a grave question, seldom raised with the seriousness it should be, How are such men affected by

such religious views and practices as those we allude to, and so powerfully portrayed by Professor Turner? The question needs but to be stated; the answer is obvious. Nor let it be imagined that the evil is confined to the two extremes we have been considering. There are multitudes who are restrained by the love of sect and by the influence of friends from the outbreakings of fanaticism, but who are, nevertheless, by this same cause deeply infected with the disease. Nearly every intelligent pastor knows some of them in his own parish. They are the unquiet, the feverish, the fitful—those who can only be influenced by working on their imaginations and their passions: to them arguments are cobwebs. Who has calculated the injury done to the cause of religion by the influence of such spirits, or pointed out the extent to which they are made what they are by the very delusion of which we are speaking?

We must here take our leave of Prof. T. We have read his book on the whole with much pleasure. The reader will doubtless agree with us, that it is not every man who could write such a book on such a subject. It doubtless has its faults both of style and matter. Its style makes no pretensions to classic elegance. It appears to have been chosen for an occasion and a purpose, and to be well adapted to both. We are mistaken if it does not conduct many a man quite through the history and causes of Mormonism, who but for the fascination of the style would never have been persuaded to read a single page. We think, however, that the author owes it to his own reputation to appear before the public on a subject more dignified and attractive, and in a style more chaste and classic. The author of "*Mormonism*" is certainly capable of so writing as to amuse and instruct.

There is yet one thought to which, in bringing our remarks to a conclusion, we wish to invite the serious attention of every reader, who waits for the consolation of Israel. We have all indulged the pleasing hope that the church and the world are in the present age rapidly advancing towards a brighter and a better day. For ourselves we still cling to this hope, and believe it to be founded on the most substantial evidence. But while we cling to it, and find it full of encouragement and consolation, we cannot deny that the age we live in is also marked, not only by widely prevalent confusion and religious disorganization, but by a readiness of the popular mind to entertain in its bosom, and to warm into life and vigor, almost every species

of imposture and fanaticism. Let us not flatter ourselves that credulity and fanaticism are confined to the Mormons: or that they furnish the only specimens of religious delusion sufficiently prevalent and flagrant to call for the compassion of the wise and the pious. He who supposes so, has studied the religious condition of our country with very little success. What inference, then, are we to make from such an admitted fact? That our hopes of the enlargement and peace of Zion are extravagant and unfounded? A little consideration will enable us to answer this question in the negative. It is no new thing in the history of Christianity, that the same age should be characterized by a real progress in the knowledge and prevalence of true religion on the one hand, and by many and disgraceful outbreaks of fanaticism and imposture on the other.

Nor is it difficult to point out the cause of this combination of opposite phenomena, seemingly resulting from the same causes. When a false principle has been admitted into the religious system of any community, it has a constant tendency to work out its own results, both logical and practical, more and completely, with each successive generation. A point at length is reached in the progress of that community at which those results become obvious and apparent to all. A threefold division of the popular mind may now be expected to take place. One party adheres still to the principle, and pushes it out boldly to all its consequences, however absurd in theory, however ruinous in practice. Those constitute the fanatical class. A second rejects with scorn and contempt the whole system of doctrines with which the false principle has been associated, without any discrimination or reservation. This class embraces the various forms and grades of religious skepticism. Others still, we fear, often a small and feeble band, adhere with attachment and conviction to the great truths of religion, and address themselves with discrimination to the work of eliminating the false principle which has produced all this mischief, and so dreadfully disgraced the respectable society into which it has been admitted. What we have here said of one false principle is of course equally true of many.

Such, we are persuaded, is the true philosophy of the present state of religious society in these United States, and indeed throughout Christendom; and nowhere is the conflict of these three conflicting forms of religious influence so fierce and so universal as in our country, and especially among the alluvial popula-

tion of the new States of the West. If this then is our condition, if the time has really come when our American Zion must either throw off the last remains of the great apostasy, and stand forth in the full freedom and power of the gospel, or sink under her burdens, and fall an easy prey to her enemies; if this struggle is actually commenced, and going on around us, then how natural the occurrence of disorganization, confusion, and fanaticism! And how reasonable to expect the fiercest assaults of all the powers of darkness and spiritual despotism! If this is our condition, how solemn, how responsible is that condition! The man who would act well his part in such a crisis, has something more to do than blindly to adhere to a favorite creed or cherished system, and look with mingled anger and contempt on what he supposes to be the hosts of error around him. It is his duty to his God to scrutinize every phenomenon of religious society around him, and to trace it, if possible, to its proper moral cause, with as much care and patience as the astronomer scrutinizes the phenomena of the heavens. It is his duty to bring every doctrine, and every practice, to the test of God's word, and to abandon all as worthless which cannot abide *that test*; and while he is made to feel, as surely he must, that all else in the moral world is but writing on the sand, to be washed out by the next wave of the swelling ocean of discussion, to rest assured that the word of God is a rock, which shall not be removed from its place by all the tumult and commotion around it. We are mistaken in our judgment, or the darkest omen in the signs of the times is, that there is so little of this true Christian philosophy. God grant it may be multiplied a hundred fold to our American Zion.

ARTICLE V.

THE ECONOMY OF NATURE SUBORDINATE TO THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.

By Rev. George Duffield, D. D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Detroit.

THE visible universe is adapted to produce, in the mind of a reflecting observer, the conviction of its perpetuity. At first

glance, indeed, appearances of decay and dissolution strike the eye, which, associated with the conviction of our own mortality, make the contrary impression. A second and more scrutinizing view, however, corrects the impression, and convinces us, that all the forms and processes of dissolution which we witness, are but the regular changes taking place in an endless series of being. The acorn breaks and liberates the germ of the stately oak, which, having evolved its innumerable offspring, crumbles in decay, depositing its own substance in the earth, to feed and enrich their growth. One generation passeth away, and another cometh, with the utmost certainty and regularity. Throughout the whole range of animated being, as life decays and disappears in one, it reappears and flourishes in another. And this alternation of life and death, this regular progression in the series of animated beings, is as fixed and uniform as the changes which occur in the physical world. The sun rises and goeth down, and returneth to his place again. The moon waxes and wanes, and passes through her monthly phases and revolutions. The planets sweep their orbits through immense circles of the universe, and preserve the vast cycles of their revolutions with uninterrupted uniformity. Summer and winter, seed time and harvest never fail. The tides have their ebbings and floodings; and the vapor, condensed and precipitated in the showers that refresh the earth, is transmitted through springs and rivulets and larger streams, till it is again borne in its elastic form from the bosom of the ocean, to repeat its revolution. And these processes have gone on, with as much uniformity in the wilderness and desert, as in the cultivated region. Nothing arrests the course of nature. All things, in this respect, continue the same as they were from the beginning of creation. Annihilation forms no feature of the physical government of God.

From this fact, the mind of man has drawn different inferences. Under the guidance of infidelity, it has been led to question the existence of a God, and the reality of a divine moral government altogether, and to reject and scoff at the day of final retribution. The scoffers of whom Peter prophesied, appear in these last days, walking after their own hearts' lusts, and saying, "Where is the promise of his coming? For, since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation," 2 Pet. 3: 4. The uniform course of providence, and the delay on the part of God, to interfere in any miraculous manner, to punish the crimes of men,

have emboldened the wicked to attribute to priestcraft and to ambition of spiritual power, all they hear about the guilt and danger of violating the moral law of God. And science is sometimes adduced to countenance skepticism, and to fortify the minds of men against their apprehensions of coming wrath. Astronomy volunteers its aid to the human eye, as it traverses the immensity of space, and introducing us to worlds and systems, whose revolutions and cycles, compared with those of earth, are like eternity, compared with time, boastfully inquires, Are all these to be extinguished? Is this frail diminutive creature, man, the moral centre of the creation? Is this little globe of primary importance in the general system of the universe, or entitled in any respect of magnitude, position, relation, or constitution, to be regarded as exerting an influence over others? Shall man, remote in his position, low in his origin, insignificant in his abode, claim to be under the government of law, and anticipate adjudications and treatment different from that, which, in common with all the animated tribes of earth, he shares in the physical government of the material universe? If he violates the law of his physical being, it is admitted, he must suffer, as do the beasts of the field, and the fowls of the air, and the fishes of the sea: but as to danger affecting his future and eternal relations, growing out of his violation of the moral law, many declare themselves to be perfectly incredulous. In the former case, the evil ensues immediately on the violation of a law of nature; but, in the latter case, "because judgment against an evil work is not speedily executed, therefore, the hearts of men are wholly set in them to do evil." But, however skeptical men may affect to be, in relation to a divine moral government, and the certainty of its retributions, the Lord Jesus Christ has taught, in the most explicit manner, that God is more tenacious of his moral, than of his physical government, and that less may be hoped for from any change in the former than in the latter. The entire constitution of the visible universe, so far as human nature stands affected by it, may and will undergo a change, but there shall never be the slightest deviation from the grand eternal principles of right and truth, which God has made the basis of his moral government. If we think it difficult, that a change should take place in ponderous globes, and revolving suns and systems, Christ says, "it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than one tittle of the law to fail," Luke 16 : 17.

The truth here taught is obviously, that the entire economy of nature is subordinate to the moral government of God. God would sooner, and could with more ease, obliterate the heavens and the earth, than alter his law, or allow its precepts and provisions, in the least respect, to be violated with impunity. In elucidating this interesting and solemn truth, it may be remarked :

I. That IT IS REASONABLE TO BELIEVE, FROM THE NATURE OF THE CASE, THAT IT MUST BE SO. The material universe is a sublime system of machinery, adjusted and balanced with the utmost skill, on the part of its great Architect. Everywhere are to be found traces of design in its structure. The order, arrangement, and motions of its various parts, all indicate the power and wisdom of Him, by whom the worlds were made and are upheld. But in all this great clock-work of creation, there are no vested rights, nothing necessarily affecting the interests and obligations of intelligent and accountable beings. The universe of mind alone is under the moral government of God. It is in the relations of rational beings, that we talk of mutual rights. Whatever changes, therefore, are made in the visible heavens and earth, they do not, in themselves, affect the rights and obligations existing between God and man. They are but new phases of the wisdom, and goodness, and power of the Creator. Revelation assures us, that they will and do wax old as a garment, and, as a vesture, they are changed by the Almighty, when fallen into decay. All such changes, however, serve only to reflect more intensely the glory of the divine power and majesty, just as we admire the wisdom of God, in the varying structure and functions of the worm, as it passes through different stages, from the egg to the chrysalis. But where the rights, and hopes, and interests, of rational and accountable creatures stand affected, changes, in the laws affecting them, become dangerous and improper. A government may level mountains, may drain marshes, and dig canals, turn the course of rivers, and fill up valleys, and change the soil and appearance of the face of the country, and get all the renown which is due to splendid improvements, but they no sooner annul laws, which vest rights, and become capricious or unrighteous in enactments, affecting the interests of their citizens or subjects, than they tarnish the glory of their moral character, and destroy the spirit of patriotism and love of country essential to their welfare. Now, God has a moral character, the maintenance

of which, is of more consequence to the universe of intelligent creatures, than all the sparkling glories of the heavens. Having given a law to regulate their conduct, and direct their hopes of immunity and bliss, a departure from that law on his part could not fail to be disastrous. The least disrespect, on his part, of its precepts or provisions, would produce the most painful doubts and suspicions, and sap the very basis of all rational confidence in his character and government. High public considerations, yea obligations, therefore, affecting his glory as a divine moral governor, and that in a respect of far more consequence than his glory as the God of nature, forbid the annulment or violation of his law by himself, and, consequently, all connivance with man or countenance of its violations by him.

Besides, the Bible plainly teaches, that the God of nature is the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has been pleased to legislate for man, and to provide a Saviour for him from the wrath to come. Now, if the laws of nature are not under the control of Him, who is the great moral governor of the universe, then is he not the God of nature, and there can be no security, that his moral government will be either permanent or salutary. That the God of nature is the great moral governor of the universe, all men feel fully and almost instinctively persuaded. That they are not different Beings, but the same, there is proof abundant, not only in the revelations of the Bible, but in the conduct of Jesus Christ, our Lord and Saviour, when upon the earth. He rebuked the waves, and bid the tempest hush its angry roar. He gave eyes to the blind, and ears to the deaf, and life to the dead, and proved that all the elements of nature were at his command, and therefore, in every respect, is entitled to our confidence. Were it otherwise, all harmony would cease in his government. The jarring elements of nature might clash with his moral administration, and the impression be inevitably made on rational minds, that there is imperfection with God, that he is either unwise in his enactments, or weak and inefficient in their execution: and this done, there never could, in the nature of things, be confidence in his government. For the glory of the divine moral character, being vastly more important than that which attaches to him as the great Creator of the universe, it is of infinite moment, that no change be made in his laws affecting it. It would be a thousand-fold preferable, that the artist's

most beautiful sculpture, or the architect's choicest specimen of skill, and taste, and sublimity, should perish, than that he should be found guilty of dishonesty and falsehood, or any other crime, which would tarnish his moral character, and consign him to infamy among men. And thus God must feel, that it would be infinitely better, that the heavens and the earth should pass away, than that he should compromit his truth and justice, by violating his own law, or suffer its admirable precepts to be broken with impunity.

II. *Another consideration on this subject is suggested BY THE FACT AND NATURE OF THE MIRACLES OF OUR LORD AND SAVIOUR JESUS CHRIST.* They prove, from phenomena which have occurred in the history of this world, that the moral governor of men, and the God of nature, are the same.

We want no better proof than a miracle furnishes, that the laws of nature may be, and have actually been set aside. The reality of miracles is assumed in this argument, as very well established by the evidence of testimony. The skeptical objection against the truth of miracles, founded on the uniformity of causation and their contrariety to our experience, needs no further notice than to remark that the uniformity of causation, which is limited to each individual's experience and observation, is, and must of necessity be inferred from a very contracted view of the combination of causes, of which our consciousness of ignorance predisposes us most naturally and readily to receive the testimony of others, who, as veracious witnesses, report to us what they have seen, or heard, or ascertained, by their own senses, to be fact. The evidence of testimony is as strong and satisfactory as that of the senses; and mankind instinctively admit the one as readily as the other to be the means of knowledge, unless they have, by their sophistry and skepticism, bewildered their own minds. He that rejects the evidence of testimony, because it goes beyond the limits of his own experience, must, if he act consistently, doom himself to inevitable ignorance on a thousand subjects of science, which, to him, can in no other way become known.

The miracles of the Bible have been wrought always, and only, for the purpose of promoting and confirming the moral government of God. The miracles of Scripture are events cognizable by the senses of mankind, produced either in direct contradiction, or by suspension of some known and established law of nature, under circumstances of publicity which admit of

no question of the facts having been observed by credible witnesses. The plagues of Egypt, which were all miraculous, were designed to exalt the honor and claims of the God of heaven and earth, above the gods of Pharaoh;—the destruction of fifty thousand Bethshemites, for withdrawing the lid of the ark of the covenant, and looking on the tablets of the law, engraven by the finger of God;—the overthrow of the army of Sennacherib, and an endless number of others, recorded in the sacred Scriptures, while they have proved that the God of nature is the God of the Bible, have also subverted the most important moral purposes. By the death of the Bethshemites, the God of Israel meant to counteract and to destroy the idolatrous superstition of the people, and to teach the dreadful danger of rashly intruding into things which he had kept hidden, of treating with vain curiosity and idle familiarity the most sacred rites and ordinances of his religion, as well as of looking to the moral law without the intervention of a mercy-seat, or propitiatory. By the overthrow of the army of Sennacherib, which was miraculously effected in answer to the prayer of Hezekiah, God meant not only to preserve the rites and ordinances of true religion from idolatrous invasion, but also to counteract the demoralizing tendency of the raillery and blasphemy of that proud monarch's ambassadors, which had been presumptuously, wantonly, and insultingly indulged, in the presence of the people. And as to the miracles of Christ, and his apostles, they all bore the impress of benevolence; and while they authenticated their mission, illustrated the character of their author, and proved that the God of nature considered his moral government of more value than his physical. A law of nature might be suspended, but one jot or one tittle of the law must not be suffered to fail.

III. THERE ARE ABUNDANT FACTS WHICH PROVE THAT GOD HOLDS THE ENTIRE ECONOMY OF NATURE SUBORDINATE TO HIS MORAL GOVERNMENT. These facts may be classed under two heads:—1st, Those which have occurred in the dispensations of his retributive providence; and 2dly, Those which grow out of the very constitution of man and the structure of human society.

Examples of the first class are very numerous. They are strung along the history of our race. They appear on the records of the past. Man was driven from his happy abode in Paradise, and the waters of the deluge rolled their desolating surges over all that was beautiful and glorious in this world.

The fountains of the great deep were broken up, and myriads of guilty creatures were swept with the besom of destruction ;—and why ? Why did the earth's huge pillars break, and all its massive bars give way ? Why did God consign this beautiful world to destruction, mingle all the elements together, and make every law of nature work for the general ruin ? Because man had sinned. He had rashly dared to violate the law, and God was determined, that not one jot or tittle of it should fail. Already has he given proof, that he holds the economy of nature subordinate to his moral government ;—that he would sooner the earth should be destroyed, than countenance the crimes of men. The very structure of the earth, replete with the memorials of that mighty wave of ruin that swept around our globe, proclaims to the eye of men this solemn truth. Sooner than sacrifice, or dishonor his law, God sacrificed the race of man, and drowned the place of his abode.

Geologists and philosophers may write and speculate as they please, about the physical causes of the deluge ; but whatever those causes may have been, they were all under the control of the great first cause, the directing hand of God. The real cause was, the crimes of men. God made an example of his determination to maintain his law. More than one hundred years before, he made known his purpose ; but the scoffers of the age laughed Noah to scorn, who revealed the will of God, and called upon them to repent of their crimes. Their unbelief, however, did not “make void the faith of God.” The destruction of millions of the race, of the entire globe, was nothing, compared with the violation of the Almighty's pledge, or of the moral constitution he had ordained for the government of man. Some philosophic spirits of a former age, doubted whence water could be obtained to drown the world. Later infidels have wondered why such an event has not more frequently occurred. But God has pledged his word, that the waters shall not again submerge the globe, and that summer and winter, seed-time and harvest, shall not fail, till the consummation of its destiny. And herein is the world's security. The moral governor of the universe is the God of nature. He is at the helm of creation, and guides and governs all natural causes to subserve the moral purposes of his lofty sway.

The destruction of the cities of the plain, and the preservation of Lot, afford another striking example. It has been supposed, and that with some reason, that volcanic fires produced the over-

throw of Sodom and Gomorrah; and that the asphaltic lakes or Dead Sea, where once those cities stood, are but the crater of an immense volcano which undermined their foundations. Others again, have thought that an earthquake rent the surface, and made the earth and subterranean waters change their places. But let the natural causes be what they may, they were all directed and controlled by that God, who is jealous of his law, and holds his word to be immutable, like himself. He had promised that Lot should escape from the general ruin, and therefore the hidden fires slumber, the earth delays its mighty heavings till he is out of the reach of their fury. "Haste thee, escape thither, to Zoar," said God to him, "for I cannot do any thing till thou be come thither." Lot trod with safety over the opening abyss,—the mighty agents at work in the natural world, were kept in check by the still mightier power of God, who had said that he should be saved. The moral constitution here triumphed over the physical. Whatever philosophic men may have thought and written about the physical necessity for the destruction of Sodom, Christ makes no account of it. The physical causes would have all stayed their destructive work; the volcanic fires would have found another vent, or slumbered to the present hour, had it not been for the crimes of the guilty inhabitants of the cities of the plain. These were the immediate causes of their destruction. Had they repented of their crimes, at the warning voice of Lot, or had the mighty moral works, which were done in Capernaum, been done in them, they would have remained to this day. The pledge of God's word, the protection of his moral sway, is infinitely better than all the security we may propose to ourselves, from what we suppose to be the necessary action of physical causes.

The dispensations of God's providence towards the Jews, and other nations of antiquity, afford illustrations of the same truth. There can be no security, however confident men may be in their individual, social, or national resources, when they seek it in the way of iniquity. Therefore, said God to them (and how many nations and individuals have verified the same to be the invariable law of his providence): "Therefore have I also, saith God, made you contemptible and base before all the people, according as ye have not kept my ways, but have been partial in my law." The least deviation from his law he will not tolerate. If he has sacrificed almost all the race, and once destroyed the globe that we inhabit, and hurled nation after na-

tion to destruction, because they would not submit to the restraints of his law, will he make more account of the impenitent man? By no means. The heavens and earth shall pass away, before God will sacrifice his law, and accommodate himself to the rebellious inclinations and wishes of the wicked.

IV. THERE IS NO PROOF THAT GOD HAS EVER ALTERED THE PROVISIONS OF HIS MORAL LAW, OR EVER WILL. The law, given on Mount Sinai, and published by an audible voice in the ten commandments, was not then for the first time enacted. The law is coeval with our race, and is wisely, wonderfully, and benevolently adapted to the nature of man. It has been enacted for the express purpose of promoting the happiness of mankind. A deviation from it he declared, in the very infancy of our race, would be ruinous. Its violation would be followed with death, and death has followed in one regular and steady flow from the first parent of the race till the present hour. It is true, that the specific form in which God presented his law was that of positive statute, prohibiting Adam and Eve from the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; but this was a mere circumstance, intended to put to the test the obedience of the first pair. It was so prescribed, and they stood in such a relation to God, that its violation was equivalent to the violation of every precept of the decalogue. The violation of a positive statute, which was made the test of obedience to an entire code, would not fail to be regarded as the violation of all; and indeed the principles of a man's conduct, which are too weak to prevent him from violating the law in one respect, cannot be safely relied on in any other, where temptations are equally strong, and circumstances equally favorable to sin. Hence the Spirit of God has declared, "He that offends in one point is guilty of all." It was the same law, enjoined on man in innocence, that now asserts its claims and authority over man in guilt and rebellion. God punished the violation of that law, in the first instance, with death, and death yet reigns over the guilty children of men. The constitution remains inviolate on the part of God, although broken on the part of man. His enactment of the moral law on Sinai, and the explicit and peculiarly pointed and solemn exposition of that law by Jesus Christ, show plainly, that whatever man may think and hope, God has not changed the code under which we live.

The apostle Paul has shown that the heathen world are all under the same law, and that far as the race is found, God is

pursuing, in the infliction of death upon transgressors, the vindication of the honor and authority of his law. Death is the wages of sin, and death reigns and triumphs with as much uniformity, and as certainly, in consequence of sin, as physical evil comes, on the violation of the laws of nature. Men do not expect a change in the latter;—they see the uniform results that flow from their violation, and whether they will, or not, the instincts of their being command their respect for them. Why then, when age after age, and generation after generation, they see death sweep over our guilty race, will they anticipate a change in God's moral constitution? The laws of nature have been occasionally changed by miraculous interpositions of divine power, but where is there an example of a sinner ever having escaped from death, save Enoch and Elijah, whom he exempted from the execution of this law of his moral government? What right or reason can the sinner have to hope for escape from the punishment so justly due to his sins? Will God alter his law for his convenience? Where is the pledge or proof the sinner has, that he either will or can do so? Are we directed to the scheme of redemption? We reply:

V. THE SALVATION OF JESUS CHRIST NEVER WAS INTENDED TO INVALIDATE IN THE LEAST DEGREE THE AUTHORITY OF THE MORAL LAW.

"I came," says Christ, "not to destroy the law, but to fulfil it." By his own example of perfect and perpetual obedience, he has magnified that law, and shown how God and all holy beings regard and honor it. And can it be, that after having set such an example—having labored and suffered so much to vindicate the good and holy law of God, he will grant the sinner permission to violate it, or look with allowance on his sins? He has indeed atoned for our sins, and rendered it consistent for God to forgive those their sins who will repent and turn from their transgressions. But all this does not affect the claim of God's law, or render void our obligations to it. The very design of his redemption is to bring men off from their rebellion, and to establish them in the love and observance of his law—to make all who will accept the proffered pardon zealous of good works, and conscientious in their observance of the commands of God. If, therefore, the sinner has learned to hope in his mercy, and can live in the indulgence of any one sin, or the neglect of any duty, he is perverting the grace of

God into licentiousness. He is expecting what God declares shall never be.

It is indeed true, that the sinner's obedience is not required in order to merit heaven, nor to establish a plea of justification before God, on the ground of personal obedience. But if God offers pardon freely through Christ, and declares that he will justify all transgressors freely through the redemption which there is in him, provided they believe, how can that affect their natural and rightful obligations to do his will? He that says he believes and hopes in the mercy of God for salvation, through Jesus Christ, while he does not conscientiously keep the commandments of God, shows that his mind is blinded, and his conscience defiled. It is easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than for God to suffer the wicked to pass to heaven, who claim the privilege of being saved without a diligent, faithful, and conscientious observance of his will.

VI. GOD AFFORDS PROOF IN THE EXPERIENCE OF EVERY UN-CONVERTED SINNER, THAT HE DOES NOT RECEDE FROM HIS LAW, AND WILL NOT ALLOW HIM TO VIOLATE IT WITH IMPUNITY. Although he may think, that impunity thus far may afford presumptive ground to hope for it in all time to come, yet will he find his mistake ere long. "Although a sinner do evil a hundred times," says the wise man, "and his days be prolonged, yet surely I know that it shall be well with them that fear God, which fear before him: but it shall not be well with the wicked, neither shall he prolong his days, which are as a shadow, because he feareth not before God." The retributions of a God of justice will overtake him. Of this, God furnishes abundant proof long before the hour of awful and signal vengeance.

Take the transgressor, of whatever character, and interrogate him in relation to the thoughts of his mind and the feelings of his heart. What painful forebodings, what agitation and perturbation of spirit! What seasons of gloom and dejection oppress and distress him! To the eye of man, he seems gay and full of glee, but could we enter his heart, what crowds of envyings, and fears, and jealousies, should we find distract him in his retirement! The youthful drunkard does, indeed, as he quaffs his cups, and raises the lewd and lustful song, vainly think himself happy; but when recovering from his debauch, and beginning to reflect on his conduct, who would envy him his feelings? How does his eye drop before the gaze of purity and innocence, and his cheek grow red with blushes, when re-

mindful of his bacchanalian exploits! How often does remorse torment him, and his conscience fill him with self-reproach, when he reaps the pain which his excess secures in his own body, or the misery which it inflicts on his wife, and parents, or children, whom he has disgraced and degraded by his crimes! His stomach, gorged and sickened by excess, does not more loathe its food, than does he loathe himself. Unhappiness attends him at every step. His friends desert him—his children despise him—his neighbors refuse to trust him—his property slips from his grasp—his debts accumulate and molest him—and the further he pursues his soul-destroying appetite, the more does he sink degraded in his own estimation. What is all this but the voice of God, proclaiming to him, that he cannot thus violate his laws with impunity?

In like manner, the gambler and seducer, the avaricious and fraudulent, the proud and revengeful, the lustful and unclean, have all their inward woes, at times, when the keen and cutting reproaches of conscience overwhelm them. These are the proofs which God is giving, that his law must be honored, and that he will not compromise its claims. All the misery in the world is the result of its violation. Some wise and gracious design must be had, by a Being infinite in his benevolence, in thus filling the earth with wretchedness. He delighteth not in unhappiness. "He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men." He would rather it were otherwise, but it is all intended to show the value he puts upon his law, and how unalterably he will adhere to all its provisions. Thus do the sorrows and woes of men speak to the Christian's faith, and proclaim the Almighty's determination to visit the sinner's iniquity upon him.

The skeptic will probably say, that the disease and wretchedness of the youthful sensualist, result from his violation of those physical laws, which God has ordained for the preservation of the health of the human body; and are to be assigned to natural, and not to moral causes. But the economy of nature, as it has been shown, is subordinate to the moral government of God. He ordained the laws of man's physical constitution, and those which regulate his susceptibility of excitement. And these laws were all intended to promote the great purposes of morality. The natural and uniform result, in due season, of suffering and wretchedness from immoral causes, only shows the wisdom and immutability of God's moral constitution, and

how subservient natural causes are made to its great interests. Impenitent men have proof enough of God's respect for his law in their sorrow and anguish, in the keenness of their self-reproach, and the discontented, fretful state of their minds consequent on their sins. They who live in the habitual violation of the law of God, pursue the very course to subvert the natural economy designed of God, and calculated to promote human happiness; and are, themselves, the authors of their own misery and ruin. Their painful convictions, and secret fears, and torturing reproaches of conscience, and restless inquietude, and dissatisfaction with every thing around them, are but the voice of God, assuring them, that it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than one tittle of the law to fail.

VII. THE RETRIBUTION OF THE GREAT DAY WILL CLEARLY AND FULLY DEMONSTRATE THAT GOD HOLDS THE ENTIRE ECONOMY OF NATURE SUBSERVIENT TO HIS MORAL GOVERNMENT. Then the heavens and the earth shall literally pass away;—the elements shall melt with fervent heat; and the earth, and all things in it, shall be consumed with the fires of his wrath; but his law shall abide forever. The flames of an expiring world shall prove to his rational universe, how impossible it is for God to set aside his law. To its honor he once sacrificed the world,—for its vindication, he poured down the lightnings of his fury from heaven, and consumed the cities of the plain. One nation after another has he swept with utter destruction, and caused their very name and memorial almost to perish, because they kept not his law. His own beloved Son, too, must be sacrificed, before ample atonement could be made, and he could impart forgiveness. And the heavens and earth, which are now, are kept in store reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men.

The scoffer does, indeed, smile at such declarations, and turns away from the warning voice that calls men to repentance: but the history of the past affords presumptions of truth too strong to be resisted by a rational mind. The laws of nature are no guarantee for absolute and everlasting safety. The very elements, so essential to life, can be easily converted into the sources of death, and often have been, where God has sent his wide-spread and desolating judgments through the earth. He wants not agents in nature to accomplish his will, for he knows all its constituent elements, and can touch at will the springs of life or death. The chemist knows full well that it

would be an easy thing for God to set fire to our globe. All that would be needed, would be to increase the proportion of one or two of the ingredients of our atmosphere. The naturalist can descry, in the volcanic craters which afford vent in different parts of the globe for the terrible agents that are struggling within, the vast reservoir of internal fires, which, at the Creator's will, can rend and melt this globe of ours. There is no want of the agents or supporters of combustion. The very laws of nature, if disturbed, as they sometimes have been, though now they work for its safety, would just as easily work for the world's destruction. It is the will and the hand of God that holds them in abeyance, and makes them subserve the purposes of life and happiness. They possess no necessary perpetuity. But the moral government of God is immutable, like himself; and he has declared, that it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than one tittle of the law to fail. The word of the Lord shall stand, and he will do all his pleasure. But it is his will, that his moral law and constitution should remain forever inviolate.

In view, then, of this important truth, how unspeakably foolish and delusive are the sinner's hopes! God declares that salvation is far from the wicked, and that escape is forever impossible for those who persist in violating his laws, and reject the only remedy which heaven has provided to obviate the consequences of their past rebellion. Yet what multitudes indulge hopes and schemes of bliss which are sustained and prosecuted in direct wanton violation of the law! Their sensuality and selfishness, their profanity and impiety, their falsehood and treachery, their avarice and cruelty, demand punishment, and will secure it, if they reject the boon of heaven, and refuse to return as humble penitents, and submit to the divine sway. On the basis of personal merit they can never stand, having once violated the law. However trivial they may allege their offence to have been, God will not allow one tittle of his law to fail. Another method of salvation is impossible. If the righteousness of Christ be rejected, there is no remedy, and there can be none other than delusive hopes.

The benevolence of God also appears distinctly in view of this subject. His law was made wisely, and was designed and adapted for the happiness of his subjects. Just in proportion to the strength of his benevolence, therefore, must he adhere to that law and enforce its provisions.

How utterly insecure and dangerous, too, must be the state of

that nation which throws off the restraints of God's good and wise and holy law, and whose rulers and governors will not recognise his authority and its prescriptions in their legislation and administration of justice! Egypt, and Nineveh, and Babylon, and Greece, and Rome, and other nations of ancient and modern ages, afford illustrations of the stability of God's word, and of the utter insecurity, yea, certain eventual destruction, of that people who will not give glory to God, and reverently observe his laws. We have had examples of his retributive justice already in the history of our own country; and if these United States will, by their constituted authorities and their popular habits, set at nought his will, and trample his law beneath their feet, desecrate his Sabbath, profane his name, disregard the solemn sanctions of his oath, violate public faith, disrespect obligations, and substitute their will and wisdom for his, we too shall learn, in our sad history, that there is a God which judgeth righteously in the earth, whose sway extends as well to nations as to individuals.

It will be but a poor pretence to urge that, as the God of nature, he may be treated with respect; but that the very genius of our government prevents us, as a people, from recognizing and honoring him as the God and Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. The God of nature is the God of grace; and he is Governor among the nations. To distinguish between these revelations of the same Being, and that for the purpose of treating his mediatorial scheme with practical contempt or neglect, will only secure the merited vengeance of that dread Being, who will not allow the violations of his law and the rejection of his counsels, to pass unpunished.

Whether as individuals or nations, the reason and the means of destruction will be found the same, and the result as sure. Opposition to, or neglect of the constitution of God, will and must prove fatal. It is madness, for either the private individual, or the public functionary, or the authorities of a nation, or the mass of a people, to expect that God will annul his law. Few, if any, would dare to avow such an expectation. But what says their conduct? Examine that,—not only the conduct of the openly profane and vicious, but of those whose behavior is the most externally correct. Penetrate their secret thoughts, which they wrap up in darkness to conceal the horror of them from themselves, and it shall be seen, that there are not wanting those who madly hope to overcome God. Is it

asked who they are? It is the fool-hardy soldier that braves danger, affronts death, and marches with undaunted step amidst fires and flames, but has never repented of his sins and committed his soul to Jesus Christ.

It is the foolish maddened votary of false honor, the miserable slave of cowardly fears which prevent him from manly independent exercise of his own judgment and will, and from submitting to the dictates of his own conscience, who ventures in single combat with his fellow man, and seeks by shedding blood to atone for the dishonor or the injury which he thinks have been done to him. It is the statesman, who pursues the suggestions of party wisdom, tramples the law and Sabbath of the Lord beneath his feet, and fears not to be guilty of state crimes, and to disclaim all practical respect for Jesus Christ and his religion. It is that proud philosophical stoic, who conceits himself to be superior to all the ills and vicissitudes of life, and lives in neglect of the law and worship of God. It is that luxurious son of wealth, who trusts in his riches and felicitates himself in their abundance. It is that voluptuary, who scoffs and sneers at all denunciations of divine vengeance, and turns away from all representations of heaven and hell, of eternity and damnation, and seeks to drown reflection in his cups, his company, his amusements and diversions. In a word, they are all who live in the violation of the law of God, and promise themselves escape from wrath, and bliss hereafter; when God hath said, "It is easier for heaven and earth to pass than for one tittle of the law to fail."

ARTICLE VI.

EXPOSITION OF JEPHTHAH'S VOW, JUDGES 11: 30-40.

By Rev. Xenophon Betts, Vermillion, Ohio.

THIS vow of Jephthah belongs to the class which Moses describes (Lev. 27) as "singular vows," i. e., vows which were not prescribed particularly or required; something of the nature of free-will offerings. Jephthah was moved by the Spirit

of God to stir up the children of Israel, and lead them to war against their oppressors, the children of Ammon. As he, with his host, was ready to go against their enemies, "Jephthah vowed a vow unto the Lord, and said, If thou shalt, without fail, deliver the children of Ammon into my hands, then it shall be, that whatsoever cometh forth of the doors of my house to meet me, when I return in peace from the children of Ammon, shall surely be the Lord's, and (margin, *or*, Heb. *ו*) I will offer it up for a burnt offering," 30, 31. He went out, was successful; and on his return to his house, his daughter, an only child, came out first to meet him, and it is said, he "did with her according to his vow which he had vowed: and she knew no man," 39.

The question arising on this passage is, What was the import of Jephthah's vow? This being settled, it settles the question, what he did with his daughter, for it is expressly said, he "did with her according to the vow which he had vowed."

The import of the vow depends on the manner of rendering the conjunctive particle *ו*, whether it is used copulatively or disjunctively. It is well known that the structure of the Hebrew language admits of either. This particle has the same force as the Greek *καί*, which may signify either *and* or *or*, *both* or *either*. Its meaning is to be determined by the subject with which it is connected. Hence the margin of our Bible gives the disjunctive rendering to the particle in this case. The vow will then read, "Whatsoever cometh forth of the doors of my house to meet me, when I return in peace from the children of Ammon, shall surely be the Lord's, or I will offer it up for a burnt offering." With this rendering, the fulfilment of the vow will imply that Jephthah, in some peculiar way, devoted his daughter to the Lord (probably to some such service as led to, or required, a life of celibacy).

The design of this article is, by establishing the marginal reading as the correct one, to remove a difficulty from the passage which strikes many minds with horror, and throws a dark shade over the character of Jephthah. With the marginal reading, the passage does not teach that Jephthah immolated his daughter, but that he devoted her to the service of God in some peculiar way, and thus to a life of celibacy. We are led to adopt the marginal as the true reading from the following considerations:

1. *From the nature of singular vows.* The account and reg-

ulation of singular vows, or voluntary devotements, is found, Lev. 27. Such vows respected persons, clean and unclean beasts, houses, and lands. In respect to persons, the rule was, "When a man shall make a singular vow, the persons shall be *for the Lord* by thy estimation," v. 1. Then follows a rate of estimation according to the age and sex. In respect to clean beasts, "whereof men bring an offering unto the Lord, all that any man giveth of such unto the Lord shall be holy," v. 9. There was no estimation put upon such devotements, and no condition of redemption. If it was an unclean beast, it was to be presented before the priest, and by him valued. It might then be redeemed by adding one-fifth to the value of it. Of the rules and conditions of other devoted things, it is not necessary to speak, as they could not be embraced in the condition of Jephthah's vow, "Whatsoever cometh forth of the doors of my house to meet me." This could respect only the persons of his household, or the beasts of his possession. Now, by adopting the marginal reading, the language of the vow was exactly adapted to the rule respecting singular vows. A person, or an unclean beast, was to be the Lord's, i. e., for his service; but clean beasts, those whereof men bring an offering unto the Lord, were to be holy, i. e., should be offered in sacrifice. His vow was, it "shall surely be the Lord's, or I will offer it up for a burnt offering." This embraced all the possible alternatives. If it should be one of his household, or a beast, which it was not proper to offer in sacrifice, it was to be separated to the Lord's service: but if it should be a beast, whereof men bring an offering to the Lord, then he would offer it up for a burnt offering.

2. *The context favors the marginal rendering.* There is nothing in the context, aside from the language of the vow, which would lead us to suppose that Jephthah put his daughter to death. All that is said in relation to his vow is, that he "did with her according to the vow which he had vowed," which, as we have seen, necessarily signifies no more than that he, in a peculiar manner, according to the conditions of the singular vow, gave her to the Lord, probably including, devoting her to a life of celibacy. This is all that is required to explain the context; and some parts of it are better explained by this interpretation, than by supposing that he offered her up for a burnt offering. This will fully explain Jephthah's grief at meeting her. The context specifies that she was his only child. His

devoting her then in this manner would be the blotting out of his name and family. This, in Israel, was regarded as a peculiar calamity. This interpretation better explains her conduct with her companions, in spending a season previous to the fulfilment of the vow in "bemoaning her virginity." It certainly strikes the mind rather singularly, that this should be the subject of their lamentation in prospect of the speedy violent death of one of their number. But, adopting the proposed interpretation, it is just the course we might expect them to pursue. She was about to be separated from them to spend her life of celibacy, either in retirement, or somewhere in such employment as would remove her from their society, and cut her off from the most animating hope of a daughter of Israel, that of becoming a mother, and possibly the mother of the promised Messiah. "She went with her companions, and bewailed her virginity upon the mountains" two months. This interpretation agrees better with the language of the historian, in recording the fulfilment of the vow, than the received translation, which must signify that he offered her up for a burnt-offering. The record is, "And it came to pass, at the end of two months, that she returned unto her father, who did with her according to the vow which he had vowed; and she knew no man," v. 39. This last clause seems rather uncalled for, on the supposition that she was at that time offered up for a burnt-offering; but, taking the marginal reading, it is perfectly natural. This closing remark shows in what manner the vow was fulfilled. He did to her according to his vow; and, instead of giving her to a husband, and thus perpetuating his family by her, he gave her to the Lord, and she remained unmarried for the sake of his service, that she might care for the things of the Lord, how she might please him. There is a marginal reading of the 40th verse, also, which becomes significant and appropriate, by adopting the marginal reading of the 31st, and the interpretation proposed. It is said, "The daughters of Israel went yearly to lament (margin "to talk with") the daughter of Jephthah, the Gileadite, four days in a year." On the adoption of the proposed interpretation, the marginal reading of the last verse becomes perfectly consistent and natural. It is the very course that would be expected from her companions, that they should, at suitable times, visit and commune with her. This course is rendered the more probable, as it might be expected that, by her retirement and devotions, she would become distinguished

for her wisdom and piety, and thus would become a person of interest, not only to her immediate companions, but to the "daughters of Israel" generally.

Here the question may arise, with regard to the fact of such devotements. Without entering fully into that subject, it cannot be denied, that some passages favor the idea. 1 Cor. 7: 32—34, clearly implies such a practice, and more than intimates, that it was regarded with complacency, as favorable to piety in those who could adopt it. Our Saviour's remark, that there are some who have *made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of God's sake*, implies the same thing. It is evident, also, that there were many female as well as male servants employed in the service of the Jewish religion; and some things favor the idea that they lived in celibacy. Repeated mention is made of singing men and *singing women*. Ezra mentions a large company that claimed to be children of the priests, who had lost their register, and who were consequently excluded from the priesthood until their origin could be settled. He says, "The whole congregation together was forty and two thousand three hundred and threescore. Besides their servants and their *maids*, of whom there were seven thousand three hundred and thirty and seven: and there were among them, two hundred singing men and singing women," Ezra 2: 64, 65.—In Numbers, chap. 31st, we have an account of a war of the Israelites with the Midianites. They slew all the men and saved the women and children. The Lord directed further, to slay all the women that had been defiled by carnal intercourse with men, and all the male children, and to spare the remaining females. Of these there were thirty-two thousand. These were equally divided with the rest of the spoil, between them that went out to war and all the rest of the congregation. Then, from the warrior's half, one in five hundred was to be a heave-offering for the Lord: of the people's half, one in fifty was to be given to the Levites, which kept the charge of the tabernacle of the Lord. The Lord's portion therefore of these, was thirty-two persons; and these, among the rest of the Lord's portion of the spoils, Moses gave unto Eleazar the priest: from the other half, there were three hundred and twenty, which he gave with the rest of their portion of the spoils to the Levites, which kept the charge of the tabernacle of the Lord. It is very plain, that widows sometimes remained in their state of widowhood from a regard to the service of the Lord. Anna, the prophetess, is an

example; and the company of widows in the primitive Christian churches shows also the same custom. All these considerations go to make it appear that devotements to the service of the Lord were not uncommon in Israel.

3. *The character of Jephthah favors the marginal reading and the proposed interpretation.* Aside from this one act which is the subject of inquiry, there is nothing which leaves any reason for suspicion in regard to his piety, or even any thing which appears like rashness. He was, indeed, an illegitimate child; and by the pride and rashness of his brethren he was thrust out from his father's house; but nothing is said of him in this transaction prejudicial to his character. It is said, indeed, that certain vain fellows joined themselves to him in his banishment; but that was true of David also in like circumstances. It shows only that he was a man looked up to in whatever company he was found. This appears still farther in the fact, that when his brethren were in trouble, they were glad to recall him, and that also with the promise to submit themselves to him as their leader. The whole narrative, except this misconstruction of his vow, goes to establish his claim to be ranked as the apostle has ranked him among the crowd of faithful witnesses. Take this view of his vow, and his whole character appears consistent. He made a vow perfectly in accordance with the nature of the dispensation under which he lived, and for the regulation of which, rules had been prescribed which would cover every possible alternative; and he fulfilled the vow which he had made at a great personal and domestic sacrifice. Take the other view of this passage, and you have one who is ranked by inspiration among the faithful witnesses, offering a human victim in sacrifice to Jehovah, an abomination of which one of Jephthah's rank and intelligence could not possibly be ignorant. Another alternative, no less absurd, is, that his vow, if interpreted according to the received reading, might have bound him to offer some unclean thing in sacrifice to God, which he must have known was expressly forbidden. The marginal reading removes this difficulty.

4. *The providence of God in the case favors the marginal reading.* Is there any other instance in which God was so solemnly appealed to in behalf of his own cause, for a result, where, by the result, he involved a servant of his in so decided an act of abomination? Herod's oath to his niece is not an analogous case. Herod was not pledging himself to God's ser-

vice. He was the slave to his lusts, and God ensnared him in his own rash vow; he no doubt also held him responsible for the consequence. Neither was God's command to Abraham to offer up Isaac a parallel case. He tried Abraham's faith, but saved him from any result which would leave the suspicion of cruelty on his character. The case before us, on adopting the received translation, is a perfect anomaly in the providence of God.

From all these considerations, we regard the marginal as the true reading; and suppose that Jephthah, instead of offering his daughter in sacrifice as a burnt-offering, devoted her in some special way to the service of the Lord and to a life of celibacy. He "did with her according to his vow which he had vowed: and she knew no man."

ARTICLE VII.

CHRIST THE PREACHER'S MODEL.

By Rev. Asa D. Smith, Pastor of the Brainerd Presbyterian Church, New-York.

It is not the design of the present article to dwell on our Lord's more private excellences. We touch not, except in the way of brief and incidental reference, on the blamelessness of his general life, his meekness and lowliness of mind, his ever active benevolence, his zeal for God's glory, his devotional habits, his self-sacrificing spirit. We consider him not even, so to speak, as a theologian—but simply as a Preacher. It is doubtless proper thus to regard him. There are certain limitations, however, with which his example should be copied, and, to preclude all misapprehension, it may be well just to glance at these in the outset.

The circumstances of his ministry were in some respects peculiar. This remark might be illustrated by many a reference to the character of the age in which he lived, and to the genius and habits of the people among whom he labored. And it has an important relation to his preaching considered as a model. Forms, both of speech and action, change somewhat with circumstances. They are seldom, therefore, to be exactly copied,

however worthy of adoption the unchanging principles they embody. Our Lord's example, indeed, in all its departments, is to be followed rather as to its principles, its elements of excellence, than as to its outward shapes; accommodated as those shapes were to surrounding circumstances, and different, in many points, as those circumstances were from ours. Again, our Lord's character was unlike that of his servants in respect to his perfect holiness. It was altogether natural and proper that this should in some degree modify his preaching. He could say, fearlessly, "Which of you convinceth me of sin?" It was quite becoming in him, therefore, to reprove with a severity, and to denounce with a sternness, which would hardly befit those who are themselves transgressors,—who adopt, every one of them, the confession of Paul, "I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing." And further, divinity was in Christ united with humanity. He could properly speak, as God does in the Scriptures generally, with an air of authority which a worm of the dust may not assume. And so he did speak, at certain times especially, Deity shining out through the vail of flesh. We may add, that during our Lord's ministry, anterior at least to his death, the work of redemption was incomplete. Of consequence, the great system of gospel truth could be but partially exhibited. Many things pertaining to it, even his disciples could not bear till he had risen from the dead. Our Lord was straitened, even as to his teaching, till his baptism of blood was accomplished. It was reserved for the Apostles and their successors in the ministry, to preach Christ crucified with a distinctness and fullness which that doctrine could not well assume, while, as yet, the cross had not been erected.

But these limitations affect not our general position. As to all the great points of excellence in pulpit discourse, our Lord's preaching may still be regarded as a perfect model. To some of its main characteristics, as thus apprehended, we propose to advert, attempting, of course, in a single article, but an outline.

We notice first its *spirituality*. Of this there are various aspects. It is one of the most obvious, that he kept aloof from all secular topics. He declared, emphatically, that his kingdom was "not of this world;" and with this announcement all his preaching corresponded. He delivered no political discourses. Political evils there certainly were around him—evils unfriendly

to the progress of the gospel, and which the spirit of the gospel was suited to eradicate. But he meddled not with them directly. It was impossible to draw him into a discussion of them. Cæsar might be a tyrant—he doubtless was. His government was little better than a system of slavery. He made sad havoc of human rights. Yet all our Lord could be induced to say of him, even when artfully and earnestly interrogated, was but to suggest certain great and efficacious principles, which he left it for his hearers to apply: “Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar’s, and unto God the things which are God’s.” When requested, on a certain occasion, to assume, as it were, judicial functions, to settle a question of heirship, his ready response was, “Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you?” And he proceeded to expose the inward evil, which formed, doubtless, the chief difficulty in the case: “Take heed, and beware of covetousness.” As if he had said, “It is the main object of my ministry to promote inward purity. This attained, all secular evils will either pass away or become tolerable.” In accordance with such views he seems to have always acted. Slavery existed in the world, and that of the most revolting kind, during his whole ministry. It existed in the very empire to which Judea was attached, yet he never made it the object of a specific attack. He knew full well that the best way to extirpate it, was to establish his kingdom in human hearts. The apparatus of war was around him, and “wars and rumors of wars” were predicted by him. Yet he never preached “a peace sermon,” as that term would be understood by some. If the peace of God should but pervade the spirits of men, he was well assured they would have peace with each other. What a lesson have we here for the gospel minister! He may not close his eyes to the secular grievances of the times, to the disorders of the social system, to political abuses, and international evils. But he should ever remember, that his chief reformatory agency, as to all these matters, is the simple preaching of the gospel, the winning of soul after soul to Christ. And this, he may be assured, is the mightiest of all agencies.

The spirituality of our Lord’s preaching was apparent, also, in his manner of exhibiting divine things. It was seen in his treatment of religious forms and ceremonies. These he did not, indeed, wholly repudiate, but he made them, comparatively, of little account. To the Jews, burdened not only with the Mosaic ritual, but with superadded traditions of the elders, he said,

"Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." In reproof of their formality, he quoted the declaration of God by the prophet, "I will have mercy and not sacrifice." "God," he taught them, "is a Spirit, and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth." He cast no contempt on rites divinely appointed, but he laid no undue stress upon them. He gave not the slightest countenance to those who contend for certain ceremonies, as if the salvation of the world were at stake, and who exclude from their fellowship all who differ from them. The circumstantials, the drapery, the mere appendages and symbols of religion, he ever represented as of very inferior consequence. In all his preaching, the weightier matters of the law, and the great essentials of the gospel, were the all-absorbing topics. In all his inculcations of religious duty, we may add, he had respect chiefly to *the inward life*. At an early period in his ministry, he refuted the superficial interpretations of the law current among the Jews. He taught them that God's commandment was exceeding broad, and that it had respect primarily and mainly to the inner man. He was always chiefly intent on the rectification of the spirit. "Out of the abundance of the heart," his doctrine was, "the mouth speaketh;" "out of the heart" proceedeth all manner of wickedness. He aimed at the reformation of the whole man, by setting right the foundations and elements of character, the sources and springs of action.

In all this how wise and salutary was his example! How vain are all attempts at reform, which are chiefly directed to the outward life! If ever so successful, they would still come far short of God's standard—they would fail to fit the soul for heaven. But in the nature of things, they must be comparatively powerless. The farther you depart from the spiritualities of religion, the less you have to do with conscience. She seconds your efforts but feebly, when they have little respect to her chief sphere of jurisdiction, the world within. And if, by other means, you succeed in producing some external change, it will probably prove but temporary. You have been cleansing the stream, while the fountain is still foul and turbid. The lava has been pent up for a little season, and flowers have been scattered around, but it will soon burst forth, the more terrible and destructive for the very restraint it has suffered. Who has not observed, how utterly inefficacious that preaching has soon become, whose expositions and injunctions reproofs and horta-

tives, have had to do chiefly with the outward conduct? A congregation under such training will soon remind the most superficial observer of "the heath in the desert." The noise, and stir, and bustle, to which clerical empiricism at first gave rise, will soon subside into the stillness and quietude of death. A sort of galvanic treatment may produce startling spasms for a time, but even these will soon cease. To drop the figure, it will come to pass, ere long, that though the preacher stand up in the holy place, and utter the most earnest entreaties, and the most awful rebukes and denunciations, he will yet seem to himself and to others, "as one that beateth the air." How different the result of eminently spiritual preaching, such as our Lord's! It bids streams gush forth in the desert. It forms not merely the cold and lifeless statue, but animates it with fire from heaven. If the heart be right, all will be right. If the life of God be but begun in the soul of man, you shall see in all the visible character the outgoings of that life. Let the gospel minister, then, imitate most carefully the spirituality of his Lord's teaching.

We may further illustrate the point in hand, by reference to the motives with which Christ was wont to enforce his teaching. His preaching in this respect was at a great remove from that mawkish *sentimentalism*, which may suit well enough the pages of an album, or an annual, but has little effect on man's higher susceptibilities, and is miserably out of place in the pulpit. Nor were his persuasives drawn, as is sometimes the case, from the twilight region of natural theology—from the cold and cheerless sphere of the heathen moralist. He had no resemblance, he afforded not the slightest countenance, to the preacher of whom it has been well said,

"How oft when Paul has served him for a text,
Has Plato, Tully, Epictetus preached!"

The morality he inculcated was enforced by highly spiritual motives. It was in this respect eminently evangelical. It was closely linked with the cross. Its sanctions and incitements were mainly gathered from the great scheme of redemption.

Another prominent excellence of our Lord's preaching, was its *simplicity*. This was a very natural result of its spirituality. He is most likely to be simple, who concerns himself chiefly with the great fundamentals of duty, with the inward elements of character. Hence the whole Bible is thus distinguished, and no part of it more so than the discourses of Christ.

This characteristic of his preaching may be considered in two points of light, in respect both to language and thought. His language was exceedingly simple. Not that it was low, or even inelegant. In more beautiful costume thought was never arrayed. The quotations so often made from his discourses, even when connected with the highest strains of human eloquence, are, to say the least of them, and to speak of their style alone, "like apples of gold in pictures of silver." They are beautiful in all their simplicity—yea, they are beautifully simple. This characteristic of language has, of itself, a charm. It not only brings truth down to the level of common minds, but makes that truth more attractive. And while it involves nothing of vulgarity or coarseness, we may truly say, that it is compatible with the very highest adornment.

But simplicity of *thought* is still more important, as to all the best ends of discourse, than simplicity of speech. Yet the one, obviously, may exist without the other. Nay, if we mistake not, the one has sometimes been the subject of much attention and solicitude, while the other has been little regarded. In our Lord's preaching, however, both these characteristics were combined. His trains of thought were marked by great simplicity. His illustrations were all borrowed from the objects of nature and the common affairs of life. Nor were they, on this account, the less clear and impressive; the reverse rather was true. It is a wise remark of Bacon, "They be not the highest instances that give the securest information, as may be well expressed in the tale so common of the philosopher, that while he gazed upwards to the stars he fell into the water; for if he had looked down, he might have seen the stars in the water, but looking aloft, he could not see the water in the stars. So it cometh often to pass, that mean and small things discover great, better than great discover the small." In simile and allegory, we may add, the preaching of Christ abounded. It may almost be said of his whole ministry, "without a parable spake he not." Truth was thus made palpable to the plainest understanding. Never did he exhibit it in an abstract way. His preaching was replete, if we may so say, with simple concretions. He dealt chiefly with masses of thought, with organic forms, rather than dissected members. He might be likened rather to the painter or the sculptor, than to the chemist or anatomist. He avoided utterly that excess of analysis which renders the preaching of some so

dry and unprofitable. Illustrations of these remarks we might draw from all his discourses. It will suffice to select but one.

On a certain occasion a lawyer "stood up and tempted him." He begged to know how he could secure eternal life. Jesus, in reply, referred him to the divine law, and questioned him as to his knowledge of it. He answered discreetly, giving a summary of the decalogue, and our Lord made application of it to his conscience. Willing, however, to justify himself, and troubled especially, it would seem, by the second great commandment, he began to question Jesus in respect to the duty it enjoins. "Who is my neighbor?" What is the nature and extent of the benevolence required? A great question this—a grand point in theology, proposed, too, by a learned and subtle man, and addressed to one "in whom are held all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." How, think you, did he reply? Let conjecture, for a moment, take the place of memory, and the thought-worn theologian answer after his kind. "He defined true benevolence, doubtless," methinks I hear one say, "as the love of being in general." "Whatever else, he said," another replies, "he made this point clear, unquestionably, that of all specific, voluntary action, happiness is the ultimate end." "Whatever view he took," says another, "he doubtless entered deeply into the nature of moral distinctions, and the ground of moral obligation; into the relations of man to his fellow-man, and the origin and scope of the social affections. His definitions, it may be presumed, were the most exact, his analysis profound and perfect, and his exposition of the whole subject—of its metaphysical aspects especially—clear, logical, and systematic." Turn we now to the record, and not a single definition do we find, not a solitary analytical process, not one abstract statement, not the merest shadow of metaphysics. His response was but a simple allegory: "A certain man came down from Jerusalem unto Jericho, and fell among thieves." We need not repeat the rest, it is fresh in the reader's recollection. Instead of defining, or analyzing, or abstracting benevolence, he painted it, he bade it live and move, in human form, as it were, before his cavilling auditor.

The great importance of simplicity in preaching, is apparent from various considerations. It is impossible without it to interest deeply the common people. By abstract and excessively analytic discourse, they are little moved, and less profited. They may admire, vaguely, the preacher's profoundness, but they

understand him not, and weariness soon ensues. They care much less, indeed, for the recondite qualities of things, than for their obvious and practical nature. If truth interests them at all, it is in the living and palpable forms which the Bible gives it. If the water of life allures them, it is not as *decomposed*, but as it flows from the throne of God and the Lamb. And the common people, be it remembered, are the great mass of the people, the great majority of our hearers, and withal the most hopeful subjects of ministerial labor. It was so in the days of Christ. His ministry was chiefly attended by the plain people, and of that class were most of his followers. He had good reason, then, for adapting his preaching to such. And so have his ministers now. He of whom it cannot be said that the common people hear him gladly, may look for little success as a preacher of the gospel. He may be distinguished as a poet, or a critic, as a historian, an antiquarian, or a metaphysician, as deeply versed in theology even—but not as winning souls to Christ.

The wisdom of our Lord's example, in respect to the point in hand, may be still further evinced. Simplicity of discourse is quite as effective with the truly intellectual, as with the common people. It is no indication of feebleness or poverty of mind, but the very reverse. It is easy enough to make a plain subject dark, by pedantic and profitless distinctions and definitions; but it is one of the highest achievements of intellect to make a dark subject so plain, that all shall wonder it ever seemed otherwise. Never is learning so magnified, as when she passes over her processes, and gives you her simple results. So the truly learned judge. Hence they respect most highly the preacher who, other things being equal, is most eminent for simplicity of discourse. And the preaching of such a man, is to them, as well as the common people, the most impressive. The truth is, the commonest sympathies of our race, the most ordinary springs of action, are ever the mightiest. Ascertain what chord is of deepest tone in the hearts of the multitude, and you have learned what chord will vibrate most powerfully in the bosoms of the intellectual few.

Another leading characteristic of our Saviour's preaching was its *directness*. It is possible that pulpit discourse should fail in this point, even when in some good degree spiritual and simple. We mean by directness, such a manner of exhibiting truth, as makes the audience feel that they themselves are concerned in it.

It is quite possible so to present human depravity, that even the attentive hearer shall hardly be reminded that *he* is depraved ; so to insist on penitence, that he shall hardly once think of it as a duty which *he* should perform. You may so speak of "the sinner," or of "sinners," that you shall scarcely be suspected of the slightest reference to the persons present. And though your teaching be orthodox, and your announcements of coming wrath distinct and emphatic, every heart before you may be as quiet as if your discourse had related to the dwellers in some other planet. It was eminently otherwise with Christ. He always made his hearers feel, not only that his speech was to them, but that they were interested in the truths he uttered. He not only declared to Nicodemus the general doctrine of the new birth, but he said also, "*Ye must be born again.*" "*Art thou a master of Israel, and knowest not these things ?*" To one who was curious to learn whether few or many would be saved, he said, "*Strive to enter in at the strait gate ;*" thus reminding him that it should be his main object to secure his own salvation. In addressing the Scribes and Pharisees, his application of truth was often most pungent and terrible. "*Wo unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites ! for ye shut up the kingdom of heaven against men ; for ye neither go in yourselves, neither suffer ye them that are entering to go in.*" "*Wo unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites ! for ye are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and of all uncleanness.*" As on a certain occasion he was uttering reproofs like these, one of the lawyers said to him, "*Master, thus saying thou reproachest us also.*" But so far from retracting or qualifying what he had uttered, our Lord promptly replied, "*Wo unto you, also, ye lawyers !*" It is said, in a certain place, that "when the chief priests and Pharisees heard his parables, they perceived that he spake of them." He so shaped his discourse on a particular occasion, that "they which heard it, being convicted by their own conscience, went out one by one, beginning at the eldest, even unto the last." And the testimony of the woman of Samaria was, "*Come, see a man which told me all the things that ever I did.*"

In all this he exhibited great fearlessness. For he knew full well it would give offence to many, and provoke, at times, the most violent opposition. And such, doubtless, to some extent, will be the result of a similar strain of preaching at

the present day. It will be unhesitatingly adopted, however, by the wise and faithful minister. He can hope, otherwise, for but little success. A general statement of truth—a statement of it as relating to the world at large—the deceitful and self-flattering heart will be likely to disregard. It is only as “thou art the man,” rings in the perishing sinner’s ear, that preaching does its perfect work. We are not, indeed, at liberty, as we have before remarked, to adopt the air of majesty, or the tone of awful severity, which sometimes marked our Lord’s discourses. But our speech may, like his, abound in the *second*, rather than the *third person*. We may rest not till each hearer feels that *he* is intended. And as subservient to such a result, we should beware, as our Lord did, of needlessly qualifying truth. How broadly and boldly did he state it—in what paradoxes sometimes! “I am come to send fire on the earth; and what will I if it be already kindled?” “I came not to send peace, but a sword.” How unlike was his manner in this respect to a certain cautious and circumlocutory way of preaching. It is quite possible to utter the great verities of the gospel, with such qualifications, exceptions, limitations, provisos, and reserves, that though they may still retain in some sense their identity, they not only lose much of their appropriate force and beauty, but what is specially to be deplored, their application to individual cases is much less likely to be felt.

The excellence of our Lord’s preaching is further manifest as we advert to its *symmetry*. By this we intend, generally, that every thing pertaining to his discourses was in due proportion. There was; in his ministry, no improper magnifying of any one doctrine or duty, no exclusive dwelling on any one topic. Nor was any one class of hearers regarded to the overlooking of others. He rightly divided the word, giving to every one a portion in due season. It would be a pleasant and edifying work, to review our Lord’s discourses with reference either to the variety of topics presented, and the symmetrical development of each, or to the varieties of character and condition to which his instructions had appropriate reference. We shall confine ourselves, however, to another and somewhat less obvious view.

Our Lord’s preaching may be regarded as of perfect symmetry, in respect to its wise adaptation to the whole nature of man, its due regard to all the departments of his complex being. Considered as the subject of pulpit ministrations, he may be describ-

ed as made up of *intellect, conscience, and heart*. And preaching may be characterized from its bearing on these several parts of his compound nature. It is not affirmed, of course, that it is possible to address human beings on religious subjects without appealing, more or less, to all these conjoined capacities. But it is quite possible—as facts have abundantly shown—to give some one of them disproportionate attention. There are those who preach chiefly to the intellect, to the comparative neglect of the conscience and the heart. There are others who discourse mainly to the conscience, to the neglect of the heart and the intellect. And there are others still who address the heart chiefly, to the neglect of both the other departments of our being. Such faults, however, receive no countenance from the Saviour's ministry.

Preaching may be addressed, we have said, too exclusively to the intellect. Dry and unprofitable will such discourse be, whether of the topical or textual sort. Even when it keeps closest to the divine word—with its green pastures and still waters—it fails of furnishing appropriate spiritual nutriment. It is not under the attenuated, plodding metaphysician alone, that

“The hungry sheep look up, and are not fed.”

In like unhappy plight may be the flocks of some who value themselves greatly on their exegetical skill. Preachers we have certainly heard, who reminded us forcibly of a quaint remark of Ralph Cudworth. “There is,” says he, “a *caro* and a *spiritus*, a flesh and a spirit, a body and a soul, in all the writings of the Scriptures. It is but the flesh and body of divine truths that is printed upon paper, which many moths of books and libraries do only feed upon; many walking skeletons of knowledge, that bury and entomb truths in the living sepulchres of their souls, do only converse with; such as never did any thing else but pick at the mere bark and rind of truths, and crack the shells of them.” But let us not be understood to decry the exercise of intellect in the pulpit, or the fullest appeal to the mental capacities. The human understanding is tasked to the utmost by the religion of Christ. And the gospel is eminently conducive to vigor and enlargement of mind. The wise preacher will beware, however, of that sort of discourse which

“Plays round the head, but comes not to the heart.”

He will beware of addressing the intellect to the neglect of

the conscience—that regent *de jure* of all the soul's faculties. So his Lord's example teaches him. While the discourses of Christ were highly intellectual, they dealt most faithfully with the moral sense; they kept the heart in continual and vigorous action. It is only thus, indeed—as it would be easy to show at large—that gospel ministrations are of highest advantage to the mental powers. It is only thus, of course, that the soul's salvation can be secured. Let a minister so preach, that truth becomes with his hearers the object of mere intellection, and his discourse, however applauded, will be to them but “a savor of death unto death.”

It was said, also, that the conscience may be too exclusively addressed. However important, in some respects, its functions, it has no power of itself to purify the heart. It may be roused to intensest action, while depravity still rages and rules. It convinces of sin, but it melts not the soul into penitence; it produces of itself, neither faith, nor hope, nor charity, nor the peace of God. To this latter result, other appliances are essential. You must appeal to the heart. The fragrance of the divine goodness must be diffused around it—it must be bedewed with the tears, and bathed in the blood of Christ. The symphonies of heaven must steal sweetly over it. Thus, too, is the piety of God's people most advanced. How powerless, even as to them, is discourse mainly objurgatory! How often do they remain cold-hearted under it, and barren, and unprofitable; how often does it seem even to sear the conscience itself! Against the error now referred to, the preacher would be effectually secured by a close observance of his Lord's example. Christ did, indeed, as has been remarked, address the conscience most pungently; but knowing what is in man, he appealed not to that alone. While he reproves, he allures; while he holds up with one hand the condemning law, he points with the other to the cross on which he hung, and to the mansions he has prepared for his followers.

The wisdom of his example is further manifest, as we recur to the suggestion, that even the heart may be disproportionately addressed. Deal with it to the comparative neglect of the intellect, and fanaticism is the natural result; a religion of mere feeling is engendered, of blind and bewildering impulses, of endless and perilous vagaries. Address it powerfully to the overlooking of conscience, and a miserably *selfish* piety will be likely to ensue. In place of self-denial, there will be real,

though perhaps covert, self-gratification; and a specious but sinister *utility* will wear the honors which belong only to *rectitude*. How admirable were Christ's appeals, in that they were so happily balanced—to the heart, indeed, as we have said, but to the heart in fitting proportion;—to the intellect and conscience in due measure also. To all the departments of our complex nature, but to all in perfect symmetry.

There is another, and that a crowning excellence of Christ's preaching, which we may not fail to notice. We refer to its *affectionateness*. Our readers are familiar with the ancient and oft-quoted maxim,

— “Si vis me flere dolendum est
Primum ipsi tibi.”

“If you wish me to weep, you must first manifest emotion yourself.” Most felicitously has Goethe expressed this same sentiment:

“Persuasion, friend, comes not by toil or art;
Hard study never made the matter clearer:
'Tis the live fountain in the speaker's heart,
Sends forth the streams that melt the ravished hearer.
Then work away for life; heap book on book,
Line upon line, and precept on example:
The stupid multitude may gape and look,
And fools may think your stock of wisdom ample:
But all remain unmoved: to touch the heart—
To make men feel, requires a different art.
For touching hearts the only secret known,
My worthy friend, is this:—to have one of your own!”*

To secure the highest ends of sacred eloquence, however, regard must be had to the kind, as well as the degree of emotion. It is very possible for the preacher to be highly excited, in view not so much of the truth he unfolds, in itself considered, or in its momentous applications, as of the intellectual processes to which he subjects it; the nice discrimination, the profound analysis, the lucid arrangement, the strict and conclusive ratiocination. He may be like the hireling painter, who feels little interest in the countenance before him, but is delighted with his own imitation of it, with the rapidity and perfectness with which he transfers it to the canvass. Emotion of this sort will have little effect on the mass of hearers. The preacher's sympathies must pass beyond his subject, considered simply as such, to the

* Translated by A. H. Everett.

souls he seeks to save. He must show himself interested in their fearful state—not merely as a theme of discourse, but as an object of affecting contemplation—if he would hope to preach successfully. In other words, he must manifest in his preaching deep and unaffected love for souls. With what a charm does love invest even the simplest forms of speech! It makes the severest reproof comparatively grateful. Let a frown becloud your brow, and angry words fall from your lips, and however pointed and just your censure, however cogent your arguments for reform, they will be all in vain. You will meet with a cold, and perhaps disdainful repulse. But go to an erring fellow-man, under the strong impulses of benevolence, let your tones be tremulous with compassion, and the dew of kindness glisten in your eye; let your words be fraught with tenderness, and your whole demeanor bespeak deep and disinterested regard; and if the case be not utterly hopeless, your pleading will be prevalent. Oh, there is nothing like the eloquence of love! The doomed man in his dungeon, all blood-stained and hard-hearted, is melted by it, and becomes, the while, like a little child. You may sit by his side, and open before him the dark catalogue of his crimes; you may expatiate upon them, you may appeal most powerfully to his slumbering conscience; all this you may do, though many a cold-hearted intruder has been driven with curses from his cell, if your tears do but fall while you speak. You can say to men, indeed, just what you please—you can do with them, we had almost added, just what you will—if they do but see evidence that you love them.

Now in the blessed and potent quality of kindness, the speech of Christ was unrivalled. He is in this respect, as well as others, a perfect model for the preacher. God is said to be love itself: and Christ was love incarnate. The savor of that same compassion which led him to the cross, was diffused through all his discourses. Well might the people wonder “at the gracious words which proceeded out of his mouth.” Even with his most fearful rebukes, what expressions of tenderness were often linked! It was on the same occasion when he said to the Jews, “Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, how can ye escape the damnation of hell,” that he exclaimed also, “Oh, Jerusalem, Jérusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings!” How does the example of Christ forbid in

his ministers all harshness and bitterness of speech ! How does it frown on a denunciatory spirit ! With what sweet enforcement does it call for kindness and gentleness, for " bowels of compassion," and pleadings fraught with love.

Such are some of the leading characteristics of our Lord's preaching. Such is the perfect and delightful pattern which the Bible holds forth to every minister of the gospel. How important to every preacher, we remark in conclusion, is intimate acquaintance with Christ ! How desirable that he should so study the record of our Lord's ministry, as to catch the very spirit and manner of his preaching, just as by familiarity with some loved and venerated friend, we acquire often his very tones, and gestures, and forms of speech. Of other models of eloquence, he need not, he should not be ignorant. He may listen to the orators of ancient time. He may linger a while even in the heathen forum, and may give his ear to the more eloquent of the Christian fathers. He may seek improvement in the study of the more modern pulpit. No little advantage will he gain from familiarity with such eminent preachers as Baxter, and Howe, and Leighton, and Edwards, and Whitefield. But they are all imperfect models. He should turn from them all, at last, to him who spake as never man spake. With him he should commune, till as he opens his lips in the sacred desk, the very manner of his preaching shall remind his hearers of Christ, and they shall take knowledge of him that he has been with Jesus. The word of such a man is seldom in vain. It contains within itself the most potent elements of moral suasion : and according, as it does, with the mind of Christ, he delights to crown it with his blessing.

ARTICLE VIII.

REVIEW OF LIFE AND WRITINGS OF EBENEZER PORTER MASON.

By Rev. William B. Sprague, Pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church, Albany.

Life and Writings of Ebenezer Porter Mason, interspersed with Hints to Parents and Instructors on the Training and Education of a Child of Genius. By Denison Olmstead, Professor of Natural Philosophy and Astronomy in Yale College. New York: Dayton & Newman.

WE are free to acknowledge that our interest in Biography has been, in these latter years, not a little diminished by the flood of insipid and trashy productions that has come in upon us in this department of our literature. It is within our recollection that a new biographical work was comparatively a rare thing; and the fact that an individual had a book written about him was regarded as some evidence that he was not a mere common-place character: but the aggregate amount of excellence belonging to these works has not increased in proportion to their number. If there are still some beautiful monuments erected to departed merit, there are not wanting pens that are ready to immortalize departed mediocrity, if not departed dullness. The reasons of this are various. Sometimes it is to be traced to the indiscreet partiality of friendship; sometimes to the commendable wish to aid some young man in his education by the sale of the book; and possibly sometimes to a mistaken desire to figure on a small scale in the character of an author. There are some stars of this kind taking their places from time to time in our literary horizon, which we trust will shine for ages; but not a small part of these publications, instead of being stars, are mere fire-flies of the night, which shine only long enough to let us know they have existed.

We have two or three grounds of objection to this as it seems to us characteristic feature of the times. In the first place, admitting the character to possess no special interest, it is an act of injustice to the subject of the narrative that he should be dragged before the public after he is dead, just to receive a verdict of having done nothing and been nothing, that should

justify an attempt to blazon abroad his name or perpetuate his memory. And next, such a book is necessarily an imposition upon the public ; for those who buy it from their love of biography, with the impression that it is a good book, get cheated ; and those who read it to find out what it is, provided they are persons of intelligence and good judgment, are very likely to get vexed that they have thrown away their time as well as their money. Or if, for the sake of making an interesting volume, a tame character be metamorphosed under the biographer's hand, into something which it never was and never could be, why here again there is manifest deception ; and no wise man wishes to be gratified by receiving falsehood as truth. And last of all, we think this sort of book-making objectionable on the ground that it is fitted to inspire the sober and reflecting with a disrelish for biography in general ; and that in consequence of this, many a gem in this department of literature will be comparatively overlooked because its brilliancy is obscured by the immense quantity of rubbish into which it is thrown.

While, therefore, we have no lack of interest in well executed biography, where the subject is worthy of such a notice, we acknowledge that there is nothing specially attractive to us in the announcement of the biography of an individual of whom we have never heard ; and hence, when we took up the life of Ebenezer Porter Mason, we should probably have never looked beyond the title-page, if the name of Professor Olmsted had not caught our eye—a name which would be regarded by every body as a sufficient pledge that the book was worth reading. And we had not advanced far in it, before we ceased to feel the need of the biographer's name to carry us forward ; and when we had read it once we read it again ; and now, upon the most sober view we can take of it, we feel justified in saying that the character which it delineates is in some respects among the most remarkable that have come within our knowledge. The book is well written of course—is characterized throughout by good taste, good judgment, and good feeling, but we are sure that Professor Olmsted will agree with us that it derives its highest interest from the remarkable facts which it details. We subjoin an outline of the life of this youthful prodigy, not as a substitute for the book itself, but as an inducement to our readers to possess themselves of the work, as exhibiting a more ex-

traordinary development of some of the faculties than almost any to be found on record.

Ebenezer Porter Mason was born at Washington, Connecticut, December 7, 1819; and we presume was named for the excellent Dr. Porter, who was formerly minister of that parish, and subsequently Professor and President of the theological institution at Andover. His father was the Rev. Stephen Mason, Dr. Porter's successor as minister of the parish in which he was born. In his very infancy, his precocious powers began to discover themselves; and he was scarcely less distinguished from other infants, than in childhood he was distinguished from other children, and in more advanced youth from other young men. His powers of observation especially began to develop themselves at what would seem an almost incredibly early period; and his father states that "he had seen him while a little creeper on the carpet, before he could walk, amusing himself with an examination of colors, textures and configurations; and seemingly to find exquisite delight in the graceful coils of a hair, and in the variety of changes which his little fingers could effect in its appearance." His fondness for books began to discover itself before he was yet two years old; and even at that early period, he evinced his love of knowledge, by finding matter for inquiry in almost every object that came under his observation. His parent, however, aware of his unusual precocity, with great good judgment, forbore to hasten the development of his powers, in the hope that a more leisurely growth might better subserve not only the consistency of his intellectual character, but the vigor of his physical constitution.

At the age of about three, this interesting child was visited with one of the greatest of all earthly calamities—the loss of an excellent mother. This loss, however, it pleased a kind Providence in a great measure to make up, by the kindness of another mother, and especially by the assiduous and devoted attentions of a beloved aunt, Mrs. Harriet B. Turner, who had much to do with his intellectual and moral training, who followed him through life with an affection truly maternal, and who ministered to his last wants before he went down into the valley of death.

From the time he was eight years old he was much under the care of Mrs. Turner, whose residence was in Richmond, Virginia; and it is chiefly from the memoranda which she has furnish-

ed, that his biography, especially through the period of his childhood, has been made out. The book must be read before any adequate idea of his capabilities at this early period can be formed: *our* limits only permit us to say that he had gained a thorough knowledge of the steam-engine, that his play-things were globes and philosophical instruments, that he could calculate, especially in fractions, with astonishing facility, and that he had a perfect passion for that most sublime of all sciences, the science of astronomy.

During his residence at the South, his remarkable powers attracted the attention of many distinguished individuals, and especially of the late excellent Dr. John H. Rice, who expressed the highest admiration of his genius, and the deepest interest in his future welfare. But notwithstanding all the attention that he excited, and all the caresses that were lavished upon him, he lost nothing of the simplicity and modesty appropriate to childhood. He was a child in his appearance, and in dutiful respect towards his superiors; but in his aspirations, and to a great extent in his pursuits, he was a man.

It does not appear that at this early period, he was the subject of any very strongly marked religious impressions; and yet we find that he was a most diligent and interested attendant on the Sabbath school, and was foremost in his zeal for acquiring a knowledge of the Holy Scriptures. Indeed his father remarks that "the clearness and strength of his intellectual faculties, were no less perceptible in his biblical than in his mathematical investigations; and while he fully believed in the inspiration of the Bible and the doctrines which it contains, his faith was not merely a prejudice, but a sober, enlightened conviction.

In 1829, the Rev. Mr. Mason removed from Washington to Nantucket, where he was settled over a congregational church. Shortly after this, his son returned from the South, and went to live again under the parental roof. A letter addressed to his aunt shortly after his arrival at his new home, containing an account of his first impressions of Nantucket, is preserved in the memoir; and any person who has ever visited that singular spot, will, in reading the letter, be struck with a description entirely true to his recollections, and will marvel when he considers that it came from the pen of a little boy but ten years of age.

His residence at Nantucket continued for about two years;

during which period he enjoyed the best advantages for intellectual culture, not only from his connection as a pupil with an excellent school, but from his constant intercourse with parents and other friends who had formed a proper estimate of his powers, and were earnestly bent upon his improvement. The memoir introduces several interesting facts illustrative of the rapidity and extent of his acquirements at this time, and shows that he had already become at home in profound investigations. But with the strength of his reasoning faculty, he gave evidence also at this early period of a vigorous and brilliant imagination; for though it does not appear that he wrote *much* poetry, he wrote *some*, which, if he had been nothing *but* a poet, would have given him a reputation. His "Farewell to Nantucket" and some other pieces, are conceived and executed with inimitable tenderness and beauty, and show that he was as capable of soaring among the stars for the indulgence of a luxuriant fancy as for purposes of scientific investigation.

In the autumn of 1832, Mr. Mason sent his son to an excellent school that had been established at Ellington, Conn., under the superintendence of Judge Hall. Here he continued nearly two years, his mind rapidly unfolding, and giving new promise of the highest intellectual distinction. Some of his compositions while at Ellington, both in poetry and prose, are given us by his biographer; and they so far exceed any thing which his age might lead us to expect, that one might well require the most ample testimony to be satisfied of their genuineness.

On leaving Ellington, young Mason returned to his paternal residence at Nantucket, and became an assistant teacher in the school in which he had formerly been a pupil. Shortly after this, his father finding his labors as a minister at Nantucket too severe for his constitution, resigned his pastoral charge in that place, and removed with his family to Collinsville, a small manufacturing village on Farmington river. His son passed the ensuing summer with his friends in Richmond; and in the following August was admitted a member of the Freshman class in Yale College. His examination on that occasion attracted the attention of the professors who conducted it, and satisfied them that he possessed a mathematical genius of the highest order.

Our limits do not permit us to go minutely into the history of his college life. It is a history of lofty aspirations and wonderful acquisitions, on the one hand, and of struggles wit

poverty and disease on the other. Scarcely had he joined college, before Professor Olmsted discovered that his ruling passion was for astronomy, and that he had no common genius for the pursuit to which his inclination prompted him; and notwithstanding the delicacy which the professor has observed in his biography, it is manifest that young Mason found in him a friend and a father, as well as a professor; and that it was especially owing to *his* fostering care and attention that his wonderful genius for astronomy was so rapidly and successfully developed. In the progress of his college course, we find him here making a long series of the most accurate and difficult observations upon the heavenly bodies, and there constructing telescopes of great power, and bringing out the most exquisite astronomical drawings—and all this in connexion with the ordinary routine of college studies. With a frail constitution at best, it was to be expected that his nightly watchings of the stars, with the necessarily attendant exposures persevered in for years, would affect his health; and accordingly, we find that at several different periods of his college life, disease seemed to be making its inroads upon his constitution; and there were signs which he overlooked, which yet announced to his anxious friends that he was probably destined to a premature grave. In addition to this, the unexpected failure of some pecuniary resources to which he had been permitted to look, subjected him to great embarrassment, and obliged him to make the most vigorous efforts to sustain himself to the close of his college course; but through the kindness of his excellent friend, Professor Olmsted, he was furnished with employment more congenial to his taste, by which he was enabled to continue in college, and relieved in some measure from the painful reflection of being dependent on charity. Before he left college, his attainments in astronomy were such as to command the respect of the first astronomers of the country; and the results of many of his observations have been carefully treasured up to be transmitted to posterity. In his senior years he seems to have resolved on devoting his life to his favorite science; though, notwithstanding his eager pursuit of this branch, he was highly accomplished in general literature, and not unfrequently invoked with much success the favor of the muses.

Shortly after he was graduated he visited Philadelphia, where he had an opportunity of making the acquaintance of many distinguished men of science, from which he derived a

fresh impulse in his astronomical pursuits. From this visit he returned to New Haven as a resident graduate, and was for some time occupied, partly in preparing a treatise on practical astronomy, and partly in completing an article on the nebulæ, which was afterwards published in the Transactions of the American Philosophical Society. This article, which Professor Olmsted reckons as its author's greatest achievement, makes about fifty pages quarto, and is regarded as one of the most valuable recent contributions which our country has furnished to astronomical science. At this period, owing to the immense amount of labor which he had assumed, and the constant exposures to the night air to which he subjected himself, his health became alarmingly impaired, and he reluctantly yielded to the importunity of Professor Olmsted to relax from his severe application to study. From this time, however, his health seems to have become an object of more solicitude with him, and he felt the importance of making his course of life, so far as possible, subservient to its establishment and preservation.

Early in the summer of 1840, he received an invitation from the Western Reserve College to a tutorship in that institution; and as, besides other advantages, the place was likely to offer some peculiar facilities for the prosecution of his astronomical researches, he was much inclined to accept the invitation. But while he was hesitating between this offer and a half-formed purpose to give up all literary and scientific pursuits for a year, and spend that time on a farm in Michigan, for the benefit of his health, a new proposal was made to him which seemed far more advantageous than either of his other plans, and which he determined without hesitation to accept. The proposal was that he should join the expedition under the government of the United States, for exploring the disputed boundary between Maine and Canada. Nothing could have been more accordant with his tastes and wishes, than this; for while it would secure to him a constant intercourse with kindred spirits, and furnish him with an opportunity to prosecute his favorite astronomical observations under a new and peculiar form, it would give him all the physical exercise he would need, and would be just the thing, as he imagined, to restore vigor to his enfeebled constitution. Accordingly, having received the appointment in due form, after a few days of hurried preparation, he set out for Portland on the 24th August with a view to join the expedition.

After an absence of about two months, during which he

seems to have been actively employed, and to have acquitted himself with much credit, he returned to New-York, with his health in no wise benefitted by the hardships to which he had been subjected. Nevertheless, his interest in his astronomical pursuits had suffered no abatement; and he was especially concerned to complete the system of Practical Astronomy which he had undertaken at the instance of Professor Olmsted, and had left in an unfinished state at the time of his joining the expedition. Within a few days after his arrival at New-York, he made a short visit at New-Haven, where he was cordially welcomed to the hospitalities of Professor Olmsted's house, and had every thing done that Christian kindness could do, to render him comfortable. But the friends who had loved and cherished him so long and so tenderly, and who had hoped so much from his eminently useful life, could no longer resist the conviction that he was laboring under an incurable disease, and that his earthly labors would soon be ended. In accordance with their recommendation as well as his own convictions, he determined to try the effect of a southern climate; and with a view to this, immediately set out to visit his favorite aunt, Mrs. Turner, who still resided in Virginia.

Professor Olmsted gives a touching description of the scene of parting with his young friend, with the full expectation that the separation would be succeeded by no future meeting in this world. On his journey, he stopped a few days in New-York and Philadelphia, and in each place was occupied chiefly with his astronomical friends. On his arrival at Richmond he was not a little exhausted by the fatigue incident to his journey, and his friends, who received him with the fondest affection, the moment they beheld him, saw that he had come to them to die. Professor Olmsted received a letter from him dated the 19th of December, giving an account of his journey, and another from one of his friends dated the 27th, giving an account of his death. He was confined to his bed but a day or two, and in the act of being raised from his bed died without a struggle or a groan.

It will naturally be inquired what were the views and hopes of this young man in the prospect of death, and what evidence he left behind him that he had made provision for the coming world. The data which the memoir furnishes in relation to this subject are more scanty than we could have desired; and yet this seems to be owing not to any fault in his biographer, but rather to the

cautious reserve with which he communicated his feelings. From his earliest childhood he manifested great tenderness of conscience, the utmost respect for parental authority, and an uncommon interest in the study of God's word; and his father early expressed the hope, as he himself did tremblingly towards the close of his life, that he might have experienced the renovating operations of the Holy Spirit while he was yet in his infancy. And during his whole life, so far as appears, his character was marked by the strictest regard to moral rectitude. In reply to a letter from his father, informing him of the hopeful conversion of his sister, he expressed a deep interest in the intelligence, seeming at the same time to recognize the fact that he was himself much less devoted to his highest interests than he ought to be. There are many passages in his writings that indicate his full conviction of the vanity of all human pursuits without reference to the interests of another life, and of the greatness and dignity of man as an accountable and immortal being. During the last few months of his life, his mind evidently became more intensely fixed on religious subjects, and Butler's *Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion* and his Bible seem to have been his constant companions. In his last conversation with Professor Olmsted, in which the Professor communicated to him honestly his impressions in regard to the fatal and rapidly approaching result of his malady, he expressed his determination to devote himself more earnestly and decidedly to his immortal interests, and then it was he remarked that he had sometimes ventured to hope that he had been the subject of an early renovation, though he added that his subsequent coldness in regard to religious things had led him greatly to doubt whether he could have experienced such a change. On his arrival in Richmond, at the house of his beloved and devoted aunt, Mrs. Turner, religion became still more the all-absorbing object of his thoughts; and perhaps no one could have been found more capable than this excellent relative of giving his last thoughts a right direction. In an account of his last days Mrs. Turner writes to a friend thus:—"A day or two after his arrival, he said to me, 'Aunt, it is gratifying to see my friends, as an expression of their kindness, but I am very desirous, and I feel it to be of great importance to me, to be left alone. I wish you would place here for my use Scott's Bible, Doddridge's *Rise and Progress*, and Alleine's *Alarm*.' I remarked, 'My dear, you are very weak, and not able to read much: here is your Bible,

where you know there is ample provision made for all you need.' He said, 'I am sensible of that, and all I can do is to cast myself at the footstool of divine mercy, and I trust I shall not be cast away.' I immediately presented to his mind the case of the leper, mentioned in the seventh chapter of the second of Kings, which he appeared fully to comprehend and to feel. At another time, while reading to him the fourteenth chapter of John, he took the words from me and repeated them from memory. I remarked, 'I am rejoiced, my dear, that this passage is so familiar to you in this season of trial.' He said, 'I know it all, but I want to feel it more;' and when I asked if these chapters had fastened on his mind from Sunday-school instruction, he replied, 'No, but from reading them so much.' He seemed to take a deep interest in my reading to him Mrs. Graham's '*Passage over Jordan*,' which you know is a collection of portions of Scripture, adapted to these solemn circumstances with appropriate remarks. In this manner his thoughts were occupied, when he was suddenly taken from us."

The estimate which Professor Olmsted forms of the intellectual character of the subject of his memoir, seems to us to be fully sustained by the history of his life which precedes it. The crowning attribute of his mind seems to have been a versatility which enabled him successfully to adapt himself to any thing. His powers of observation, of reflection, of reasoning, of fancy, were all of the higher, if not of the very highest order; and though he will be remembered chiefly as an astronomer, he might have been, for aught that appears, equally distinguished as a mechanician, and in a high degree as a poet. His biographer institutes an interesting comparison between his powers and those of the lamented Professor Fisher; and concludes—and we think justly—that while the former had far more versatility than the latter, he would not, if he had lived to the same age, have been inferior to him in soundness and depth of intellect.

We sometimes see great vigor of mind associated with moral qualities which almost give us a disrelish for what is admirable in the intellect; but in the case of young Mason, the heart and the head seem to have been in delightful keeping. He was a gentle, docile, unpretending youth, full of affection to his friends and of gratitude to his benefactors; and while he accommodated himself most readily to the circumstances in which Providence placed him, he possessed an invincible perseverance to overcome any obstacles that might lie in his way. Those

who knew him best seem to have given him the greatest amount of affection as well as of admiration.

We should forbear an inherent prying into the secrets of Providence; and yet one can hardly help asking wherefore it is that He, who orders all things according to the counsel of his will, sends here and there a great spirit upon the earth to exhibit its marvellous powers for a little season, and then to our view prematurely closes the present scene of its exercises and improvements. We may, perhaps, find a solution of this problem partly in the fact, that things out of the common course strike the mind with the greatest power; and that notwithstanding all the advantages of the general uniformity of the Divine government, some apparent variation from the track in which Providence ordinarily moves, may occasionally be necessary to arrest and direct the thoughts of men. The history of such a mind as that of Mason, is fitted to exalt our conceptions, more than the history of a thousand ordinary minds, of the grandeur that pertains to the human soul—the grandeur of its faculties—the grandeur of its destiny. In contemplating men of only a common intellectual stature, such as we meet with in our every-day intercourse, we are but little impressed with the greatness of the human spirit. But let us see the giant mind towering above all others with which it is associated; let us see the youth sinking into the profound of mathematical science; or exploring other worlds by instruments of his own construction; or soaring away on an eagle's wing in fields of fancy—and it must be no common degree of stupidity that will suppress in our minds the feeling of reverence for our own spirits, and the feeling of concern that they may fulfil their appointed end. If the mind, even in this early stage of its existence, can achieve so much; if, while subject to the influence of flesh and sense, it can make itself at home in the distant regions of immensity;—what will it not effect, as it shall expand under purer influences, and in brighter worlds, in the illimitable progress of its being? How vastly important that this great and immortal principle should receive a right direction! and how foolish and guilty are they who trifle in any way with their own souls! And while the appearance of a youthful prodigy upon earth must impress us with the inherent dignity of the mind, his removal from the earth, if his powers have been rightly directed, is equally fitted to impress us with the grandeur and glory of heaven. For *there* are assembled a host of illus-

trious minds, and their employments are worthy of their faculties ; and every object which occupies them renders the impress of heavenly beauty more deep, and thus they are undergoing a perpetual transition from glory to glory. When a youth of exalted intellect is removed from earth to heaven, it suggests the reflection that in that world of light, all flourish in immortal youth ; and even those who have descended through the vale of age, into the yet deeper valley of death, have come out of that valley in the glory of a complete intellectual and spiritual renovation.

But while the occasional appearance of these intellectual prodigies doubtless has its important uses in the government of God, let it not be forgotten that every such case is attended with some peculiar dangers. We will notice two of the most important.

There is danger to the bodily health. It often happens that a mind of the highest order is found inhabiting a tenement of unusual frailty ; and unless the tenement be carefully guarded, it will inevitably go prematurely to ruin. There is an inward fire in the spirit that consumes the vital energies ; and while we are yet gazing at some glorious young genius, we are called to write his epitaph. Mason from his earliest childhood had a feeble frame ; and while the operations of his mind were most vigorous and intense, his ruling passion led him to the most imprudent exposures, and what was little better than trifling with his delicate constitution ; and under this double influence, it was not strange that he came so early to his grave. Young men of superlative genius are under special obligations to guard their health ; partly from the greater ability which they possess to render good service to their generation, and the consequently increased value of their lives, and partly from the fact, that they have to encounter some untoward influences arising from the more intense action of the mind upon the body, from which others are exempt. There is a voice from the grave of Mason charging every highly gifted young man, and indeed every one who is bent upon the highest cultivation of his powers, sacredly to guard his health, and to take care that his intellectual pursuits are not at the expense of an emaciated frame and a broken constitution. It is a debt which he owes to himself, to his friends, to his country, to his race—that so far as it is in his power, he preserve his physical vigor unabated ; for, so long as the mind is connected with the body and acts through bodily

organs, it must depend in no small degree on the health of the body for the success of its operations.

And there is yet greater danger in reference to his spiritual and immortal interests,—greater, as the interests at stake are more momentous. There is reason to hope that Mason was no stranger to the influence of eternal things; and that the mind which was here trained to such sublime excursions, is now prosecuting its researches into the works of God in a brighter light, and on a nobler field of observation. Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that the intensity of his devotion to scientific pursuits, lessened his general spirituality of character, and that a portion of the time which he spent in gazing at the visible heavens, had better have been spent in communion with his Heavenly Father. True, indeed, there is nothing in science in itself considered that is adverse to the influence of Christianity,—on the contrary, science supplies to a rightly disciplined spirit the materials of devotion; and this is pre-eminently true of astronomy, which has in it every thing to exalt the Creator, and to abase man at his feet. And yet science, even astronomy, may so engross the whole man that God shall be forgotten in the pursuit; or if he be not entirely forgotten, shall receive but a partial and divided homage. If we mistake not, the fact to which we here refer is often illustrated in the experience of religious students in our colleges. They suffer themselves to be so engrossed by their daily studies, that they find less time than they ought for daily devotion; while at the same time, they apologize to their consciences that necessity constrains them to be diligent, and that they are occupied in preparation for future usefulness. If the secrets of many a pious student's heart were revealed, we doubt not that it would appear that his best religious enjoyments were previous to his entering college; and that in proportion as the fire of ambition had kindled, the fire of devotion had gone out.

We have made these remarks, not with an intention to repress a suitable zeal on the part of religious students in the pursuit of science and literature, but only to put them on their guard against perverting the advantages of their situation to the neglect of their higher interests. Let them remember that it is altogether at too great an expense that they become accomplished scholars, and bear away the highest collegiate honors, if they thereby lose in any degree their evidence of the divine favor or their interest in eternal things. Let them study dili-

gently, earnestly, but in all their studies let God be acknowledged, and let every new attainment be consecrated to his service. And let those who make no pretensions to Christian character, remember that this character must become theirs, else neither the purpose of their lives is gained, nor the salvation of their souls secured; and let them bear in mind that science, literature, any thing that takes complete possession of the soul to the exclusion of eternal things, will operate as a barrier between them and heaven. Learning in itself is a noble endowment, but unsanctified learning, ill directed learning, can never be a blessing to its possessor.

In taking leave of this book, we feel that we have done it but imperfect justice in the brief sketch which we have now given. We have been able to deal only in generals, whereas the book deals in particulars; and those who will estimate the character as it deserves, must not be contented with any thing short of Professor Olmsted's description of it. It is well that the writing of the memoir was confided to such hands; and we doubt not that the manner in which he has done his work will secure to him the approbation and gratitude, not only of his own generation, but of posterity.

ARTICLE IX.

CONFLICT OF LAWS—OF CHURCH AND STATE.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

WE are obliged, in the present case, either to depart from our rule as to giving the author's name, or to deprive our readers of the valuable thoughts of our respected correspondent. We reluctantly choose the former, after vain efforts to overcome the extreme modesty of the author and his reluctance to write for the public in any other way than anonymously.

His legal acquirements, however, are such as to secure for him a high judicial station, and to qualify him for speaking by authority on the points discussed in the subsequent article. The views are striking, and worthy the consideration of every

citizen, and more especially of every minister of the gospel in this country, of every denomination.

This, and the discussion of the biblical question in the last number of the Repository, have thrown up a munition of rock around the right of a man to marry the sister of his deceased wife, which it will require a strong battery to demolish. ED.

UNION of Church and State is a partisan alarm-cry, frequently raised without cause, in apparent stupidity, for sinister purpose. The success which nevertheless attends it, proves the extreme sensitiveness of the public mind to the slightest indication of danger from this quarter. Frightful indeed must have been the mischief which has left such an indelible impression of dread upon the memory of mankind.

Conflict of Church and State has made no such impression; it is not among even our imaginary perils: but history teaches us, there have been evils from this source, and wisdom admonishes us to be guarded against them. Power over conscience, is a tremendous power; it has been employed sometimes through ignorance and delusion, sometimes through sincere conviction, often through unprincipled, calculating selfishness, for effecting great wickedness.

In this country, although fanaticism has not been wanting in zeal or effort to excite, under pretence of religion, the energies of conscience against state institutions, the church has discreetly confined itself within its own province. Having for its great work, the salvation of men, it has wisely refused to suffer any obstacle to be placed in its way of access to them; it has not sought, for the sake of its own greatness, to exercise lordship or authority; but it has, to a greater or less extent, recognised the vital principle of usefulness,—to become the servant of all, if by all means it may save some. With respect to the civil power, it keeps in view its divine Teacher and his doctrines—"Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you?"—"My kingdom is not of this world."—"The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them; and they that exercise authority upon them are called benefactors; but ye shall not be so."—"Let every soul be subject to the higher powers: for there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God:"—"wherefore ye must needs be subject not only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake."—"The servant of the Lord must not

strive, but be gentle unto all men, apt to teach, patient, in meekness instructing those that oppose themselves, if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth, and that they may recover themselves out of the snare of the devil who are taken captive by him at his will."—Who would suppose, that there had ever been lust and strife of the church for power? Yet, looking in this direction, what havoc do we see of the rights and welfare of man! what desolation of intellect, and morals, and all good! It is not by conflict of laws, nor by acts of power, that the church can expect to promote just government, but by enlightening and purifying, through a preached gospel, the minds and consciences of men: it is through "supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks made for all men, for kings and for all that are in authority;" its members must "lead quiet and peaceable lives in all godliness and honesty."—"Seek the peace of the city, and pray unto the Lord for it; for in the peace thereof ye shall have peace."

An occurrence some years ago at Princeton illustrates this point. A groundless complaint was made that the wagon conveying the United States mail, had been stopped at that place on the Sabbath by virtue of a law of New Jersey; implicating certain distinguished individuals of the Presbyterian church, known as steadfast maintainers of the sanctity of the Lord's DAY. These individuals felt it to be their duty not merely to absolve themselves from the implication, but to inquire, and give a public account of the transaction, refuting the complaint. The ground of the complaint was, the putting of the law of a state in conflict with a law of the United States, being of superior authority; it was intended through this complaint covertly to assail the church as instigating to this course; the refutation was designed to remove all surmise of this kind. Here was more than an acknowledgment, that the church should not permit itself to have law in conflict with the law of the land; it was acted on, as principle, that the church could not, with propriety, abet the putting of a law of an individual State in conflict with a law of the United States, but must take knowledge, and acquiesce in the superior authority of the latter; although conscientiously approving the state law, and disapproving the law of the United States, as a palpable violation of the divine commandment, "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy."

The church will not intentionally come into collision with the state :—with understanding of the case, it will not allow a conflict of law—its own law with that of the state. This evil can be introduced, only when unperceived. Yet so blinding is prejudice, and so perverse is inveterate opinion, that it may be introduced and become flagrant, and still its existence be positively and obstinately denied.

These reflections have arisen upon examining the decision of the General Assembly in McQueen's case, that marriage with a deceased wife's sister is incestuous, and therefore liable to the penal consequences of incest : a decision of far greater concern than appears to a superficial view. This remark has no allusion to any matter of Biblical criticism or interpretation, involved in the case ; although in these respects very extraordinary positions must be taken to sustain the decision : but the point of special regard is, that it was not deemed material in the case, that the marriage in question was lawful in the state where contracted ; that under the laws of that state the parties had the right to contract it ; that it was celebrated by authority of these laws, and thus received the highest sanction of legality and propriety according to the principles of our institutions, securing our lives, liberties and property ; and that these laws require the faithful observance of it. It is surprising indeed, if a church existing under the structure of government formed by the laws, dependent upon them for protection and safety, for that distinguished blessing religious liberty, in judging of actions as right or wrong, may disregard the stamp of the law upon them, and treat its deliberate sanction as of no effect. When a church by its solemn sentence condemns and punishes as criminal an act which the state authorizes, and seals as lawful and binding, there is certainly a conflict of laws—of church and state.

To make plain the remark, that it is surprising, if a church (or its judicatory) in judging actions as right or wrong, may disregard the stamp and sanction of law upon them, it will be useful to recur to certain established principles held by all civil courts. Suppose a resident of Massachusetts marries there the sister of his deceased wife. In Massachusetts the marriage is lawful and binding. He with his wife removes to Virginia, and settles there : they are subject to the laws of Virginia. According to these laws, it is incestuous for a man to marry his deceased wife's sister : the marriage is forbidden, it is void. But if the marriage of these persons is drawn in question in

Virginia, her courts will pronounce them husband and wife, and hold the marriage valid; giving to it all the legal effect and consequences of a lawful marriage.—On what ground?—the lawfulness of the marriage where contracted; holding it to be a principle of universal justice, that the laws where an act is rightfully done, determine its character and legal effect. The argument upon this point applies with greater force to a church judicatory than to a state government. Virginia is a sovereign state: in her independent power of legislation she has prohibited marriage with a deceased wife's sister; making it unlawful and void: those who remove and settle within her limits, by their own act, of their free will, subject themselves to her laws. Yet with respect to such persons, she holds as principle because of justice, that their acts shall be judged according to the laws where they were done, not merely to exempt from penal consequences, but to sustain as valid for all legal purposes. But the church has no independence analogous to state sovereignty: it exists within the structure of government, is dependent upon the laws for protection, and owes allegiance to them; and it acknowledges, in the principle discarding union of church and state, the right of legislation to be in the state exclusive of any participation on its part. The obligation and propriety requiring the church to pay deference to the laws to which it owes allegiance, and from which it receives protection, are more obvious, than any principle requiring one independent state to respect the laws of another in relation to acts done under them. How then can it be sustained, that the church judicatory in this case shall not only refuse to allow the validity of the marriage in question according to the law under which it was contracted, but shall go beyond this, and although the marriage has the full sanction of these laws, condemn it as an offence and visit it with punishment?

Marriage necessarily is the subject of law:—who may marry; what are impediments to marriage including prohibitions on account of kindred and other disabilities; what constitutes a valid marriage; what are its legal incidents and effects; in what manner and for what cause it can be dissolved; are all matters of law, involving all inheritances and transmissions of property, the character and legal capacity of all persons as legitimate or illegitimate, and all the rights and duties, obligations and responsibilities arising from the relation of husband and wife:—law most extensive in its operation, continually called for, vital

to society. This law, in these United States, must proceed from the CIVIL POWER: there can be no law on the subject except what this power pronounces and administers. In the Old World ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS have jurisdiction over matrimonial causes; taking cognizance of marriage and divorce. In this country, the fundamental principle of our government securing social order and civil and religious liberty, discards union of church and state: of course, the state alone, exclusive of the church, makes and administers law.

In our Union, the law of marriage belongs to the municipal codes of the individual states: it is enacted by their legislatures, and pronounced and administered by their courts. The states are in the common exercise of this jurisdiction; every matter in respect to marriage or divorce is determined by their legislatures or courts. If in any state the legislature have made no enactment, and a question of marriage arise, it must be decided according to general principles recognised by the structure of government, which it is the province of the judiciary to investigate, pronounce and apply. In 1820 a case under such circumstances came before the chancellor (Kent) of New-York. Remarking "the singular situation" of that state, "probably unexampled in the Christian world," in "having no statute regulating marriage, or prescribing the solemnities of it, or defining the forbidden degrees," he says, there must be a tribunal to apply "the principles of jurisprudence" to these matters, "otherwise there would be a most deplorable and distressing imperfection in the administration of justice;"—and he determines, that in New-York the Court of Chancery was the tribunal. Since that time the legislature of New-York have enacted a law upon this subject.

The six eastern states, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut; the five middle states, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware; of the southern states, Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama; and of the western states, Kentucky, Arkansas, Missouri and Michigan, (eighteen out of twenty-six,) have legislated concerning marriage, and prescribed the prohibited degrees evidently in view of xviiith Leviticus: in neither of these states is marriage forbidden with a deceased wife's sister; but in every one of them that marriage is lawful, the right of the citizen, as fully established and as well secured as any other right. Virginia has enacted a law of marriage; and a deceased wife's sister is a prohibited

case. The other seven states cannot be spoken of with absolute certainty. It is confidently believed from researches made, that in all of them with at most one exception, there is a law of marriage enacted by the legislature, and that in all of them marriage is lawful with a deceased wife's sister. Virginia is believed to be the single exception to the law of the states upon this point; an exception obviously attributable to the entire predominance of the Episcopal church in that state, as shown by the Memoirs of President Davies, and other notices of its early history, and the usual insertion formerly in the book of Common Prayer and the authorized Bible, of the table canonically established by that church of the prohibited degrees in marriage. This table, part of such books, prohibiting marriage with a deceased wife's sister, the prohibition became an article of religious belief, pervading the common mind; the marriage was thus associated with incest—an opprobrious name: it is not necessary to suggest how strong and lasting would be a prejudice so formed, even if utterly groundless. The following passages quoted in a late able "*View of the doctrine and practice of the ecclesiastical courts in England relative to marriage and divorce*," from a work in 1674, of Dr. Dixon, Doctor of Divinity of the Episcopal church in England, place this table in a point of light proper and useful to be regarded. He says, "In respect of marriage, the Levitical degrees do, in fact, bind us; yet they do not bind us by Divine authority; because their obligation by Divine authority ceased, expired and died at the death of Christ; and therefore all Christian churches were left to their several liberties to follow such rules, orders, measures and degrees, as by right reason and Christian prudence should be established. For the determination whereof, the church of England conceived it the most prudent course to make the Levitical laws her precedent and pattern; and at last assumed them, and adopted them into her own canons and statutes; reviving with them an obligation, not of Divine authority, as once they had from God, but of human authority, by the secular and ecclesiastical power of our princes and bishops after the reformation." Of similar import is the authority of Paley, a name entitled to no common respect: "Upon this principle the marriage as well as other cohabitation of brothers and sisters, and lineal kindred, and of all who usually live in the same family, may be said to be forbidden by the law of nature. Restrictions which extend to remoter degrees of kindred

than what this reason makes it necessary to prohibit from inter-marriage, are founded in the authority of the positive law which ordains them."

According to this doctrine of Paley, all prohibitions of marriage between kindred beyond the direct line, ascending and descending (as parents and children, grand-parents, &c.), and the first collateral degree (brothers and sisters), are matters of positive law; and of course it belongs to the power invested with authority to make law upon the subject, to determine what prohibitions there shall be. This is fully corroborated by the quotation from Dr. Dixon, which by its plainness and reasonableness approves itself to every considerate mind. It might be added that, in a leading case upon the subject in England, much discussed there, in which there was strenuous, even irregular exertion on the part of the church to establish and constructively extend the Levitical degrees, one of their best and greatest judges, after consultation with all the other judges, declared, that the ground of these degrees being in force in the nation, was that their laws had adopted them: their laws were the governing principle, giving existence to the rule that applied these degrees. But we need no aid from authorities to support our state legislation. We have seen, indeed no one looking to the many vital interests and concerns arising from the marriage relation can doubt, that there must be law upon this subject; it is indispensable: and it is equally undeniable, that in the structure of our government, the power to make and administer this law is in the state, exclusive of the church. According to the very nature of government, upon first principles of polity, that which the proper authority of the state enacts or pronounces to be the law, is the law, and must be allowed all the attributes of law. Upon any other principle we legitimate that spirit of misrule, so fearful in this country, to which, that it may be treated with levity, a slang name has been given (*Lynch law*), and which works in secret and disguise, in the hearts of many who tremble at its gross manifestation. Therefore the law of each state upon the subject of marriage is authoritative rule for adjudicating all marriages regularly solemnized within its jurisdiction. Persons contracting marriage under this law, have its sanction and protection; and their act must be treated as lawful and valid. We have seen, that all civil authority in all places, even where a different law prevails, recognizes this principle. Can the church

repudiate it? Can the church visit with condemnation and punishment persons under protection of the laws of the land, for their obedience to these laws, and acts in conformity to them?

It may be answered that the church proceeds spiritually in this matter; that it imputes no secular offence, and awards no secular penalty; but being the rightful expositor of the word of God, and determining the marriage in question sinful according to that word, it convicts of the sin and inflicts spiritual punishment. It is presumed that this is the ground on which the proceeding and sentence in McQueen's case are placed and vindicated; and it is a bold one—probably more so than those who take it imagine. One of the strongest arguments against the Roman Catholic church in this country, is, that it has spiritual laws that may contravene the laws of the land. Some of the severest and most earnest measures in England against that church, were directed against it on this very point, receiving and acknowledging spiritual laws inconsistent with the laws of that kingdom. Is the position admissible, that in our system of government, securing equally civil and religious liberty, the church can have its spiritual laws repugnant to the municipal law, and by its judicial proceedings and sentences, so far as it can make its spiritual power felt, invalidate that law?—requiring its members to forego or renounce the benefits thereby secured to them, or in the alternative, depriving them of their spiritual comforts, and if ministers, of their ministerial office and their livelihood! On the contrary, is it not inherent in our polity as a principle, that the church equally with others, individuals or bodies, is subject to the municipal law, and that it can have no rule nor pursue any proceeding inconsistent with this law; such rule or proceeding, from the nature of the case, being void. But the inquiry may be made: Suppose the municipal law to be contrary to the word of God, must not the church obey God rather than man? Neither our Saviour nor his apostles make any such supposition, although living under Tiberius and Nero. Decency does not allow the supposition. It is presumed that our legislators make just laws;—one of the highest and most estimable sanctions of law, respect, arises from this presumption. Whether a law liable to no constitutional exception, can be declared void on any other ground, is a question, in relation to which it is sufficient at present to say, that in all probability there will never be an occasion in this country to determine it.

It is not true, that the church is an authoritative expositor of the word of God. We acknowledge no such functionary. It belongs to the legislative bodies in our country, in their proper spheres to determine, whether proposed laws contravene the divine law; and this determination, so far as concerns their act, is conclusive upon all, within the regular operation of this act.

It may be further answered, that the church is a Body upon the voluntary principle, receiving and retaining its members through their free will; and that therefore for the regulation of their lives, and the promotion of charity, truth and holiness, it may exercise discipline according to the revealed will of God, determined by its own conscience and judgment irrespective of human laws. The Roman Catholic church could not desire a better place to stand upon to move the world. Except in that church this principle has never obtained, and as already remarked, it is its most objectionable feature. It would be most perilous in the governments of the United States, free governments resting upon the opinions of the citizens, to admit a body directing and wielding the power of conscience to act upon rules and enforce sentences paramount to the municipal law, and subversive of the rights it confers. All bodies permitted to exist under our polity, enjoy the privilege upon the principle, that they can have no rules repugnant to the law of the land. So vital is this principle, that although a Body be constituted by the most positive and unqualified terms without condition or modification, the restriction is implied.

It is to be remarked, that the exercise of discipline, the judicial declaration of rules and principles for the adjudicating of cases, the passing of sentences, are very different matters from the preaching of the word. Every citizen may discuss the laws, argue against their propriety, justice or expedience, petition against them, and use all proper measures for repealing or changing them. The church may hold forth its doctrine, and by all the talent of its ministry and members, enlighten and persuade the public mind, and thus contribute its powerful aid to effect desired reformation of laws or manners; but it is not reconcilable with Scripture or reason, that it should proceed judicially against a person, and condemn and punish him as guilty, for an act conformable to the municipal law, and stamped with its sanction. This *divisum imperium*, the church adjudging criminal and penal, what the state authorizes as right and proper, would be an incongruity under any system of gov-

erament. The Roman Catholic church in the times of darkness and superstition usurped jurisdiction over marriage; but it was exclusive; marriage was declared a sacrament, the state was allowed no cognisance of it. In England, in their partial reformation from popery, the ecclesiastical courts retained jurisdiction of marriage cases, and the canon law (*the law of the church*) is their rule of proceeding and judgment. But there is also statute law of that kingdom, like the enactments of our legislatures, concerning marriage. Now although the ecclesiastical courts, upon questions of marriage, have the canon law for their rule, they must regard the statute law as paramount, and not infringe it: if they proceed, upon ecclesiastical law, against a marriage valid according to the statute, the courts of law interpose and prohibit them. The law of the land is maintained; nothing is suffered to be done to prejudice what it sanctions. In Scotland, the law of the state (this term is here used indistinction from church) governs upon this subject. It is true, this law is contained in the Article of Marriage and Divorce in the CONFESSION OF FAITH, and was prepared by the Westminster Assembly of Divines; it however does not derive its authority from that Assembly, or from the church of Scotland, but from the Parliament of Scotland, who, upon the application of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, ratified it by statute, and made it the law of the land. That general assembly did not consider that their ratification of the CONFESSION OF FAITH gave it requisite efficacy; but after their ratification of it, they applied to the Parliament, the legislative power of their country, for an act of legislation to impart this efficacy to it. In this application they solemnly acknowledge the paramount authority of the legislative power of the country and its act. Upon this principle can a General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in these United States disregard the acts of the constitutional legislative power in these states? The principle obviously requires the observance of the municipal law. If the General Assembly of the church of Scotland deemed it requisite to apply to the LEGISLATURE of that kingdom for a law to complete the CONFESSION OF FAITH as a rule in that country, certainly our General Assembly cannot proceed upon it as a rule in this country in direct conflict with the law enacted by our LEGISLATURES. Those familiar with the precedents in the church of Scotland, must consider, that those precedents cannot be applied here; because in Scotland the CONFESSION OF

Faith is attended by statute passed by the Parliament of the kingdom, and is adopted as the law of the land; there can, therefore, be no conflict of laws in Scotland, for that church has taken for principle that it must have the sanction of the laws of the land: while in this country the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church having adopted the *Confession of Faith*, as approved by the General Assembly of Scotland and ratified by the Parliament of that kingdom, the church judicatories proceed upon it without reference to the law of the land, and in the present case have formed and affirmed a decision in contradiction to it.

One consequence, a very serious one, of this *divisum imperium*, the church condemning a marriage as incestuous and convicting the parties of incest, when the marriage was contracted according to law, with its authority and sanction, is, that there can be no repentance. In England or Scotland, when there is a decision that a marriage is incestuous, and a consequent conviction of incest, the marriage is annulled; the parties are put in a condition for repentance, and on repentance they will be received again into the church. But in this country, the church has no power over the marriage; the whole power is in the state; and when the marriage is sanctioned by the law of the state, the parties must continue in it; the state, so far from divorcing, will compel the faithful observance. How then is repentance possible? Its first step and its whole course must trample upon the law. For suppose they yield to the decision of the church, and by mutual consent absolving themselves from the marriage, treat each other as unmarried. In this they violate solemn obligations legally subsisting, and set not only an example of insubordination, under the sentence of the church holding up the law to public odium, but the immoral example of persons in the marriage state living regardless of its bonds; and they are subjected to all the inconveniences of a single state; for they can contract no other marriage. An article in the Princeton Review of July last, justifying the decision of the General Assembly, seems to feel, that perpetual deposition from the ministry and exclusion from the church would be too severe a sentence for the sin. It says, therefore, "This suspension must continue until the party gives evidence of repentance. What evidence is, in this case, to be deemed satisfactory, rests with the discretion of the Presbytery. No one will doubt that incest is an offence which admits of various degrees." Remark-

ing the difference between marriages with a mother, and with an aunt, with a sister and sister-in-law, it proceeds: "As therefore the offence differs, so should the penalty. We find that in the ancient church the penalty for the marriage of a man with his wife's sister was excommunication for a term of years; for marriage with his own sister it was final excision from the church." The allusion in "excommunication for a term of years," is to a canon of a Provincial Council, A. D. 314, which ordains, "if any one after the death of his wife took her sister, he must abstain from the communion for five years." This part of the article is well worthy of examination. Separation of the parties when united in lawful matrimony, would be a scandal to society, a dangerous example, and a deliberate contempt of the laws. That such a separation should be requisite under a sentence of the church, for a restoration to its communion, would not only be a gross reflection upon the civil authority, but would exhibit a countervailing influence incompatible with the spirit of our institutions. The course, related in the History of England, of the monk Dunstan and the Archbishop Odo, toward the beautiful Elgiva and the unfortunate Edwy, could not be endured in this age. The quotation from the Review will not allow, that the sentence in this case, shall extend to the separation of the parties or to their final excision from the church, and it will avoid these consequences by adopting the principle to which it alludes,—that exclusion from church fellowship for a proper period, such as shall be satisfactory to the Presbytery, shall be the punishment. This is a very good suggestion for a Roman Catholic church; but it is not seen how it can be admitted in a Protestant, evangelical one. "As therefore the offence differs" (says the Reviewer), "so should the penalty." The proposition is, that the punishment must be proportioned to the offence, and that when that punishment has been borne, there is an end of punishment; of course, the offender is restored, for there can be no further punishment of the offence; its full punishment has been inflicted. If five years exclusion from communion be the punishment proportioned to the offence, to continue this exclusion longer would make the punishment excessive. This is penance, the true Roman Catholic penance: the sin of the soul cancelled through the suffering of the body: punishment working the restoration of the offender. Five years abstaining from communion, blots out the sin of incest. In our understanding of spiritual punishment, its purpose is to lead to repentance: upon repentance there is forgiveness and restora-

tion; not that the sin is cancelled because it has borne its proportionate punishment, but forgiven on the ground of repentance, and until repentance, no matter how small the sin, there can be no forgiveness nor restoration. In a most flagitious case of incest, a man having his father's wife in his father's lifetime, when he had put away the wife, and was evidently penitent, although he had not been excommunicated more than a year, Paul directs the church to forgive and comfort him, lest he "should be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow," "Wherefore I beseech you that you would confirm your love to him:"—suggesting the warning, "lest Satan should get an advantage of us; for we are not ignorant of his devices." (2 Cor. ii. 5—11. 1 Cor. v. 1—5.) What advantage would it not give Satan in such a case, to exclude, for five years, from church privilege and fellowship! Would not this penalty which the Reviewer finds in the "ancient church," and suggests for precedent, be a convenient instrument for the adversary? Can we avoid noticing the marked difference between the spirit of Paul's instruction, and that of the precedent of the ancient church? This would admonish us to be distrustful of these precedents, even if history were not so full of warning. To invalidate the allegation, that through the early corruption of Christianity, which came to such head in the Romish church, false rules were adopted as well in relation to marriage as other subjects, the article just quoted from, remarks, "the marriage in question was forbidden before there was a Pope in Rome." We do not suppose, the Pope introduced these corruptions; but the corruptions introduced the Pope. Paul says, "the mystery of iniquity doth already work." The first error we see in the church is effort to depreciate and corrupt the New Testament by engrafting upon it the Old.

But to return to our examination of the ground on which in the case in question the offender can be restored to the church. No one can suppose, that the doctrine of penance can obtain in the Presbyterian church during this generation: restoration, therefore, must be through forgiveness upon repentance. In order to repentance there must be a sense of the sin, so that there shall be a turning from it with grief and hatred, with full purpose of, and endeavor after new obedience. The marriage, therefore, must be treated as a sin, and consequently there must be a separation of the parties:—subjecting themselves to discomfort and danger, and society to the bane of their example. Restoration upon any other ground, supposes that there can be no

repentance of sin while continuing in the wilful practise of it ; unless indeed abstaining, for a period, from the communion of the church, have transforming, moral efficacy upon guilt, so that what was incest at the beginning of this period, shall cease to be so at the end of it.

As, therefore, in this country the church cannot exercise effectual jurisdiction over marriage, and its proceeding in spiritual cognisance of it upon any rule distinct from the law of the land must involve itself and the parties in difficulty, it ought to pay deference to the Civil Power, whose jurisdiction upon the subject is complete. Indeed, to this power jurisdiction over this matter is appropriate. Municipal regulations, according to the nature of things, proceed from the civil power : the law of marriage is a municipal regulation : the xviiiith Leviticus is so. True, that law was given to the children of Israel by God ; but it was because of their government being a Theocracy ; he, their lawgiver, prescribing all their laws. In the council of Trent it was stated and admitted, that jurisdiction over marriage had come to the church from the secular power partly by commission, and partly through negligence of the civil magistrates. Under the Theodosian code, compiled toward the close of the fourth century, and the Justinian about the middle of the sixth, this jurisdiction was in the secular authority. Chancellor Kent, after his usual thoroughness and ability of research in the case before mentioned, says : " All matrimonial and other causes of ecclesiastical cognisance belonged originally to the temporal courts." In Scotland the General Assembly of the church by soliciting and obtaining from Parliament a statute ratifying the Confession of Faith, as we have seen, acknowledged the paramount authority of the law of the land, and their proceedings in marriage cases according to the Confession of Faith, are grounded upon it as law enacted by the civil power. In England the Westminster Assembly presented the Confession of Faith to the Parliament of that kingdom, not as having any binding force, but as their advice for the legislative action of that body to make it obligatory. This was no common Parliament. It was elected in troublesome times, the most perilous and interesting period of English history, when, under well grounded apprehension of the despotic disposition of the king and the arbitrary tendency of his measures, there was a general cry for reformation. The occasion was felt by the nation as involving its liberties and happiness ; and men of the highest

and most trustworthy character were sought out to represent the people in the House of Commons. Even Clarendon, an adherent of the royal family through close alliance, allows, that "there were many great and worthy patriots in the house, and as eminent as any age had ever produced: men of gravity and wisdom, of great and plentiful fortunes, all members of the established church, and almost to a man for Episcopal government." In this house, so constituted, the Confession of Faith was presented, December 11, 1646; came up for discussion, May 19th, 1647; and afterwards, from October 2d, to the following 22d of March, was debated every Wednesday. Upon this debate the greater part of the chapter of Marriage and Divorce, including all in controversy in this case, was referred to the law of the land. We have thus the deliberate, solemn judgment of such a body, upon such examination, that the laws of the land are the proper rule upon this subject.

We have seen, that in this country the law of marriage must proceed from the civil power, the state legislatures and the state judiciaries; the first enacting, the last pronouncing and administering it: that this is an essential result of our institutions for the maintenance and preservation of civil and religious liberty. We not only see this as matter of fact, but on examination we find, that it is correct in principle according to the wisest codes of antiquity, of Theodosius the Great and Justinian, held in reverence at this day. This argument is rendered more forcible by the circumstance, that the latter emperor made theology his study, so that it became a prominent feature in his character, was disposed in all things to favor the clergy, by his code, especially his Novels, confirming and enlarging their privileges, and in all disputes between them and laymen seemed to regard it as a settled point, that truth, innocence and justice, were always on the side of the church. That this result of our institutions is correct in principle, is further sustained by the judgment of the very Parliament under whose appointment the Confession of Faith was prepared, and to whom it was presented for ratification, and is corroborated by the fact, that jurisdiction exercised by the church came to it by partly commission from the civil power, and partly through the negligence of its magistrates.

In any light it would appear extraordinary for the church, in deciding a question upon marriage, to refuse to receive the laws of the state of which the parties were citizens as the rule

of decision : but the view that has been presented, shows that there is not a pretence to countenance such a course. Now, whatever may be claimed for the church as a voluntary society, making rules for its own regulation, binding only those who choose to be in its communion, it is utterly incompatible with the essential character of civil authority, that any Body, lay or ecclesiastic, within the pale of our institutions should have rules derogatory or opposed to the laws. Allow this, and the principle is settled, through which carried out in its legitimate consequences, men may be absolved from allegiance to their government. The church in the proper discharge of its functions may instruct, enlighten and persuade, in order to produce a change of laws by the constituted authorities ; but it cannot impair or infringe the duties, rights, or immunities which its members owe or hold, as citizens, under subsisting laws. For the church to impugn by its discipline the laws enacted, declared and administered by the constituted authorities, reproaches the gospel, and disregards propriety. When, therefore, the article referred to, in view of the solemn, legal enactments, it is believed of all but one, certainly of more than two-thirds, of the States in this Union, in order to maintain the decision of the General Assembly, advances the position,—“ Men may legalize such marriages, but they never can cease to be violations of the laws of nature, that is, to be inconsistent with the order and constitution of nature as established by God ;”—the church is placed upon a ground and in an attitude from which all who desire to see its ordinances crowned with salvation, should unite to remove it.

The article of the Princeton Review, before referred to, places its justification of the decision of the General Assembly upon two grounds :—it is against (1st,) the law of nature, (2d,) the word of God, for a man to marry the sister of his deceased wife. The position is laid down,—“ A parent and child, a brother-in-law and sister-in-law cannot intermarry without doing violence to the feelings which, of right and necessity, belong to the relations, and without undermining the foundations of Christian Society.” Is there fairness in joining, as in this position, brother-in-law and sister-in-law with parents and child ? The tendency in common reading is to carry the judgment formed upon one part of the same sentence over the other, especially when in immediate, intimate connection ; and as in this sentence there can be no necessity in respect to parents

and child, most persons will pass along with the sentiment thus produced without stopping to inquire how far brother-in-law and sister-in-law are within the same reason. The phraseology, too, a legal fiction expressing in sound what does not exist in fact, and which seems to have been brought into use in the case we are considering, favors this fallacy, the name of the nearest kindred, brother and sister, being used, because allowed by usage as descriptive of a condition into which kindred does not at all enter. There is certainly no similarity or analogy between the relationships of parent and child, and brother-in-law and sister-in-law, to lead to their being associated. Is not the effect of the association, to connect the feeling which revolts at marriage between parent and child with that between brother-in-law and sister-in-law? The article strongly asserts the impropriety of marriage with a sister-in-law,—the sister of a deceased wife, or the widow of a deceased brother: supposing probably the last the clearest case, and as in another sophism, "*juncta juvant.*" Metaphysical morality easily forms reasons; but common capacities require something substantial and intelligible as ground for opinion. When the article says, "All experience teaches, that habitual, familiar, confidential intercourse, such as must exist among members of the same family, between young persons of different sexes who are allowed to intermarry, is, among the mass of men inconsistent with the preservation of purity,"—the proposition is not disputed; but what application has it to marriage with a brother's widow or a wife's sister? When a man marries, he forms his own separate family: his wife does not become a member of the family of his brother, nor does he become a member of the family of his wife's sisters. Neither case presents the "habitual, familiar, confidential intercourse, such as must and should exist among young persons of different sexes, members of the same family." Besides, the married ones have reached a time and condition of life, when this principle guarding young persons, brothers and sisters, in their free intercourse by a sentiment shrinking with abhorrence from a thought of impurity, has no place, but is superseded by other principles adapted to a more advanced stage of mind and morals. For the reviewer is mistaken, if he supposes that there are not other principles besides this law of incest, sufficient to render the intercourse of the sexes safe and decent. The article adds, "If a wife's sister is not to look upon her brother-in-law as a brother, then she cannot allow

him a brother's rights, nor receive a sister's privileges. She will shrink from him as from every other man. She will become a stranger in her sister's house and to her sister's children."—"Is she to have all the rights and privileges of a sister, without a sister's protection? Is she to be a sister in all the relations but one, and as to that one, a stranger?" The natural inquiry upon these quotations is, What is the practical answer of society to the suggestions? It is believed, that every state of the Union but one, it is certain that in eighteen of them, comprehending a large proportion of the oldest and most populous, the law sanctions marriage with the sister of a deceased wife. This law has been enacted and approved by those intrusted with legislative power; it was prescribed, and it has been sustained by public opinion. These states will certainly bear advantageous comparison with any other people of modern or ancient time with respect to morals and religion, and decency, refinement and intelligence. Is it found, that a wife's sister shrinks from her sister's husband? that she becomes a stranger in her sister's house, and to her sister's children? that she suffers through want of protection? These questions answer themselves, affording a practical and complete refutation of the reviewer's doctrine. The makers of these laws were more competent for their office, than the reviewer. Not only did the institutions of the country commit this subject to them, making their action conclusive; but they were selected from the walks of men, where intercourse with society and practical knowledge acquired among the experiences of life naturally would qualify them for the proper discharge of their duty. The reviewer's notions pushing even prudery to extravagance, might suit oriental customs, immuring females to save them from pollution, but they do not correspond to the manners of Christian communities, where men and women freely associate in full reliance upon the common proprieties of decorum, never surmising that there is peril or indelicacy in their intercourse.—"She will shrink from him as from every other man."—Certainly; for it is not discernible by common sense, how with propriety she can associate with him in any other way than with every man worthy of her acquaintance. The suggestion, however, is, that "she will shrink from every other man:" an idea that cannot have been formed in the world, among its people and their ways, for nothing can be found there of which it is the image. Indeed, prohibition of marriage, if there were no other

adequate security, would be most precarious and vain protection; to trust to it, would invite instead of obviating ruin.

The reviewer appeals to the sentiments of parents as universally requiring the separate education of males and females. His conclusion is deemed a mistake. In the parts of our country where the writer of this article passed the first twenty-two years of his life, males and females were educated together in the common schools and in the academies. In these schools and academies were both sexes, from early childhood to ages above twenty years. One consequence was, their acquaintance with each other, so that their intercourse was easy and agreeable. In all companies of the young, would be both sexes in nearly equal numbers, enjoying each other's society. He removed to another part of the country, where he has since dwelt, and where he found a different custom in these respects; the sexes being educated separately, the males by themselves and the females by themselves in appropriate schools. The regulation thus begun, formed the subsequent habits; the young men associated together, entering the company of females in refined society with embarrassment, and preferring to be anywhere else. The reason is apparent. Separation of the sexes for the purpose and in the course of education, occasioned awkwardness in each other's company. From long and careful observation the writer of this article is convinced, that this estrangement of males from female society, the natural result of this separation of the sexes in education, has been the most copious source of noxious immorality that has wasted our youth, like a frost in spring, nipping almost every blossom of promise; and that the habit of males associating with females for the enjoyment of agreeable society, was the most pure and beneficial moral influence he has ever observed.

The summary of this argument is: On this subject the church ought to pay deference to the civil power in the exercise of its just constitutional authority, and of course receive the law of a state where a marriage is regularly contracted, as the rule in relation to it. This argument rests on two grounds:—(1st,) legally, morally, and scripturally, it is the duty of the church to obey the laws of the land, constitutionally enacted and administered, and it is insubordination to set up its discipline paramount to them:—(2d,) those intrusted by our civil institutions to make and administer the laws upon this subject, are better qualified to discharge these functions, and can be more safely

confided in, than those who administer church discipline. What has been the history of church discipline?

The article in the *Princeton Review*, so often referred to, contains what may be quoted as pertinent in reply to the summary just stated. Consideration of it in this connection, will conduce to a fuller understanding, and a juster appreciation of the argument, that has been used. The research to which it will lead, will discover the origin and nature of the principle on which the decision of the General Assembly is grounded. The reviewer says, "Now there is *prima facie* evidence, that this view of the subject is incorrect, from the fact, that the Christian world, for so many ages, and with so much unanimity, has regarded this marriage as an evil of such magnitude as to require its prohibition, both by the civil law and the canons of the church." "We are not so much wiser than all other men." "If the great mass of Christian men, in all ages, have united in thinking such marriages wrong, then the probability is, that they are wrong." "It will not be denied, that the earliest records of the ancient church, relating to this subject, condemn the marriage under consideration. By the apostolic constitution, no man who had married the sister of his wife, could ever be admitted to the ministry; and by the early councils, the parties to such connections were excommunicated from the church; so that this became as settled a point in ecclesiastical law as any other connected with the whole subject of marriage. Indeed, the language of our Confession is a literal version of the old canon law on this point. As the law was of authority in all the western churches before the reformation, so all the Protestant communions adhered to its provisions so far as our Confession retains them." "We are not only adhering to our own laws, and to our own usages, but we are standing up for the common law and practice of Protestant Christendom, against modern innovations." (*)

(*) The law of Pennsylvania was enacted in 1705, that of Maryland 1777, Connecticut 1793, New Jersey 1795. The dates of other laws cannot be here stated, they being found in revised editions; those of both Massachusetts and New Hampshire are believed as old as those of Maryland, and probably older. Not *modern*, according to the acceptance of the term, in this new world. Appealing to precedents of the ancient church in derogation of changes—[reformation it has been called] is not in unison with the spirit which peopled this country and founded its institutions of freedom.

Here is a retrograde movement, a going back into former times and establishments, of a bold character—a church upon our own free soil, fled to as an asylum from the abuses of these former times and establishments; this church, a part of our social system, within the pale of our institutions formed for ourselves to secure our civil and religious liberties, to claim for its own, and avow its adhering to, and standing up for the laws, usages and practices of those times and establishments “against modern innovations,” being no less than the laws of our own states, made according to our constitutions! “We are not so much wiser than other men.” Must the conclusion be, that the laws of other men shall supersede our laws upon our own soil? But what is this wisdom of the ancient church, before which our laws are to be despoiled of both character and power; of the character of law, to determine the innocence or guilt of acts done under their regular cognisance, of the power of law to protect the citizens in their conformity to them? “But this law was of authority in all the western churches before the reformation.” And why was the reformation? Because there were abuses, corruptions, and errors in the laws, usages and practices of the churches. It is, therefore, nothing in favor of a law, usage or practice, that it existed before the reformation; because it was, in all human probability, at least tinged with the abuses, corruptions and errors, which required the reformation. We know that, in the laws relating to marriage, there were gross abuses. It is said, however, “the Protestant communions adhered to the provisions” of this law. Do we not know that many errors were adhered to? Can we suppose, that men educated in inveterate errors, which had been impressed with their first conceptions as truths, in connection with all they held holy, should not retain very many errors? Did not Luther himself adhere until death to the doctrine of transubstantiation? Even Queen Elizabeth could hardly be persuaded to part with images, or consent to the marriage of the clergy. In the great doctrines of salvation, there was remarkable light in the reformation. In this respect the minds of the reformers seem to have been peculiarly under the unction of the Holy One. But upon church government, discipline, law of marriage, and divorce, men were left to evince the infirmity of their nature. Do we not consider, do not liberal Episcopalians admit, that their church is prejudiced by “a literal version” of that which was retained in the reformation? And shall we hold it as imparting authority to our con-

fession on the subject of marriage, that it "is a literal version of the old canon law upon this point?" In England, did not the Parliament find it requisite to interpose a statute, and her courts to render their solemn judgments, to prohibit the church courts from proceeding in relation to marriage upon laws and usages to which they as "Protestant communions adhered?" One of the best law reporters thought it a matter of consequence, requiring the subjoining of a special memorandum to his report, that a high dignitary of the church had labored with the judges to produce a decision different from that which was the result of their judgment, and by which they determined, that the church court was illegally extending prohibition of marriage, and restrained its proceeding. This was more than a century after the reformation. When we consider the strong inclination that was in the church before the reformation to enlarge the prohibitions against marriage, and observe the tenaciousness in this respect of the Protestant church since, and take into view its power through its union with government and its being arbiter of conscience, it would be surprising, indeed, if very questionable law and usage upon this subject had not been retained. Certainly we cannot cease to remember, that abuses left by the reformation in Protestant churches, drove the Pilgrim fathers first to Holland, and afterward to this new world; their recorded motive, "by separating from all existing establishments in Europe to form the model of a pure church free from the admixture of human additions." What is it but to condemn and impugn this motive and its principle, to cite "the earliest records of the ancient church," "the apostolic constitutions," and the very establishments referred to by these devoted adherents of civil and religious liberty, and in deference to them reject our own laws as "modern innovations?" Let it be noted, that these "earliest records of the ancient church," are not the Scriptures of the Old or New Testaments, but the writings of that obscure period, which, within our memory, used to be styled "the dark ages," when there seems to have been just light enough to bewilder and lead astray. These writings have been the storehouse of proofs, to sustain unfounded pretensions in the church. The apostolic constitutions, Mosheim says, "are the work of some austere and melancholy author, who designed to reform the worship and discipline of the church, which he thought were fallen from their original purity and sanctity, and who ventured to prefix the names of the apostles to his precepts and regulations, in

order to give them currency." It is a new thing in these states to cite such matters as authority. Our whole system of civil and religious liberty is a modern innovation. How long has it been deemed proper to adhere to the early records of the ancient church, and stand up for the common law and practice of Protestant Christendom in the old world, against such "modern innovations?" It is the very excellency of *Puseyism* to supersede modern innovations, by bringing back the tenets and usages of the ancient church. It is remarkable, too, that *Puseyism*, repelled in England with unmingled discountenance, has received no inconsiderable favor in these United States; and if heed be not taken, it will prevail in efficiency, though not in form, elsewhere than in the Episcopal church. The special approbation that has been bountifully bestowed on this decision of the General Assembly, and those who advocated and pronounced it, should admonish them of the principles esteemed in that quarter worthy of commendation.

Our Institutions deem so highly of man as immortal and responsible, that under them it is the duty of every one to investigate and think for himself, forming his own judgments in the free and conscientious use of his own faculties, as he is personally answerable for the results. "So then every one of us shall give account of himself to God." Men are endued with intelligence, that they may exercise it; and because of their intelligence our institutions invest them with privileges requiring its exercise. We pay deference to precedents: the opinions of good and wise men deserve deliberate regard: but we cannot blindly follow any man, and be guiltless. Hence there is originality in our laws, that may be miscalled innovation; for it can rarely be said of them as of "our Confession" in the preceding quotation, that it "is a literal version of the old canon law." Let us examine the law, usage and practice, on which the reviewer insists, of the ancient church and Protestant Christendom, and fairly estimate their value.

The Theodosian code, about A. D. 385, included within the degrees prohibited from intermarriage, first cousins. This is one degree beyond the canonical tables of the Episcopal church, and the Confession of Faith, according to each of which first cousins may lawfully intermarry. Theodosius the Great, under whom this code was compiled, was a Christian emperor zealously orthodox, and powerfully influenced by ecclesiastics: on the requirement of St. Ambrose, he submitted to do public penance.

—This prohibition was sanctioned by St. Ambrose, who declared such marriage contrary to the divine law. St. Augustine admits the divine law does not forbid the marriage, but justifies the prohibition as necessary for the maintenance of public decorum. By the 10th canon of the Council of Arles, A. D. 538, and 31st of the Council of Autun, *second* cousins were prohibited. By subsequent canons the prohibitions were enlarged so as to include *fourth* cousins; and the mode of computation according to the canon law being substituted for that of the civil law, added several degrees. In these facts we see the disposition of the church to extend the prohibitions; and the approbation by the most eminent Fathers of the ancient church of an extension of them, now acknowledged universally not to be maintainable: the one pronouncing this extension to be according to the divine law, and the other declaring it necessary for the maintenance of public decorum. All these laws and canons extending these prohibitions, even the remotest, like our Confession on this point, professed to be grounded on xviiiith Leviticus, and to be mere declarations of the degrees prohibited by that chapter. The fact, that some of these prohibitions have been universally abandoned, proves the disposition of the ancient church to amplify the Levitical law on this point, leading it into manifest error. The cause is the same which gave Paul so much trouble in preserving his infant churches from adopting the law. It has always been a favorite plan to do works, and in the letter go beyond the letter. Ceremonial purity, abstaining from marriage, will-worship, things that God never commanded, neither entered they into his mind:—these have always been favorite substitutes for evangelical piety. It was the natural inclination and reasoning of men, taking the law for their rule, to augment holiness by stretching its requirements or going beyond them. To enlarge God's law, was to abound in the merit of obedience. In the "View" before referred to is the following passage citing Grotius: "It has been surmised, that in the first ages of Christianity, the ardor of the Gentile proselytes was not satisfied by a tacit renunciation of their Pagan customs which tolerated marriage condemned by the Levitical text; and that being desirous of manifesting to the world the superior purity of their new profession, by a corresponding sanctity of life, their zeal in reprobating those alliances which they were taught now to view with abhorrence, led them to carry the opprobrium of incest beyond the limits with which the Hebrew nation was satisfied, or

which were required by more civilized societies for the maintenance of public decorum."

The laws and usages of Protestant Christendom (the part of the Old World where the reformation has prevailed) are liable to exception of the same nature as those of the ancient church. We have adverted to the influence of that church running into the reformation, through the power of opinions long entertained and associated with every thing deemed holy, to escape from which was motive strong enough to drive the Pilgrim fathers from the comforts of civilized life, and settle them in a savage wilderness. We could not suppose that the rank and vigorous growth of error, where it had struck its roots deep and wide, would ever be wholly eradicated. We have seen the Protestant church more than one hundred years after the reformation insisting, with unyielding pertinacity, upon prohibiting a degree forbidden now by no canonical table. Even the Pilgrim fathers could not divest themselves of the influence from which they fled. Besides, there were strong circumstances to rivet errors on this point. Henry VIII., one of the most wicked of men and powerful of monarchs, had become weary of his amiable but sickly wife, Catharine of Arragon, and had fallen in love with one of her maids of honor, the beautiful Ann Boleyn. To marry the one he must divorce the other. He seized upon the pretence that Catharine was widow of his brother, who had married her at the age of sixteen, and died in a few months afterward. This matter had been deliberately and solemnly discussed, and determined in favor of the marriage of Henry with Catharine. The Pope refusing to grant him a divorce, he separated from the church of Rome, which he had zealously defended, and placed himself on the side of the reformation which he abhorred. Determined upon a divorce, he applied to the universities of Europe, and obtained their answer that it was not agreeable to the law of God for a man to marry his brother's wife. This answer is cited by the reviewer as authority to sustain the decision of the General Assembly. It is wonderful, in this country and age, that authority can be accepted from such a source. As well may the judgments by which Ann Boleyn's head was cut off, by which Sir Thomas More was led to the block, by which another queen was beheaded, and another divorced, and the best blood of England was shed, all by solemn decisions of competent tribunals, under the influence of this unyielding man of power, be adduced as precedents for the promotion of truth, charity and holiness. But

these proceedings have another bearing upon this subject. The reviewer says, "From the reformation to the present time the general law of Christendom has remained unchanged:"—(by Christendom still meaning the Old World under the reformation, to the exclusion of this country.)—These proceedings show, that in the dawn of the reformation, extraordinary power was in operation to settle in a particular manner, for a special, wicked purpose, the great and commanding point relied on in the discussion before the General Assembly.—This point was, that it was unlawful to marry a brother's widow, and therefore unlawful to marry a deceased wife's sister, being relationships of the same nature and degree: the inverted argument being just as good, it is unlawful to marry a wife's sister, therefore a brother's widow. Accordingly we find a statute of Henry VIII., in which the wife's sister is expressly inserted as a forbidden degree, and in the case in which this point was finally settled in England, in opposition to a precedent opinion most elaborately formed upon consultation of all the judges, this statute was cited by the chief justice as conclusive. It is deserving of observation, in order to understand the character of the times, that it is cited as the reason of this statute, "that many inconveniences have fallen by reason of the marrying within the degrees of marriage prohibited by God's law;" when by another statute four years afterward the inconveniences that had been experienced are recited to have arisen from the interposing of "other prohibitions than God's law admitteth." There was a convocation of the English clergy, and two hundred and fifty-three were in favor of the divorce, and only nineteen against it. What the influence of Henry was in respect to these proceedings may be understood from the fate of the great favorite Wolsey, who failing to effect the divorce, was ruined: the distinguished patron of learning, the most eminent statesman of his time, a cardinal of the church, a man of consummate ability and unbounded wealth, utterly destroyed. Under such circumstances, the determinations referred to, not only are divested of all power to convince us; but it is made manifest, that the law has been settled in the Old World upon the very point in discussion, under the strongest sinister influences. With respect to the opinions of the foreign Universities, we cannot be ignorant, that the influence of so powerful a king as Henry VIII., whose alliance was courted by the highest monarchs in Europe, could make itself felt in those institutions as well as in England; and besides, the learned doctors in those

universities had all been educated in the church of Rome, and had a full persuasion of the right of the church to expound and fix the meaning of the word of God. To understand what probability there was, that these men would lay aside their professions arising from enlarged construction of the Levitical text, which they had imbibed with their first impressions in the matter, and make up opinions upon the plain, unadulterated word, we refer to another article in the same number of the Princeton Review. There is this passage—"It is indeed a fruitful source of error and its perpetuation, that men are ever more prone to follow a leader than to pick their own way, to pin their faith upon a particular author rather than think for themselves. This is especially the case in schools, where the teaching falls into a beaten track, in which it remains until admonished, that the world has moved on and left the college far behind."—So that, after all, the charge of innovation is not so decisive against our laws, and when taking the ground, "from the reformation to the present time the general law of Christendom has remained unchanged"—the reviewer might with propriety have deemed this country within the limits of Christendom, and excepted every state but one of our Union from the scope of his assertion.

We think it manifest, that in the pursuit of truth in this case, the precedents relied upon are not safe guides. Neither the early records of the ancient church, the apostolic constitutions, nor the laws and usages of Protestant Christendom (confined to the Old World), deserve confidence. We must learn by the word of God, what that word is. We admit, "we ought not," as the reviewer insists, "to approach the investigation of the Scriptures on this subject, as though we were searching for something which ought not to be there." But we positively deny his position, "that the *reverse* is true." No one can doubt that it is perilous to truth, to approach this investigation of the Scriptures, searching for something which ought not to be there. The churches have standards, and to exalt their credit, maintain, that they exactly conform to the word of God; it then becomes the purpose of investigation to establish this conformity. The doctrinal part of the Confession of Faith is remarkable for its soundness: upon full debate the English Parliament readily concurred in it; but they had good grounds for not agreeing to other parts, and, among these, the chapter of Marriage and Divorce. It is believed that the whole difficulty of this subject has arisen from a determination to find in the Scriptures what is

plainly expressed in the Confession. Men have been educated in such reverence for the Confession, that they will not allow themselves to hesitate on this point. For the doctrinal part, setting forth the great gospel truths of salvation, we sympathize in this reverence; but we are confident there is no ground for it with respect to the exposition of the law of marriage and divorce: the Parliament was right in referring this subject to the law of the land: for it is matter of law. The position of the Confession is, "The man may not marry any of his wife's kindred nearer in blood than he may of his own, nor the woman of her husband's kindred nearer in blood than her own." This proposition is not in the Bible; nor only so, no proposition can be found in the Bible, bearing resemblance or analogy to it. The consequence is, that those whose prepossessions will not suffer them to give up this sentence, are reduced to the necessity of searching the Scriptures for something not expressed there; but because expressed elsewhere, to be found there unexpressed—*understood*, as the grammarians say; but at any rate to be found there. Hence we have labored arguments, pages upon pages, volumes to prove that to be the law of God, which if it were the law of God, would be written in a short verse. All this labor, all this learning put in requisition to make out that marriage is prohibited with a deceased wife's sister, by words which neither mention, nor allude to a deceased wife's sister. The verse most insisted upon as containing this prohibition (Lev. 18: 16), "Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy brother's wife; it is thy brother's nakedness," is particular, explicit and unequivocal; meaning a brother's wife and nothing more; precisely defining that special relation and nothing else. No two things are more distinct and unlike to perception and expression than the wife of your brother, and the sister of your wife. It is absurd to say the expression "brother's wife" either means or alludes to "wife's sister;" any person intending to convey the meaning of "wife's sister," or to be understood as alluding to her, could not make use of the single phrase "brother's wife." The expression "daughter-in-law" occurs in this chapter, the expression "mother-in-law" occurs in another of the books of Moses, and the expression "sister-in-law" is found in the book of Ruth: if in this verse of Leviticus, the intention had been to express *sister-in-law*, would not the proper term have been employed? The other verse referred to for aid to make out this prohibition (Lev. 18: 17), "Thou shalt not

uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter, neither shalt thou take her son's daughter, nor her daughter's daughter, to uncover her nakedness, for they are her near kinswomen: it is wickedness"—obviously to common sense, and upon the clearest principles of sound interpretation, has the opposite effect. For when the lawgiver explicitly specifies the wife's kinswomen, that are prohibited, his not mentioning her sister, is conclusive that he does not mean to comprehend her in the prohibition. The case excludes the supposition of inadvertence. But is the sister omitted? Examining the paragraph (Lev. 18: 6—18), we perceive that the lawgiver being very explicit in his prohibitions, and having accurately specified the kinswomen of the men, and the kinswomen and wives of his kinsmen, within them, in the verses preceding verse 17, proceeds in like manner to specify the kinswomen of his wife, also within them, and uses for this purpose the language in verses 17 and 18: the prohibition being of her daughter, her son's daughter, and her daughter's daughter absolutely, because "it is wickedness," and of her sister during her life, because it would vex her. The verses are connected in language, forming one simple passage. This is the plain sense of the passage; and it carries in itself no slight evidence of the correctness of our English translation. Is not this the best translation that has ever been made of any book; has it not been the more approved the more it has been scrutinized with a view to make a better; and has not every attempt to improve it been consummated in versions universally pronounced to be inferior? Why then prove its correctness? Simply, because to find what must be found in the xviiith Levit. in order to sustain the position quoted from the Confession of Faith, it is necessary to change the 18th verse of that chapter. For however slightly those insisting upon the unlawfulness of marriage with a deceased wife's sister may speak of the effect of that verse, while it stands as in our translation it is impossible to maintain their point: the prohibition is limited expressly to the wife's life, and therefore expressly after her decease there is no prohibition. The translation is of the highest credit; there is strong internal evidence specially supporting that of the 18th verse: on what ground can a different translation be substituted? The substitute proposed is, "Neither shalt thou take a wife to another;" using the word *another* instead of "sister." The first objection to this substituted translation is, one of the best Hebrew scholars of our country says, it is not correct;

that upon principles of just Biblical criticism, our present translation is accurate. The second objection is, the verse in this substituted translation is not homogeneous with the passage in which it stands. The general import of the passage is prohibition of sexual intercourse in certain relationships: in our translation the 18th verse expresses a prohibition of that kind, in correspondence with the preceding verses: in the proposed substitute, it expresses no such prohibition:—the matter of relationship, the vital principle pervading the whole, is utterly abandoned. Besides, we know, the division into verses was wholly arbitrary: no principle governed in it. Verses 17 and 18 are connected in language; evidently forming a simple passage: in the first part three relatives of the wife, her daughter, son's daughter, daughter's daughter, and in the last another relative her sister, are mentioned. In the substitute no relation is mentioned. The third objection is, according to the proposed translation, verse 18 expressly prohibits polygamy, and is inserted for that purpose alone. Now we know that the laws of Moses expressly allowed and regulated polygamy, Deut. 21: 15, Exod. 21: 10. It was practised by the men most distinguished for piety and by blessing, and is never reproofed: Gideon, the parents of Samuel, David, Solomon, also 2 Chron. 24: 3. Can we take verse 18, from its proper connection, divert it from the leading subject of that connection, and make it an isolated clause transformed into a law against polygamy, which was allowed and regulated by the same code of laws, and practised without an intimation of reproof by the holiest men? The answer to this question is obvious: it admits no other.

We ought to take a further view of verse 16, against sexual intercourse with a brother's wife. Without some examination, it may be deemed clear that this verse prohibits marriage with a brother's *widow*. In the preceding argument, this verse has been taken in this sense; for it has been considered clear, that either phrase, "brother's wife" or "brother's widow," must signify a relative of the brother, and could not be construed to mean a relative of the wife, although no relative of her had been mentioned in the chapter. The proposition, that the prohibition of marriage with a brother's widow directly forbids marriage with a deceased wife's sister, has been so solemnly advanced as to conceal, even from those who advance it, its absurdity: it is nevertheless absurd. For upon the plain principles of interpreting language, departure from which would bring again the con-

fusion of Babel, we must understand a particular expression as used for the very purpose of conveying its particular meaning. When a lawgiver composing and publishing laws, under a sense of the importance that they should be readily and rightly understood, uses the term "brother's," it must be held, that it was his intention to confine himself to "brother's," and that if it had been his intention to comprehend *a relative of the wife* also, he would have used some word to signify that intention. When, further, in the same chapter, relatives of the wife are mentioned, the argument, if its force is susceptible of increase, is corroborated; because there is a violent presumption, that when mentioning the relatives of the wife, he will mention all he intends: and when, still further, the wife's sister is named, no one can hesitate to receive that as the clause governing this question, entirely excluding the other.

But there is no substantial ground for maintaining that this verse (16th) does mean a brother's widow. The expression is, "thy brother's wife." It is admitted, that the term *wife* may signify either wife of the living or deceased—wife or widow. What the signification is in this verse, must be gathered from the manner of its use, and the circumstances applying. To the argument that "wife" in this verse cannot mean wife of a living brother, because the offence then would be adultery, and adultery was punished with death under this law, there is a full answer, which not only satisfies this argument, but also evinces, that we are very incompetent expositors of this old law, given more than thirty-three hundred years ago, for a people in a state of society of which we have no proper knowledge or understanding. For example, it is believed that the most impressive part of Dr. Breckinridge's very able and ingenious argument was that, by which he showed that by determining verse 18 to prohibit taking the sister of the wife in her lifetime, they would establish the principle that a man might lawfully have two wives. This was a startling proposition, felt as a *reductio ad absurdum*, and the interpretation involving it shrunk from, because the hearers were under the influence of our present condition of society, and their sentiments were at once formed, without entering upon the investigation leading back to the people for whom this law was made, and disclosing that among this people the same law in another part provided for the case of a man's having two wives: even the priest to whom the administration of the law belonged, took two wives

for a king under guardianship, (2 Chron. 24 : 3) ; and those most competent to communicate information say, that this verse (18) had direct allusion to the eminent patriarch and servant of the Most High—the ancestor of this people—who had two wives that were sisters. To return to the position, that verse 16 may signify wife of a living brother, and still the offence not be adultery. Marriage among the Jews was extremely loose ; divorce at the arbitrary will of the husband (Deut. 24 : 1—4). It is to be presumed, a wife might leave her husband (1 Cor. 7 : 15). If the husband who had sent away a wife, took her again, it was abomination before the Lord (Deut. 24 : 4). She might marry again ; but for his brother to marry her, would be worse than for him to take her again : the thought to us is vile ; it would obviously be a root of bitterness between the brothers. The brother's taking or cohabiting with her is not forbidden, except in this 16th verse. Besides, there was an allowed state of concubinage. The curse was upon Reuben, for an offence with his father's concubine. The threatening in respect to David's wives, was fulfilled with his concubines (2 Sam. 12 : 11 ; 16 : 21). In the case in the New Testament, of a condemnation by John the Baptist under this prohibition, Herodias the wife had left her husband Philip, and afterward in his lifetime, his brother Herod married her. We thus find, that the manners of the Israelites and their condition of society, rendered this prohibition with respect to the wife of a living husband, proper and expedient ; and that the only case on record in the Bible of its application, is to a wife so circumstanced. There are objections, believed insuperable, to holding the prohibition applicable to a brother's widow. The reason given for the prohibition, " it is thy brother's nakedness," is incompatible with such application. If the brother be dead, the wife " loosed from the law of her husband," how can this reason be true ? It is true of the living brother, not of the dead. The character of the offence (Lev. 20 : 21) " it is an unclean thing," connected with the law (Deut. 25 : 5—10) requiring, in case of a married brother dying childless, his surviving brother to take his widow, makes it manifest, that the prohibition is confined to the wife of the brother while living. Can we admit, that the God of truth and righteousness, whose language to his people is, " ye shall be holy ; for I the Lord your God am holy," would enjoin by law " an unclean thing ?"

The passage (Lev. 18 : 6—18) is very plain upon common,

well-established principles of interpretation. No principle is more clearly established nor obviously just, than that a general clause followed by specific cases, becomes special—limited by the specifications. The reason is apparent to common sense,—indeed, grows out of it. It is the lawgiver puts the cases, that you may understand his application. Upon this ground, as the general prohibition in verse 6, is followed by sixteen specific prohibitions, and as the sister of a deceased wife is not within either of them, there is no prohibition with respect to her. The article in the Princeton Review admits this conclusion: "If the cases therein mentioned are to be taken as specific instances which exclude all others, then this marriage is not prohibited." But the article proceeds: "But if those cases are given only as examples of the degrees within which marriage should not take place, then this connection is forbidden. As every thing at last turns upon this point, it is obvious, that we must have better authority than our own, to decide upon the rule of interpretation." The ground on which we are willing to stand with the reviewer, is described by the inquiry, "whether the cases therein mentioned are to be taken as specific instances, or are given only as examples of the degrees within which marriage should not take place." We agree that the rule which we have stated does not apply, unless specific cases follow the general clause; when examples are given merely to illustrate the clause, they are not specific cases within our meaning. But it must be easy to determine, whether matter is set forth by way of example to illustrate a prohibitory clause, or to express direct prohibitions of particular things. In the present case, it is certainly very easy. Who ever heard of sixteen specific, carefully defined cases, each the distinct subject of a full, positive prohibition, being put as examples to illustrate a general preceding prohibition? No one can read Levit. 18: 7—18, without seeing, that here is a series of special prohibitions, each clearly defined, and full in itself, in which case has been used to express plainly each case. In each case, there is explicit particularity. When such care has been used, and so much explicitness and particularity to express clearly each case, is it not strange construction to add something wholly omitted, not alluded to in any thing expressed, because in certain tables devised by men, according to certain rules of computation established by them, it is to be found in the same degree with something expressed, totally distinct and different? As if the

lawgiver who has said so plainly, particularly, and explicitly, what he has said, did not know all he ought to say, and has therefore left defects for us to supply. "We are not so much wiser" than HE. We will also stand with the reviewer upon his other ground:—"We must have better authority than our own, to decide upon the rule of interpretation." We have it. "Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shalt thou diminish aught from it; that ye may keep the commandments of the Lord your God which I command you."

The remark in the Article referred to relative to Lev. 18: 6, "by kin, we are to understand relationship in general; because nearly two to one of the specifications which follow relate to affinity and consanguinity," should not pass without examination. The word "kin" signifies relationship by blood—the same kind. The Hebrew term, as is manifest from the phrase in the margin, "remainder of his flesh," another version of it, is more definite and precise in the signification of relationship by blood than our word kin: like the expression, near of kin, which excludes relationship by blood if not *near*, and of course, that by affinity, devoid of the element of kindred. In Lev. 21: 2, we have a definition of the phrase, "kin that is near unto him; that is, for his mother, and for his father, and for his son, and for his daughter, and for his brother, and for his sister." It is an established rule of construction, to consider a lawgiver as using the same phrase in the same sense; and when he defines his terms in one place, to apply that definition to the same terms in other places: there may be exceptions, but for good reason. Upon what ground, then, can we attach to the phrase "near of kin to him," a more enlarged meaning than is warranted by its proper signification, either in our own or the original language, or than the lawgiver attaches to it in another part of his law? Is there not manifest impropriety in construing the words "near of kin," as signifying "relationship in general?" The error that has been just shown, of holding the cases in verses 7—17 to be examples given of verse 6, in violation of all principles of language, instead of specific prohibitions according to the natural import of the terms used, occasions this misconstruction. Why give this enlarged and forced meaning to the words "near of kin?" The reason assigned is, because the cases in verses 7—17 are given as examples, and to comprehend them the meaning of the words must be enlarged. Is it not the more obvious and correct

course, as these cases do not come within the proper signification of the words "near of kin," to hold that they are not examples, but according to the natural import of the language, distinct prohibitions, or in other words, the declaration of the lawgiver of the cases which he intended to prohibit? Some are within the proper scope of verse 6, and some additions resting on other ground. When we accurately examine the language, this becomes clear to us. Thus father's sister, and mother's sister are *kin*, that is, relations by blood; but they are not *near of kin*, as the lawgiver has used the phrase in the passage cited; and in verses 12, 13, he does not prohibit these relationships as near of kin to the man prohibited, but as the kinswoman of his father and mother. This identical remark applies to verse 17. In verse 15, the prohibition in respect to the daughter-in-law, is not because she is near of kin, but because "she is thy son's wife;" and verse 16, in respect to brother's wife, the ground expressly stated is the injury to the brother—"it is thy brother's nakedness:" so with respect to the father's wife, mother-in-law, the prohibition is grounded on the injury to the father—"it is thy father's nakedness" (8). With respect to father, mother, sister, properly within verse 6, according to the lawgiver's use of the same terms, there is no distinct, additional ground to what is contained in that verse (7, 9, 11). With respect to son's daughter, and daughter's daughter (10), one remove from the lawgiver's own definition of near of kin, there is no distinct ground, but an explanatory observation—"theirs is thine own nakedness." This verse when deliberately considered, will be deemed to afford useful instruction; for when the lawgiver would not rest the prohibition with respect to a son's daughter and daughter's daughter upon the general ground in verse 6, of "near of kin," without an explanation; how shall it be extended to "relationship in general?" In the only remaining case, the wife of the father's brother, neither being within the terms "near of kin," the special ground of the prohibition is, "she is thine aunt." The Jewish writers, entitled to full credit with regard to their own laws and manners, say, that the aunt is in the same degree as the father and mother, as to natural superiority over the nephew, and that his approach to her would invert the order of nature. Whatever may be the reason, it is sufficient that the lawgiver assigns it as the specific ground of that prohibition. We may confidently lay it down, that when a lawgiver assigns a special reason for a prohibition, the reason

assigned is the true reason, and he intends that the prohibition should be held to proceed from, and rest upon it; and of course, that all the prohibitions in Lev. 18: 6—18, for which special reasons are assigned, are to be considered as distinct prohibitions for the reasons assigned, and not as parts of verse 6. A few of the prohibitions come under this verse; the others are such as the lawgiver, in view of the reasons given, has seen proper to ordain.

This subject is by no means exhausted. It presents other important points for remark. It has been discussed upon the ground, that Levit. 18: 6—18 is a regulation of marriage. It is not a law for that purpose. It is confined to the prohibition of sexual intercourse. It is admitted, that it is a restraint and preventive of marriage; but this is a result and consequence. The law may be violated without marriage; and there may be a contract of marriage legally solemnized without transgressing the law. This false position of the subject is a source of error in discussing it.

Putting the Levitical law, or any part of it, upon the same ground on which we place the ten commandments, is utterly inadmissible. It is new, and it is dangerous. The reason, "the precepts in Leviticus are the declaration of God as to what is right"—would establish the entire judicial law with all its penalties. "We may differ from Confucius, we dare not differ from God." Very true. We dare not maintain, that the laws given to the nation of Israel by their and our Maker, were not suitable to their condition, and good laws for them in their circumstances. But who will say, that those laws have been given to any other people, or that they were not made for a state of things that is past, or that the whole frame of polity which they constituted was not intended to be temporary, and has not ceased according to the design in its construction? There are very wise things in these laws: but that any part of them retains the force of law is positively denied. Wisdom of laws depends upon the state of society for which they were made, and the evils to be corrected. We can form no just opinion now of these things. The law we have been considering is a positive law; it has nothing in common with the decalogue, the moral law. We consider it clear, that the church is bound to respect and obey the laws of the state where it is situated, and where its members receive protection and owe allegiance, far more than the laws that were given Israel in their ancient theocracy, terminated long since by its own appointment. Even

in the time of Paul, when the minds of men were not prepared to consider the Mosaic dispensation as terminated, he does not place the case at Corinth of a man's having his father's wife (the father was living, 2 Cor. 7 : 12), upon the Levitical law, but the law of nature (1 Cor. 5 : 1, not even named among the Gentiles).

The question is gravely proposed, Can you say that you have not a doubt that this marriage is forbidden by the word of God, and will you then hazard the sin ? This is the device of superstition: the very proposal of the question to the timid produces the fear it suggests: follow out the course, and you can establish the Inquisition. It should be our warning, that this dreadful institution was founded in Spain, with all its horrors full grown in its very inception, by the wisest and best of sovereigns, and the most amiable and excellent of women, Queen Isabella. The proposition, therefore, can be by no means assented to, that it is material at all, whether a man may marry the sister of his deceased wife or not, there will be always others equally eligible;—it is of great importance, that a false principle should not be adopted, and that the church should in no case by latitudinarian construction interfere with the rights of men. This is not the way of salvation; the gospel has other views: this going to the law is not in its spirit. Especially should not the church stand in opposition to the laws upon a ground that is not solid, and in a matter in which it is wrong and they are right: even if it could for a moment allow itself in the determination to take such an attitude under any circumstances.

ARTICLE X.

REVIEW OF DR. EDWARDS'S "DISSERTATION CONCERNING LIBERTY AND NECESSITY."

By Rev. Samuel T. Epear, Pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church of Lansingburgh, N.Y.

As intimated by its title-page, this Dissertation was intended by its author as a reply to the Essays of Dr. West and others, on the subject of Liberty and Necessity. Indirectly it is a defence of the doctrine of Moral Necessity adopted by the Elder Edwards, as well as an exponent of the views entertained by its

distinguished author. Upon its first publication, during the lifetime of the author, it was by many regarded as an unanswerable refutation of the system of his opponents. That it presents clear and decisive marks of strength in argumentation, tact and ingenuity in metaphysical criticism, as well as candor both in the statement of principles and their legitimate deductions, must be acknowledged. It is much to be regretted, that this Dissertation, with the other productions of the same respected writer, should so long have been inaccessible to the great proportion of the ministers and students of our country. The editors and publishers of Dr. Edwards's Works are entitled to the lasting thanks of the community for the service they have now rendered to the general cause of truth.

It is proposed in this article to examine so much of these works as may be found in the Dissertation concerning Liberty and Necessity. It is not judged important to decide the comparative merits of the arguments of Dr. Edwards and those of his opponents. On some points victory seems to have been on one side; and upon others, on the other side. To judge of the truth of a system by the skill displayed in its defence would be a very unsafe dictum in philosophy. Truth at times may be committed to incompetent hands; while error may be fortified, not only by great names, but by great adroitness in making "the worse appear the better reason."

The system of Necessity, as stated and defended by the elder and the younger Edwards, has for years been regarded as entirely established. No man, until recently, has dared to intimate even a doubt of its truth. Authority little less than *axiomatic* has been assigned to it. It has imparted its own peculiar type to the theological philosophy of our country. In the providence of God, however, it seems destined to undergo a re-examination; minds of much worth and power are enlisted in this investigation; it can no longer be said, that it carries with it the conclusiveness of a mathematical demonstration, at least in its relation to the existing state of opinion. Nothing is to be feared from this *new* movement. If Edwards was wrong, the fact ought to appear; if he was right, a re-examination of his arguments will not be of disservice to the system. Philosophy is now in a better state to review this question, than when it was originally argued. The science of psychology has made great advances since the days of Edwards. On every account it is desirable that this philosophical movement should go for-

ward, until truth is ascertained, or the impracticability of its knowledge shall be fully demonstrated. In itself the subject is one of great importance; it is a part of the philosophy of the human mind; in its relations to other branches of truth, it is perhaps not less important. Let the discussion then proceed, begun, continued and ended, as a simple inquiry after truth.

On the one side of this question will be arranged the Dissertation of Dr. Edwards. Although dead, by the republication of his arguments he will yet speak. By many they will be regarded as conclusive;—with all it is hoped that they will receive that attention and confidence, which are proportionate to their merit. In constructing a review of this Dissertation, our intention is not to follow in the exact sequence of chapter or title; but to make a selection of points, ascertain the views of Dr. Edwards on these points, and aim to compare them with truth. To this undertaking the attention of the reader is now solicited.

I. *The Statement of Moral Necessity.*

Upon careful examination it will be found, that Dr. Edwards was by no means consistent with himself in his exposition of Moral Necessity. He gives not *one*, but *three* definitions, which are not identical. Let us proceed to confirm this proposition.

1. In the first place he defines it to be the *previous certainty of the existence of moral actions*. He says, "But concerning my own meaning, I have a right to speak more peremptorily, that I mean all necessity, or *previous certainty of the volition or voluntary action* of a rational being, whatever be the cause or influence, by which that necessity is established," Vol. I. p. 305. "But moral necessity is the previous certainty of a moral action," p. 306. "For antecedent certainty of moral actions is all we mean by moral necessity," p. 399. This definition he has repeated a great number of times in the course of his Dissertation. It prevails throughout his chapter on Foreknowledge. Here he assumes the foreknowledge of Deity, and reasons correctly in supposing that such knowledge of a future event implies the previous certainty of its existence. Moral necessity in this sense is fully established; no argument could be more conclusive. Moral necessity, then, is the simple affirmation of a fact, which may be demonstrated, as such, without any reference to its *ground or cause*. Foreknowledge proves this fact

and nothing more. What is the cause of this certainty, and indeed whether it have any cause, are points to be disposed of by other processes of reasoning. The argument which proves this simple certainty, terminates at this point, it does not necessarily decide the question of cause. Dr. Edwards does not claim this; he does not hold that foreknowledge *causes* the certainty; he concedes that it has no other than a *logical* connection with the certainty—e. g., *it proves it*. In this sense of Moral Necessity Dr. Edwards has no antagonist, not even in Dr. West himself.

2. In the second place he defines Moral Necessity, *as the certainty of connection between moral actions and their cause or causes*. "Moral necessity is the real and certain connection between some moral action and its cause," p. 306. "Moral necessity is the certain or necessary connection between moral causes and moral effects," p. 300. This is a new definition, as contrasted with the former. The other was the certainty of the *action*; this is the certainty of its *connection* with some cause. The first certainty is proved by foreknowledge; the second certainty, however true, is not proved by the same means. This kind of certainty is self-evident, for it is but a specification of the axiom, *that for every event there must be some cause*. This is not the place to inquire into the use of the word "*connection*" by Dr. Edwards; whether he meant connection in the sense of certain antecedence, or in the true sense of cause. Upon either construction, he affirms nothing more than the general axiom of causality, as applied to a specific case. Here again Dr. Edwards can have no antagonist in this sense of Moral Necessity; for surely no man would admit the certainty of an event and deny that it had a cause.

3. We proceed to the third exposition of Moral Necessity. It is the certainty of connection between *volition as effects, and motives as their cause*. He quotes the definition of President Edwards. It is "that necessity of connection and consequence, which arises from such *moral causes*, as the strength of inclination or motives, and the connection which there is, in many cases, between these and certain volitions and actions," p. 299. "There is nothing in this inconsistent with the influence of motives on the will, to produce volition; or with the dependence of volition on some cause, extrinsic to itself, extrinsic to the power of will, or to the mind in which it exists. What if motives do excite to volition?" p. 311. Much of Dr. Edwards's reasoning relates to necessity according to this construction.

It is important to observe, that in this sense, moral necessity is different from either of the other two. In the first, we had certainty of existence;—in the second, certainty of connection;—in the third, we have the *terms* of this certain connection, e. g., volitions on the one hand, and motives as their cause on the other. The last, besides including the two former, defines the ground of the certainty. It is also important to notice, that the arguments, which establish necessity in the two former senses, do not prove it in the latter; for to prove the certainty of a future event, and that it must have some cause, is not to prove what that cause is;—not to tell *why* the event will or must be. It is true that Dr. Edwards says, that he does not regard motives as the efficient causes of volition;—he equally denies that mind is the efficient cause; hence God must be the efficient cause, if there be any. His theory of the connection of motive and volition, will receive attention in its proper place. For the present, it is sufficient to say, that he speaks of motive as the cause of the certain existence of future volitions. This assumption lies in the third exposition of moral necessity. It is not peculiar to him; it was abundantly affirmed by President Edwards; it has been the doctrine of every writer upon that side of the question.

Dr. Edwards is chargeable with having neither stated, nor argued moral necessity always in the same sense. The same is true of President Edwards. Sometimes they are defending necessity in the sense of simple certainty. This is the case especially with the first-mentioned writer in his chapter on foreknowledge, where he repeatedly asserts, that previous certainty of volitions is "all the necessity for which we plead." This was not true; for at other times he pleads for necessity in the sense of the previous certainty of volitions, founded on the certainty of their connection with motives as causes. Here are two certainties, that are by no means identical; the first does not imply the second, neither is the latter proved by arguments which establish the former. His opponents do not deny necessity in all the above senses;—it is only in the last sense, and in that branch of it, which makes motive the cause of volition. To prove necessity in any other sense, is to prove what nobody denied; the issue must be made on the disputed ground, or there is no issue.

Moral Necessity then, as a subject of debate between its advocates and opponents, presents this proposition: *that motives,*

"which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest," determines the will. This proposition being proved to be universally true, moral necessity is then proved as the true theory of the will. By *determining*, the advocates of necessity define themselves to mean, "causing, that the acts of the will or choice should be thus, and not otherwise." In proving this proposition, they must prove three other positions, viz., that the will or mind is determined—that it is determined by motive—and that it is determined by the strongest motive. In the execution of this work, they must fix on some correct standard of measuring the comparative strength of a motive, besides the fact of its prevalence; for this being taken as the rule of measurement, gives us nothing but an identical proposition. The evidence must go directly to the establishment of this proposition, the one in debate, and not some other. This sets aside the arguments from foreknowledge, unless it can be shown, that foreknowledge is not consistent with any other hypothesis of volition. Two methods of proof may be adopted. In the first place it may be *psychological*, which is an appeal to universal consciousness and experience. It may be *logical*, which is a deduction of the proposition in question from others, either previously proved or admitted. The advocates of necessity have taken their stand chiefly in the logical department. Here three or four syllogisms would contain a formal statement of their whole argument. It is of the following character, viz., that to deny the proposition of necessity, leaves no cause for volition; or that it involves the absurdity of an infinite series of volitions; or that the invariableness of motive, as an antecedent, proves it to be the cause of volition; or that if motive be not the cause of volition, it cannot be previously certain, as proved by foreknowledge. These are the germs of as many syllogisms, which have been used on the one side, and replied to on the other. It is not proposed to examine the validity of this reasoning; my purpose having been to state the point to be proved, and designate the character of the argument, which has any appropriateness to the point. Had these things been always kept in view, the opponents in this discussion would have been confined to a much narrower field, and had less occasion to complain of mutual misunderstanding.

II. *The two Necessities, Moral and Natural, distinguished.*

It is admitted to be "a very plain dictate of common-sense, that natural necessity is wholly inconsistent with just praise or

blame." Hence the advocates of Moral Necessity, at least many of them, have strenuously insisted on a distinction between the two systems of necessity. Dr. Edwards is among this number. The piety which prompts the effort, deserves our respect, whatever be the fate of the effort. Let us then attend to the lines of distinction, as drawn by the pen of Dr. Edwards. This will be best secured by obtaining his answer to the four following questions: e. g., In what sense does he use the term Natural Necessity? In what sense does he use Moral Necessity, when making the distinction? What are the points of agreement, if any, which he admits? What are the points of distinction which he alleges? It is proposed to obtain and examine his answer to these questions.

I. What is the conception which he gives us of natural or physical, necessity?

He says "Natural necessity is the connection between causes and effects, which are not of a moral nature," p. 300. He here consents, that it is a connection of causes and effects, but interposes a single negative qualification, e. g., neither the effect nor the cause is of a "moral nature." By causes and effects of a "moral nature," he means "some previous habitual disposition, or some motive exhibited to the understanding," and "some inclination or volition of the soul or voluntary action." In a note, p. 301, he is careful to say, "By inclination, disposition, or bias, I mean something distinct from volition." It must be confessed, that if nothing farther had been said of this kind of necessity, we should be left in great doubt as to its positive nature; we could tell very definitely what it is not; but our conception of what it is, would, at best, be very indeterminate.

The subject however is not left at this point. In allusion to the views of President Edwards, Dr. Edwards says,—"By *natural* necessity he explains himself to mean, 'such necessity as men are under, through the force of *natural* causes, as distinguished from what are called *moral* causes; such as habits and dispositions of heart, and moral motives and inducements,'" p. 299. This is certainly an advance upon the former definition. By "natural causes" he means all causes, but those of "a moral nature." By these causes the necessity is created. In reference to whom or what? This is answered by the fact, that it is "such necessity as *men* are under through the force of natural causes," etc. Here both the causes and the subjects of the necessity are defined. And according to the principle stated, men or voluntary beings are the only subjects of natural

necessity. This idea is confirmed, when he quotes President Edwards, as saying, that it always "has reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavor, which is insufficient," p. 299. He endorses this sentiment on the next page,— "Natural necessity admits of voluntary, but ineffectual opposition from him, who is subject to the necessity." It is certain that no such opposition is possible, unless to *agents* invested with the power of will: hence, if this be the universal reference of natural necessity, it will follow that voluntary beings are its only possible subjects. The illustrations which he adopts, as the case of a man being dragged to prison "in direct opposition to every act of his will," involve and imply the same view. We have then gained Dr. Edwards's conception of natural necessity; it is this,—*it is a necessity created by the force of natural causes; it always has voluntary beings for its subjects, and refers to some supposable voluntary, but ineffectual opposition in those beings to the result.* No element is omitted, none added to his statement. We have it precisely as it came from his pen. I propose now to pause a moment at this point, and with some care examine this interpretation of natural or physical necessity.

1. In the first place, although intended to be such by its author, it is not an exact representation of President Edwards on this point. An important qualification of the Elder Edwards is overlooked in this statement. His language is the following,— "By natural necessity, *as applied to men*, I mean such necessity as men are under through force of natural causes," etc. Again, "That necessity, which has been explained, consisting in an infallible connection of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, *as intelligent beings are the subjects of it*, is distinguished into moral and natural necessity." Upon a comparison of these passages with the language of Dr. Edwards, no man can fail to see that the latter does not do entire justice to the former. In both passages President Edwards speaks of natural necessity "*as applied to men*,"— "*as intelligent beings are the subjects of it*." This carries his remarks into a limited and specific sphere, and leaves the question undecided, whether natural necessity has any other applications. Dr. Edwards in quoting the President, omits to notice this attitude of the question; he defines natural necessity in a *generic* sense; his terms are universal and include a definition, not in *one*, but in *all* the applications of natural necessity. His

language clearly implies, that it always has voluntary beings for its subjects, and refers to some supposable, but insufficient opposition in those beings; whereas President Edwards stated the case so far, and so far only as it is "applied to men,"—"as intelligent beings are the subjects of it." It is true, that this is the form of natural necessity, which prevailed in the mind of President Edwards; he seems scarcely to have thought of any other; but it is not true, as it is of Dr. Edwards, that his formal definition commits him to this view, as the only kind of natural necessity that is possible.

2. I observe again that this interpretation of natural necessity is incorrect, by being *defective* and *partial*.

It will be granted, that Dr. Edwards has succeeded in presenting a case of natural necessity;—necessity in relation to voluntary beings, where the event is made certain, notwithstanding any supposable or actual opposition of will to it; it is certain, while the mind chooses a different event, which choice is insufficient to prevent the real event and secure the one chosen. The event is clearly by a natural necessity in relation to its subject. The mind chooses a certain consequent, while *something else*, not only prevents it, but makes another consequent both certain and physically necessary in relation to the mind. This decides not, whether that *something else* is also subjected to a physical necessity; it settles the question only so far as the mind is involved.

Is this then the only province of physical necessity? We are shut up to it by the definition. Is the definition true? What shall be said of those cases, which have no reference whatever to *the will of an agent*, where the subject of the necessity is not a voluntary agent, where indeed it is doubtful, whether the subject be an agent in any sense? When a stone falls to the ground, is not the phenomenon by a natural necessity in relation to the stone? Is not every physical phenomenon an instance of such necessity in relation to its subject? This necessity embraces not only the certainty of the phenomenon, but a total want of power not to fall or to any other phenomenon, as resident in the stone. It has not a voluntary being for its subject, neither has it any reference to any supposable, but insufficient opposition to the consequent event; the case by its terms is one of total want of power to the contrary, and therefore of all supposable opposition. In the light of this illustration the defect in the above exposition must be

apparent. In the language of logicians, we should say, that it employs the term, *natural necessity*, in an *undistributed sense*; states what it is in reference to a single class of objects, and omits to notice it in other applications, where it holds equally true. In the two references it is not precisely the same. In the one it is modified by relation to the will of an agent;—there is a certainty of the event with supposable, but inefficient power of resistance. In the other it has no relation to the will of an agent; there is an equal certainty with a total want of all power of supposable resistance or opposition to the event. These cases are not in all respects identical; yet both are clear and decisive instances of this kind of necessity. Physical necessity is a *genus* of which the two illustrations constitute *distinct species*. The point of *generic* resemblance is the certainty of the event with the impossibility that it should not be. The *specific* differences are these: in one the necessity has reference to the will of an agent, where ineffectual opposition is supposable; in the other it has reference to a physical subject, where no such supposed opposition is allowable. Now Dr. Edwards has the merit of defining one of the species of this genus; his mistake is, that he treats it as the genus, a very important mistake in this discussion, as will be shown in the progress of these observations. His definition is true in a single application, but entirely false in another, which is as legitimate as the one he contemplates.

3. I observe in the third place, that this defective and partial construction has an important bearing upon the question, whether the two necessities *moral* and *natural*, are distinct.

Dr. Edwards contended, that in moral necessity any opposition of will to the event was insupposable—that it implied an absurdity. Whereas, natural necessity always had reference to such supposable, but insufficient opposition, and hence it was clearly distinguished from that which is called *moral*. This reasoning works very well, so long as we allow him to mean by moral necessity, simple certainty of the existence of volition, and to construe natural necessity in the manner already defined. But suppose we take natural necessity in its application to physical subjects; here we shall find, that it does not in its nature differ materially from moral necessity in application to causes and effects of "a moral nature." In the one case you have certainty of the *moral* sequent with opposition as insupposable; in the other you have an equal certainty of the *physical* sequent

and an equal insupposableness of opposition to the existence of that sequent. If it be absurd to suppose the power of willing opposed to itself, in the very act of willing, is it any the less absurd to suppose opposition where there is no power of opposition? In both sequents, therefore, there is no supposable opposition; in both there is an equal certainty of existence. What then becomes of the pretended distinction between the two necessities from which the sequents arise? Does it not seem at best to vanish into emptiness? But the distinction is a point too momentous to be given up. Here is a difficulty. What is the mode of obviating it? This is done by contracting the field of philosophical vision, and fixing the eye upon a partial and defective view of natural necessity. Having taken this view he leaves the field of argument, bearing in his hand the laurel of a successful contest; it however withers in his grasp the moment the sphere of vision is so enlarged as to include natural necessity in all its applications. This is the very thing which Dr. Edwards did not do. Had he turned his attention to physical necessity in relation to objects purely physical, as well as to voluntary agents, he would have found it difficult, if not impossible to escape the charge of confounding the two necessities. His mistake was exceedingly opportune; it served the interests of his cause admirably well; it enabled him to distinguish natural necessity as applied to voluntary agents, from that which is moral. It made no provision, however, for any such distinction, when natural necessity is taken in application to physical subjects. It is to be regretted that Dr. Edwards should have confined his attention to a single reference of physical necessity: how he would have disposed of the difficulty attending its application to physical subjects, it is impossible to imagine.

4. Finally, I observe that Dr. Edwards seems to me to have somewhat entangled himself, even upon his own construction of natural necessity.

Recollect that it always "has reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavor, which is insufficient." If then the will be supposed in any case to oppose the will, there is an insufficient opposition of the volition not prevalent to the prevailing one, and consequently the volition that prevails will take place by natural necessity, since there is voluntary, but ineffectual opposition to its existence. Has Dr. Edwards anywhere admitted the reality of such a case? He says—"He

may from prevailing motives and from moral necessity choose virtue. He may *at the same time* from weaker motives and ineffectual temptations choose vice, and so far feel reluctant or indisposed to virtue." "Yet there is a mutual opposition between the forementioned different acts of choice, the choice of virtue and the choice of vice," p. 302. "They may in particular cases be equal, or so nearly equal, that neither of them, at the instant, appears to prevail, and the man 'is in a strait betwixt two.' In other instances they may, for a time at least, *alternately* prevail, and exhibit a man of very inconsistent conduct. In other cases one may *generally* prevail," p. 302, 303. It is important to notice these concessions of Dr. Edwards; they are these: that the choice of virtue and the choice of vice may exist in the mind "at the same time;" that between these two volitions there is "mutual opposition;" that sometimes they are equal or nearly so; that sometimes they alternately prevail; that at other times one generally prevails. What then is the characteristic which he assigns to natural necessity? It is, that there should be voluntary, but insufficient opposition to the consequent event. In every such case the event is one of natural necessity. Do not the above concessions bring at least one of the volitions in question within the range of this category? Two volitions are admitted to be in the mind "at the same time," and to be opposed to each other. Hence the prevailing volition would seem to be by a natural necessity, since there is "the voluntary, but ineffectual opposition" of the volition that does not prevail.

But lest we should do injustice to the views of Dr. Edwards, let us hear him fully on this subject; let us see how he solves this difficulty. He says—"But though a man who is determined by moral necessity to choose a virtuous course, cannot *in the act* oppose that choice or the cause of it; yet he may *in other acts* of his will oppose both the choice and the cause, and thus in different acts choose and act differently." "And this weaker choice is no more opposed to the moral necessity, which causes it, than the stronger choice of virtue is to the moral necessity which causes that," p. 303. This is one solution. Recollect the concession, that there may be "*at the same time*" the choice of virtue and the choice of vice—that between the two there may be "mutual opposition," and that one may be prevalent. By the prevalence of one he cannot mean the non-existence of the other;" both exist "*at the same time*," but one

prevails over the other, and governs the conduct. Now in this solution he tells us, that the choice of virtue is not opposed to itself, nor the choice of vice to itself, e. g. that a single act of choice cannot be two acts and two opposing acts at the same time. Suppose this to be granted, yet if they may both be "at the same time," then there may be a mutual opposition, and if one prevails, then it exists contrary to the ineffectual opposition of the one not prevalent, and of course has the characteristic given to natural necessity. Let them both exist by their respective moral necessities—let neither be opposed to the moral necessity which causes it; yet there is "a mutual opposition" between the two volitions originating from their respective necessities, and the one that prevails is a phenomenon of natural necessity by the principles and concessions of Dr. Edwards. He has conceded too much to be consistent with himself. He must retract the concession, or change the characteristic given to natural necessity, or be logically compelled to allow that some volitions exist by such necessity.

He has another solution of the difficulty. "Now it will not be pretended, that this opposition of one act of the will to another is parallel to the *entire* opposition of the will, which there is or may be to natural necessity," p. 303. It will be perceived, that the fact of opposition is here a point conceded—that the former admission of opposing acts "at the same time" is not denied, and that the ground of distinction, which he assumes, is that the two oppositions are not *parallel*:—in the one case it is *entire opposition*;—and in the other it must be something different from "entire opposition."—Now, if I mistake not, he has here introduced a *new* element in the conception of natural necessity. He said, that it refers to *some* supposable, but ineffectual opposition. Here he substitutes the word *entire*, meaning, "an entire and perfect opposition of the whole will," and meaning by this again, that there is but one act of choice, and this is opposed, though ineffectually, to the resulting event. He concedes the case of *some* supposable and real opposition of one will to another; and when pressed with the argument, that one of these wills must upon his own construction be by a natural necessity, he modifies the idea of such necessity, and makes it have reference to "an entire and perfect opposition of the whole will."—Dr. Edwards is entitled to the full benefit of his own explanations. What is "an entire and perfect opposition of the whole will" in any case?—It is plainly nothing more than the

simple fact, that the mind chooses, and chooses contrary to the resulting event. Every act of choice is by its nature "an entire and perfect" act of choice, and when it is against the resulting event, it is "an entire and perfect opposition" of the act to the event. How then does the "entire and perfect opposition of the whole will" differ from the "opposition of one act of the will to another," as conceded by Dr. Edwards?—In the one case you have *one and but one* "entire" act of choice contrary to the event;—in the other you have *two* entire acts of choice contrary to each other, between which there is "an entire and perfect opposition." So that, after all, the cases are more nearly parallel than Dr. Edwards supposed. One event exists contrary to one entire act of choice; in the case of "opposition of one act of the will to another" the volition prevalent exists also contrary to the "entire and perfect opposition" of the volition not prevalent. Both cases certainly present "entire and perfect opposition;" and hence both terminate in the same kind of necessity. If this criticism be deemed severe, it is believed not to be unjust;—it forces no unnatural interpretation upon the language of Dr. Edwards;—it simply assumes that he wrote as he meant.

II. In the next place let us inquire, in what sense he uses Moral Necessity, when insisting on its distinction from Natural Necessity?

This question is rendered important by the fact, that he uses moral necessity in three different senses. In a passage where the distinction was the very point that he was elaborating, he says that moral necessity "is a previous certainty of the existence of a volition or voluntary action." p. 300. He quotes President Edwards as presenting the same conception—it "is a certainty of the inclination and will itself." I have already shown, that in this sense moral necessity is not a subject of debate, as well as that Dr. Edwards is not consistent with himself in this use of it. To distinguish it in this sense, is to employ it in a sense in which it is not denied, and to leave the question of its distinction in other senses entirely unsettled.

III. In the third place, what are the points of agreement, if any, which he has admitted?—It will be conceded that in reference to the certainty of the sequents, it is equal in both cases. Dr. Edwards says,—"*The difference between these two kinds of necessity lies chiefly in the nature of the two terms connected by it,*" p. 300. He quotes the language of President Edwards

on this point,—“the difference between these two kinds of necessity does not lie so much in the *nature of the connection*, as in the two terms connected.” This is a very obvious concession, that “in the nature of the connection” they agree. Here he attempts to make no distinction; all his reasoning fixes on another point of distinction. Agreement in this respect is then acknowledged. What is the nature of this connection, in respect to which the identity of the two necessities is a point conceded? It is a connection between a certain cause and its effect in one case, and then it is a connection of natural necessity; and between a certain other cause and its effect in another case, and then it is a connection of moral necessity. In the one case, it is a physical cause connected with its physical sequent; in the other it is a moral cause or motive connected with its moral sequent or volition. However different the *terms* may be in the two connections, still the nature of the connection is the same. The prior terms in both secure their respective sequents with equal certainty; in both they are equally causes and act in the same way, so far as they are causes at all.

Omitting to examine the assumption, that motive is properly a cause, I wish to propose this question: *Is not the identity of the two necessities admitted in every material respect?* In two cases of natural necessity the connected terms differ, *not* as causes and effects, but in other respects consistent with this identity. Were it said that two instances of natural necessity differ, the inquiry would be,—In what? If it were answered, *in their terms*; the answer would be, that this difference has nothing to do with the simple question of necessity; and therefore they might equally be instances of such necessity. It is the very nature of necessity, not to give a history of the terms connected, but to treat of the nature of the connection, to inquire into the ground or reason of the certainty of this connection. If we adopt any other view, we should have as many different kinds of necessity as there are terms—all equally disagreeing with each other;—that would be a *mechanical* necessity, a *chemical* necessity, an *electrical* necessity, a *galvanic* necessity, a *vegetable* necessity, an *animal* necessity, &c. Every effort to identify these as cases of natural necessity would fail; for in every instance it might be replied, that the terms of the connection differ. It is true, that they differ, but not in any respect which affects the question of natural necessity. Here they are one, because the nature of the connection is one. If then na-

tural and moral necessity be admitted to agree in the *nature of the connection*, we have an agreement, which essentially confounds the two necessities. They disagree, not in the respect which identifies them as instances of necessity ;—they differ only as different cases of natural necessity differ from each other, e. g., in the *terms* connected. There is no distinction in the certainty, with which sequents follow, for in both cases it is absolute ; there is none in the nature of their connection with their respective antecedents. What is the fundamental element of natural necessity ?—It lies in the nature of the connection between the two terms, e. g., the physical antecedent and the physical sequent ; this creates all the necessity, by which the sequent exists ; it is the ground of its certainty. To identify the two necessities therefore in the nature of the connection, is to make them alike in that respect, in which necessity has any meaning. Hence it is not strange, that the advocates of physical necessity should sometimes appeal to President and Dr. Edwards, as being on their side. The truth is, they have, without intending to do it, conceded the identity of the two necessities in the very respect where they should have proved a difference, if they meant to insist on a distinction between the two. This however was the best they could do, after having assumed that motive causes volition, and that the mind does not.

IV. We come then in the last place, to the points of distinction between the two necessities. President Edwards held that the distinction "does not lie so much in the nature of the connection, as in the *two terms* connected." Dr. Edwards held the same sentiment, that it "lies chiefly in the nature of the two terms connected by it." In reply to the charge, that this "is a distinction without a difference," the latter writer says, "it is manifest that there is that very difference in the two cases which President Edwards's distinction supposes. To say that this is a distinction without a difference, is to say, that an habitual disposition or a motive is the same with something which is not an habitual disposition or motive ; and that a volition or voluntary action, is the same with what is not a volition or voluntary action, p. 300. This reasoning confirms the idea, that the distinction of terms was the great distinction on which Dr. Edwards intended to issue the question.

What then are the *two terms* of the connection in moral necessity ? They are of "a moral nature,"—e. g., "some previous habitual disposition, or some motive" as the antecedent

and cause; "volition or voluntary action" as the sequent and effect. These are not the terms of a connection by natural necessity. Hence, there is a "difference in the two cases." This is the argument, and the whole argument on the point: and so far as it goes, it is a conclusive argument. There is a distinction with a difference;—difference in respect to what? In respect to the terms of the sequence in the two cases—this is all; it is all that is pretended. Let this distinction be allowed, and let the terms be subjected to a careful analysis.

In the first place, let us examine the *antecedents* in the two cases: in both they are admitted to be causes. Viewed simply as causes, they cannot be distinguished from each other; for President Day very properly observes, that "one cause cannot be unlike another in the very property, which is common and essential to all causes." To classify causes, is not to distinguish between them simply as causes, for in this respect they must be alike; but to distinguish between them in some other respect, which is perfectly consistent with the supposition that they are all causes, as when we speak of *proximate* and *remote* causes,—*first* and *second* causes,—*mental* and *physical* causes,—*moral* and *natural* causes. In these distinctions we have the *generic* idea of causes, associated with *specific* differences, which differences contain no allusion whatever to the simple idea of cause, this being exhausted in the generic idea. Suppose, then, the antecedent terms in the two necessities differ; the question is, How do they differ? Not as causes merely, but in other respects having no sort of relation to their nature as causes; they differ as a *proximate* does from a *remote* cause, by having dissimilar attributes or accidents, none of which pertain to their nature as causes. The cause in moral necessity and the cause in natural necessity are alike in the respect in which either is cause. We have, then, the identity of the two necessities in the nature of the connection acknowledged; we have proved the identity of the two prior terms, so far as their nature as cause is concerned; we therefore have an identity of the two necessities in all the respects in which the word necessity has any import: to contend for a distinction in other respects, is mere verbal trifling; it is to go beyond the range of the whole subject in search of distinctions. The conceptions of necessity are exhausted in the affirmation of a previous certainty in the nature of the connection of two terms, which is the basis of that certainty, and in the causal nature of the prior term, which

is the basis of the certainty of the connection. To reverse the order of statement;—the prior term is a cause; its nature as a cause is the ground of the certainty of its connection with a sequent; that certainty of connection is the ground of the certainty of the existence of that sequent. What other conceptions can be found in any consequential necessity? They exhaust the whole idea: they are either admitted, or proved to belong to moral necessity. How, then, do the two necessities differ, in respect to the prior terms of the two connections? As *necessities*, I am unable to see any distinction between them.

In the second place, we may institute an examination of the *posterior* terms of the two connections, e. g., the *sequents*;—What are they? A "volition or voluntary action," and something which "is not a volition or voluntary action." In the order of sequence, they are *consequents*—resulting phenomena. They are more; they are *effects*, and as such, alike; for no effect can differ from another in that property which is common to all effects. Suppose, then, that they differ in other respects, which are consistent with their common character as *consequents* and *effects*; will this make a distinction in the two necessities from which they arise? Obviously not; for here, as in the former case, the distinction would be laid beyond the range of the subject. If a man were describing phenomena, such a distinction would be proper; but if he be reasoning on the subject of necessity, it is not pertinent.

Before leaving this subject, it may be well to advert to another ground of distinction, e. g., that natural necessity always "has reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavor, which is insufficient;" whereas "no such opposition or contrary will and endeavor is supposable in the case of moral necessity, which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself," p. 299. It is a sufficient reply to this, to say that natural necessity, as already shown, does not always have reference to such supposable opposition, and that moral necessity is here used in the sense which is not a subject of debate. This distinction, therefore, would amount to nothing.

From the preceding criticism, the reader will of course draw his own conclusions. I have aimed to do full justice to the arguments of Dr. Edwards, both in stating them and in replying to them. Has he made out a satisfactory distinction between the two necessities? I am compelled to reply in the negative.

III. *The Dictum Necessitatis.*

The above title is shown to characterize a certain species of argument, on which much stress is laid by the advocates of moral necessity. It is the great element of one of their most formidable demonstrations against their opponents. Its efficacy seems to have been ever regarded as equal to the famous *Dictum Logicum* of Aristotle. It is much relied upon, both by President and Dr Edwards, in their arguments on the Will.

What is this Dictum? The following extracts will answer. "Liberty in the sense of our opponents is not possible or conceivable. By liberty they mean a power to cause all our own volitions, and to cause them freely. But that we should thus cause them, is neither possible nor conceivable. If we should thus cause a volition, we should doubtless cause it by a causal act. It is impossible that we cause any thing without a causal act. And, as it is supposed that we cause it freely, the causal act must be a free act, e. g., an act of the will, or volition. And as the supposition is, that all our volitions are caused by ourselves, the causal act must be caused by another, and so on infinitely, which is both impossible and inconceivable," p. 323, 324. President Edwards before him had reasoned in the same manner. He says, "An active being can bring no effects to pass by his activity, but what are *consequent* upon his acting." The inference was, that if the mind causes action, it must do it by a causative act, which being an act, requires another causative act, and so on *ad infinitum*; and thus we become involved in an endless series of actions or volitions. This argument is one of the strong-holds of necessity;—the fate of much that has been written by President and Dr. Edwards turns upon its validity. It assumes a certain principle in regard to cause, e. g., *that a cause cannot act but by first acting to produce that act*;—this is the Dictum Necessitatis. When applied to the mind, it was agreed, that the mind cannot cause its own volitions, but by first acting to cause them, which supposition leads to an endless series of acts; if the mind be the cause, the reasoning is unanswerable, if the dictum be allowed.—I propose, therefore, to make it the subject of the following remarks.

I. It is an assumption in regard to all causes. Dr. Edwards has not stated it in the general form adopted above: his sentiment was made in view of a specific cause, e. g., the mind as

cause of volition; but as he has said nothing to show why it should be true of the mind any more than of other causes, it is legitimate to test its validity as a universal category of cause. The conclusiveness of the reasoning based upon it, depends upon its universal truth.

II. The reasoning offered in its support proceeds upon a doubtful, if not a false analogy. It is true that bodily sequents are caused by the mind (if caused by it at all) by a volition prior to those sequents. If I will to walk, I cause the motion of my limbs by a previous volition. Dr. Edwards reasons correctly in regard to a ship-carpenter being the efficient cause or builder of a ship, when he supposes that it would be absurd to say, that the carpenter builds the ship without the intervention of exertions or volitions for this purpose. The bodily sequents connected with the building are caused by the mind through the medium of volitions prior to the sequents. But does it hence follow that the volitions are caused by the mind in the same way, if caused by it at all? Can you reason conclusively from one case to the other? Not unless they are entirely parallel. Dr. Edwards does not know, that the mind in fact causes the bodily sequents at all. It may be cause of the volitions, which volitions are known only as the stated antecedents of the sequents. It will not do to assume, that the sequents and volitions have a parallel relation to the mind, and then reason from the causation of the one to that of the other. If the sequents are caused by the mind through the medium of volitions, it does not follow that these volitions must equally be sequents of other volitions, and so on *ad infinitum*. Indeed neither Dr. Edwards, nor any body else, knows that a finite cause ever causes by a causative act. What is known is simply this, that acts of causes have stated sequents,—but the *efficiency* which connects the sequents and the acts is not known to be in the acts or in the causes of those acts. I may will a motion and be the cause of the will, when something else may be the cause that connects the willing and the motion in the order of a stated sequence.

III. The plausibility of the assumption and of the reasoning to which it leads, rests mainly on an *ambiguity* in the use of the word cause. It is sometimes used for *that which by acting produces effects consequent upon the acting*. In this sense, it is always used by those, who seek to press their opponents with the absurdity of an infinite series of acts. It is also used for *that*

which acts, which is itself the originator of phenomena. In that sense it causes action without prior action. Now if we use cause in the first sense, it is absurd to say, that mind is cause, or indeed any thing else, for it is impossible to escape the charge of infinite succession. If we use it in the second sense, no such consequence will follow. If proof of any cause in the last sense be demanded, it will be presented in the course of this article; for the present I reply, by demanding proof of cause in the first sense, and promise to make that cause an absurdity by bringing against it the charge of an infinite series, the very charge which Dr. Edwards has brought against the mind as cause.

This ambiguity in using the word cause served a valuable purpose in the hands of Dr. Edwards. His opponents asserted that the mind *determines* the volition. Dr. Edwards responds, that if by "*determines*," they mean simply that the mind is a *subject* of volition, then he agrees with them; but if they mean that it *causes* volition, then he does not agree with them, for it then must cause by a previous causative act. Now it is obvious, that by the word "*determines*" Dr. Edwards does not mean a volition, but the fact merely of being a subject of volition. When he speaks of motive as *determining*, then also he does not mean a volition, but that motive causes volition. On the other hand, his opponents by the same word do not mean volition, nor simply that the mind is a subject of volition; but that it also causes volition. But this is neither "possible nor conceivable," replies Dr. Edwards, using the word cause in the first of the above senses. His opponents reply, it is both possible and conceivable, using the word cause in the other sense. They do not contradict each other, for they use cause in two senses. Dr. Edwards assuming, that by "*determines*" his opponents meant a volition, and taking advantage of an ambiguity in using the word cause, found no difficulty in convicting them of an infinite series.

IV. This assumption undertakes to decide *how* a cause acts. No man is competent to answer the question;—How does a cause act? Who can tell how a physical cause produces effects? If motive be a cause, will Dr. Edwards pretend to tell how it causes? If mind be a cause, we can never tell any thing about its *mode* of causing. We may say that it causes, as any cause causes; but how does any cause cause effects? Here we are profoundly ignorant. Among our intellections we

find disclosed the nature of a cause, and the principle of causality ;—by experience, including observation and consciousness, we ascertain the phenomena of causes ; by reasoning we refer those phenomena to their causes. Beyond this we can never pass to the *mode* of causation by any cause. Yet Dr. Edwards by the assumption undertakes to decide this very question. If the mind causes volition it must do it by a previous volition, is his proposition. How does he know this when he knows nothing of the mode of causation? The mind is a *thinker*. Will any man pretend to say that it cannot think without a prior act of thinking, by which it thinks? It is also a *knower*. But who will say that it cannot know without some prior phenomenon of knowing? Suppose we say that it is also a *willer*. Can Dr. Edwards be certain that it cannot will in the sense of causing, without some antecedent act of willing? In this point of view, this famous dictum degenerates into a mere assumption.

V. It is an assumption which necessarily leads to the doctrine of an infinite series. If we apply it to the human mind, it works very well for the cause of necessity. But it proves that volitions are not caused at all, which is an absurdity ; or an infinite series if caused by the mind, which is an equal absurdity ; or an infinite series if caused by the mind, which is an equal absurdity ; or that they are caused by *something else*. Very well. Let us take that *something else* ; we will suppose it to be motive. If it causes volition, it must be by a previous act of causation, and here again as in the former case you have an infinite series, or no cause, or some cause more ulterior. You may take this ulterior cause and go through the same round ; there is no end to the process ; you have an eternal succession, or no cause in the universe, or you must come back to some cause, which does not cause by prior causative acts. If all these suppositions be absurd, then we may as well bid farewell to all philosophy. The two first are admitted to be absurdities. Is the idea of a cause, causing without prior causative acts, an equal absurdity? It is not *known* as such, for the very reason, that we do not know how any cause acts. That it is not, is manifest from the fact, that it is the only mode of escaping one of two absurdities—viz., infinite succession or no causality. Some cause therefore there must be, competent to cause without preceding acts of causation. What that cause is, is not the question ; but the logical necessity of supposing

such a cause. This logical necessity is inconsistent with the dictum. Hence we have no alternative but to reject it: this at once unsettles the validity of all the reasoning based upon it; and the strong fortress of necessity against the mind's self-determination in the sense of causing volition falls to the ground.

It is not to be supposed, that an argument, which has so long and so faithfully served its masters, will be given up without some efforts to save its life. Dr. Edwards seeks to preserve the dictum, and at the same time evade the force of the last objection to it. He says, "We maintain, that action may be the effect of a divine influence; or that it may be the effect of one or more second causes, the first of which is immediately produced by the Deity. Here there is not an infinite series of causes, but a very short series, which terminates in the Deity or first cause," p. 385. He stops the series and makes it a "very short series," by resorting to the Deity as the first cause. Among finite causes you have a succession of causative acts, which stops short of infinite by terminating in the first cause. This is the argument.

A volume might be written in reply to this position. My remarks must be condensed, as much as possible. One of the following suppositions must be true,—viz., *Either God is the cause of his own acts, or he is not the cause of them.*

Let us then assume the first supposition to be true. God created the world by the causative act of creation. Is He the cause of the creating act? We will suppose the answer to be in the affirmative. Let us then bring the dictum to bear on this phenomenon of the Divine mind,—*No cause can act and thus produce effects without prior action.* It follows, that this creating act needs a prior act to account for its existence; and this latter for the same reason needs another, and hence you have an infinite series of Divine acts causing each other, on the supposition that God is cause. The series so far from being a short one, when it reaches the Deity, enters upon a new theatre and there proceeds *ad infinitum*. If it be said, that the dictum is true of all second causes, but not of the first cause,—that God may cause without prior causative acts;—I reply, that this is giving up the whole question; it is disallowing the universal truth of the dictum. If the Deity be such a cause, may He not create another in this respect like Himself? If the conception of God as such a cause be no absurdity, then is the conception of man as such a cause no absurdity. We

have then a question, not of logic, whether any such cause can be, for one is admitted; but of psychology, whether man is such a cause, against the presumption of which no objection can be drawn a priori.

Let us examine the second supposition,—viz., *that God is not the cause of his volitions or acts*. If this be assumed, then they are caused by some other cause, or they are not caused at all. If we take the first supposition, we not only subject the Deity to fate, but involve that other cause in an infinite series. If we take the second, then we must say, that the *Divine volitions or acts are uncaused—they have no cause*. Now which of these suppositions does Dr. Edwards adopt? He says,—“The divine volitions were no more caused, whether by God himself, or by any other cause, than the divine existence was,” p. 321. The series of causes is therefore not infinite, because it terminates in the *uncaused and self-existent volitions or acts* of the Deity. It is admitted, that this avoids an infinite series and preserves the dictum; but it removes one difficulty by involving another quite as fearful,—*that the Divine volitions have no cause*. On this I shall submit the following observations:—

(1.) If it be admitted, that to say, that God causes his own acts, involves some philosophical difficulties as connected with Divine immutability, still the question may be asked, Does not the denial involve difficulties in another direction equally as great? I think Dr. Edwards or any other man will see some serious difficulties along the path of denial. Suppose the difficulties of affirming or denying be just equal to each other, then this position of Dr. Edwards will at least be neutralized, and the question will stand, as it would, had the position never been presented.

(2.) Again, Dr. Edwards seems to have supposed, that the Divine volitions were uncaused, because he judged it inconsistent with Divine immutability, that God should cause them. This is the only reason he gives for the opinion. He allows, that the effects of divine acts take place in succession and time, but contends that with God there is no succession, in respect either to knowledge or acts. Now we propose this question:—*May not Dr. Edwards have assumed a view of Divine immutability as true, which is inconsistent with the nature of intelligence, cause, or agency, finite or infinite?* That, indeed, would be a strange hypothesis of Divine Immutability, which contradicts

the nature of God as an Intelligence and a Cause. It is an immutability of such an Intelligence and Cause, not one that is inconsistent with these ideas. Without pretending to fix the lines of demarcation, let us reason for a moment on this difficult point.

It will be granted, that the Divine knowledge is a knowledge of things as they are. To view a thing as existing, when in fact it did not exist, would be viewing things, not as they are, but as they are not. Did God know the world, *as existing*, before it did exist? He knew it as about to exist in some future time, but certainly he did not know it *as existing*, when in fact it did not exist. This is not possible in the very nature of intelligence. To say, then, that there may be succession *out* of the Divine mind, but none *in* it, is a self-contradiction. Time, or duration, has the form of an infinite conception; in time, or duration, events occur; they occur in certain portions of time; they do not all occur in the same portions, but in different, and therefore they are necessarily successive, one before the other, not so merely in our view, but so in fact. This succession God knows when it is yet to be; this is foreknowledge. He knows it as it comes to pass; this is present knowledge. Now to make the foreknowledge and the present knowledge the same acts of knowledge, is to say that the knowledge of a thing as yet to be, is the same as the knowledge of a thing as being,—it is to make both acts of knowledge contrary to each other and contrary to the fact. The doctrine of no succession in the Divine mind, but of "an eternal now," is pregnant with this absurdity: there is and must be in the very nature of things, some succession in the Divine acts of knowing, not that God is wiser at one time than another, for what may now be the subject of present knowledge, because now existing, was the subject of foreknowledge, when it was yet to exist; but still the act of present knowing is necessarily successive to that of foreknowing. Such succession is involved in the very nature of intelligence, finite or infinite.

Now, to assume an hypothesis of the Divine immutability inconsistent with such succession, is to make immutability inconsistent with God's nature as a being of intelligence. May not Dr. Edwards have done this very thing in relation to the Deity as the cause of his own acts or volitions? It might be affirmed, that Deity is the cause of his own volitions, and Dr. Edwards might be challenged to show his immutability in any

sense, that is inconsistent with the truth of this proposition. If the Divine volitions be the efficiency which causes events, and if there be no succession in those volitions, how comes it to pass that there is an actual, not merely an apparent succession in the events? If there be succession in the volitions, then all the difficulty in supposing God to be their cause, as founded on immutability, is at once removed; for the supposition of any succession in the Divine mind presents as great a difficulty as that of his being the cause of his own acts.

(3.) Again, if God be not the cause of his own acts or volitions, then it will follow, that he is not the cause of any thing. If God be the cause of the world's existence, then He must be the cause of the creating act or acts; if He is not the cause of these, He certainly cannot be the cause of their sequences. How can Deity be the cause of the sequences of acts, when He is not the cause of the acts? The thing is inconceivable. The acts cannot cause the sequences; and if Deity cause the sequences, it must be by causing the acts; but the acts are uncaused according to the supposition; therefore Deity is cause neither of the acts, nor of the sequents, nor of any thing else. If we adopt the hypothesis, we must carry along with it this logical consequence; it sweeps away Divine agency, and indeed all agency from the universe. To reason from Divine immutability to the destruction of all Divine agency, is a most mighty march in logic.

(4.) Dr. Edwards himself abundantly denies his own hypothesis. He speaks of Deity as being influenced by reasons, and good reasons, for all his purposes and acts. This is the moral necessity to which the Deity is subject. What! the Deity influenced by reasons to acts and purposes, which are absolutely uncaused!—influenced to acts which have no cause, neither *in*, nor *out of* Himself! No man can state a greater paradox. To say nothing of the absurdity of calling *acts* self-existent and uncaused, it is manifestly impossible, that a being should be influenced to acts which have no cause. Influenced to what and for what?—Not to cause them, for this is inconsistent with the supposition. Indeed, neither Dr. Edwards, nor any one else, can write or speak on this subject without contradicting this hypothesis. When we speak of the *purposes of God, the acts of God*, etc., we must mean, if we mean any thing, that He is the cause of those purposes and acts. Upon any other hypothesis

the language of the Bible, as well as of men, on this subject must go for nothing.

To affirm therefore that God causes his own volitions and retain the dictum, is to involve an infinite series. To deny that He is the basis of his own volitions, is to involve a difficulty, between which and an infinite series there is little ground of choice. The only alternative is to abandon the dictum as a necessary conception applicable to cause. Dr. Edwards made a bold sweep in his effort to save it, but failed of success. Some cause there must be, which does not cause by prior acts of causation.

ARTICLE XI.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*The Complete Duty of Man: or a System of Doctrinal and Practical Christianity.* By the Rev. Henry Venn, A. M., Rector of Yelling in Huntingdonshire in A. D. 1763. *A New Edition, revised and corrected by Rev. H. Venn, B. D. of St. John's Holloway.* New-York: American Tract Society. 1842. pp. 430.

THIS valuable work of practical theology first appeared in 1763, and since that time has passed through several editions. The author was an evangelical minister of the Church of England, whose labors were much blessed in the diffusion of wholesome views of truth, and in promoting among the younger ministry of the established church an evangelical standard of preaching and living. He rested from his useful labors after having served his Master in the ministry of the gospel for half a century. But a blessing remained behind in the publication of his 'Complete Duty of Man.' Many a wanderer has been recalled by it to the love and service of Christ; and now that it will go out extensively among the people through the agency of the American Tract Society, we trust that many more will be led by it to the foot of the cross, and bring forth fruits meet for repentance.

The book is well adapted to popular reading, and treats in a plain style of—The Soul—God—Man—The Law—Faith in

Christ—The Holy Spirit—Repentance—Christian Graces—Relative Duties—Self-denial—Prayer—The Scriptures—Christian Joy. Christ is the centre of all—his atonement the grand means of holiness as well as the only ground of a sinner's pardon.

- 2.—*Notes, Critical and Practical, on the Book of Leviticus : designed as a general Help to Biblical Reading and Instruction. By George Bush, Prof. of Heb. and Orient. Lit. N. Y. City University.* New-York: Dayton and Newman. 1843. pp. 282.

Professor Bush is doing a good service to the church, in publishing brief commentaries on the books of the Old Testament, in volumes of a convenient manual size. Those, which have appeared prior to the present, have met with a favorable reception, and this on Leviticus is equally worthy the attention of Sabbath School teachers, members of Bible classes, and others who are interested in the study of God's word. It is the best study on earth, and our gratitude is due to the man, who devotes his days and nights to its elucidation, making God's revelation plainer to the common mind, and placing before the reader such facts and suggestions as enable him readily to apprehend what otherwise might be obscure.

The author has in this volume given the view of the scape-goat, which he had before published in the Am. Bib. Repository. He also enters, at some length, into the discussion of the question of marrying the sister of a deceased wife, and on the whole entertains the opinion that it is not unscriptural.

We commend the book to the attention of those who would make themselves familiar with the Levitical rites and ceremonies, and can promise them a clear and generally satisfactory interpretation of the laws recorded in this part of the Old Testament.

- 3.—*The Sacred Seal ; or the Wanderer Restored ; a Poem. By Rev. N. Emmons Johnston.* New-York: John S. Taylor & Co. 1843. pp. 80.

Those who love poetry will here find some verses worthy of the name ; and we are glad to see the poetic Muse summoned away for a little while from brooding over scenes of love and folly, to inspire one who consecrates his gifts to so holy a subject as that of the seal of the covenant.

Nor is there any attempt here, to throw a sombre shade of holy awe and reverence around the mere uncommanded rites of our religion; to win the sympathies of tender hearts towards that external pomp which is adapted to strike the imagination,—but poetry is consecrated to a great practical subject, the powerful influence of early instructions around the fireside, as connected with the simple ordinances of the Gospel.

The author selects a young man piously educated for his hero; permits him to break away from the holy restraints of home,—follows him to the gambling-table, the infidel-club, the havoc of war;—in all the scenes through which he passes, unable still to drown the voice of conscience and of God, until he at last bows his stubborn will and proud heart, and returns a lost one found, to the bosom and embrace of his parents, brothers and sisters, coming in silently upon them, just as the good old man is kneeling in family prayer, and pouring out his whole soul, in believing, submissive supplication for the wandering son. This scene is well and touchingly described. We quote a part of it:

“ The group was silent, as the eldest son
The story of the Prodigal begun :
Sobbing, went through the room. The patriarch bowed ;
And there, before his Saviour wept aloud :
At last, composed, his quivering accents fell,
Like genial dews upon the flowery dell.
He thanked his covenant God, whose grace had made
At night his sunshine, and at noon his shade.
* * * * *
* * * * *

While he spoke,
(And one sweet voice beside him, said amen,)
Silent a stranger entered, and unseen,
Knelt on the vacant chair with humble mien ;
And as the patriarch ended, once again
Broke forth in stronger tone that word, *Amen !*
That circle started—from their knees they sprung,—
’Twas LINCOLN GAFF that o’er his father hung ;
Poured his warm tears amidst the whitened hair,
And raptures mingled more than hearts could bear.”

- 4.—*The Lost Sister of Wyoming. An Authentic Narrative. By Rev. John Todd. Northampton : J. H. Butler. New-York : Dayton & Newman. 1842. pp. 160.*

The Rev. John Todd, author of this simple and beautiful story, is well known to possess qualifications for interesting

the young : and, we doubt not, many a youth has before this time read this entertaining little volume. To any who have not, we can safely recommend it. It contains some good descriptions of scenery, especially in the Wyoming valley on the beautiful Susquehanna ; some entertaining historical incidents in the early settlement of that celebrated vale, and some excellent reflections on the providence and care of God.

Among other interesting events, we find here a particular account of the capture, by the Indians, of little Frances Slocum, in 1778, when five years old, and her recent discovery by her friends, among the Miami tribe in Indiana.

- 5.—HARPERS' FAMILY LIBRARY, 156. *Education. Part I. History of Education, Ancient and Modern. Part II. A Plan of Culture and Instruction, based on Christian Principles, and designed to aid in the right education of Youth, physically, intellectually, and morally.* By H. J. Smith, A. M., Prof. of Mod. Languages in the Penna. College, and of German Language and Lit. in the Theolog. Seminary at Gettysburg, Penna. New York : Harper & Brothers. 1842. pp. 340.

We are pleased to see the above work. It gives us a history of education from the beginning of time down to the present day, and brings within a small compass, valuable information on this subject, in respect to the Hebrews, Chinese, Babylonians, Egyptians, Grecians, Romans, etc.

The second part, 'Plan of Culture and Instruction,' embraces important considerations on physical, intellectual and moral education. The plans proposed we think excellent, and could they be carried out in the family circle would make more healthy and better children in every respect. Until some such principles are generally acted on, we shall not have the stamina requisite for sustaining our republican government, nor for conducting the great benevolent movements of the age.

Under physical culture, we find some admirable suggestions for the improvement of the senses, of sight, hearing, etc., and for the proper cultivation of the voice to various and distinct intonations : and under moral, excellent modes of training the juvenile heart in those lovely dispositions, which will assimilate it to the divine pattern of moral beauty exhibited by the Lord Jesus Christ.

- 6.—*Encyclopædia of Science, Literature and Art ; comprising the History, Description and Scientific Principles of every branch of Human Knowledge ; with the Derivation and Definition of all the Terms in use. Illustrated by Engravings on Wood. General Editor, W. T. F. Brande, F. R. S. L. & E. New York : Harper & Brothers. 1842.*

This work is to be completed in twelve parts, of 112 pages each, and to be sold at 25 cents a number. We have received Parts I. and II. The type is of course small, but clear and good, and will answer better for a book of reference like this, than for one requiring continuous reading. We have already expressed our opinion of the work, and confidently expect, from the talent displayed in it, that it will become a standard work of its kind.

- 7.—*History of Europe from the commencement of the French Revolution in 1789, to the Restoration of the Bourbons in 1815. By Archibald Alison, F. R. S. E., Advocate. In four volumes. Vol. I. New York : Harper & Brothers.*

This is another of the Harpers' publications to be issued in parts, and completed in 16 numbers, making four volumes of about 600 pages each. The execution of the first part is good, and promises well for the work. Alison's is undoubtedly one of the most elegant histories of the day, and will be extensively read. It is not free from errors, however, both of language and fact. In respect to the United States, so gross are the mistakes of the learned author, that it might be well to correct them in the American edition, by appending suitable notes, if not in the text.

The part before us embraces six chapters, treating of Progress of Freedom in France and England—Causes in France which predisposed to Revolution—Constituent Assembly—From Revolt at Versailles to the conclusion of the Constituent Assembly—From the Legislative Assembly to the Fall of the Monarch—French Republic, from the dethronement to the death of Louis.

- 8.—*A Pictorial History of France. For Schools. By S. G. Goodrich, Author of Peter Parley's Tales. Philadelphia : Samuel Agnew. 1842. pp. 347.*

A good school book is a good thing, and rather rarely

to be met with. It ought to contain truth, facts; and for juvenile pupils should be attractive. Peter Parley has afforded much instruction and entertainment to the young, for many years, and has been very successful in the preparation of some of his school books. His Common School History, especially, has been very extensively adopted as a text-book: and where histories of particular countries are subjects of study in a school, we should think this pictorial history of France would be well adapted to the purpose. It presents a clear and brief account of that interesting country, and carries its history down to the existing state of things under the reign of Louis Philippe. At the close we have tables of the Bourbon, Bonaparte and Orleans-Bourbon families.

The History of France is to be followed by pictorial histories of the United States, England, Rome and Greece, by the same author.

9.—*The Church's Best State ; or Constant Revivals of Religion.* By Rev. Simeon W. Harkey. Baltimore : Publication Rooms ; Boston : Tappan & Dennett, and Crocker & Brewster ; New York : D. Appleton & Co. and Dayton & Newman ; Cincinnati : E. Lucas ; Pittsburg : C. H. Kay. 1842. pp. 172.

This book emanates from a minister of the Lutheran Church ; is written in an excellent spirit, under a high sense of responsibility, and with the intent to benefit that portion of Zion, to which the author belongs, by promoting revivals of pure and undefiled religion. The subject is treated under the following chapters. 1. What is true religion ? 2. What is a genuine revival of religion, considered negatively ? 3. What is it, considered affirmatively ? 4. Are genuine revivals the Church's best state ? 5. Constant revivals possible. 6. 'New Measures' — 'Old Measures ;' Means to be employed for the promotion of revivals. 7. How to conduct revivals. 8. Conclusion and application of the whole subject.

We are much pleased with the author's views as expressed on these several topics ; and while he is careful to guard against fanaticism and *undue* excitement, and the injudicious and untimely resort to protracted meetings, he is not unfriendly to these meetings at proper times and properly conducted. On this subject much must be left to the judgment of pastors of the churches. There are doubtless seasons, when to withhold extra efforts would be sinful, because the Spirit of God evidently leads the way. Then they are always safe, conducted in the spirit of the gospel.

- 10.—*Julia of Baia; or The Days of Nero. A Story of the Martyrs.* By the Author of "*The Merchant's Daughter*," "*Virginia*," "*Christmas Bells*," etc., etc. New-York: Saxton & Miles. Boston: Saxton & Pierce. 1842. pp. 260.

This is an interesting book of fiction, interweaving much that is fact, and conveying to the mind of the reader many beautiful impressions of the scenery of Italy, and many striking incidents in the history of the times of Nero. That cruel monster is appropriately depicted, and the sufferings of the Martyrs under his reign graphically portrayed. The book will undoubtedly be acceptable to the youthful portion of the community, and where fiction is employed to attract, we prefer that it shall be used to throw a charm around such and kindred subjects, as the author of *Baia* has selected.

- 11.—*The Salem Belle: A Tale of 1692.* Boston: Tappan & Dennet. 1842. pp. 238.

The design of this little book is to exhibit some of the prevalent superstitions of the 17th century, and to caution the public mind against the prevalence of others equally to be deplored. We seem not to have advanced far enough yet in civilization and Christianity to be exempt from the most ridiculous superstitions and most flagrant fanaticism.

- 12.—*A Grammar of the German Language.* By George Henry Noehden, LL. D. From the eighth London edition, by Rev. C. H. F. Billoblotzky, Ph. D. With alterations and large additions, chiefly from the Grammars of Dr. Becker. By Rev. Barnas Sears, D. D., President of the Newton Theological Institution. Andover: Allen, Morrill & Wardwell. 1842. pp. 452.

We have before us the grammar announced as forthcoming in our October number of 1842. We expected a good, well digested grammar, and we are by no means disappointed. In the first place, Dr. Noehden's grammar has deservedly sustained a high reputation both in England and in this country. Few men were better qualified to prepare a grammar of the German tongue. Educated at Göttingen, having thoroughly studied the principles of the German language, and of universal grammar, and afterwards spending many years in England as an instructor in German, he possessed himself of the knowledge requisite for the preparation of a grammar adapted to the wants of English students. Then, Dr. Becker has greatly contributed to simplify a knowledge of the syntax of the Ger-

man language, and this syntax has very properly been substituted for that of Dr. Noehden in the present edition. And again, Dr. Sears is one of the very few men in this country qualified to do justice to a German grammar. He is intimately acquainted both with the structure of the German language and with his own, and in the preparation of this grammar has shown himself to be not a mere compiler, but an original thinker.

We consider it decidedly the best German grammar for students of that language yet published in this country. The list of irregular verbs is very convenient and complete; whilst that of grammatical terms, that of abbreviations, and the index, add greatly to the usefulness of the work.

The book is well and accurately printed.

13.—*Lucilla ; or the Reading of the Bible.* By Adolphe Monod. Translated from the French. New-York and Brooklyn : Robert Carter. 1843. pp. 240.

Adolphe Monod is so well known to us by report as a Protestant minister of fine talents and ardent piety, that this little book from his pen will be welcome to many households. It is intended to meet the infidelity and Romanism of France ; but is adapted also, in many respects to our own land. We have here a secret and widely-spread infidelity, as well as bold efforts of Papists, to overcome. It may be said of the author that he knows that, whereof he affirms ; and whilst his reasoning is forceful and conclusive, his spirit is meek and lowly.

The book is written in the style of dialogue, and the interest is well sustained : we hope it will be extensively read, and that the excellent author shall yet live to write many more such books.

14.—*Christ our Law.* By Caroline Fry. New-York and Brooklyn : Robert Carter. 1842. pp. 72.

This is a delightful book, full of important matter. Christ is held forth prominently, and made, as he ever ought to be, all in all. Christ is our law : in his sovereign Love—his Incarnation and Substitution—his justifying Righteousness—in our Responsibility to him—in his regenerating Spirit—in saving Faith—in the obedience of Faith—in Repentance unto Life—in his sanctifying Grace—in his holy Ordinances—in our Union and Communion with him. These are the subjects of the successive chapters, and they are treated with great good sense, and in a vigorous style.

In her preface, Miss Fry says: "The time seems at hand when we shall all have to retreat upon the strongholds of our faith; when they that teach, and they that learn, and they that keep the watch-tower, or go forth to the battle-field, will be compelled to do for a declining church, what for an advancing one the Apostle forbids to be done: to maintain 'the principles of the doctrine of Christ,' instead of 'going on unto perfection;' to 'lay again the foundation of repentance from dead works, and of faith towards God;' in order to preserve and strengthen and encourage those that stand, if we may not renew again to repentance those that have fallen away."

- 15.—*The Writings of Jane Taylor. In three Volumes. Containing Memoirs and Correspondence; Poetical Remains; Essays in Rhyme; and Contributions of Q. Q.* New-York: Saxton & Miles. Boston: Saxton & Pierce.

Jane Taylor is so well known and so highly appreciated, that we presume the publishers of these volumes will find themselves compensated for their outlay, in the ready sale of the work. True, many are in possession of some of her fugitive poetical effusions, and of the Contributions of Q. Q., yet those who admire her writings will wish to have the three volumes in uniform binding. The Memoir and Correspondence, digested by her brother, Isaac Taylor, also favorably known to the public, must greatly enhance the value of these volumes.

For the young, Jane Taylor has written much that is entertaining and instructive. Parents will find in these volumes wholesome sentiments, clothed in chaste and appropriate language—such as they can safely instil into the minds of their children. Many, now grown to manhood and womanhood, probably remember some of her choice lessons, early committed to memory, under the direction of a fond and judicious mother.

16. *Universalism examined, renounced, and exposed, in a series of Lectures, embracing the experience of the author during a ministry of twelve years, and the testimony of the Universalist ministers to the dreadful moral tendency of their faith.* By Matthew Hale Smith. Boston: Tappan & Dennet. 1842. pp. 396.

The author of this book has been himself a Universalist minister, and has recently announced his conviction of the truth as it is in Jesus. He now undertakes to reason with his

former friends, and to show them the instability of the foundation on which they build. For although he once built on the same, he now feels satisfied that it must have been swept from beneath him at the day of judgment, and left him a wretched soul on the shores of eternity. We consider him a qualified witness in the case, and hope his book may fall into the hands of many of those with whom he once walked to the place of worship in company. And as in the cause of temperance, the testimony of those who were once besotted is of more avail towards the reformation of others, than any other means, we may hope that the argument of Mr. Smith will be successful in convincing multitudes of Universalists of their error, and leading them to the acknowledgment of the truth.

The volume embraces several lectures, giving an account of Mr. S.'s early life, and of the means of his conversion, with a refutation of the reasonings on which Universalists rely : and although not evincing a mind of uncommon acuteness, it is written from such a stand-point as gives the author a great advantage over those who may have written on the same subject with more acumen and learning. We think the book adapted to do much good, and we trust the day is not far distant, when those who disbelieve in the doctrine of a Hell, will see that they, at the same time, deprive us of a Heaven. Both rest on the same basis—the same principles of interpretation.

17.—*Old Humphrey's Addresses.* By the Author of *Old Humphrey's Observations*. New-York and Brooklyn : Robert Carter. London : Religious Tract Society. 1842: pp. 252.

We have seen and read this book before, in another form : but we think Mr. Carter is doing the community a good service by republishing it in a new dress, and so as to make it easily purchasable. Old Humphrey, with his 'stump of a pen in the infirm hand of an old man,' writes, nevertheless, in a very lively, interesting style. And he that is won to read the book, we doubt not, will rise from the perusal profited. We knew a young man who, after reading the essay on blankets, in the beginning of winter, was prompted at once to set about raising funds for the purchase of blankets for the poor of his own vicinity, and succeeded, to the great comfort of many destitute families. Let old Humphrey be read and re-read, and the heart will be moved, and prompt the reader to deeds of benevolence, and lead him, like his master, to go about doing good.

18. *Puseyism ; or the Errors of the Times.* By the Rev. Robert Ferguson, Minister of Brickfield Chapel, Stratford, London. London : J. Snow. 1842. pp. 72.

This is a small volume, written in a popular style, intended to guard the mass of the community against the evils which threaten the church, from the spread of Puseyism. It is eminently adapted to do good ; and the time has certainly come, in England, if not in our own land, when Protestants must be prepared for the inroads of superstitious error. This Puseyism is but a modified form of Romanism, and ere long they will probably discover that they are twin sisters, too long estranged, and will rush to each other's embrace with enthusiastic delight : and it may be, with fanatic hate of all who are without the pale of the mother church—the church, by emphasis.

We did hope the day had gone by, when vain rites and pompous ceremonies should come to be considered as the very essence almost of Christianity—as that without which there is no church, no ministry, no sacraments, no safety. But it seems not. Well ! Jehovah is on the throne, and before him darkness will become light—clouds of most portentous gloom, those of most refulgent glory.

ADDITIONAL NOTICES.

Just at the last moment we have received :—

- Sketches of Modern Philosophy, especially among the Germans.* By James Murdock, D.D. Hartford : John C. Wells. 1842. pp. 201.

We of course cannot now speak of the book from personal inspection, but doubt not it will contain much interesting matter to scholars.

- The Perpetuity of the Earth ; A Discourse preached before the Premillennial Advent Association, in the City of New-York, Jan 1st, 1842. With Notes on the Millenarian Controversy, and Strictures on Professor McClelland's " Manual of Sacred Interpretation."* By John Lillie. New-York : John Moffet. 1842. pp. 240.

- Emma, or the Lost Found ; or Reliance on God Rewarded.* New-York : Dayton & Newman. 1843. pp. 199.

- The Scripture Alphabet of Animals.* By Mrs. Harriet N. Cook. *The Children of the Bible ; As Examples and Warnings.*

Robert Carter, New-York, has issued new editions of *Romaine on Faith*, and *Brown's Concordance*.

Essays on the Philosophy of Vitality, and on the modus operandi of Remedial Agents. By Martyn Paine, A. M., M. D., etc., etc. New-York: Hopkins & Jennings. 1842. pp. 68.

The End of the World not yet. A discourse delivered at Newburyport, Mass. By Rev. L. F. Dimmick. Newburyport: Charles Whipple. 1842. pp. 48.

The Ambassador of God; or The True Spirit of the Christian Ministry. A Sermon, by Rev. John W. Nevin, D. D. 1842.

ARTICLE XII.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Prussia.

PROFESSOR MOSER of Königsberg, says Alexandre Von Humboldt, has obtained daguerreotype impressions in a dark room—one of the most marvellous discoveries of this day of discovery and invention.—Five works of Schelling are about to be published, comprising the History of Philosophy since Descartes—Positive Philosophy—Philosophy of Mythology—Philosophy of Revelation—and Natural Philosophy.

Germany.

A new *Literaturzeitung* has been commenced at Jena, by Prof. Hand.—An exegetical manual of the first three gospels is promised by H. E. G. Paulus.—Neander is engaged on a new edition of his 'General History of the Christian Religion and Church.'—Hengstenberg is publishing a Commentary on the Psalms.—Dr. Tuch, commentator on Genesis, etc., has left Halle to enter on his professorship of Oriental languages at Leipzig.—The number of students at Berlin, by the last account, was 1757—Bonn, 558—Breslau, 639—Göttingen, 728—Halle, 705—Heidelberg, 572.—Ludwig Tieck has left Dresden and taken up his residence at Berlin.—A statue of Jean-Paul Richter has been erected at the Gymnasium of Baireuth.

Prof. Krug of Leipzig, author of a "History of the Philosophy of the Ancients," and Kuinol, well known by his Commentary on the New Testament, have both departed this life.—The University of Halle has suffered an irreparable loss in the death of Professor Gesenius, well known to biblical students. He died in the 57th year of his age.

France.

In 1841, 8036 works were printed at Paris.—The Volnian prize in philology has been awarded by the Academy of Sciences, to Dr. Theodore Benfey, of Göttingen, for his *Etymological Lexicon of the Greek language*.

Italy.

The design of publishing, at Rome, a uniform edition of the works of the Fathers, from the apostolic times to the 13th century, and in connexion the best writers in patristic theology, has been abandoned.

England.

Dr. Solomon Herschel, Chief Rabbi of the Jews in England, died at his residence recently, in the 83d year of his age. For forty-one years he had been Chief Rabbi of the Great Synagogue.—Allan Cunningham died October 29th, 1842.—A complete edition of the works of the venerable Bede is to be published under the superintendence of Dr. Giles. It will contain the original Latin, with a new translation of the principal works.—K. O. Müller's "*Attica and Athens, with a map and plan*," translated by J. I. Lockhart, is a valuable work, which has recently appeared.—Also, a Historical outline of the book of Psalms, by the late J. Mason Good, M. D.

United States.

We have to record the early decease of Professor Isaac Nordheimer. He was a ripe Oriental scholar, surpassed by few, if any, of his years. He, of course, left his Concordance incomplete; but it may be taken up by some other hand.

Jonathan Leavitt and John F. Trow, 194 Broadway, will publish this month **THE COMPLETE WORKS OF PRESIDENT EDWARDS**, being a faithful reprint of the "**WORCESTER EDITION**," with valuable additions, and a copious **GENERAL INDEX**, prepared expressly for the work—bound in handsome sheep, at a reduced price.

THE
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BIBLICAL REPOSITORY.

APRIL, 1843.

SECOND SERIES. NO. XVIII. WHOLE NO. L.

ARTICLE I.

CHARACTER AND THEOLOGY OF THE EARLY ROMANS.

By Rev. Albert Smith, Professor of Rhetoric and English Literature, Middlebury Col., Vt.

It is a remark of Aristotle, that excellence in man depends on his acquaintance with something higher and better than himself. The truth and importance of this idea are illustrated by the whole history of our race. Nations never rise in their moral character above the qualities ascribed by them to the divinities they worship. If these are represented as virtuous and noble, a corresponding excellence and greatness of soul will be produced among the people, and this in proportion to their reverence for the objects of their adoration. But wherever the gods are imperfect or base, imperfection or baseness will belong to the worshippers. Nor is it by the force of example only that the influence of the higher nature is exerted. Truth, or that which is received as truth, rendered sacred by a connection real or supposed between man and some superior being, acts with moulding power on the character of nations. The religion of a nation is decisive of its character, because the combined impressions of divine example and theological belief on the human mind are more efficacious and controlling than any, and all other causes. The superiority of Christianity over every other form of religion consists in the adaptation of the double nature and the perfect character of our Saviour to the wants of man ;

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in the necessity, purity, and authority of the peculiar doctrines of his religion; and in the truth of the system of philosophy and natural theology which in the Holy Scriptures is everywhere *implied*. So far as the character of Christ and the peculiar doctrines taught by him and the Apostles are concerned, there is in respect to an approach to the true religion very little ground for a comparison of heathen systems among themselves, but ample room for a contrast of them all with Christianity. But in regard to a true *natural* theology there is a wide difference between the systems of error which have constituted the creeds of nations. No religion is wholly false, for a system composed entirely of error could never secure belief. In proportion as religions have been free from the worst abominations of idolatry and the crudest absurdities of superstition, and have embraced more or less of the fundamental doctrines of a right theology, the destructive influence of heathenism has been neutralized, and the salutary impressions of truth secured. That this was to a certain extent the case among the early Romans it is the object of this article to prove. That the Romans had at any period orthodox notions of the Deity, that they admitted into their creed in its purest state no debasing errors, and that they conceived in their minds and practised in their lives the distinguishing virtues of Christianity, we neither assert nor believe. At the best as well as the worst periods of their history the Romans were a heathen people, and their religious system was a heathen system. But while this is admitted, it may at the same time be maintained that there was an important difference between the religious views of the early and those of the later Romans, that there was as great a difference in their characters, and that the latter difference was to a great extent the result of the former. This is what we affirm and shall endeavor to establish. It is by no means our purpose to draw a full length portrait of the ancient Roman, to state at length the articles of his theological belief, or to give a description of the rites, ceremonies, and symbols of his religion. Our object is much more humble and restricted. We propose in the present article, to point out some of the excellencies in the noble character of the early Romans, to establish the fact of their belief in certain theological truths, and to show that there was a connection between this belief and the moral character which was, we think, its fruit. The contrast between the character and theology of the early Romans and those of their

descendants may be exhibited by a description, in a future number, of the condition in later times of both morals and religion.

I. Credibility of the Early History of Rome.

The early history of all ancient nations is necessarily obscure. It is a mistake, however, to imagine that it is midnight with antiquity because it is not noonday. It is the obscurity of the twilight, and not impenetrable darkness, that rests on the primeval days of Rome. The assertion that "the early history of Greece and Rome is deserving of no credit whatever," is much too sweeping, and cannot be maintained. It may be improbable, that in a period of nearly two hundred and fifty years the Roman monarchy was governed by only seven kings. The dates connected with the reigns of these sovereigns may be wholly supposititious, and many of the legends related of them sheer fabrications. But the probability that there were other kings does not disprove the existence of those of whom we have accounts.

Nor do the chronological impossibilities, and the interpolated fictions of a heroic age, destroy the historical foundation on which the common belief rests. Among others Niebuhr has been referred to as having annihilated the credibility of the early Roman history. But this writer states expressly that "there is no rational ground for doubting the personal existence of Tullus Hostilius." He thinks that from the commencement of the reign of this prince very few of the characters mentioned in the history are imaginary, and that many of the chronological statistics taken from the yearly records are as definite as could at so remote a period be expected. At the same time he supposes that some poetical legends are added to the true account of his reign, and that it is only in the reign of the fourth king, Ancus Martius, that the public records assume the character of an unvarnished statement of facts. "The lay of Tullus Hostilius is followed by a narrative of a course of events without any marvellous circumstances or poetical coloring." This historian seems to regard the received accounts of the first two kings either as fictions purely poetical, or as traditional tales in which truth and error are confounded beyond hope of separation. He classes Romulus with Hercules and Siegfried, and thinks the legends respecting him and Numa belong to religious

poetry. "Romulus was a god, the son of a god, Numa a man, but connected with superior beings." And yet in another place he says that Numa was not a theme of song like Romulus; nor does he, whatever particular expressions may seem to imply, appear to be prepared to deny the existence of either. "If the tradition, however, about them both is in all its parts poetical fiction, the fixing the pretended duration of their reigns can only be explained by ascribing it either to mere caprice, or to numerical speculations."

It would not comport with the design of this article to enter upon an examination of the opinions and arguments of those historians whose authority, in connection with that of Niebuhr, has been appealed to in proof of the uncertainty of the early Roman history. Of Niebuhr it may be affirmed that his investigations have not always been able to abide the test of critical examination, and respecting the most distinguished of the other writers he has himself observed: "The soul of his book is skepticism: he does nothing but deny and upset." That much of what is related of the early Roman heroes and events is fabulous no one doubts. It was evidently regarded as such by the most judicious of the ancient historians. That Romulus ascended to heaven on the wings of the lightning, that Numa received divine revelations from a goddess, that Jupiter thundered from the right or left at the bidding of an augur, that an ox spoke, or that a priest cut through a flint-stone with a razor, is of course incredible.* Such stories evidently originated in that love of the marvellous which is native to the human mind, and which exists in a high degree among every rude and superstitious people. Like other heathen nations, the Romans were disposed to connect their ancestors with the gods, and to ascribe to them supernatural power. But this disposition cannot convert the walls of their city into air, nor annihilate the civil and religious institutions which existed among them, and which can be proved to have descended from the earliest times. The admis-

* Respecting the credibility of Livy, Müller has the following remark. "The relation of prodigies proves nothing against his judgment: he reports what the ancient world believed, and what he perhaps was willing the Roman people should continue to believe." *Allg. Geschichte*, I. 182. *Heerens Handbuch*, 386, 382.

sion of Niebuhr at the commencement of his work, that long before any historical record of particular individuals occurs in those ages, the forms under which the commonwealth existed may be recognized with certainty, is both true and important. Whatever views may be entertained respecting the early periods of Roman history, there are certain points which cannot be questioned. Rome had a beginning. The city itself, with its civil and religious institutions, must have had a founder, or founders. The popular belief ascribed the origin of the city and its government to a man by the name of Romulus, while holy Numa was celebrated, first in poetical lays, and then in sober history, as the author of the national religion. If it is contended that the *names* of those chiefs are not genuine, that the hero who built the walls of the city was not called Romulus, and that his successor neither bore the name of Numa, nor received the additional title of Pompilius on account of the religious processions which he instituted, it may be replied that a name is of small importance. If it is affirmed that no such men existed, still the city and its institutions remain, and neither sprang spontaneously out of the earth. Their existence must be accounted for, and until some more plausible conjecture is started, it is safe to speak of Romulus as the founder of the city, and of Numa as the author of the national religion. Accordingly this has been the practice of the most judicious historians, even of those who have been often skeptical in regard to the narrations of the ancient writers. The following remarks respecting the sources of the first periods of Roman history will commend themselves to the good sense of the reader. "The earliest history of Rome is as incapable as that of Athens, or of any other city of antiquity, of being reduced to strictly historical truth; since it rests for the most part on traditions which were delivered by the poets and orators. That in connection with fiction they contain also truths, is proved in the clearest manner by the political institutions whose origin they relate, and which reach back with certainty to those times. To wish to draw a well defined boundary line between the mythical and the historical periods, is to misunderstand the nature of mythology." "The traditions of the fathers were in part preserved in historical songs; (of a larger epic we hear nothing;) in this sense there existed a poetical history; but the history is by no means on this account to be regarded as merely poetical. Even at so early a period, the traditions respecting the institu-

tions of Numa have no poetical characteristics.”* For an obvious reason, our brief examination of the Roman history in reference to the subject of discussion, has been commenced with the preceding remarks on the credibility of the sources from which the earliest portions of that history are drawn. A suspicion that the whole had been founded on a false assumption was certainly to be forestalled or removed.

II. Character of the Early Romans.

In all inquiries respecting the character of the early Romans, it is doubtless necessary to make allowance for that veneration for antiquity, and that pride of ancestry, which dispose men to lavish indiscriminate praises on their forefathers. After every reasonable deduction, however, it will still remain a truth as well established as any in history, that under the monarchy and in the first ages of the republic, the Romans were remarkable for their morality. Laudatory as the expression is, it was not without some reason that Ammianus called ancient Rome ‘the home of all the virtues.’ The character of the early Romans was almost the very opposite of that of the Greeks, and altogether diverse from the refined degeneracy of the modern Italians. Stern integrity, incorruptible love of justice, simplicity of life, and sincerity of manners—these are the qualities which we admire in the ancestors of Rome. The tribute of Sallust to the fathers of Rome, in which he affirms that in peace and war good morals were cultivated; that justice prevailed among them not so much by means of laws as from natural impulse; that quarrels, discords, and animosities found a place only in

* This writer returns to Niebuhr the compliment on the score of skepticism which the latter had paid to Beaufort. Of Niebuhr’s work he remarks: “Rather a critique than a history, with a constant effort to overthrow what had been previously received. Acuteness is not always acute in discerning truth (*Scharfsinn ist nicht immer Wahrheitsinn*); and we do not so readily give credit to a work which is not only opposed to the prevailing view of Antiquity itself; (occasionally inferences from particular passages do not carry this opposition so far as the general spirit of the work;) but also, as the author himself confesses, (II. S. 5,) contrary to all analogy in history.” *Handbuch*, 384.

regard to enemies; that citizens strove with citizens only in virtue; that frugality, and fidelity to friends reigned at home; and that their magnificence was displayed only in the sacrifices to the gods;* may perhaps be suspected of having had its origin in love of country, and a natural veneration for his ancestors. But the testimony of Polybius to the excellent character of the Romans is not liable to the same charge. This historian had thoroughly studied the character of the Roman people and the genius of their institutions. It has been affirmed that he understood them both the better for having been obliged to learn them as a foreigner. But however this may be, his judgment respecting them is worthy of the more confidence inasmuch as it was not biassed by the unavoidable partiality of a native. "Such is the impulse to noble deeds," says that writer, "and the virtuous emulation, which are produced by the institutions that exist among them. Moreover, in regard to the acquisition of wealth, the manners and customs of the Romans are superior to those of the Carthaginians. For with the latter nothing is base provided it is likely to be attended with gain; whereas in the estimation of the former, nothing is more disgraceful than to receive a bribe, or to acquire property by any unfair means. While they esteem wealth an honor to him who obtains it in a proper way, they consider gain secured by unlawful practices as a reproach. This is proved by the fact that among the Carthaginians offices are obtained by the unconcealed use of bribes, while among the Romans, the penalty for this is death. Since, therefore, different rewards of excellence are proposed by the two nations, it were reasonable to expect that the method of attaining these rewards would likewise be different."† The Roman senate was the refuge of nations, the arbitrator of causes, the avenger of wrongs, and the deliverer of the oppressed. "The Holy Spirit," says Bossuet, "has not disdained to praise, in the book of Maccabees, the distinguished prudence, and vigorous counsels of this wise assembly, in which no one arrogated to himself an authority not warranted by reason, and all whose members labored for the public good without partiality and without jealousy."‡ The simplicity ac-

* Bell. Cat. § 8. 9.

† Hist. VI. 54.

‡ Discours sur L'Histoire Universelle, II. 269. It is not necessary to quarrel with the bishop respecting the canonical authority of the books of Maccabees; any more than it was

accompanied by morality, energy and dignity, which characterized the earlier Romans are described by Müller in several passages.* The tragical story of Lucretia shows clearly what were the early Roman ideas of conjugal fidelity. Matrons enjoyed peculiar honor. According to Plutarch it was two hundred and thirty years before a divorce occurred at Rome. Other writers say five hundred and twenty. The virtues of the Roman women are traced by Plutarch to the regulations of Romulus and Numa. "Romulus also enacted some laws; amongst the rest that severe one, which forbids the wife in any case to leave her husband, but gives the husband power to divorce his wife, in case of her poisoning his children, or counterfeiting his keys, or being guilty of adultery. But if on any other occasion he put her away, she was to have one moiety of his goods, and the other was to be consecrated to Ceres; and whoever put away his wife was to make an atonement to the gods of the earth."† "But Numa, though he preserved entire to the matrons all the honor and respect that were paid them by their husbands in the time of Romulus, when they endeavored by kindness to compensate for the rape, yet obliged them to behave with great reserve, and to lay aside all impertinent curiosity. He taught them to be sober, and accustomed them to silence, entirely to abstain from wine,‡ and not to speak even of the most necessary affairs except in the presence of their husbands. When a woman once appeared in the *forum* to plead her own cause, it is reported that the senate ordered the oracle to be consulted,

for Burke to defend the inspiration of Ecclesiasticus, which he quotes against the French revolutionists on the ground that it furnished at least the authority of "a great deal of sense and truth."

* Allg. Geschichte, I. 177, 178, 240, 241.

† Langhorne's Plutarch. Life of Romulus.

‡ "Romulus made the drinking of wine as well as adultery a capital crime in women. For he said, adultery opens the door to all sorts of crimes, and wine opens the door to adultery. The severity of this law was softened in succeeding ages; the women who were overtaken in liquor were not condemned to die, but to lose their dowers." To this note of Langhorne add the following: "In the Samnite war wine was still sprinkled upon the altars *by drops*, and Mecianus was not blamed for putting his wife to death because she drank without his knowledge." Müllers Allg. Geschichte, I. 243.

what this strange event portended to the city. Nay, what is recorded of a few infamous women is a proof of the obedience and meekness of the Roman matrons in general. For as our historians give us an account of those who first carried war into the bowels of their country, or against their brothers, or were guilty of parricide; so the Romans relate that Spurius Carvilius was the first among them that divorced his wife, when no such thing had happened before for two hundred and thirty years from the building of Rome: and that Thalea, the wife of Pinarius, was the first that quarrelled, having a dispute with her mother-in-law Gegania, in the reign of Tarquin the Proud. So well framed for the preserving of decency and a propriety of behavior were this lawgiver's regulations with respect to marriage." "Yet farther, Numa's strictness as to virgins tended to form them to that modesty which is the ornament of their sex."*

In connection with the domestic virtues resulting from the family institutions of the Romans may be mentioned the absence of a heinous crime, examples of which are not uncommon in almost every other. To the crime of parricide Romulus appointed no punishment, because, as Plutarch affirms,† he called all murder parricide, and regarded the murder of a parent by his child as impossible. And in fact no instance of the kind occurred at Rome for nearly six hundred years. Of the specific virtues which contributed to the prevalence of general morality among the early Romans, none was more important than that sacred regard for the preservation of public and private faith, especially for the solemn obligations of an oath, for which that people were distinguished. Its salutary influence was felt in all the relations of private life, and in all the affairs of state. To say nothing of the many illustrious examples of individual fidelity, and of the punishment not only of perjury, but even of an artful evasion of the real meaning of a contract, two or three instances of a more general character will show the hold which this feeling had on the public mind. At one time, in the midst of a sedition, the army having determined not to follow the Consuls, proposed to kill them in order to free themselves from the oath by which they were bound to obey them, and were only prevented by being shown that it

* Comparison of Lycurgus and Numa.

† Life of Romulus.

was not by a crime that they could expect to rid themselves of the obligations which an oath imposed.* At another time, when the troops had mutinously refused to pursue the flying enemy, Fabius persisted in his determination not to lead them to the conflict, for which they were afterwards clamorous, till they had first *sworn* to leave the field of battle victorious. "Once in the field," said he, "the soldiers have failed in their duty to the Roman Consul; their obligations to the gods they will never violate."† "We have no need of a levy," said the Consul Quinctius, who had been elected in the room of Valerius slain in battle, "since, at the time when P. Valerius armed the people for the recovery of the capital, they all took the oath that they would assemble at the command of the Consul, and would not depart without his order. We decree, therefore, that all who took the oath appear in arms to-morrow at the lake Regillus." In vain the tribunes urged that the people were absolved from the oath, since Valerius was dead, and Quinctius, now in his place, was then only a private man. The consciences of the people were not to be so satisfied. For that disregard of the gods, which Livy testifies prevailed in his own time, had not yet commenced; nor had they yet learned by ingenious devices, and verbal quibbles, to shun the performance of the thing promised.‡ So great was the force of the early institutions, and so permanent the habits resulting from them, that even in the midst of the corruptions of later times which had overthrown the republic and were ruining the empire, the oath, always the nerve of the military discipline, is called by the Emperor Maximus, in his address to the army, "the sacred mystery of the Roman government."§ Without accumulating a redundancy of evidence in favor of the early Romans, the testimony may be closed with the following tribute to those stern prototypes of the Puritans. "The austere frugality of the ancient republicans, their carelessness about the

* Liv. II. 32.

† Consulem Romanum miles semel in acie fefellit, Deos nunquam fallit." Ib. II. 45.

‡ Sed nondum haec, quae nunc tenet seculum negligentia Deum venerat: nec interpretando sibi quisque iusjurandum et leges aptas faciebat; sed suas potius mores ad eos accommodabat. Ib. III. 20.

§ οὐλασσοντες τὸν στρατιωτικὸν ὅρκον ὃς ἐστὶ τῆς Ρωμαίων ἀρχῆς σεμνὸν μυστήριον.

possession and the pleasures of wealth, the strict regard for law among the people, their universal steadfast loyalty during the happy centuries when the constitution, after the pretensions of the aristocracy had been curbed, was flourishing in its full perfection—the sound feeling which never amid internal discord allowed of an appeal to foreign interference—the absolute empire of the laws and customs, and the steadiness with which, nevertheless, whatever in them was no longer expedient was amended—the wisdom of the constitution, and of the laws—the ideal perfection of fortitude realized in the citizens and in the state—all these qualities unquestionably excite a feeling of reverence, which cannot be equally awakened by the contemplation of any other people. Theirs was no state of unnatural constraint, such as existed under the laws of Sparta, where, in the opinion of other Greeks, the contempt of death was natural, because death burst an intolerable yoke: it was a system, on the contrary, which fostered a rich growth of true individual happiness, of manly enjoyment free from sensuality. Other constitutions, perhaps no less perfect, produce a less imposing effect upon us from the honor they pay to wealth: nations of manifold capacities and buoyant spirit cannot escape faults, from which singleness of aim is the only preservative: and in the events of times past we are more sensible of faults than of deficiencies. Thus it is quite natural, that, even setting aside the splendor wherewith power and victories are always surrounded, we should look up admiringly to the Romans of the good times of the republic.”* It is undoubtedly true, as the same writer affirms, that the virtues of the early Romans were carried to excess. Strength of development was a prominent characteristic of their moral qualities. Hence their bravery bordered on presumption, their frugality on parsimony, and their temperance on the extreme of rigorous self-denial. They were just even to severity, and their piety was ready to degenerate into superstition. Their faults too, as might be expected of such a people, were strongly marked. But their virtues were virtues still. They were noble qualities, which, clustering as they did in masculine beauty and strength around the Roman character, imparted to it a dignified and commanding excellence. When it is asserted that these virtues prepared the way for their own destruction, more is said than can be proved. The Roman

* Niebuhr's *Rome*, p. XXII.

virtues remained while the causes which produced them continued to operate; when these causes were removed, it was a matter of course that the effects which had followed from them should cease.

III. Source of the Roman virtues.

When effects like those which have been pointed out are contemplated, it is natural to ask for their origin. What gave to the Roman character that strength and vigor whose stern and rugged features during the prosperous days of the republic everywhere appear? From what source did the Roman institutions derive whatever of superiority they possessed? Was it from the diffusion of knowledge among the people? Was the foundation of Roman greatness laid in a superior system of common school education? That the virtues which adorned the Roman character were not produced, fostered, and perfected by a well digested scheme of intellectual instruction accompanied by lectures on moral philosophy is certain, because at Rome no such system existed. The Romans were never distinguished for their love of learning, and in those periods of their history when the people were most virtuous, they were not instructed even in the rudiments of science. Plutarch blames Numa for making no provision for the education of children. According to that writer the object of this prince was to change the fierce and warlike disposition of the people, and to induce them to live in a state of peace. But whatever good effects his institutions may have had, this primary object of the lawgiver was not accomplished. The failure, his biographer thinks, was occasioned by the want of a thorough system of general education.* It is true, that as the extent, the power, and the

* "However, in the education of the boys, in the regulation of their classes, and laying down the whole method of their exercises, their diversions, and their eating at a common table, Lycurgus stands distinguished, and leaves Numa only upon a level with ordinary lawgivers. For Numa left it to the option or convenience of parents to bring up their sons to agriculture, to ship-building, to the business of a brazier, or the art of a musician. As if it were not necessary for one design to run through the education of them all, and for each individual to have the same bias given him; but as if they were all like

wealth of the republic were increased, the subject of education, as was natural, attracted more and more attention. In the number and the intellectual qualifications of teachers there was a great advance, and useful information became more generally diffused.

But it must be remembered that the virtuous habits of the Romans were established, and the foundations of their empire laid, long before any considerable amount of knowledge existed in the nation. It was therefore neither to the cultivation of the arts and sciences by the higher classes, nor to the general diffusion of knowledge by means of popular education, that this noble people were indebted for their moral greatness, and their political supremacy. To what then shall the superiority of their character, with its magnificent results, be traced? It is not enough to say with Niebuhr that Roman greatness was owing for the most part to *fate*. For, the nobleness of the Roman character, the integrity, the fidelity, the patriotism, the general morality which prevailed in the early periods of the republic, are not to be resolved, any more than other effects, into the absolute sovereignty of God. Indeed the same writer remarks, that one great object of Polybius in composing his history was to convince the Greeks that the greatness of Rome was not founded on any fatality, but was the result of wise institutions, and a noble character. Shall we then suppose with De Pauw,* that the chief source of the prosperity of Rome was the Grecian

passengers in a ship, who, coming each from a different employment and with a different intent, stand upon their common defence in time of danger, merely out of fear for themselves or their property, and on other occasions are attentive only to their private ends. In such a case common legislators would have been excusable, who might have failed through ignorance or want of power; but should not so wise a man as Numa, who took upon him the government of a state so lately formed, and not likely to make the least opposition to any thing he proposed, have considered it his first care, to give the children such a bent of education, and the youth such a mode of exercise, as would prevent any great difference or confusion in their manners, that so they might be formed from their infancy, and persuaded to walk together, in the same paths of virtue?" Comparison of Numa and Lycurgus.

* *Recherches Philosophiques sur les Grecs*, II. 65.

laws? It may be true, as he affirms, that without these laws the Romans would never have made any sensible progress. Nor is it to be denied that when they neglected them they became "the basest of slaves, and the most corrupt of men." Cicero declared that in his estimation that one little book of the twelve tables was of more value than all the libraries of the philosophers.* It is altogether probable that in this case his judgment is correct. But it may still be asked, 'How came the Roman people to obey these laws?' In Athens, where the code chiefly originated, the laws were unable to produce subordination. At home they were far from establishing general morality, rendering the government stable, and securing public happiness. Is it then to be supposed that, by a transfer to Italy, the same principles of justice, when adapted to the circumstances of another people, acquired such power that they created a virtuous national character and secured all the blessings of permanent freedom? It is obvious that for the primary sources of national prosperity we must look to something more efficacious than ordinary civil laws. The Roman character was formed by the institutions of Numa. The precise period at which this prince lived is uncertain. It is impossible, among a rude and uncultivated people, to fix with precision the chronology of so remote an age. In regard to the period to which the reign of Numa is to be assigned, there appears to have been among the ancients themselves a great diversity of opinion. Some affirmed that Numa was a scholar of Pythagoras, while others believed that he was entirely unacquainted with Grecian learning. Among those who maintain the last mentioned opinion are Polybius and Livy, the latter of whom thinks,† that even if Numa had flourished in the time of Pythagoras instead of two centuries earlier, it would have been impossible in so barbarous an age, that any communication should have been opened between Rome and Magna Grecia. Cicero‡ supposes the current report that the Roman lawgiver was a Pythagorean, to have arisen from the fact that Italy was formerly filled with philosophers of that sect from the schools of Magna Grecia. But Numa, he remarks, who lived many years before Pythagoras, is to be regarded as the greater man, for having shown so much wisdom in laying the foundations of an empire nearly two centuries before the Greeks gave proofs of

* *De Oratore*, I. 44.† *Liv.* I. 18.‡ *De Oratore* II. 37.

any such skill. Plutarch, after enumerating many circumstances which seemed to indicate that Numa must have been acquainted with the doctrines of Pythagoras, cuts short the argument by observing: "But as these matters are very dubious, to support or refute them further would look like the juvenile affectation of dispute."* The example of Plutarch in passing over this disputed point may be followed with advantage; for it is much more important to know what the views and institutions of Numa were, than from what source he received them. In common with some other legislators, this prince laid claim to inspiration, by which means he secured for his laws the sanction of divine authority. His institutions are distinguished above all others (if we except those of Moses) for their strong moral and religious tendency. The object which he had in view, and the means which he adopted to accomplish it, are pointed to in the following passage of Plutarch. "Numa having settled these matters with a view to establish himself in the people's good graces, immediately after attempted to soften them, as iron is softened by fire, and to bring them from a violent and warlike disposition, to a more just and gentle temper. Persuaded that no ordinary means were sufficient to form and reduce so high spirited and untractable a people to mildness and peace, he called in the assistance of religion."† The character and influence of the institutions of Numa may be best seen by a reference to some of the prominent features of his religion.

1. One of the most remarkable of these is *his views of the Deity as indicated by the absence of image worship*. On this point no writer is more explicit than his biographer Plutarch. "His regulations concerning images seem likewise to have some relation to the doctrine of Pythagoras; who was of opinion that the First Cause was [is] not an object of sense, nor liable to passion, but invisible, incorruptible, and discernible only by the mind. Thus Numa forbade the Romans to represent the Deity in the form either of man or beast. Nor was there among them formerly any image or statue of the Divine Being: during the first hundred and seventy years they built temples indeed, and

* On the question whether Numa and Pythagoras knew each other; Drachenborch's *Livy* I. 18, Bucher's *Instit. Hist. Philos.* 95, Niebuhr's *Rome*, I. 181.

† *Life of Numa*.

other sacred domes, but placed in them no figure of any kind, persuaded that it is impious to represent things divine by what is perishable, and that we can have no conception of God but by the understanding. His sacrifices too resembled the Pythagorean worship; for they were without any effusion of blood, consisting chiefly of flour, libations of wine, and other very simple and unexpensive things."* The testimony of Plutarch, in regard to the absence of images and the simplicity of the religious rites, is strengthened by other authority. "Although some superstitions were introduced by Numa," says Tertullian, "nevertheless at that time the worship of the Deity among the Romans was not yet attended with images, or performed in temples. Religion was chaste, and the rites without ostentation. There was then no capitol ascending to heaven, and as yet the altars were hastily made of turf, and the vessels earthen. But little splendor appeared, and God himself was nowhere seen; for the ingenuity of Greeks and Tuscans had not yet inundated the city with images.† Another witness is Varro, as quoted by Augustine. "He says also that the ancient Romans worshipped the gods more than one hundred and seventy years without an image. If this, he adds, had continued till the present time, the gods would receive a purer homage."‡ These passages might seem to be sufficient to prove that the early Romans were not worshippers of idols. But the truth of this representation has been denied by distinguished men, and assertions supposed to be at variance with these have been found in other ancient writers. The objections to the statements of Varro, Plutarch, and Tertullian are exhibited in the following extract from Meiners *Historia Doctrinae De Vero Deo*. "For I have observed that distinguished men have been induced by a certain passage of Plutarch to believe that Numa strictly prohibited all images of the gods formed in human shape, because he believed that the divine nature is uncompounded and indivisible, and that it is to be discerned only with the mind. It is not at all wonderful that Plutarch fell into this opinion; for since he desired to ascribe his own doctrines or those of Plato to almost all ancient people and men, he would do this the more readily in respect to Numa, because he falsely thought that this Roman king had at some time or other been instructed by Pythagoras. But it is easy to see

* Life of Numa.

† Apologet. IV. c. 25.

‡ De Civ. Dei. IV. 31, cf. I. 131.

from the sacred rites instituted by this founder, and reformer of the Roman religion, and from the gods which he introduced, that such noble ideas concerning the divine nature as Plutarch attributes to him, never entered his mind. For the Roman nation owe to Numa not only the worship of fire and the society of vestal virgins, but also their gods of stone, Terminus and Jupiter, by whom the *Feciales* swore, and *Libitina*, and *Jupiter Elicius*. (Dion. Halicar. II. 74, Liv. I. 20, 21.)

The same man appointed a constant priest of Jupiter, and connected with him two others, one of Mars, the other of *Quirinus*. He also chose twelve priests to Mars *Gradivus*, and the *Pontifex Maximus*, whose duty it was to instruct the people both in celestial ceremonies, and in funeral rites, and the mode of appeasing the manes, and how certain prodigies given by lightning or in some other form (I use *Livy's* own words) were to be taken up and investigated. He moreover consecrated a grove to the muses, because their interviews with his wife *Egeria* were held in that place. To this grove he frequently retired without witnesses, as if to a meeting with the goddess. Even granting, therefore, that this Roman king, who set up stones to be worshipped by his subjects, dedicated no shrines and images to the deities, we can only infer from this, that among rude and half-civilized men, no one was capable of making images of the gods. *Pliny* favors this conjecture, affirming that *Demaratus*, the father of *Priscus Tarquinius*, employed the statuaries *Euchira* and *Eugrammus*, and that these men first introduced the plastic art into Italy (XXXV. 12, (43). But if any one should think *Pliny* more worthy of belief in another passage (XXXIV. 7, (16), then the idea which generally prevails that Numa prohibited all images of the divine nature, must certainly be false. For the learned writer not only declares that a very ancient statue of *Hercules* was consecrated by *Evander*, but also that "Janus with two faces was made a god by King Numa, and wrought out, rudely indeed, but yet with much labor."* The object of this writer is to prove that, with the exception of the Israelites, Greeks, and Christians, and the nations whose literature and religion may be traced to these, there has never, from the earliest ages, been any people who have had correct ideas of the true God.† It was the opinion of *Cudworth*, founded

* Page 225.

† "Except these illustrious nations, of whom mention has
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chiefly on a passage in Seneca, that the Etrusci (from whom the Romans early received religious impressions) had orthodox notions of the Deity. If Meiners, without affirming that images were worshipped in the infancy of Rome, had confined himself to an exposition of the defectiveness of the ideas of the divine nature prevalent in the earliest periods of Italian history, it would not be necessary to enter into a controversy with him. The idea, however, which runs through his book, that, aside from the Jews, the further back into the childhood of the nations of antiquity the history of religion is carried, the more puerile and imperfect the prevailing views of the Divinity will be found to be, is not altogether accurate. It leaves out of view the traditional religion received from the first parents of the human race, and supposes (what indeed is elsewhere asserted by the same writer*) that the only source of religions is the inability of the human intellect, in the infancy of society, to account for the phenomena of nature without referring to some higher power. But if the ideas of the Deity become more and more crude and erroneous the higher they are traced towards the origin of the race, it might be expected that the more cultivated and intellectual any nation should become, the more pure would be the prevailing notions of the Deity. Whereas, if those nations whose theology is derived from revelation are left out of the account, with the exception of a few philosophers, the fact is just the contrary. It were indeed natural, from the gradual progress of the arts and sciences from rude beginnings to higher

just been made, no other ever existed, which had made such progress in observing and interpreting nature, or so investigated the illimitable universe, and the immensity of the heavenly bodies and of the forces by which they are impelled; their amazing velocity and eternal permanence; the courses of the seasons, and the use and adaptation of all vegetable and animal life, as to draw from them the conclusion, that such a mass of material objects, harmonizing with each other, never could have been created and organized by chance, nor even by necessity, or the contrivance of several architects, but only by the energy and design of one mighty mind." Meiners, *De Vero Deo*, p. 17.

* "The only cause of the origin of religions, was the want of a correct knowledge of nature, or the inability of rude men to investigate the true causes of natural phenomena."—Meiners *Geschichte der Religionen*, I. 16.

and higher degrees of excellence, to infer that the same must be true of religion, that as nations become civilized, intelligent, and refined, their views of the divine nature were in proportion corrected and elevated. But this a priori inference is contradicted by the testimony of history. "Superstition and idolatry," says Dr. Leland, "instead of being corrected and diminished, rather increased and gathered strength among the heathen nations as they grew in learning and politeness. If we consult fact and experience, we shall find, that the religion of the Gentiles in the most ancient times was in several instances more pure and simple, less incumbered and corrupted with idolatry, than in succeeding ages, when the arts and sciences had made a considerable progress."* In accordance with this view is the opinion of Müller. "It is a striking fact, that the most ancient and in other respects entirely uncultivated nations, had very just conceptions, and a correct knowledge of God, of the world, and of immortality, as well as of the motions of the stars, while the arts which relate to the conveniences of life are much younger. On the most important subjects the fathers of the human race formed correct judgments; in the affairs of life they were children. There are preserved among most nations obscure, perverted, misunderstood traces of these primitive ideas."†

The fact that the early Romans were less cultivated than

* Leland's *Advantage and Necessity of Revelation*, Part I. chapter xx. He adds, "This seems to show that the knowledge men had of God and religion in the first ages, was originally owing not merely to the efforts of their own reason, which was then little cultivated and improved, but to a divine revelation made to the first of the human race, and from them communicated to their posterity. It might have been hoped that this tradition, which when duly proposed is agreeable to right reason, would have been preserved with great care, especially when learning and knowledge were improved: but it soon began to degenerate, and became the more corrupt, the farther it was removed from the original. The true primitive theism, which was the most ancient religion of mankind, became soon adulterated with mixtures of polytheism, still preserving for the most part, amidst all their corruptions, some obscure idea of one Supreme Divinity, till at length it was almost lost and confounded amidst a multiplicity of idol deities."

† Allg. Geschichte, I. 24.

some other nations of their own age, or than they themselves afterwards became, is not of itself conclusive proof that they must have been idolaters, or even that their religion did not approach more nearly to truth and reason, than when at a later period they had become more intellectual.

The authority on which Meiners rests his assertion that the early Romans worshipped images, is that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Livy, and Pliny. The first two, if the characteristics of each are kept in view, may be regarded as excellent writers. The former had for his stand-point the reference of every thing Roman to Greece for its origin. Whatever may be the value of Livy's history in other respects, he is not to be depended on in regard to the religion of the early ages, because he did not choose to disturb the prevailing belief of his own times. The passages cited from Pliny by Meiners, are not sufficient to prove what is contradicted by the express and concurring testimony of writers of good authority. In the strongest of these passages (XXXIV. 7 (16.) Pliny states that Numa caused a statue of Janus to be made. But this would not prove that the worship of images was established. In the other (XXXV. 12 (43), he affirms that Tarquinius Priscus first introduced the plastic art into Italy, the inference from which would seem to be that the former statement is incorrect. It is suggested by Meiners, that even if it were proved that Numa did not authorize the use of images, nothing more could be inferred from this fact than that, in so rude an age, there were no artists to carve them. It would seem that this writer had never seen the rough and uncouth idols of the South Sea Islands and other savage heathen of our own times. These hideous and misshapen blocks prove conclusively that the low state of the arts is not a sufficient defence against image-worship.

The difference between the views of the Deity which prevailed in Rome at an early period, and those which were current in Greece, are exhibited in the following passages from Kreutzer's *Symbolik*: "It were a great misapprehension to confound these and similar traditions with those epic histories of the gods which sprang from the Grecian Anthropomorphism. The religious feeling of the old Italian was removed to the farthest extent from this loquacity in the rehearsal of fables, from this childish simplicity. Even the Grecian Dionysius pays this just tribute to the Romans. In a remarkable passage (*Antiqq. Romm.* II. 18, p. 273 Reisk) he speaks of the wisdom of the reli-

gious institutions of Romulus, and shows the great superiority of the old Roman religion over the Grecian. The former has its temples, consecrated places, altars, images of the gods, and symbols; it brings into view, also, the influence of the immortal gods, and the benefits which they bestow on the human race; it consecrates, moreover, festivals and sacrifices, has, in common with the Greeks, assemblies for divine service, days of rest, and means of atonement. On the other hand, the fables related by the latter, with all the blasphemous accounts of the contests of the gods—the mutilations, wounds, death, imprisonment, and slavery of those divine beings, the religion of the Romans utterly rejected. If this passage is understood, according to its connection, of the original features of the old Roman religion, the view which it gives of the peculiar character of the religious belief of the first Romans, is altogether correct.* Those pious, noble fathers of the quiet, mild, thinking Latium were not to be charmed away from the native circle of the paternal religion by the excitable fancy of Greek poets. A hundred and seventy years the pious old Roman served his divinity without needing any images.† And even at a later period, when idols had already obtained a place in the sacred niches, in the important service of the lofty Vesta, he preserved the memory of the old law. Thenceforward the glowing flame of the pure fire in her still, sacred house, satisfied him without any image or external

* II. 992, 993. Compare the passage in Hegels *Vorlesungen ueber die Philosophie der Geschichte*, referred to in Vol. VIII. p. 50 of the Repository. "In the preceding part a closer view has been taken of the Greek religion, and according to the common idea, the Roman religion, with a change of name only, was the same as the Greek. Upon a nearer inspection, however, the most striking difference shows itself." "In all circumstances the Roman was pious," etc.—*Werke*, IX. 297.

† "Plutarch in Numa, Cap. VIII. § 4, p. 65 B. p. 287 Leopold. Vergl. Augustin de Civ. D. IV. 31. It is not unknown to me that Heyne (*Opusc. Acad.* II. p. 71) has raised certain doubts respecting this representation of the old Roman religion. But that distinguished man was not then in possession of those original helps which have placed us at the present time in an entirely different point of observation, the same, to wit, to which I am endeavoring in this book to conduct my readers," etc.

sign. And when, in the earthquake, the mysterious energy of the dark powers showed itself in terrific manifestations, then the mind of the Roman continued in this region of darkness and awe, and prayed to no definite, to no known God.”*

2. But whatever opinion may be held respecting the views of the divine nature entertained by the early Romans, that *religious feeling was one of the most deeply seated, and strongly developed of the elements of the Roman character*, can be

* II. 993. It has been already remarked that Dionysius is disposed to assign a Grecian origin to every thing Roman. The temples, sanctuaries, altars, statues, festivals, and other religious institutions, he thinks, were all copied from the best Greek models. But while he attributes to the Greeks the merit of having, by their intellectual superiority, given laws and religion to the greatest of nations, he praises the founders of the Roman state for the important improvements which they had made in these borrowed institutions, and especially for the superiority of their views respecting the divine nature. “Among the Romans,” he says, “we hear of no Uranus castrated by his own children, no Saturn murdering his own offspring, through fear of their conspiring together, no Jupiter destroying the power of Saturn, and confining his own father in the prison of Tartarus, no wars, wounds, bonds, or slavery of the gods with men. Among them no festival is celebrated with black apparel, or funeral solemnities amid the wailing and the tears of females, on account of the disappearance of gods, as is done among the Grecians in reference to the rape of Proserpine, the sufferings of Bacchus, and other things resembling these. Among them, in spite of the corruption already prevalent, can be seen no inspired ravings, no tumults of the Corybantes, no processions of mendicants, no bacchanalian frenzy and secret mysteries, no watchings of men with women throughout the night in the temples, no jugglery of the kind; but all things in reference to the gods are done and said in a reverential manner, unlike the customs both of the Greeks and the barbarians.” “But supposing the accounts circulated about them, in which there are certain calumnies or accusations against them, to be malicious, useless, indecent, and unworthy not only of the gods but even of good men, he rejected the whole, and accustomed men to entertain and express the best ideas concerning the gods, attributing to them no propensities unworthy of their blessed nature.”—Antiq. Rom. II. 18, 19.

doubted by no one who knows any thing of the subject. To the testimony of the writers already adduced, may be added the following striking sentiments of Polybius, whose judgment, means of information, and impartiality, give great weight to his opinion. "But the greatest superiority which the Roman political constitution possesses, seems to me to consist in their belief respecting the gods. In fact, the very thing which is reprobated among other men, seems to me to hold together the Roman commonwealth—I mean superstition. Its influence has been introduced among them both into the private lives of individuals, and into the public affairs of the state, and carried to the highest possible extent. To many this may seem surprising; but it appears to me to be an expedient adopted on account of the populace. If, indeed, it were possible to assemble a state composed wholly of wise men, perhaps no such contrivance would be necessary. But since the multitude are always fickle, full of unlawful desires, and violent passions, and liable to unreasonable excitement, there is no way but to restrain the populace by the dread of things unseen, and such like terrific inventions. It was not in vain, therefore, or by chance, as it seems to me, that the ancients infused into the minds of the people the notions respecting the gods, and a belief in the punishments of the infernal regions. On the contrary, I think that the present generation have rejected them without reason, and to no good purpose. Omitting on this point other examples, (of the good effects of a belief in these doctrines) if among the Greeks those who manage the public funds are intrusted with but a single talent, it is impossible by making use of ten bonds, as many seals, and double the number of witnesses, to secure fidelity. Whereas those who, in the Roman magistracies and embassies, handle a large amount of money, discharge their duty faithfully through the single obligation of the oath. Thus, while in other states it is a rare thing to find a man who, not having laid hands on the public treasure, is pure in this respect, among the Romans it is seldom that any one is convicted of such a crime."* Most of the writers who have been quoted, represent the religion of the early Romans as more or less different from that of Greece, and as superior to the latter. In one point they all concur. They unitedly regard the Roman character and Roman great-

* Hist. VI. 54.

ness as intimately connected with religion. Can it be supposed that they are all mistaken? Such is the opinion of some. "There is no doubt," remarks Buchholz, in his observations on the passage from the historian just cited, "that Polybius, in what he has said respecting the superstition of the Romans, and respecting their honesty, is altogether correct. Nevertheless, in regard to the causal connection into which he brings them, he may easily have erred; for, in nothing do men deceive themselves more readily than when they undertake to assign the causes of phenomena."* If then the admitted honesty of the early Romans did not grow out of their religion, if their conscientious performance of private contracts, their sacred regard for the solemnity of an oath, and their faithful discharge of the offices of the state,—all of which indicate a high and unusual tone of moral feeling,—are not to be traced to the religious belief of the nation, in what manner are these facts to be accounted for? We need not, observes Buchholz, deny altogether to the popular superstition (for he will not, he says, dignify such a system with the name of religion,) any influence on morality; but we shall do well to search for the causes in more influential principles. And what are these? He suggests, in the first place, that it was for the interest of the patricians, who constituted a distinct order, and in whose hands the offices were, to prevent all abuses which would have injured their reputation, and weakened their influence. And besides this, after the institution of the tribuneship, detection (he thinks) was so certain to follow all abuses in the public offices that it is not strange that there were few or no breaches of trust, since publicity is the most dreadful scourge which men without conscience apprehend. It is hardly necessary to remark, that these reasons are wholly insufficient to account for the state of morals at Rome in the early periods of its history. Public and private virtue is not the natural offspring of party spirit. The *esprit du corps* leads to very different results. That the fear of detection is a very poor defence against crime, is proved by the history of the same people at a later period. But what shows conclusively, continues this writer, that Polybius was mistaken, is, that had he lived fifty years later he would have been altogether of another opinion. For then the superstition of the Romans remained, while their virtues no longer existed. In

* Philosophische Untersuchungen Ueber die Römer, I. 35.

the seventh century from the building of the city, the Romans, he affirms, were as regardful of the gods as at any former period, and yet their morality was gone forever. This proves, he thinks, that the connection between the two was always loose, as is the fact at the present day with the inhabitants of modern Rome. This argument would indeed be conclusive if the premises were admitted. But while it is true that the morality of the Romans was corrupted, it is not true that their religious faith remained the same. That there was a change in the religion of the nation, and that this change exerted a powerful influence in debasing the public morals, we propose to show hereafter. A similar view of the moral tendency of the ancient religions is maintained by Meiners. Polytheistic and corrupt monotheistic religions, he thinks, are no more useful than ignorance and vice, anarchy and despotism. He supposes, therefore, that when Bailly undertook to prove that superstition is more injurious than skepticism, the divines who regarded his proposition as a dangerous paradox, and maintained that even false religions are better than none, were much mistaken. "National religions will not become the friends of human virtue and happiness, until they teach that the Deity is not only an inconceivably powerful, but also an inconceivably wise and good being; that for this reason he gives way neither to anger nor revenge, and never punishes capriciously; that we owe to his favor alone all the good which we possess and enjoy; that even our sufferings contribute to our highest good, and death is a bitter but a salutary change; in fine, that the sacrifice most acceptable to God consists in a mind that seeks for truth, and a pure heart. Religions which announce these exalted truths offer to man the strongest preservatives from vice, and the strongest motives to virtue, exalt and ennoble his joys, console and guide him in all kinds of misfortunes, and inspire him with forbearance, patience, and active benevolence towards his brethren."* To this it may be replied in the words of this writer himself,† that no religion *as received by the people*, consists of pure truth. It is manifest that in every religion of ancient and modern times, not excepting Christianity itself, as these religions have existed, or do exist, in the public mind, there is a mixture of truth and error. It is not necessary therefore to affirm with the opponents of Bailly, that as truth itself

* Meiners Geschichte der Religionen, I. 78, 79. † Ib. I. 6.

is sometimes injurious, so also, under certain circumstances, falsehood may be useful. A religion is likely to be useful to society in proportion to the amount of important truth, which in connection with freedom from errors of injurious tendency, it inculcates. If, therefore, it can be shown that the religion of the early Romans contained truths of great importance and of salutary tendency, and that the most corrupt features of the later national superstition, together with the general skepticism, belong to a subsequent period, it is reasonable to believe that religion, as it existed at first, was favorable to morality. It has already been shown to be highly probable, that when the foundations of the national religion were laid, idolatry did not exist. The religious ceremonies were then fewer and more simple than they afterwards became, and whatever may have been the prevalent views in theology, it is certain that the religion as a whole diverged much less from a system of truth than at a later period.

The great object which the religious institutions were designed to accomplish was, according to Plutarch and Dionysius, to soften the roughness of the national temper, to cherish a reverence for sacred things, and to promote the observance of public and private faith. In addition to the characteristics which have been already mentioned, another important feature of the religion of the early Romans is worthy of notice.

3. In the first ages of the state, *the Romans believed themselves the subjects of a moral government administered by super-human power.* It is obvious that next after the existence of a Supreme Being, the question whether the affairs of this world are under his control, is of the highest practical importance. That the heathen philosophers were fully aware of this is proved by the remarks of Cicero on the subject. Speaking of the notions on this point prevalent among the philosophers of his own day, he says: "There have been and are philosophers, who maintain that the gods exercise no supervision over human affairs. If their opinion be correct, how can there be any piety, any devotion, any religious reverence? For these sacred and pure acts of homage are due to the majesty of the gods, if they are taken notice of by them, and if any thing has been bestowed by the immortal gods on the race of men. But if the gods neither can nor will assist us, nor exercise any care over us, nor perceive what we do; and if no influence from them can pervade the lives of men,—why should we offer to

the immortal gods any worship, honors, or prayers? But piety, like other virtues, cannot exist in mere hypocritical forms. Along with piety, devotion and religious reverence must also be removed; and the consequence would be great disorder and confusion. And I am not sure that if piety towards the gods were taken away, fidelity and the ties which bind society together, and justice, that pre-eminent virtue, would not also be overthrown.”* In his treatise *De Legibus* also, the same writer expresses similar sentiments respecting the influence of a belief in the reality of a divine government. “But who can deny that this belief is useful, when he sees how many things may be confirmed by an oath, how salutary are the religious rites of covenants, how many have been withheld from crime by the fear of divine vengeance, and how sacred is the union which binds citizens together, when the immortal gods are invoked, not only as judges, but as witnesses.”† It has been affirmed by those who do not regard it as a compliment, that in the early ages the Roman government was almost entirely religious. “Perhaps,” says Buchholz, “the assertion is not too bold, that the Romans in the first centuries of the republic, were governed entirely by a theocracy.” “But here, where the discourse respects the constitution and law, it should not remain unobserved, that while the religious institutions formed the keystone of the constitution, the Romans were governed far more by influences drawn from religion than from temporal authority.”‡ There is no doubt that religion was made use of at Rome to a considerable extent as a political engine. But whatever may be thought of the use to which it was applied, there can be no doubt that the religious belief of the people had a large share in the formation of the national character. “These *religiones* which Numa instituted, were his way and means of governing the state. He himself, as Pontifex Maximus, was neither more nor less than a ruler of the state, who, because a public sentiment was yet as much wanting as a public authority, could rule only by stepping forth as the servant of the gods. What was useful to him was followed by the most important consequences in relation to the development of the Romans.” “It was a distinguished benefit that he

* *De Natura Deorum*, I. 2.

† *De Legibus*, II. 7.

‡ Bei weitem mehr theokratisch als kosmokratisch. Ueber die Römer, I. 49, 52.

gave opportunity to this gloomy, misanthropic people to form connections with each other, to lay aside their old roughness, to learn to feel new wants, etc. What was done in the middle ages for the Germans, and other barbarous nations by the spread of the Christian church, this Numa did for the rude Romans of his time, who could much more easily be divided into parties than united.”*

The manner in which Dionysius accounts for the prevalence of public and private faith among the early Romans, is worthy of notice. “Numa,” he says, “made use of a means unknown to the founders of other celebrated constitutions. He built a temple and instituted religious ceremonies, for the purpose of consecrating fidelity in the eyes of the people as a divine quality.” This measure he thinks was followed by the most beneficial consequences. “A pledge was therefore considered as a thing so sacred and inviolable, that a man’s word was equivalent to the greatest oath, and stronger than all testimony; and whenever any doubt arose about a contract which had been made between two individuals without witnesses, the word of one or the other of the parties settled the dispute, and permitted the lawsuit to proceed no further. The magistrates and the tribunals adjudged most controversies by means of oaths of fidelity. These things affording indeed encouragement to integrity, and giving efficiency to justice, were devised at that time by Numa, and rendered the civil polity of the Romans more perfect than the best regulated family.”† There is a remarkable sentiment of Cicero respecting the religious character of his countrymen, and its results. The Romans, he says, were the most religious of all people, and excelled other nations in this one particular, that they acted under the firm conviction that all things are under the supreme control of a divine providence. By this single piece of practical wisdom, he affirms, they conquered the world. “We may think of ourselves, Conscript Fathers, as highly as we please; yet we have neither surpassed the Spaniards in number, nor the Gauls in strength, nor the Carthaginians in cunning, nor the Greeks in the arts, nor, in short, even the Italians and Latins themselves, in the native and peculiar characteristics of this nation and country; but we have excelled all nations in piety and religious reverence; and in this one proof of discernment, that we have

* *Ibid.* I. 32, 34.† *II.* 75.

perceived that all things are controlled by the will of the immortal gods.”* Respecting the practical influence of a belief in the existence of superior beings, and of a divine providence, Lord Bolingbroke has the following observations: “The good effects of maintaining, and the bad effects of neglecting religion, had been extremely visible, in the whole course of the Roman government. Numa, the second founder of Rome, contributed more to the prosperity and grandeur of that empire than the first founder of it, Romulus, and all the warrior kings who succeeded him; for Numa established a religion, directed it, as others, both kings and consuls, did after his example, to the support of civil government, and made it the principle of all the glorious expectations that were raised in the minds of that people. His religion was very absurd; and yet by keeping up an awe of superior powers, and the belief of a providence that ordered the course of events, it produced all the marvellous effects which Machiavel, and writers more able to judge of them and their causes than he was, Polybius, Cicero, Plutarch, and others, ascribe to it. The inward peace of that government was often broken by seditions: Rome was in distress at home whilst she triumphed abroad; and at last, the dissolution of the commonwealth followed a long and bloody civil war. But the neglect of religion, not religion, was a principal cause of these evils. Religion decayed, and the state decayed with her. She might have preserved it; but even in her decay she gave it no wounds, nor festered like a poison in any.”†

4. Whatever may be thought of the truth or importance of the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, its antiquity cannot be doubted. A consciousness of accountability is so deeply inwrought in human nature, that the belief of the immortality of the soul is with difficulty separated from the idea of some species of retribution. And as it seems evident to most men that the awards of justice which they feel to be due to human character and action, are not administered in this world, it is natural that the period of retribution should be referred to that which is to come. The separation of future retribution from future existence appears to be rather the result of the repeated efforts of men to rid themselves of apprehension, than the dictate of nature. Cicero says of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, that all the ancients (those who in his day were called ancients) were agreed in it, and that they received

* De Harusp. Respons. § 9.

† Works, IV. 427, 428.

it rather from the teachings of nature than the reasonings of philosophy.* Seneca also represents this universal agreement as a strong argument in favor of a future existence.† The great antiquity of the doctrine not only of future existence but of future retribution, is admitted even by those who are least of all disposed to receive it as a truth. Respecting the doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future state, it is confessed by Lord Bolingbroke that "it began to be taught before we have any light into antiquity, and when we begin to have any we find it established."‡ It is evident from many passages of the ancient historians, and indeed from the very structure of the ancient religions, that wise men and legislators were sensible that the doctrine of future rewards and punishments is necessary to the welfare of society. It is even contended by those who admit its importance while they deny its truth, that it was invented by ancient lawgivers for political purposes. "To give an additional strength to these motives," [regard for the good of the whole] says Lord Bolingbroke, "the ancient theists and polytheists, philosophers or legislators invented another; that, I mean, of future rewards and punishments, represented under various forms, but always directed to the same purpose."§ That this was the general opinion at Rome in the time of Cicero, may be gathered from several passages in the writings of that orator, together with the speeches of Cato and Cæsar in the Roman senate, in the debates respecting the Catilinian conspiracy.|| It is evident from these passages, as well as from that before cited from Polybius, that the doctrine of future punishment was taught and believed among the early Romans. "In the ancient and most virtuous times of the Roman republic," says Dr. Leland, "the doctrine of a future state, and particularly of a future retribution, seems to have been generally received, and believed among the people."¶ The same thing appears from the representations of the poets,** who were the popular divines of antiquity, and whose works exerted a much stronger in-

* Tusc. Disp. I. 14. "But if the agreement of all is the voice of nature; and if all everywhere agree that there is something which belongs to those who have departed from life, we also ought to be of the same opinion," etc.

† Epist. 117.

‡ Bolingbroke's Works, V. 237, 4to.

§ Ibid. IV. 288.

|| Sallust. Bell. Cat. 52, 53.

¶ Leland's Advantage and Necessity of Revelation, II. 386.

** Virgil's *Æn.* VI. 556 seq.

fluence over the people than the labored speculations of the philosophers. It is worthy of remark also, that those who believed, or wished the people to believe, the doctrine of future retribution, thought the punishments would not be sufficient to restrain from crime unless some of them were eternal. It is the opinion of Cicero, that the influence of this doctrine while it was held was highly salutary.* Nor is the utility of this belief denied even by the most distinguished of the infidels of modern times. Mr. Hume, in reply to the objections which he puts into the mouth of his skeptical friend, makes use of an unanswerable argument in favor of the doctrine. "Whether this reasoning of theirs [of the people, on which the belief in future punishment is based,] is just or not, is no matter; its influence on their life and conduct must still be the same: and those who attempt to disabuse them of such prejudices, may, for aught I know, be good reasoners, but I cannot allow them to be good citizens and politicians, since they free men from one restraint upon their passions, and make the infringement of the laws of equity and society in one respect more easy and secure."†

And Lord Bolingbroke observes that, "Reason will neither affirm nor deny that there is to be a future state: and the doctrine of rewards and punishments in it has so great a tendency to enforce the civil laws, and to restrain the vices of men, that reason, which cannot decide for it on principles of natural theology, will not decide against it on principles of good policy."‡

An appropriate comment on this admission of the necessity of the belief in future retribution with a denial of its truth, is found in a remark of Neander upon the passage before quoted from Polybius (VI. 56.—See page 276). "This penetrating observer of human nature, to whom nothing but the light of divine wisdom was wanting, though he saw only with the natural eye, perceived clearly that the constitution of civil society existing on the earth, if it should not be held together by some higher bond connecting human affairs with heaven, could not maintain itself as something independent; but how wretched would human nature be if this bond could be maintained only by a lie, if there were need of falsehood in order to hold back the greater part of men from evil!"§

After the proof which has been exhibited, it is not too much

* DeLegibus, II. 7 (see p. 278). † Hume's Essays, II. 170.

‡ Works, V. 322.

§ Kirchengeschichte, I. 11.

to affirm that the *religiones* of the earliest Romans, which some writers regard as a foolish and useless system of superstition, embraced the essential elements of religion. The worship of a Deity (whether one or more) without images; a deep and settled reverence for the Divinity, and for sacred things; a belief in the doctrine of providence and human accountability; an undoubting conviction of the immortality of the soul; with the expectation of rewards *to be bestowed on virtue*, and punishments *to be inflicted on vice* in the future world;—these are the first great principles of true religion. And it can hardly be supposed that when they are deeply fixed in the public mind, an influence should not be exerted for the suppression of crime, and the encouragement of morality. Such, accordingly, is found to have been the effect among the Romans. “Besides the advantages which the republic derived from the prevailing religion, that religion had an efficacious influence also on morality and national virtue. For although it had already degenerated in most of its features into superstition, yet along with it had been received the belief that the gods abhor vice and love virtue. Moreover, the reverence and awe which the Romans felt towards the gods, was increased to an uncommon extent by the prosperity of their government, the victorious success of their arms, and the imposing characteristics of most of the religious ceremonies, which they knew how to clothe in a dignified and fascinating dress. The religious disposition of the Romans showed itself not only in the conscientious discharge of their duties as citizens of the state, but also in the affairs of common life, and especially in the conscientiousness with which they observed an oath. But the decline of morals at Rome in process of time relaxed this mainspring of political and moral power, which had formerly operated so beneficially on the character and morals of the Romans.”* The principles from which originated the lustre of the Roman name, and the boundless extent of the Roman conquests, were *domestic morality, love of country, and the fear of the gods*; these three, and the greatest of these was the last. It was the bond and security of the others, and therefore the grand procuring cause of all the results of the combination. While reverence for the gods remained, freedom and public happiness continued to be enjoyed, even without the diffusion of knowledge to more than a very limited extent.

* Meyers Lehrbuch der römischen Alterthümer, 201.

But when religion declined, morality declined with it. When the fear of the gods was weakened, morality gave way before the violence of passion, and patriotism was displaced by private interest. And when the Epicurean philosophy began to remove all faith in the gods, and they ceased to exist in the estimation of the people, morality and patriotism perished with them. This we propose to show in a succeeding number.

ARTICLE II.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINE DECREES.

By Enoch Pond, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Bangor, Maine.

It is the object of this paper, not to *prove* the doctrine of Divine decrees or predestination, but to present a brief account of opinions and discussions in the church of Christ respecting it.

I assume, therefore, in the outset, that the inspired writers held and taught the eternal and universal purposes of God. "He doeth according to his will *in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth*, and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What dost thou?" "Being predestinated according to the purpose of him *who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will*."

Such, indeed, are the teachings, not only of the Bible, but of *nature and reason*. We may infer as conclusively, from the light of nature, the eternal and universal purposes of God, as we can that there *is* a God of infinite wisdom and goodness. For in the possession of infinite wisdom, he must have discovered in eternity the best end, and the best means or plan of accomplishing it. And in the possession of infinite goodness, he must have preferred this plan, rather than any other. And this boundless plan of providence for accomplishing the noblest end, is but another name for the eternal and universal purposes of God.

But how has this doctrine been held in the church? What diversities of opinion, what discussions have been had respecting it?

From the days of the Apostles to those of Augustine and Pelagius, there seems to have been no great dispute, no controversy on the subject. The early Greek Fathers were strenuous advocates of the *freedom of the will*; but they held this idea in close connection with another, to which they often refer, that God had before him, from eternity, a perfect plan of all future contingencies and events. It must be admitted, however, that several of the Greek Fathers, as Justin, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Chrysostom, insisted more frequently and earnestly upon the unembarrassed freedom of the will, than did the Latins of the same age; and probably for this reason: they were brought more directly in contact with a class of philosophers, as the Stoics, the Gnostics, and the Manichees, who denied human freedom and responsibility, and bound the whole moral world, as well as the natural, in the chains of resistless necessity and fate. The philosophical tendencies of the age, more especially in the East, were all adverse to human freedom; and from this circumstance, the early Christian writers were led to insist more upon the freedom of the will, and less upon the Divine predestination, than they might otherwise have done. Still, as I said, they seem never to have doubted that God saw the end from the beginning, and had before him, in eternity, a perfect plan of all future circumstances and events.

The tide of worldly prosperity which flowed in upon the church after the accession and conversion of Constantine, had, as might have been anticipated, a disastrous influence upon its spirituality. The honors which were heaped upon the higher dignitaries of the church, were such as they were ill able to bear. A spirit of worldly ambition was infused, which spread through the several ranks of the clergy, and deeply contaminated the church. The consequence was, that there was a manifest decline of vital piety, through all the latter half of the fourth century. Christians were not as humble, as spiritual, as dead to the world, and as deeply engaged in the things of religion, as they had been while passing through the fires of persecution. There was much now to tempt worldly men into the church, and into the ministry; and in too many instances the temptation prevailed. During this period of declension, the great doctrines of grace, such as the entire corruption of the natural man, regeneration by the Holy Spirit, justification by faith, and others of a kindred character, were lost sight of or discarded.

But God had promised not to forsake his people, and in due time his gracious promise began to be fulfilled. Appropriate instruments were raised up, and the slumbering church was revived and quickened. Among the instruments of this revival, which occurred in the early part of the fifth century, the first place is due, unquestionably, to the celebrated Augustine of Hippo. This man was born at Tagaste, an obscure village in Numidia, A.D. 354. His father was a pagan till near the close of life; but his mother was an eminently devoted Christian. His advantages of education were good, and his talents of the highest order; but his early life was one of continued debauchery and wickedness. In philosophy, he was a Manichee, and in profession a teacher of rhetoric and oratory. In the exercise of his profession, he came, at length, to Milan; where, under the searching and powerful ministry of Ambrose, he was brought to repentance. His convictions of sin were deep, painful, and abiding. In his own experience, he learned effectually the solemn lesson, that the heart of the natural man is full of evil, and fully set in him to do evil. His conversion was eminently satisfactory—very like those which frequently occur in our best modern revivals. Old things passed away with him; all things became spiritually new; and he was prepared, at once, to devote his cultivated and brilliant powers to the service of God and his church. He was thirty-three years of age at the time of his conversion. Subsequent to this, he lived more than forty years, and was, under Christ, the great luminary of the church. He was specially instrumental in reviving and diffusing spiritual religion. He brought out the distinguishing doctrines of the gospel, gave them prominence and power, and defended them against the errorists of the times. His controversy with Pelagius was no other than a struggle for evangelical religion against one who impugned it, and was secretly laboring to subvert it.

Among the great doctrines which were taught by Augustine, was that of the Divine purposes, or predestination. This was a necessary part of that system of truth which he had learned in his own experience. If mankind in a state of nature are universally and totally corrupt, then the reason why some are saved, rather than others, cannot be that in themselves they are better than others, but must be owing entirely to the sovereign grace and purpose of God.

It has been often said, that Augustine was led to adopt his

peculiar sentiments respecting predestination and grace, in consequence of his controversy with Pelagius. But the truth rather is, that he was led into this controversy, in consequence of his holding and revering these sentiments. It may be proved, historically, that he publicly taught them, at least ten years previous to the Pelagian controversy.

I would not be understood to adopt or approve all that Augustine wrote on the subject of predestination. He may have expressed himself too strongly, in particular instances. My impression however is, that taking all he has written on the subject together, and qualifying one statement by another, he has left the matter very nearly as it was left by the Apostle Paul, and as it is now understood by our best Calvinistic writers. It may be further added, that perhaps no individual has lived since the days of Paul, the influence of whose writings upon the religious world has been so great, and happy, and enduring, as those of the celebrated Bishop of Hippo.

It happened to Augustine, as it often has done to other master spirits of the ages in which they lived, that his disciples did not understand predestination so well as he did, and did not express themselves with the same care and caution respecting it. The doctrine was so represented by certain monks of Adrumetum and Gaul, that Augustine himself was constrained to cry out upon them, and defend himself against the statements of his too ardent and officious friends.

The doctrine of Augustine respecting predestination was confirmed by several councils, and became the general belief of the church, more especially in Africa and the West, for several centuries. There were those, undoubtedly, who did not receive it; but there was little more controversy respecting it, till the time of Gotteschalk, who flourished in the ninth century.

Gotteschalk was of Saxon origin, and was educated in the monastery of Fulda. When arrived at manhood, he wished no longer to lead a monastic life, but was compelled to it, on the ground that his father had devoted him to such a life, and that no human power could vacate the transaction. He now removed to Orbais, where he was ordained a presbyter, and so distinguished himself as a scholar that he was surnamed Fulgentius. Augustine was his favorite author, and he freely advanced the opinions of Augustine respecting Divine predestination and grace. Many favored these views, but others opposed them; among whom was Hincmar, archbishop of

Rheims, to whose diocese Gotteschalk belonged. Through the influence of Hincmar, Gotteschalk was arraigned before the synod of Chiersey, was condemned, degraded, publicly whipped, and shut up in prison, where, after a confinement of twenty-one years, he died. He persevered to the last in his opinions, and because he would make no retraction, was denied Christian burial.

Gotteschalk was a learned, able, conscientious, good man, and deserves to be enrolled in the catalogue of martyrs. But though he died, the cause which he espoused did not die with him. Numerous and powerful advocates were raised up for it during his imprisonment, and after his death, and it was confirmed by several provincial councils.

From this period, the doctrine of predestination was almost continually agitated in the Romish church, during the next eight hundred years. It found a powerful advocate in the celebrated Thomas Aquinas, in the 13th century; and an opponent equally subtle and powerful in Duns Scotus, in the century following. From this time, it furnished a standing topic of inquiry and controversy between the Scotists and Thomists for a long period—a topic on which all the subtleties of scholastic logic and ingenuity were expended in vain. Nor was the controversy confined to the Scholastics; but as Aquinas was a Dominican and Scotus a Franciscan, it embroiled and agitated these two great rival orders of monks—the Dominicans and Franciscans—down to the time of the Reformation. The Dominicans and Augustinians were the decided advocates of predestination; while the Franciscans, and subsequently the Jesuits, opposed it with all their art and strength.

The controversies respecting predestination and grace were rather evaded than decided in the Council of Trent. Consequently, soon after the termination of the council, they broke out again in the Romish church, with renewed violence. The Jesuits were now the leading opponents of the doctrines in question, while the Dominicans and Jansenists were their advocates. With regard to these disputes, the Pontiffs were slow to decide any thing. They were often appealed to, but as often put off the parties with fair promises, which were never intended to be fulfilled. At length, however, about the middle of the 17th century, Alexander VIIth, the reigning Pope, being overcome by the numbers and clamors of the Jesuits, consented to issue a formal condemnation of the Jansenists, and of the doctrines

which they espoused. From this time the Jansenists, among whom were some truly pious and devoted, as well as learned men, became the objects, not only of opposition, but of relentless persecution. They were miserably harassed with banishments, imprisonments, and other vexations; and the church of Rome at length settled down in a quiet rejection of the doctrines of predestination and grace. While the members of this church professed to revere Augustine and Aquinas, and to regard their opinions as of almost equal authority with holy writ, they formally rejected these opinions, and miserably persecuted those who embraced them.

But it is time that we turn from the Romish church, and contemplate the history of the doctrine under consideration among the Lutherans. Luther, while a Catholic, was an Augustinian monk, and was converted during his residence in the monastery at Erfurth. He had a deep sense of his entire sinfulness and helplessness while out of Christ, and the work of grace upon his soul was thorough and abiding. Next to his Bible, he best loved the works of the great Augustine. He read them with intense interest, entered into the spirit of them, and was prepared to become their advocate and defender. When his sentiments as a reformer began to be made known, he was a decided believer in the doctrine of predestination. But Melancthon, with whom he was intimately associated, hesitated on this point, and would not receive it without material qualifications. And as Melancthon was chiefly concerned in drawing up the Augsburg Confession—which has ever been the symbol of the Lutheran church—the doctrine in question was left out of it. In consequence of this omission, the subject became one of controversy among Protestants of that age; and most of the Lutheran clergy since, not excepting the more evangelical of them, have failed to hold and teach the doctrine of predestination.

In recent times, there have been indications of change in respect to this doctrine, in the Lutheran church; whether for the better or the worse remains yet to be seen. It is now generally admitted by the more learned of the Lutheran clergy, that their standards are not quite consistent with themselves. Many do not hesitate to acknowledge that they must either reject (what their standards inculcate) the entire corruption of the natural man, and his inability, of himself, to perform any thing good; or that they must receive (what their standards re-

ject) the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination. In this dilemma, some are for steering one way and some the other. The late Dr. Bretschneider preferred the former course, and discarded the doctrine of native depravity ; while Schleiermacher adopted the latter alternative, and frankly acknowledges that, as a Lutheran, he can no longer sympathize with most of his contemporaries, in condemning the doctrine of predestination as irrational and unscriptural.

Among those who, in the 16th century, separated from the church of Rome, all the communities not Lutheran were commonly classed together under the appellation of *the Reformed*. These constituted, not one church, but a great many churches, scattered over the north and west of Europe, having almost no bond of union, except their opposition to the religion of Rome. In these reformed churches, the man who, of all others, exerted the widest and most enduring influence, was the celebrated Calvin.

Calvin was a Frenchman by birth, and was educated as a Romish priest ; but becoming disgusted with the superstitions of his church, he early abandoned it, and devoted himself to the study of law. In this profession he made rapid progress, and published several works of distinguished excellence. He could not be satisfied, however, to spend his life as a civilian, and when about thirty-six years of age, he began to preach openly the Protestant doctrines. The providence of God soon directed him to Geneva, where, with slight interruptions, he spent the remainder of his days. He greatly distinguished himself, not only as a pastor, a scholar, and a preacher of the gospel, but as an author, and theological teacher. His school of theology was the most celebrated at that time in the world, and was the resort of students from almost every country in Europe. I hardly need say, that Calvin was a strenuous advocate of what are commonly called the doctrines of grace, including that of predestination. By means of his school, and of other channels of influence which were opened around him, he was the means of disseminating these doctrines through all the reformed churches. The doctrine of predestination was incorporated in the standards, not only of the Swiss churches, but of those of England, Scotland, France, Holland, and of several of the Protestant states of Germany.

For the first half century after the death of Calvin, his peculiar sentiments continued to be taught with little contradiction

in most of the reformed churches. But in the early part of the next century (the 17th), a powerful antagonist arose in Holland. This was James Arminius, Professor of Divinity at Leyden. In his published writings he expressed himself cautiously; but in his more private instructions, he was understood to depart widely from the teachings of Calvin, and from the standards of his own church. His pupils carried out his principles farther than he did, and a lamentable schism was occasioned in the churches of the Low Countries.

After various fruitless attempts to adjust the difficulty, it was concluded to convene a Synod, to be composed of delegates from all the reformed churches. This Synod, which was called by the authority of the States General of Holland, assembled at Dort, A. D. 1618. Delegates were present, not only from the United Provinces, but from England, Scotland, Hesse, Bremen, and the churches of the Palatinate. The Synod held, in all, one hundred and eighty sessions; near the close of which the Arminians were condemned, and deprived of their ministerial and academical functions, until they should renounce their errors and return to the faith of the church.

The civil authorities proceeded much farther than this. They banished the leading Arminians, and suppressed the assemblies; and when found assembled in disobedience to the laws, they were dispersed, in some instances by force of arms, and punished with fines and imprisonments.

These violent proceedings brought great reproach upon the Synod of Dort, and destroyed all the good effects which might otherwise have resulted from it. Very soon there was a reaction in favor of the Arminians. They were recalled from banishment, restored to favor, and were in a situation to spread their peculiarities even more rapidly than before.

As a distinct sect, however, the Arminians have never been numerous. They have sought to prevail, not so much by setting up for themselves, as by silently mingling with other sects, corrupting their churches, and (without changing their name or form) bringing them over to their views.

In this way, the originally Calvinistic church of England became substantially Arminian, under Archbishop Laud. The articles remained as before—essentially Calvinistic—while a majority of those who subscribed them, and promised to defend them, were Arminians. The infection was slower and later in its operations in the kirk of Scotland, but we fear it has not

been less pervading or sure. The Protestant churches of France became first Arminian, and then Socinian; and the same has been the melancholy issue, even in Geneva. There has been a reviving, indeed, in most of these countries, since the commencement of the present century; but the revival, for the most part, has not been carried forward through the instrumentality of the old Protestant churches. On the contrary, it has sprung up *without* these churches, while its advocates have been opposed and persecuted by them.

The first settlers of New England were strict Calvinists. They held the doctrines of predestination and grace, much as these were taught in the original school at Geneva. And for more than a hundred years after the settlement of this country, there were no important changes of religious opinion. The Arminian errors began to appear here, and to be the occasion of alarm to serious Christians, about one hundred years ago. These errors received a check by the great revivals which were enjoyed in New England, near the middle of the last century; but at the close of these revivals they sprang up afresh, and assumed a more alarming aspect than ever. During all the latter part of the century, not a few of the churches of the Pilgrims, or more properly the ministers of the churches, especially those in the eastern part of Massachusetts, were Arminian. They have since become, in most instances, Unitarian.

The forms of Arminianism of which I have spoken were generally cold, barren, and lifeless. The abettors of the doctrine were decided opposers of evangelical truth, and of every thing which had the appearance of warmth and eagerness in religion. They discountenanced special religious meetings, and of all things were most afraid of what was called by the bad name of enthusiasm.

There is a form of Arminianism, now prevailing in this country and in England, which is of quite a different character. It is embodied chiefly among the General or Arminian Baptists, and the followers of Mr. Wesley. These are proper Arminians, so far as opposition to predestination and some other connected doctrines is concerned; while they retain in their system enough of truth to give it life, warmth and vigor, and to entitle them to be classed with evangelical Christians. They have been, in general, much engaged in religion, and have undoubtedly carried the salvation of the gospel to many souls.

A history of the doctrine under consideration would be im-

perfect, did it not include some account of the more common *abuses or perversions* of it.

This doctrine is continually perverted by its opposers. They seldom, if ever, represent it fairly. They draw conclusions from it which its friends would reject with as much abhorrence as themselves, and then reason from these conclusions as though they constituted an essential part of the doctrine. In short, they state the doctrine as no one believes it, and thus contend, not against the real doctrine, but only a fiction of their own imagining.

But there are other perversions of the doctrine of Divine decrees, besides those which proceed from its avowed enemies. It has been often misstated and abused by erring and inconsistent friends. In some instances, it is so held and taught, as to be of a decidedly Antinomian character. "There were those in England, in the time of the Commonwealth, who denied that it was necessary for ministers to exhort their hearers to *obey the law*; because those whom God, from all eternity, had elected to salvation, would of themselves obey the law; while those who were destined to eternal punishment, though admonished and entreated ever so much, could not obey it. Others, at the same period, insisted that the elect, because they cannot lose the Divine favor, do not truly commit sin, or break the law, even when they go contrary to its precepts;—that adultery, for instance, in one of the elect, though to us it appears a sin, is in reality no sin in the sight of God." I quote here from the history of the times, to show to what lengths of perversion and abuse erratic minds have sometimes wandered, in their reasonings on the doctrine of election.

By a portion of its advocates, the doctrine of Divine purposes has been perverted in another way. They not only admit but insist, that this doctrine is opposed to human freedom, and that there is no such thing as free agency or moral accountability in the universe. "One man," they say, "does the will of God as truly as another; and the distinction between right and wrong, holiness and sin, is merely nominal or conventional." Of this stamp are the Necessarians and Fatalists of modern times—the abettors of a philosophical mania, which is hardly less to be dreaded than downright atheism.

Those abuse the doctrine of Divine purposes who make it a means of inducing sloth and discouraging effort on the part of Christians. Abuses of this sort, there is reason to fear, are not

unfrequent. Christians believe that God has purposes respecting the salvation of individuals; that those purposes will certainly be accomplished; that all his elect will be gathered in; and in these views they find a pillow for their consciences, and an excuse for their sloth. While they are engaged and active for the securing of other objects, which they believe equally settled in the purpose of God, they quietly resign a world lying in wickedness to be disposed of according to his pleasure.

Of a similar perversion of the doctrine in question, impenitent sinners are perpetually guilty. How many are there, and among these not a few who ought to know better, who, when pressed on the subject of religion, are ever ready to reply, "Why should we give ourselves any trouble about it? If it is God's purpose to save us, we shall be saved, and if not, we cannot be, let us do what we may."

The moral tendency of the doctrine of God's purposes, when held in its just connections, and stated with proper qualifications, has been uniformly happy. And this has frequently been acknowledged, even by its opposers.—A learned infidel, while expressing a decided preference of the Arminian to the Calvinistic system, admits that "the modern Calvinists have, in no small degree *excelled their antagonists* in the practice of the most rigid and respectable virtues. They have been the highest honor to their own age, and the best models for imitation to every succeeding age."

A writer some years ago in the Edinburgh Review, who was probably an infidel, asks, "What are we to think of the morality of Calvinistic nations, especially the most numerous of them, who seem, beyond all other men, to be most zealously attached to their religion, and most deeply penetrated with its spirit? Here, if anywhere, we have a practical and decisive test of the moral influence of predestinarian opinions. In Protestant Switzerland, in Holland, in Scotland, among the English Nonconformists, and the Protestants of the North of Ireland, and in the New England States, Calvinism was long the prevalent faith, and is probably still the faith of a considerable majority. Their moral education was at least completed, and their collective character formed, during the prevalence of Calvinistic opinions, yet *where are communities to be found of a more pure and active virtue?*"

I add one more testimony to the good moral tendencies of Calvinistic predestination. It is that of Tholuck, a Lutheran,

and not a professed believer in the doctrine. In his Treatise on Oriental Mysticism, he says, that "the doctrine of predestination, so far from producing the despondency and inaction often ascribed to it, on the contrary, *moves and excites the inmost soul*, by the self-surrender which it demands to the all-prevailing will of God." To the influence of this doctrine, he attributes whatever of seeming religion there is among those who receive the sensual dogmas of the Koran. "And Calvinism," he allows, "is *incomparably more favorable to the deeper religious life*, than that doctrine, by which the will of God is limited or conditioned by the human will."

From these concessions, as well as from other and more obvious considerations, it appears that the doctrine of God's universal and eternal purposes is not one of idle and unprofitable speculation. It is rather one, when properly stated and explained, of high practical influence and importance. It gives us the most exalted ideas of God and his truth. It humbles the pride of the sinner; tries the feelings of the human heart; sustains and comforts the people of God in seasons of darkness and affliction; and stimulates and encourages them in the performance of painful self-denying duties. It gives them a deep sense of obligation to God for his distinguishing goodness and mercy, and thus promotes their gratitude, their humility, and their growth in grace. In short, when properly represented and urged, the influences of the doctrine are *good—all good*, and so they have showed themselves, always and everywhere. It becomes Christians, therefore, to hold the doctrine fast, and to rejoice in it, as an important branch of that holy system of truth by which they are to be sanctified and made meet for heaven.

ARTICLE III.

REVIEW OF DR. EDWARDS'S "DISSERTATION CONCERNING LIBERTY
AND NECESSITY."

By Rev. Samuel T. Spear, pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church, Lansingburgh, N. Y.

[Continued from page 240.]

IN resuming this work of examination and comparison with truth, it may be well to remind the reader, that in the former Article, the criticism upon Dr. Edwards was directed to the three following points, viz., *the nature of Moral Necessity,—the distinction between the two Necessities, moral and physical,—and the Dictum Necessitatis*. In the present inquiry we shall seek to indicate and examine the grounds of Dr. Edwards in relation to the *cause of volition*.

The question, *What causes volition?* is the main question to be proposed and answered in every theory of the will; it is the Gordian knot which has puzzled the philosophic world; it is indeed the only question, that is fraught with much difficulty. The answer indicates the school of philosophy to which its author belongs. If we adopt the canon, that the mind can bring no effects to pass but in consequence of acting, and hence infer that it cannot itself be the cause of the acting; and hence again infer that the willing must have some cause *ab extra*, our position is fixed in the school of necessity. If we take the opposite grounds, the Dictum Necessitatis must be rejected, mind becomes the cause of the phenomenon, and our position is fixed among the advocates of what has been termed Free Agency or Philosophical Liberty. That philosophers have not been agreed on this subject, needs no better proof than the history of this discussion. Both parties have been about equally confident as to the merits of their cause, and the success of their argumentation; both charge each other with maintaining the grossest absurdities; neither seems to have been satisfied with the reasoning of its opponents. If we were to judge of this question by the confidence with which different advocates have defended

their respective positions, we should almost be inclined to allow the possibility of demonstrating contrary propositions. On the one hand Collins, President Edwards and the Son, think they have proved, beyond successful contradiction, the truth of moral necessity. On the other, Buffin, Reid, Stewart, Dr. Clarke and Professor Tappan, claim to have fully replied to the arguments for necessity, and made out a complete demonstration of the opposite scheme.

The question, beyond a doubt, is one of great difficulty. No man can penetrate its interior without making this discovery. Its importance is not less than its difficulty; it is a vital question in its bearing on responsible agency, and man's relation, as a subject, to any religious system, whether natural or revealed. The attack has been made at this point more frequently than at any other, by those who have sought to upturn the foundations of all religion. It is the Thermopylæ of religious disputation. The skeptic has here brandished his intellectual armor, and attempted to foreclose the subject of religion by the force of "the previous question." Piety may treat him with contempt; common sense may laugh at him; but philosophy must be serious, and conduct this warfare by argument, or leave the whole ground in the undisputed possession of the skeptic.

It deserves special notice that the ground of President Edwards on this subject has been differently understood by different writers. Some suppose him to deny *mental causality in toto*; some understand him to make motive *the sole cause* of every volition; others regard him as asserting the causality, both of mind and motive. The fatalist and the atheist have claimed him as being on their side of the question; the philosophical and pious theist vindicates the reputation of Edwards from this aspersion, and insists that he has taken no such grounds, either by implication or concession. This discrepancy of interpretation is not a little remarkable; it argues, either great ambiguity of style, or great obscurity of view, or numerous self-contradictions, or much complexity in the subject, or a most extraordinary concurrence of contingencies, leading so many competent minds to such dissimilar interpretations. President Edwards is not now under review; if he were, it might easily be shown that he is not always consistent with himself or with truth.

Dr. Edwards prepared his Dissertation with his eye upon the work of the Elder Edwards. Having adopted the system of the

latter, his purpose was to explain and defend it, and especially to reply to the Essays of Dr. Samuel West. His Dissertation, therefore, contains not only *his* construction of the father's system, but also a statement of his own views. He stands before us in the attitude of an interpreter as well as an original author. If any one may be supposed to have had signal advantages for this work, that man was Dr. Edwards. He lived, thought, and wrote at the time, when this discussion was in progress. Gifted with unusual talent in metaphysical reasoning, and incited by the strong impulse of filial feeling, he doubtless searched this subject, as he supposed, to its very bottom. He had every motive to understand the "Inquiry" of President Edwards, and being an honest believer in its positions, to defend it against the attack of its opponents. He addresses himself to this work with great skill—suggests no doubt as to the truth of the father's system—intimates no wish to modify its features—gives substantially the same explanations, and repeats the same general arguments. The system of the son and the father is one system. It matters but little, which work you read; both contain the same arguments, and aim at the same general conclusions; both must stand or fall together. A criticism, therefore, upon the Dissertation of Dr. Edwards, is indirectly a critique upon the great "Inquiry" of President Edwards.

Having made the reader acquainted with the main design of this Article, and submitted several suggestions upon the attitude of the question before us, I propose the following *synopsis* of discussion:

1. Whether volition be an effect?
2. Whether the knowledge of *what* causes an effect supposes the knowledge of *how* it causes?
3. Whether the mind be the cause of volition?
4. Whether motive be its cause?
5. Whether God be the cause of every volition?—These inquiries cover the entire ground,—they lay open the whole field. Let us proceed to examine Dr. Edwards on these several points:

I. *Whether Volition be an Effect?*

Alexander Smith, in his "Philosophy of Morals," does not grant the position that volition is properly an effect at all. In allusion to the arguments on the side of necessity, he says—

"The fallacy in the reasoning here employed appears to me to lie in this, that it confounds an *effect* (as a change in the subject operated upon, from one specific state to another) with the specific mode of operation belonging to a cause, (as producing one change rather than another,) and assumes a volition or act of will to be of the former, instead of the latter description."—Vol. II. p. 92. Here the preliminary position, that volition is an effect, is not admitted, and of course any subsequent inquiry after its cause is a work of mere nugation. Does Dr. Edwards assume this ground? In chapter v. he criticises Dr. West severely for saying, "that volition is not properly an effect, which has a cause." He does not understand him to mean "that it is an effect, which has no cause," but "that it is not an effect at all." Having complimented the doctor for "originality in this part of his system," he proceeds to examine and overthrow the reasons for this position. I need not detain the reader to recite this argument, for with the conclusion of Dr. Edwards I am entirely satisfied. Volition is undoubtedly an effect. *What is an effect?*—Any event, any thing which comes to pass, whether it be the production of existence or any modification of that existence. That which once was not, but now is, or which is not now, but will be in future, is an effect, and demands for its existence a cause. Volition is of this nature; and it is not the less an effect though it be the *mode* of a cause, even the most ultimate mode that can be supposed. We cannot suppose an infinite series of *modes* following each other—we must in the last analysis come to the ultimate mode between which and the cause there is nothing intermediate. That ultimate mode, however, must always come under the title of an effect. The fallacy of Mr. Smith was not in supposing volition to be a modification of a cause, even though it be ultimate, but in supposing such modification not to be an effect. A volition existing at the present moment, did not exist at a prior moment; hence it has the only character, which can be given to any effect; it must be an effect or be eternal.

II. *Whether the knowledge of WHAT causes an effect supposes the knowledge of HOW it causes?*

I am not aware that Dr. Edwards has in any instance formally said, that one kind of knowledge supposes the other; but the assumption is implied in much of his reasoning, *ex hypothesi*,

to which concealed element the reasoning is indebted for its apparent conclusiveness. It was the doctrine of Dr. West, that *we* are not merely the subjects, but the causes of our own volitions. He had admitted that, "no agent can bring any effects to pass, but what are *consequent* upon his acting." This admission contains the Dictum Necessitatis, in regard to which the reader is requested to recur to the observations of a former Article. Upon this admission Dr. Edwards seizes and recoils upon his antagonist with great power. He understands the term "*acting*" in the sense of volition, and reasons conclusively from the premises, when he supposes the "*acting*" cannot be an effect of the agent, since the "*acting*" is the indispensable condition of the agent, producing any effect. Agreeing with Dr. West in the admission, he turns it against him, and compels him to grasp the blade of his own sword. There is no escape, when once this canon of necessity is allowed; it is omnipotent in demonstration; it has power sufficient to make every cause in the universe the very grossest absurdity. If we say, that no cause or agent can bring any *effect* to pass, but what is consequent upon its *acting*; if we then distinguish between the *acting* and the *effect* brought to pass; if we make the *acting* prior to, and separate from, the *effect*—it then follows that the cause of the effect cannot be the cause of the acting; the acting must have some other cause. If we generalize this mode of reasoning, we drive every cause out of the universe.

Now let it be observed, that this is the very species of reasoning repeated over and over again, in the works of both the Elder and Younger Edwards. Neither of them grants the possibility of an agent in the sense of a pure and simple *originator of action or modification* in its own bosom; the agent can bring effects to pass only in consequence of prior acting. Dr. Edwards says, "If we cause our own volitions at all, we cause them, either by a previous volition, or without such volition." The first supposition involves an infinite series. In regard to the second supposition, he says, "Now I wish it may be inquired, whether such a causation of volition as this, *if it be possible or conceivable, as I contend it is not,*" etc. Works, Vol. I. p. 334. An originator of action is, then, impossible, according to Dr. Edwards; every cause, if it cause at all, must cause by prior action. In the present connection I shall institute no controversy with these positions, my object having been to show that Dr. Edwards, without a formal announcement of such an

intention, undertakes to decide *how* an agent must cause, if it cause at all. He tells us *how* it cannot be, i. e. without a previous volition; he tells us *how* it must be, if at all, i. e. by a previous volition. But this last hypothesis is an absurdity; therefore the agent does not cause the volition at all. Now in every step of this process the knowledge of the *how*, the ultimate *modus operandi* of a cause is assumed; the reasoning derives all its validity from this assumption.

The question before us, then, is this: *Is it possible for man in the last analysis to know the mode of a cause in causing?* Suppose we take our stand in the physical world, what do we discover? Nothing but simple succession of events. By a necessary law of the mental constitution, valid *within* us and *beyond* us, we infer a cause of that succession. For the purposes of physical science we call the antecedent, the cause; but whether it is in fact the cause, we can never know; much less *how* it causes.—If we come to ourselves, we are in the same predicament. When we *will* or *think*, we are conscious of the phenomena at the moment of their existence. If we analyze this consciousness, we shall find, that it gives us the phenomena, the subject, and a relation of cause and effect between the two. It gives us no more. How the subject of the willing or thinking passes from the state of *not* willing or thinking, or from some other state of willing or thinking to the specific modification in question, does not appear. Whether there be a succession of modes or none at all, is what we do not know. If we be causes at all upon any hypothesis, the question of the mode passes entirely beyond the range of our cognitive powers. If we ascend to the First Cause, we shall be as unsuccessful in disposing of this question. The question ought to be ranked with the idle disputations and endless jargon of the school-men; there is no place for it in modern philosophy. The true course is at once to confess entire ignorance on the point. Had Dr. Edwards contemplated the question simply in itself, he doubtless would have adopted the same course. In his mind it was mingled up with other points;—he had a battle to fight, and hence, without perceiving it, he seizes a weapon too heavy for him to wield. He wished to demonstrate that mind cannot cause its own volitions; in carrying out this demonstration he involves himself in the whole question of the *mode*, decides how it cannot be, and how it must be, if at all. One single sentence precipitates this whole argument overboard, e. g. *he makes the issue*

dependent upon that about which he knows nothing. We must know the very essence of the soul, before we can safely travel along the line of the Edwardean logic. If we know not this, how can we know its *mode* as a cause, on the supposition that it is a cause?—And if we know not the mode, how can we say that an originator of action without prior action, is an impossibility, or that no agent can bring effects to pass, but what are consequent upon his acting?

The inference from the above reasoning is a very plain one. Either we have no knowledge of cause at all, or such knowledge is perfectly consistent with ignorance of its mode. The first alternative not being admissible, the last necessarily follows.

III. *Whether the Mind be the Cause of Volition?*

In reference to the opinions of Dr. Edwards on this point, the following extracts will be amply sufficient to indicate his ground:

In allusion to the positions of President Edwards, he says: "He holds that we ourselves determine; but he does not hold, that we are the *efficient* causes of our own determinations."—"President Edwards holds, that we ourselves will or choose; that we ourselves act and are agents. But he does not hold, that we *efficiently cause our own mental acts.*"—"President Edwards does not hold that we are mere *passive* beings, unless this expression mean, that our volitions are the effects of some cause extrinsic to our wills."—"Though we hold, that our volitions are the effects of some extrinsic cause, and that we are passive, as we are the subjects of the influence of that cause; yet we hold, that we are not *merely* passive; but that volition is in its own nature an act or action, and in the exercise of it we are active, though in the causation of it we are passive, so far as to be the subjects of the influence of the efficient cause. This we concede; and let our opponents make the most of it. We fear not the consequence," p. 318.—"We deny, that *causing our own volitions* and acting by chance, are either realities or possibilities," p. 325.—Again, in allusion to his opponents, he says: "Let them honestly confess, that all they mean by self-determination, is what we all allow, that they are the *subjects* of volition, and as Dr. West expresses it, that they *themselves will and choose,*" p. 332.—Again: "Yet from the supposition

that volition is not the effect of a cause extrinsic to the mind in which it takes place, it will follow, that there is no cause of it ; because it is absolutely impossible that the mind itself should be the cause of it," p. 339.—"The evasion of Dr. Clarke and others, that the mind itself is the cause of its own volitions, has been already considered ; beside other absurdities, it has been found to lead to an infinite series of volitions causing one another," p. 372.—Again, in allusion to the position "that in determining the mind determines," he says, "Whether it convey any other idea, than that *the mind does determine and has a volition*, without touching the question concerning the cause, extrinsic or intrinsic ; I submit to the reader," p. 333.

It would be a very easy task to multiply quotations of this character to an indefinite extent. They are not accidental slips of the writer's pen, mere *lapsus verborum* ; the expressions are accurate ; they are often repeated ; the positions they enunciate, penetrate his whole system. Dr. Edwards is no antagonist veiling himself in doubtful phraseology ; he marches up to his positions with a boldness that bespeaks the honesty of the man ; he cuts off his own retreat, and challenges his combatant to a contest on a field, which he has not feared to indicate. Let us then pause a moment, and make ourselves certain of the ground on which he stands.

We have in the first place a distinct denial, that the mind is the *efficient* cause of its own volitions, "that we efficiently cause our own mental acts." Dr. Edwards does not allow this ; and he tells us that the same is true of his father. His is not the system, that the mind is the *efficient*, and motive the *occasional* cause of volition, as some of the advocates of the Edwardean doctrine have supposed. It so happens that Dr. Edwards has nowhere defined the word *efficient*, in application to cause. As he was a philosopher, however, it may be presumed that he understood the term, and intended to use it in its correct sense. That sense is very well stated by Professor Upham : "*Effective* causes have power in themselves ; while preparative causes only furnish the appropriate and necessary occasions, on which the power that is lodged somewhere else, exercises itself. Both classes are invariably followed by their appropriate results or effects ; but the one class, having the whole efficiency in itself, is strictly operative, and actually makes or brings to pass the effect, whatever it may be." Upham on the Will, Chap. II. Sect. LXX. I shall join no issue with the professor on the ques-

tion whether every thing that is really a cause must not be included in the definition given of an efficient cause. If the distinction between *occasional* and *efficient* causes be admitted, then he has stated the common and universal idea of an efficient cause. Dr. Edwards's ground then is, that the mind is not such a cause of its own volitions. He does not hold that volitions take place without *any* efficient cause, but that the efficiency is not in the mind. This is equivalent to saying, that the mind is invested with no *power* to produce such phenomena upon its own theatre. If they exist there, it is by some foreign efficiency, of whose causative influence the mind is merely the subject.

In the next place Dr. Edwards distinctly denies that mind is the cause of its own volitions *in any sense whatever*. It is not possible to have stronger evidence of this than the passages already quoted. What can be a more perfect denial than to say, "it is absolutely impossible that the mind itself should be the cause of it?" He abounds with such expressions; they are universal and without any qualification. If they be taken as an index of truth, the mind sustains no relation of cause whatever to its own volitions; in this relation it has no more to do with them than the planet Jupiter.

Dr. Edwards allows, that the mind *determines, wills, chooses, is the subject of volition; that volition is an act or action; that in the exercise of it we are active*; and had he not so carefully defined his ground, we might have supposed him to grant all his opponents claim. He distinguishes these admissions from the idea, that the mind is cause of volition. Let us not then be deceived on this point. What do these and kindred propositions mean? In the nature of things they are susceptible of but two constructions; one is, that they predicate a *causal* relation between a given phenomenon and the mind as its cause. The other is, that they predicate merely a *subjective* relation between a given phenomenon and the subject in which it occurs. The two relations are not identical, and the latter does not necessarily imply the former. Which of these constructions does Dr. Edwards adopt? Not the *first*, for this he is careful to deny. The second is the only one which is left, and this he avows. These propositions therefore must not pass for more than they are worth in this discussion. They simply affirm, that a change takes place in the mind, of which it is the theatre, but not the cause, the descriptive term of which change is *willing, choosing, acting*, etc. The mind wills in no other

sense than a stone moves, i. e. neither contributes any thing to the production of the changes, only so far as they are the subjects of them. We might with the same propriety say that the motion of a stone is an act or action, and in the exercise of it the stone is active; for all that Dr. Edwards means by these affirmations in application to the mind, is as true of the stone as of the mind. The only conception which survives this philosophical wreck of mental agency, is the bare one of *subjectivity*. All mental causality in the production of volitions is swept away, not by logical deduction from the principles of a system, but by the candid acknowledgment of one of its ablest expounders.

It is of great importance in this discussion not to institute a false or a merely verbal issue. Such a procedure gains nothing in the discovery of truth; it defeats the triumph of argument; for to make and then demolish a man of straw is a work to which the merest tyro is adequate. It may therefore be of service in this stage of the inquiry to entertain and consider certain objections against the above interpretation, which are urged by the defenders of the Edwardean scheme. The general objection is that the scheme is not understood by its opponents. This charge is repeatedly brought against Dr. West by the younger Edwards, and in some instances the criticism is correct. It will not then, I trust, be labor lost to spend a few moments in listening to the admonitions of the objector, and viewing the subject in the attitude in which he may present it.

It may be said, *that Dr. Edwards never intended to deny that mind is cause of volition in every sense; that although his language seems to involve this broad ground, still his scheme was, that motive is cause in part, and the mind in part, and that the two made up the complex idea of the cause of volition.* The suggestion deserves a hearing. In regard to it I offer the following observations.

(1.) Dr. Edwards himself has presented no such view. The suggestion is not his, thinking and writing for himself, but the invention of some disciple thinking for him, or as he would have him think. Many shrink from going the whole length of the Edwardean system, while they are not satisfied with the opposite ground; hence they retain the name, but modify the substance. The above is the more usual modification. Let it be recollected, however, that it is not the work of Dr. Edwards, but of his successors. He never for once indicated the slightest

misgivings as to his own ground ; he exults there and challenges his opponents to make the most of his concessions.

(2.) Again, what he says on page 372 is of high authority in settling this question. He says—"For every cause of volition is included in President Edwards's definition of motive." He then quotes the definition: "By motive I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether it be one thing singly or many things conjunctly." This is followed by declaring the sentiment of Dr. Clarke and others, that the mind is cause of volition, to be an evasion and an absurdity. Every cause of volition being included in the term motive, it follows that there is no other cause besides motive. If Dr. Edwards, then, be supposed to view the mind as cause of volition in any sense, he must be supposed to include mind under the term motive. But this is not allowable by the very definition of motive, since motive is that which expends its efficiency on the mind, and is therefore distinct from the mind. Neither President nor Dr. Edwards ever dreamed of including mind itself in the definition of motive. If they did not mean thus to include mind, then the definition of motive, as including every cause of volition, certainly excludes mind from all participation as a cause.

(3.) Again, it is a favorite argument with both the Elder and the Younger Edwards, that, if we deny motive to be the cause of volition, we involve the supposition that volition has no cause. The latter says—"Yet, from the supposition that volition is not the effect of a cause extrinsic to the mind in which it takes place, it will follow that there is no cause of it ; because it is absolutely impossible that the mind itself should be the cause of it." This was said in reply to a suggestion of Dr. Price, that self-determination did not imply an effect without a cause, since the mind itself was assumed to be the cause. Now this inference does not follow without the previous assumption, that the mind is not in any sense the cause of volition ; for if it might be cause in any sense, in that sense there might be a cause of volition, even if extrinsic causality were denied. The validity of the reasoning depends on the total denial of mental causality.

(4.) It is also argued by Dr. Edwards, that to suppose the mind to cause volition implies the absurdity of an infinite series of volitions. If this absurdity follow at all, it equally attends the supposition that the mind is cause in part, cause in any

sense, as that it is cause entire and complete. The reasoning strikes at the nature of all causation, and is equally good, whether we suppose a given phenomenon to be the product of one or a dozen causes. If we assume the phenomenon to arise from two or more causes, still each cause has its specific sphere in the causation; in that sphere it acts as cause, and in that sphere it must be proscribed as an absurdity by the rule of the *Dictum Necessitatis* considered in a previous Article. Suppose then the mind to be cause of volition in part, what follows according to Dr. Edwards? That so far as it is cause at all, it is an absurdity. Did he intend to allow this?

(5.) This suggestion derives its plausibility from a misconception of terms. Dr. Edwards is ever ready to admit that the mind is an *agent*—that it *acts, wills, chooses, determines, &c.* These may be regarded as admissions of mental causality; but we have seen, that he intended to convey no such sentiment. All he meant was that the mind is the subject of the change or changes thus designated. Suppose we say that the mind is the cause of volition in some sense, the question is, in what sense? In the sense that it wills, chooses, etc. Well, what is that sense? It turns out to be nothing more than the fact, that the mind is a *subject of volition*, without being its cause. In all this we deceive ourselves in the use of terms; we predicate causality of the mind in precisely that sense in which there is none. Cause in this sense is in reality no cause, and it was so understood by Dr. Edwards, for he maintained that it is the mind that wills, while he denied that it caused the willing. These phrases may do as flourishes of rhetoric, but as explained by Dr. Edwards they do not involve the supposition of mental causality in respect to volition.

(6.) Finally, the denial of all mental causality in the production of volitions, is a legitimate deduction from the system of necessity as stated and defended by Dr. Edwards. No man will pretend that the mind can be the cause of that which is made the chronological condition, the necessary antecedent of its being a cause of any thing. Such a pretension would imply, that it is a cause before it is a cause. Volition is made this necessary antecedent on the supposition of Edwards, that if the mind cause volition at all, it must be by the exercise of volition. By the supposition, it cannot in any sense be the cause of this prior volition, since it is the very thing which precedes the possibility of the mind causing any thing. The logic, if valid,

seals up the question; it does not leave the shadow of a shade of mental causation in the production of volition. Dr. Edwards was entirely true to his system in the bold denial of all such causation. He, who maintains for him mental causality in part, must allow one of three absurdities: either that volitions are caused by the mind in an infinite succession; or that it is a cause of that which is the chronological condition of its being a cause, i. e. is a cause before it is a cause; or that it is a cause in part of that which came into existence by some other cause, before mental causation was even a possibility. If those who institute this claim for Edwards will understand him, they will no longer be deceived by the terms *activity, agency, willing, choosing, acting*, etc. They involved no admission in any sense of the point in debate.

It may be said again, *that the question is not, who determines or wills, but why that which determines at all determines thus rather than otherwise; and that, although the mind be a sufficient cause of the existence of volition, it can never be a cause of the fact that volition is thus and not otherwise; and hence we must seek for a cause, which causes the mind to choose thus rather than otherwise.* In the statement of this point, I have endeavored to give it all the importance which is attached to it by the advocates of necessity. I proceed to make it the subject of the following critical remarks:

(1.) If the suggestion have any relevancy to the point at issue, it must predicate, of the mind at least, some share of causality in the production of its volitions. If it does not accomplish this, it does not touch the question in debate, however much of truth it may contain. The question is, whether the Edwardean scheme admits the hypothesis that the mind causes its own volitions in *any* sense. To that question I have already replied in the negative, and supported the answer by an extended reference to the concessions of Dr. Edwards, as well as the structure of the system he advocates. This ground remains good, unless the above suggestion put in a plea of some mental causality, and that plea be traced to Edwards as its author.

(2.) Let us proceed, then, to interrogate both the Younger and the Elder Edwards on the question, whether they intended to admit that the mind causes its volitions in *any* sense whatever. In respect to the first mentioned writer, I have nothing to add to what has already been said. If he has not rejected the hypothesis, then language has no meaning. Let us then

recur, for a moment, to the language of President Edwards, and ascertain whether he admitted or denied the causality in question.

President Edwards, in his "Inquiry," joins issue with his opponents on the question, *why* the soul "exerts *such* an act, and not another; or why it acts with such a particular determination?" He animadverts upon Dr. Clarke for proposing to answer this, but really answering another question, as he alleges. Now the "*why*" of President Edwards is plainly an inquiry after a cause. The cause of what?—Of the fact that the soul is in *this* specific state of volition rather than *some* other. He very fully grants that the mind *acts, chooses, determines*, etc., but this did not in his view touch the specific question which he had in his mind. To say that the mind is competent to originate action, choice, determination, etc., was an answer which was not at all satisfactory to the mind of Edwards: he still pressed the question, *why* it chooses thus and not otherwise; i. e. he demanded a cause for the specific choice. If his opponent replied that the mind itself was a sufficient cause both of the existence and the particular direction of volition, Edwards was ready with an answer—that an agent can bring no effects to pass, but what are consequent upon his acting. Now this *acting*, willing, or determining, call it what you please, was the very thing to be accounted for, and for which he sought a cause. To allow that this *acting* was an effect of the agent in any sense, either involved a prior acting in regard to which the same difficulty must arise; or it was a perfect contradiction of the philosophical canon just stated, which President Edwards had too much discrimination not to perceive. He did not admit the doctrine of an infinite series of volitions, causing each other, which he charges upon his opponents. How did he avoid it? By making the *acting*, the *willing*, which he speaks of as belonging to the agent, not an effect having the agent for its cause, but an effect of something else, of which the agent was the subject. Had he done otherwise, he must have been swallowed up in a vortex of his own creation. This is precisely the attitude of his philosophy, and it cuts up, root and branch, all possibility that the mind should ever cause one of its own volitions. And this is the very point before us—not what is true, but what did Edwards say, is true. As this point has become one of absorbing interest and keen discussion in our own age, the reader will allow me to verify these positions by an appeal to the author.

He tells us, that "an active being can bring no *effects* to pass by his activity, but what are *consequent* upon his *acting*." Part II. Sect. IV. Again: "So the mind being an *active* cause enables it to produce effects in consequence of its own *acts*; but cannot enable it to be the determining cause of all its own *acts*." Ibid. The "*acts*" here spoken of are volitions. These being already in the mind, it can produce consequential effects; but how plainly he denies that the mind can cause these acts. This denial he is logically compelled to make, after assuming that a cause cannot cause but by prior causative acts. Again: "So that the will does not determine itself in any one of its own acts; but every act of choice and refusal depends on, and is necessarily connected with, some antecedent cause; which cause is not the will itself, nor any act of its own; nor any thing pertaining to that faculty." "And therefore the will is necessarily determined, in every one of its acts, from a man's first existence, by a cause beside the will, and a cause that does not proceed from, or depend on any act of the will at all." Part II. Sect. IX. By *determining* he meant causing the volition to be this rather than that volition. By *will* he meant the mind as invested with a certain power called by this title. Here he plainly denies that the mind in possession of this power can contribute any thing to the causation of volition: this depends on something else. Again: "So to suppose that there are *acts* of the soul by which a man voluntarily moves and acts upon objects, and produces effects, *which yet themselves are effects of something else*, and wherein the soul itself is the object of something acting upon and influencing that, does not at all confound action and passion:"—"action may be the effect of some other cause besides the agent or being that acts." Part IV. Sect. II. Now the "*acts*," the volitions here spoken of, are the very things in question, for which a cause is sought. These "*acts*" are declared to be "*effects of something else*" besides the soul. If a man "*produces effects*" it is in consequence of these "*acts of the soul*;" the "*acts*" are not effects of which he is the producer, but their sequents. By the very supposition the soul can contribute nothing in the causation of these "*acts*," since it produces effects only in consequence of them; and hence Edwards very properly supposed that they must be "*effects of something else*." What this "*something else*" was in the view of Edwards, may be learned from the following extract:—"But if every act of the will is excited

by a motive, then that motive is the cause of the act. If the acts of the will are excited by motives, then motives are the causes of their being excited; or, which is the same thing, the cause of their existence. And if so, the existence of the acts of the will is properly the effect of their motives." Part II. Sect. X. To excite the volitions is the same as to cause them; and does he not distinctly indicate, that the "something else" of which volitions are effects, is motive? Does he not in motive cover the entire ground both of their existence and particular direction? His system shuts him up to extrinsic causality as the only alternative. Hence not a passage can be found in his book which implies that the mind, in any sense, causes volition. In this respect he was perfectly consistent with himself.

President Day, in his "Examination of Edwards on the Will," presents himself as the expounder and defender of Edwards. After explaining the use of the word *cause*, he observes: "In this sense of the word, neither external motives nor the agent are the *sole* cause of his volitions; but *both together* are truly the cause," p. 120. This he proposes as the Edwardean ground. I am very willing to grant that it may be the doctrine of President Day, but it does not correctly indicate the scheme of Edwards. It would have been gratifying to those who disagree with the commentator, had he produced his proof texts in support of his position. I hesitate not to say that they cannot be found in the "Inquiry" of Edwards. Passages in abundance might be cited, where it is granted that the mind *chooses, acts, wills*, etc.; but not one of these, by the very interpretation of Edwards, implies that the mind in the least degree causes the willing, the choosing, etc. Indeed, how could he have admitted this point? It would have been the wreck of his whole scheme, the death-blow to his strongest arguments. If an agent must first act before it can produce an effect—if the effect and the acting be not identical—if the acting also be the effect, then to say that the acting is at all produced by the agent, is nonsense;—we are carried out of and beyond the agent altogether, when searching for the cause of the acting. And bear in mind, that this is the very point,—what causes the *acting*, the *volition*, and not its sequents. President Day was certainly mistaken when he said that motive and the agent "both together are truly the cause;" this was not the ground of Edwards; it is nowhere asserted; it is not admissible in his scheme. To say that the mind has an *active*

nature, is to say, in consistency with his scheme, that the mind is capable of having what is called an *act* or *volition* wrought *in* it, but not *by* it—that it may be a subject of the change in question. If a man choose to designate this by the title of cause, I have only to say, that he entirely mistakes the idea of cause.

So far then as President Edwards is concerned, the plea in question does not leave the mind in possession of any causality in relation to volition—the only point I am now seeking to settle. In this respect Dr. Edwards most fully concurs with him. If any one shall enter his protest to this criticism, I have only one request to make; that he confine the protest strictly within the limits of the question.

(3.) I have not yet finished all I wish to say in relation to the above suggestion. I proceed therefore to observe, that it has in view a groundless distinction of questions. It assumes, that the question, *what causes the existence of an event*, is distinct from the question, *why this particular event is caused rather than some other*; and that although the mind should be sufficient to cause the *existence* of volition, still it can be no cause of its specific direction, as being thus and not otherwise. Is this a valid distinction? What is the phenomenon in question? It is a volition. What is the *nature* of that phenomenon? It is its nature to be fixed on, and directed to, some possible object of choice. It must be this, or that, or some object within the range of things possible to be chosen. This is essential to its very nature; *subjectively* it may be viewed as a mere phenomenon; *objectively* it must be directed to some object. Destroy the relation of an object to volition, and volition ceases to be a possibility. What is it for volition to have an object, but for it to be thus, or as it is, and not otherwise? If it exist at all, it exists under this condition; remove the condition, and its existence becomes an absurdity. Can the mind, therefore, have any concern in causing a volition, without having an equal concern in fixing its direction? Can that which causes the existence of an event cause that event, without causing also whatever pertains to its very nature, and makes a part of the event itself? The supposition is not possible from the very nature of the event itself. Whatever causes volition to be *thus and not otherwise*, causes it *to be*; and whatever causes it *to be*, causes "*the thus and not otherwise*" of its being. The two things can never depend on separate causes, for they are in fact not two things, but two aspects of one thing. If you explain "*the thus*

and not otherwise" of volition, by resorting to motive as its cause, you have finished the whole question of the cause. If you explain the "*to be*" of volition by referring it to the mind as its cause, you have equally finished the question. Whoever insists upon the distinction, must admit the absurdity of an *abstract* volition, that has no direction. Did Edwards, either the Elder or the Younger, assign to the mind any causality in the matter of "the thus and not otherwise" of volition? This no man will pretend. And if not; here again all causality is carried out of the mind.

The necessity that volition should be in *some* determinate direction decides not, whether the cause of it be necessitated to cause it to be thus and not otherwise. Here is a point where the advocates of necessity have sometimes committed a great mistake in the criticism of their opponents. The keen mind of Locke was at least a little incautious on this very point. He says, "A man, that is walking, to whom it is proposed to give off walking, is not at liberty, whether he will determine himself to walk, or give off walking, or no. He must necessarily prefer one or the other of them, walking or not walking." Book II. Chap. XXI. Sect. XXIV. To say, that the mind must necessarily cause in *some* one of the possible directions of events, if it cause at all, is one thing; to say that it is necessitated to cause in *this* particular direction, is quite a different thing. A man sitting must necessarily remain sitting, or move; the necessity respects the alternative; it is not that he must necessarily remain sitting, or that he must necessarily move. The necessity that one or the other should be, is a very different thing from the necessity that he should do this one and not that one. In the one case it respects the *alternative*; in the other it respects the agent. One is consistent with liberty, the other is destructive of it. Those who wish to see this point clearly presented, I refer to Whately's Logic, p. 180-183. Let no one, therefore, suppose that the necessity that volition should have some specific direction, decides its cause to be also necessitated; the necessity grows out of the *nature* of volition, and determines nothing in respect to its cause.

(4.) Again, when the mind is spoken of as *being caused to choose, or to choose as it does rather than otherwise*, we are in danger of deception and mistake in the use of terms. President Day says, that the question with Edwards was, "whether there is any thing which *causes the man to will as he does*?" Dr. Ed-

wards says, "We see, hear, feel, love and hate, in the active voice; yet we are, or may be, caused to see, hear, etc. And when we are caused to love or hate, we are indeed the subjects of the agency or influence of some cause extrinsic to our will, and so far are passive. Still the immediate effect of this agency is our act, and in this act we are certainly active," p. 319.—Now these modes of expression carry with them an air of plausibility, which disappears upon a close and analytical inspection. They seem to imply that the mind as cause contributes somewhat to the existence of choice. *What then is the analysis of being caused to choose?*

One construction would be, that the mind is caused to cause the volition or choice. This would make *two* causes; the mind would be one, and something else would be the other; both causing together, whether simultaneously or successively, would constitute the causation of volition. The mind is the *subject* of the influence of a cause, and so far is *passive*; upon that instant it also causes, and is so far *active*. The supposition, I trust, is understood. Now is this the scheme of Edwards? It evidently is not. According to the reasoning of Edwards, mental causality in reference to the thing in question, would be an impossibility even upon this construction, since his fundamental position is, that an agent viewed as a cause, can cause nothing but what is consequent upon its acting, and therefore cannot be the cause of the acting. This reasoning turns not upon the supposition, whether the agent is caused to cause, or is not; it applies to the question, whether he causes at all? To place another cause before the causation of the agent, does not in the least degree relieve the difficulty. The great argument of Edwards must be given up, before the mind can be cause upon this hypothesis. If a cause causes another to cause, the first produces in the second some change; after which, and in consequence of which, the second produces some other change, but not the one which the first produces. What is the change produced by the first cause in the supposition before us? Volition. Where is it produced? In the mind. What is the change produced by the second cause? Some sequent of volition. What is the question? It is, whether the mind causes volition at all. How plainly the Edwardean system replies in the negative. President Day is right, when he says, "present acts cannot, according to Edwards, be the *effect* of present agency." 3

The other construction of *being caused to choose*, is, that the

mind is simply the subject in which choice is produced by some cause. If this be the meaning, it is a concession of the very point for which I am contending. Grant this, and it matters not what follows in the train of sequence; the position that the mind causes choice at all, is given up. This comes at once to the ground which Dr. Edwards openly avows, and on which his father equally stood. They may say, that in volition "we are certainly active," if they wish to retain this form of expression. With equal propriety another might say, that a tree in falling to the ground is "certainly active." The one is just as active as the other, and no more so. Volition may be called "an act." It is as much an act in relation to the mind, as the motion of a stone is an act in relation to the stone. To say, that the mind chooses, or a stone moves, is, upon this hypothesis, to predicate of the two subjects kindred relations.

Behind all this philosophical furniture, there is a concealed conception in relation to cause, that deserves a moment's attention. It is, *that every cause, when it causes, must be caused to do so*. This conception is manifested, when the advocate of necessity for the sake of argument admits, that the mind may cause volition, but asks, *why it causes then and thus?* This "why" occupies a large place in his field of vision. It is an inquiry after some other cause besides the one he has admitted, and to which he looks to explain the causation of the admitted one. Now this question borrows all its importance from the conception that lies beneath it—the conception just stated. To press this question as an argument, is to assume the truth of the conception. I shall reply to it in a single sentence, which the reader may expand at his leisure: allow the conception, and you have an infinite series, not of modes of a single cause, but of successive causes. The distinction between *occasional* and *efficient* causes will not save you from this absurdity, for if you admit them both to be causes, (and if you do not, the distinction is groundless,) you will find yourself upon a road which has no end.

(5.) Finally, it deserves to be considered, whether the question, *why this event is, or this rather than some other*, in the sense intended by the advocate of necessity, does not transcend the legitimate boundaries of all human investigation. If this be the fact, it would be well to pause a moment and first find out where we are. The question is certainly an ambiguous question; it admits of more than one interpretation.

When proposed in relation to any event, it may mean, *who* or

what caused that event? An event is; an inquirer asks, why it is? i. e. he asks for its cause, and asks for nothing more. This being discovered, his inquiry having reached its object, terminates. All this is legitimate; it lies within the range of our cognitive powers. This disposition of the question, however, does not meet the design of the defender of necessity, for it does not touch the point he has in view. This being the question, the controversy might very soon be closed up.

Again it may mean, *how* came the cause of the event to cause? It assumes, that the reputed cause of the event must have something going before it, as the proper explanation of its own causation. I have just said, that this assumption involves an infinite series of successive causes; but let us waive this objection; let us give the question a hearing in this sense of it, and ascertain whether in the last analysis philosophy is competent to give any answer. What is this *something* preceding and explaining the causation of the cause supposed? It is some other cause. Upon its discovery the advocate of necessity rests his inquiry, having solved, as he supposes, the whole problem. He stops just in season to conceal the difficult point in his own question. Now I propose to take it up where he leaves it, and institute another question still more ulterior. Granting the whole hypothesis, it still remains to be answered, How comes it to pass, that the cause in view did commence the process of causation even upon this hypothesis? Give me an explanation of this. If some other cause be proposed, then the question may be renewed in regard to that, and so on forever. If it be said, that the cause, whose causation is to be explained, is in fact no cause, then the whole question is given up, its meaning is changed; we in fact have no question, and come back at once to the ground charged upon Edwards. How plain is it, that the ultimate *how* and *why* of a cause must forever escape human discovery? Here the advocate of necessity has no advantage over his opponent; he at last leaves the question just where he found it, and there every man must leave it. He may state the *when*, the historical circumstances both before and after the event; and so can his opponent do the same; but when they come to the ultimate *how* and *why*, they are lost, and lost forever. The system of necessity has gained much by starting this question; and then it has gained more by not following it out to its last analysis. In the latter respect it has been very wise by being cautious, and thus saved itself from the reactions of its own inquiry.

It may be said, that the definition of cause given by President Edwards is a very broad one, so broad as to include the historical antecedents or circumstances, which go before an event, whether they have "any positive influence or not," and that the question, *why is this volition rather than that one?* may refer to these antecedents. It is not pertinent to my present design to give a critique on this definition. Were it so, it might easily be shown, that it is not sufficiently broad to reach the proper idea of cause; neither is it sufficiently narrow, to exclude that which cannot be cause. Passing this point, however, I wish to advert to a marked discrepancy in the movements in the mind of Edwards on this subject. In giving his definition of cause his language is so general, as to include motives, whether they be causes in fact or not. Motives may be all that his opponent allows them to be, and no more, and yet be causes according to his definition. He sets out with a very ambiguous and defective definition of the term. This he felt himself, for he says, "and agreeably to this, I *sometimes* use the word effect for the consequence of another thing, which is perhaps rather an *occasion* than a cause, most *properly* speaking."—Agreeably to what? To his definition. Well, in following out his definition he "*sometimes*" confounds an occasion with a cause, "*properly speaking*." Is a discussion upon the difficult problems of human agency the place for improper speaking and vague phraseology, where the looseness of a term may be the garb which conceals a thousand fallacies? Mark, also, that he tells us that he "*sometimes*" uses the word thus and so. Now when he entered upon the discussion of the subject, he has not in a single instance informed us, that the term included in the general idea of "*sometimes*" has come; he speaks of motives, he describes them, and reasons upon them as causes all through his essay; but not once does he put the reader on his guard by informing him, that he uses motive as cause, understanding cause not in its true sense "*properly speaking*." This is not all, his reasoning assumes the causality of motive in the true sense of cause. Speaking of motive and volitions he says, that it is "*the cause of their existence*." He follows this statement by saying, that, "*motives do nothing as motives or inducements, but by their influence; and so much as is done by their influence, is the effect of them. For that is the notion of an effect, something that is brought to pass by the influence of something else.*" Part II. Sect. X. He criticises Mr. Chubb

severely for speaking of motive as a passive occasion of choice ; and did he mean to use motive under the title of a cause in the same sense, and thus make himself an object of his own criticism ? The truth is, the "sometimes" of President Edwards, never came in the course of his logic. Motive is really and properly a cause in his whole system ; you reduce it to a mere occasion, and the scheme of Edwards is gone. He never intended to allow that motive is a mere occasion, while the mind is the efficient, the real cause of volition. When he put the question, Why does the mind choose thus rather than otherwise ? he understood both the question and the answer. He meant a cause by the "why" and he gave motive as that cause. The guarded sentence in question, has been a convenient refuge for his disciples, but it served no purpose in his own system. To infer that he may have meant by motive, when spoken of as cause, nothing but a mere occasion, leaving the mind to be the efficient cause of volition, is to teach a very different system from his.

The issue with Dr. Edwards may be considered as fairly stated ; mind is excluded altogether from the category of cause in the production of volitions. The language of President Edwards is less marked and definite ; but he stands substantially on the same ground. This position will now be made the subject of the following observations.

1. It is not consistent with the definition of cause which he adopts. According to this definition, a cause is, "any antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason, why the proposition which affirms that event is true ; whether it has any positive influence or not," p. 343. This is borrowed from President Edwards ; and it is a little remarkable that its author should have contended that motives are causes of volition, *only* as they have influence to produce it, when he allows, that an antecedent may be a cause even though it has no positive influence. Can the mind be a cause by this definition ? To be such, it is not necessary, that it should have "any positive influence" in the production of the "consequent event." It must however be an antecedent to that event. Volition is the event ; and is not the mind an antecedent to this event ; before the mind wills, does it not exist ? So far then it may be a cause. It is farther necessary, that it should be an "antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason, why the proposi-

tion which affirms that event, is true." Volition again is the event in question. Now that belongs to the reason, why the proposition affirming this event, is true, *without* which it could not be true; it comes under the idea of being "so connected." Is not the mind an antecedent of this character? To deny it is to affirm, that there can be a volition without a mind for its subject. Hence the mind is that without which the proposition affirming the event, cannot be true; hence it belongs to the reason, why the proposition is true. This gives it the character of being "so connected," which is defined by the idea, "that it truly belongs to the reason," etc. No proposition in mathematics can be better established than mental causality, according to this definition. Dr. Edwards may be left to settle the controversy with Dr. Edwards. Either he was not right in his definition of cause, or in denying the mind to be cause, or he has used the word in two different senses, mutually excluding each other.

2. This position is not consistent with his admissions in regard to natural power. He concedes that the mind has natural power to choose otherwise than as it does. "If by *power* he mean *natural* or *physical* power, I grant that we have such a power to choose not only one of several things equally eligible, if any such there be, but one of things ever so unequally eligible, and to take the least eligible," p. 319. In regard to Judas's betrayal of Christ, he says, "he was under no natural necessity to betray him, but had a full *natural power* to do otherwise," p. 404. He concedes the natural power of an agent to choose otherwise, as perfectly consistent with the certain futurity of his actions, p. 410. Now I conclude that Dr. Edwards by *natural*, means *real* power, that he is not amusing himself, or his readers, with a mere verbal fiction. This power is predicated of man, as an agent. It is admitted to be a "power to choose" otherwise, and not simply to act otherwise, in consequence of having chosen. How do these, and parallel admissions, comport with his great position? That has natural power not only to choose, but to choose otherwise than it does, which has no concern in the causation of any choice! That which is not the cause of the event in question, nor of any event of the same class, has natural power to produce that event not only, but also any other one belonging to the same class! If this be not a contradiction, I desire to know what is. How Dr. Edwards could have given birth to both positions, it is diffi-

cult to see. Like the author of the "Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion," who in his system of philosophical necessity, contended that liberty was impossible, and yet allowed, that we are so constituted as necessarily to view ourselves as being free agents; so it may be, that the common sense of Dr. Edwards announced one position, and his philosophy the other.

3. To be consistent, Dr. Edwards must deny that mind is the cause of any thing whatever. If it cause any thing, it must cause either its own existence, or certain modifications and states within itself, or certain changes without itself. The first supposition is an absurdity: the second is both false and absurd according to Dr. Edwards. Here his scheme is entirely at issue with that of his opponents. One involves the causality of motive; the other of mind. They have different points of departure; move in different directions; end differently, and mutually exclude each other. Moral necessity as a *consequential* necessity, predicates a causal relation between two terms, of which motive is the prior and causal term, and willing, the posterior term or effect.

Let us then accept this conclusion and institute the question: *Can the mind be the cause of any thing?* If so, it must be the cause of certain sequents of its own states, or modifications. These are connected in a chronological order with these states. Does the mind cause this connection? If so, then it must act to do so, by the reasoning; but this acting to cause the connection is but another mental state, and therefore the mind cannot be the cause of it. Suppose volition to be the first link in a chain of sequents, each depending on the preceding, and all dependent on the first link; suppose it to be said, that the mind is the cause of all but the first, and of this it is not possible that it should be the cause; I ask, would not the supposition be self-contradictory? It is self-evident, if all the links depend on the first, and the mind has no relation of cause to the first, that it has none to any of them. If I do not cause the *willing* with which motion is connected as a sequent, then I do not cause the motion, whether it have for its sequent the death of a man, the revolution of an empire, or the destruction of the universe. It is not possible for a thing to be cause of events *without* itself, unless it originate and cause the changes *within* itself, whatever they may be, which are antecedent to the changes without. A cause must have causality in its own bosom, in

respect to its own modifications, before it can possibly be cause in respect to any thing connected with those modifications; every cause must have its primordial theatre of causation in itself. But as we have seen, Dr. Edwards does not allow the mind to be cause of its own volitions. After this it is nonsense to speak of it as being cause of any thing. If it be an agent, it is such an agent as causes nothing; if it produces, it is such a producer as produces nothing. No event *within* or *without* it can be traced to it as cause. This must be allowed, or Dr. Edwards must recede from his position; it is an unavoidable deduction. The atheist, the pantheist, and the skeptic, will welcome the deduction, and use it for the vilest of purposes; but Dr. Edwards is not the person to sit down quietly under such a view of man. He has truly made a man which "nature never made," and which all his views of morality would lead him to unmake.

4. This position absolutely destroys all basis for any responsible agency in man.—This charge has often been brought against the scheme of necessity. It has been cordially adopted by some, and as heartily denied and rejected by others. The leading purpose of President Edwards in his work on the Will, was to reply to this imputation. Simply to renew the charge is therefore not sufficient; it must be shown to be a legitimate deduction, or it becomes a mere *argumentum ad invidiam*, alike unpropitious to the discovery of truth, and unfair in philosophical discussion. Let us for a moment attend to the confirmation of this position.

Responsible agency supposes the following postulates;—the existence of a subject—that that subject is a *free moral agent*—that he exists in certain moral relations—and that he has actually produced moral actions. These are deducible *a priori* from the nature of the term; they are what would be termed in the Kantian philosophy *analytical judgments*, affirmations of intelligence derivable from a simple analysis of the term. The first three must be supposed to make such agency even a possible hypothesis; the fourth must be added to reduce that hypothesis to reality. The necessity of these postulates is self-evident; some have denied their reality, but they have generally been consistent enough to deny also the doctrine of responsible agency.

The position of Dr. Edwards is destructive of two suppositions; that man is a free moral agent, and has produced moral

actions. I am aware that much, so far as consistency of argument is concerned, depends on the definition of a free moral agent. Dr. Woods tells us that "a *moral* agent is one who performs actions which are of a *moral nature*, and are related to a moral law." Bib. Repos. July, 1840, p. 228. How much we gain by such a definition will appear if we transpose its terms; "one who performs actions which are of a moral nature, and are related to a moral law, is a moral agent." It might as well have been said, that a moral agent is a moral agent, for the predicate of the proposition is not more intelligible than the subject. It is a mere *nominal* definition. Speaking of freedom as "necessary for those who are the proper subjects of law," he says, "we *do* what we *choose*, and we *choose* as our *heart is inclined*," p. 229. He does not of course mean by the word "*do*," choosing, for this would make him say, that *we choose what we choose*, or that we choose to choose. The word "*do*," therefore, means some sequent of choosing. By the phrase, "as our heart is inclined," he does not mean choice, for this makes him to say, that *we choose as our choice is*. He must mean some involuntary antecedent or state going before the choice; and if he be a faithful expositor of the Edwardean creed, producing or causing the choice. A free moral agent, according to this exposition, would be one who, in the performance of moral actions, does what he chooses, and chooses as his heart is inclined. This is perhaps a fair exposition of such an agent, according to the Edwardean system. Dr. Edwards tells us, that he holds to freedom in the sense of "power, opportunity, and advantage to execute our own choice," p. 326. The idea is, not that freedom pertains to the choice or the agent in making the choice, but to its sequents; when they are not interfered with by co-action or restraint, we have freedom, and all the freedom that is possible. President Edwards occupies the same position. His idea of freedom is, "the power, opportunity, or advantage that any one has to do as he pleases." If the term "*pleases*" mean a volition, then freedom is power *to do as one chooses or wills*. What then does the word "*do*" mean? It means either a volition, and then freedom is power *to choose as one chooses*; or some sequent of volition, and then freedom is the absence of any "hinderance or impediment" to the existence of that sequent. But if by the term "*pleases*" he means some antecedent of volition, and by the term "*do*," a volition, then liberty is the power to choose, as is the antece-

dent. President Edwards was not always clear in the use of this phrase descriptive of liberty. In some instances he seems to use the word "pleases" in the sense of volition, and "do" in the sense of its sequent; in others he uses the word "pleases" in the sense of the antecedent of volition, and "do" as the volition itself. The two modes of use make out very dissimilar schemes of freedom. The first is the absence of "hinderance or impediment" to the existence of a chosen sequent; the second is but another form of saying, that volition is caused by the antecedent motive.

In this connection it is not proposed to examine these notions of liberty, as it would carry me beyond the compass of my present design. The reader is desired to fix his attention on a single point. It is admitted that freedom is "the property of an agent"—that it belongs to an agent—that there must be an agent before freedom is a possibility. *Moral* freedom belongs to an agent, who is capable of moral distinctions. Place it where you please, either in the proximate antecedents of volition, in the volition, the agents of volition, or somewhere on the ground between the volition and its sequents; give it what characteristics you please; and on all hands it is conceded that there must be an agent somewhere, before freedom is possible, and that a being who is not a free moral agent in *some sense* cannot be a responsible subject. There is no debate on these points.

Now I affirm that, according to the scheme of Dr. Edwards, *agency* is no reality in respect to man, that he is no *agent*, and therefore the epithets "free and moral," if applied to him, are applied to a nonentity. In what respect can Dr. Edwards allow man to be an agent? Not that he causes his own volitions, for this he denies; not that he causes their dependence on, and connection with, their proximate antecedents and causes, for this he also must deny; not that he causes their connection with their sequents, for this is equally inadmissible. The system absolutely sweeps all causation from the mind in all possible relations. Mind does nothing; it is the bare *subject* of efficiency foreign to itself. What kind of an agent is that which does nothing, never did any thing, and never can do any thing? It causes no modification *within* itself, and consequently none *without* itself, and yet it is an agent! If men choose to retain the term, we have no objections to gratify their rhetorical taste; but as philosophers let them understand what they mean, and let

others understand them also. If we say with Dr. Woods, that a "moral agent is one who performs actions, etc.," the question arises: What do we mean? If by "actions" be meant the sequents of volition, and by "performs" the relation of cause between the volition and those sequents; then the question arises: *Is the mind the cause of the volition?* If the reply be negative, (and this is the reply of Dr. Edwards,) then the mind does not cause the "actions"—it does not *perform* action in the sense of cause. But if by "actions" be meant volitions themselves, then in what sense does the agent *perform* them? Not that he causes them, for this is denied. In what sense then, we beg to know? In the sense that the so called agent is a mere subject of those phenomena. There is plausibility in the mode of expression, "who performs actions;" it chimes in well with the common sense of mankind; it implies causality in the agent; but before the searching scrutiny of the Edwardean metaphysics it vanishes like the morning cloud and early dew. The language would have been more consistent with the system had it been, *a moral agent is one who is merely the subject of changes, which men call actions*; such in fact is the only kind of agent that can be picked up among the *membra disjecta* of humanity thus unrobed by philosophy. If any one still insist that such a being is an agent, he uses the word *agent*, and qualifies it by the epithets, *free and moral*, in precisely that sense in which it has no meaning. In this sense a block of wood may be an agent; indeed, nonentity may be such an agent. If it be demonstrable that no other agency is possible, it is as demonstrable that such an agent is in fact no agent at all. To call it an agent is contrary to the *usus loquendi* of the word—a total blotting out of all the ideas which in ordinary acceptation it conveys; what in common parlance would be termed "a clean sweep;" not a wreck is left behind.

Logically, therefore, although not in fact, man's agency is destroyed. To ask, whether man is a *free, moral, and responsible* agent, is to ask a question which is forestalled, and cut off by the answer of a previous question. The question cannot be entertained even as an hypothesis, for you have blockaded all inquiry in respect to the characteristics of agency, at its very threshold. Attach what ideas you choose to the words, *free, moral, and responsible*—let them be true or false in themselves—and they are but the adjuncts of an airy nothing, the attributes of a dream—in *re*, in connection with reality they have no existence. This

philosophy upturns the subject to its very basis, *ab origine*, by disallowing all mental causality in the production of volitions; it scatters by the fury of its power all the possible incidents of agency, such as freedom, morality, responsibility, blameworthiness, or praiseworthiness. Where then is the basis for responsible agency in man?—Nowhere.

It may be said that man is admitted to be an agent, since it is admitted that he *acts, chooses, wills, determines*, etc. I have already considered the nature of these admissions. In the scheme of Dr. Edwards, they imply no relation of cause on the part of the mind to the resulting volitions; but that it is simply the subject of the phenomena thus called. With this interpretation it is not strictly true, that the mind wills or chooses, for this affirmation contains more than the idea of a mere subject. What is it to act, but to cause action? What is it to choose, but to cause choice? What is it to will, but to cause the willing?

It may again be said, that the virtuousness or viciousness of a volition inheres in its very nature, without any consideration of its cause, and therefore, although the mind be not its cause, it may be responsible-blame, or praiseworthy on its account. This view is presented by President Edwards. Without intending a full reply, I give a single answer; viz., the denial of mental causality absolutely precludes the question of moral distinctions, so far as the mind is concerned. If it be granted that volition has its nature of right or wrong in itself, still the question of moral distinction in actions, involving both the fact and its grounds, can never be a question, except in bare hypothesis, without certain *logical conditions or antecedents*. One is, that the subject should be able to discern between right and wrong. If we deny this, as in the case of idiocy or infancy, we preclude the moral problem by cutting off its logical antecedent. Another is, that the subject should be the cause of the volition, claimed to be virtuous or vicious. What is volition, but that subject in a given state? How then can desert of reward or punishment attach to the subject on account of the volition, in whatever way we explain the fact of its having a moral nature, when that volition is absolutely uncaused by the subject? The volition abstractly is not the legitimate subject of reward or punishment. These ideas attach to the agent, if any where. But the being in question is not the agent in any true sense by the supposition—the phenomenon takes place *in* him, not *by* him. Whatever then may be its moral features—in

whatever way we derive them; it is certain that they have no sort of relation to man as a responsible subject. Volitions and not their sequents have a moral nature. We blame a man for *willing* wrong—we praise him for *willing* right; but if the *willing* be no effect of his, then it is neither his right, nor his wrong; if it be no effect of any being, then it is neither the right nor wrong of any being: in other words, the moral problem is shoved out of the universe, as completely as if the phenomenon had never been. Who will pretend, on the supposition of an event coming to pass without any cause, that it could have a moral nature, so as to involve any being? If volition be an event coming to pass in the mind, without any causality on the part of the mind, it is impossible that it should involve that mind in any just liabilities on its account. There are no data by which to connect the two. The fact, that the mind happens to be its theatre, is nothing to the purpose; the case would not be altered, if a fixed star had been that theatre. The fact that the mind is capable of moral judgments and emotions, does not alter the case, for it only makes its misfortune the greater, and its very constitution an object for sympathy rather than blame. Besides, all these judgments and emotions, take for granted what the theory in question denies. The moral problem, therefore, is repealed and entirely annihilated, so far as humanity is concerned, by an exclusion of one of its logical conditions. This is the reply I offer to the view presented by President Edwards.

5. The position of Dr. Edwards renders both the idea and the knowledge of cause a complete impossibility. Consciousness is the primordial theatre upon and in which the idea of cause first takes possession of the human mind. Man must know himself, as cause, before he has any idea of any other cause, or cause in general. The process of the mind in discovering and reasoning upon causes, is not from causes without to the mind as cause; it is in a reverse direction. The occasion upon which the idea is first suggested to the intelligence, is a specific act of causation, which has its beginning, its progress, and its end, in the very bosom of the cause itself. That act, upon the instant of its being, is intuitively referred to the mind as its cause. This primitive cognition is the germ from which proceed all subsequent inductions, deductions, and abstractions on the subject. If these positions be denied, then the doctrine of Hume follows: *that the relation of causation is simply a succession of events.* He has shown conclusively, that if we look to experience for

the idea of cause, (understanding by experience the simple observation of things without us by the senses,) we can obtain nothing but a simple succession. This is demonstrably not the true idea, and therefore there is a defect in the process of discovery. If we pass to the theatre *within*, we find that the idea becomes a positive intellection of the mind upon a single condition; i. e. that a self-conscious cause actually originates an event in its own bosom. The idea of cause is not possible upon any other condition. A thing must be a cause, and be conscious of itself, as such, else it can have no such idea. A man can have no conception of a sensation, whether of pleasure or pain, but on the condition that that sensation has been a matter of *mental experience*. The same is true of thought, of color, etc. Hence, if the observation of external things gives us nothing but succession, as Hume has shown; if that succession be not identical with the idea of cause, as is certain, it follows that we must go to some other theatre for its discovery. What is that theatre? But one is possible;—the mind itself. Now can the mind discover or receive the idea of cause, when as yet no cause has gone into operation and actually caused? Plainly not. Hence if it has not caused, it can never have the idea, since it derives it originally from itself, upon the condition of its own causation. Having thus gained the idea, it subsequently generalizes it by abstraction, and *universalizes* it by application to the events of the physical world.

I am happy in being able to corroborate these views by a reference to the language of the critical reviewer of Whewell's *History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*. He says: "The direct personal consciousness of causation which we have, when we either exert voluntary force or influence the train of our own thoughts, has been much and singularly lost sight of by many writers on this subject. Whatever be the essential nature of that relation, or whether even it be in all cases the same, we are no more left in doubt of its being a real relation *when we experience this consciousness*, than we are of our own reality or of that of an external world. When once *suggested*, as we conceive it to be, by *such experience*, as a kind of *mental sensation*, it is seized and dwelt upon with a force and tenacity which strongly indicates its real importance to our knowledge and well-being." *American Eclectic*, No. 6, Nov. 1841, p. 418. This writer was by no means favorable to all the philosophical views of Whewell; yet he speaks of the idea of cause as being

first suggested by a certain "*experience as a kind of mental sensation.*" Now what is that experience? It is "the direct personal consciousness of causation which we have," when we ourselves cause. This is identical with the above view of the *genesis* of the idea. It is the ground of Victor Cousin; it is without doubt the true ground. It has been frequently charged against Locke, that he taught a different view; that he laid the basis of the sensual school of philosophy. In Book II. Chap. XXVI. Sect. I. he inclines very clearly to the sensual origin of the idea; but in the same Book, Chap. XXI. Sect. IV. he indicates a different origin of the idea. So that all that can be justly charged upon Locke is, that he was not consistent with himself.

How then stands the position of Dr. Edwards, that the mind cannot possibly be the cause of its own acts, its own volitions? In the following attitude, viz., that the indispensable condition of having the idea of cause, some fact of causation by the cause so having the idea, does not proceed from, and is not originated by the cause. The idea must first be suggested by a "direct personal consciousness" of our own causation, and yet it is not possible that we should ever have any such consciousness, for it is not possible that we should ever cause any thing upon the theatre of consciousness! It would be gratifying to know whence Dr. Edwards derived his notion of cause, upon which he reasons so largely, and with so much ability. One feels a little temptation to fly to the transcendentalism of Innate Ideas, created by God, stored away in the mind, slumbering in some dormitory of the soul, existing in full perfection, prior to all mental action, and ready to be evolved as chance may direct. Indeed Dr. Edwards ought to have disallowed the idea of cause altogether. Upon the hypothesis that the mind originates none of its own changes, the idea is an impossibility; and the position of Dr. Edwards is a branch of this general hypothesis.

6. This position is against the consciousness and common sense of the world.—If it be a dictate of philosophy to adopt it, it certainly is not one of common sense. The remarks of Dr. Price on this subject are so appropriate, that I shall take the liberty to transcribe them. He says: "A being who cannot *act* at all, most certainly cannot act well or ill, virtuously or viciously. Now so far as it is true of a being that he acts, so far he must *himself* be the cause of the action, and therefore not necessarily determined to act. Let any one try to put a sense on the expressions, *I will, I act*; which is consistent with sup-

posing, that the volition or action proceeds not from myself, but from somewhat else. Virtue supposes determination, and determination supposes a determiner; and a determiner that determines not himself is a palpable contradiction. Determination requires an efficient cause. If this cause is the being himself, I plead for no more. If not, then it is no longer *his* determination; that is, he is no longer the determiner but the motive, or whatever else any one will please to assign as the cause of the determination. To ask, what effects *our* determination, is the very same with asking, who did a thing, after being informed that such a one did it. In short, who must not *feel* the absurdity of saying: my volitions are produced by a *foreign* cause, that is, are not mine?" Price on Morals, Lond. edition, 1758, p. 315, 316. When unsophisticated minds say that a *man wills*, they mean that he does the willing; is its cause. No one dreams of any other construction, till philosophy, in her effort to make the subject clearer, envelopes it in darkness. How the man causes is never asked—it can never be answered; but this does not invalidate the reality of his being the cause. The advocates of necessity are constantly falling into these popular modes of expression. They say, the *mind determines*; they say also, that *motive determines*. What do they mean? Not the same thing by the two affirmations. Mind determines, as it is the subject of volition; motive determines, as it is the cause of volition.

IV. *Whether Motive be the Cause of Volition?*

The fourth chapter of the Dissertation is devoted to the consideration of "Motives and their Influence." This chapter abounds with numerous strictures upon the views of Dr. West, Dr. Clarke, and others. On the justice of these criticisms we offer no opinion. What is the ground taken by Dr. Edwards, as respects the relation of motive to volition? This is the question before us; and let us proceed to hear and examine his answer.

1. He maintains that motives have *influence* in the production of volitions, and charges his opponents with great inconsistency in admitting this point, and yet denying moral necessity. President Edwards insisted that motives can be causes only as they have influence, although he had admitted that an antecedent might be cause, even if it had no "positive influence." In the first part of this position the son is true to the system of the

father. As did the father, so does the son maintain, that unless the strongest motive determine the volition to be thus rather than otherwise, there is no cause for the volition. Having adopted the definition of motive given by the Elder Edwards, he says: "Now if any act of choice be without motive in this sense, it is absolutely without a cause," p. 372. It is not necessary to enlarge on this point, since Edwards, and all his defenders, are ready to grant it in the fullest degree.

2. He farther asserts, that motives comprehend the *entire* and *whole* cause of volition; not only that they have influence, but all the influence in the way of cause, which is concerned in the production of volition. This is no misrepresentation of the ground which he assumes and endorses in at least one passage: "An act of choice, without a motive in the large sense of motive, as defined by President Edwards, is an event without a cause. *For every cause of volition is included in President Edwards's definition of motive.* 'By motive,' says he, 'I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether it be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly.' Accordingly in his further explanation of his idea of motive, he mentions all agreeable objects and views, all reasons and arguments, and all internal biases and tempers which have a tendency to volition; i. e. *every cause* or occasion of volition. And if an immediate divine influence, or any other extrinsic influence be the cause of volition, it may be called a *motive* in the same sense that a bias is," p. 372. Now it will be observed, that in "every cause or occasion of volition," Dr. Edwards does not include the volition itself, for this is the effect; neither does he include the mind, for this he denies. "The whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, comprehends the whole idea of motive; the whole idea of motive comprehends *every cause* of volition, so that if volition be without motive, it is without any cause." This is plain English. Had Dr. Edwards dropped his pen at this point, we should infer that he never supposed any other cause.—But let us hear him still farther.

3. He states, defines and defends the doctrine of "the infallible connection between motive and volition." He says—"By infallible connection between motive and volition, we mean that volition never takes place without some motive, reason, or *cause* of its existence, either in the views of the mind of him who is the subject of the volition, in the disposition, bias or appetite of

his mind or body, or from the influence of some extrinsic agent," p. 344. The *infallible connection* here spoken of, is a connection between one thing and another, without which the first never exists:—this is its distinctive characteristic. This connection as applied to the subject under discussion is between "volition" and "some motive, reason or cause"—all these three terms being used synonymously. The theatre where this "motive, reason or cause" is to be sought, lies in "the views of the mind," or "its disposition, bias, or appetite"—or "the influence of some extrinsic agent." In arguing this point on page 346, he asks, if this connection be not "a connection just as infallible as that between cause and effect?" It is not only as infallible, but upon his own showing it is the very connection itself, and the only connection as an effect, which volition ever has, so far as we have yet presented the views of Dr. Edwards. In every specific volition he maintained that the connection is between that volition and the *strongest* "motive, reason or cause."

A full exposition of this doctrine must be postponed until I examine another part of his scheme, the introduction of which now would confuse the order of discussion. In passing, I wish the reader specially to notice a particular view, that is very common among writers on the side of necessity; viz. *that when one thing will not exist without another thing, the relation of cause and effect exists between these two things*. Had Dr. Edwards simply said, that the infallible connection is between volition and some cause, without defining the cause, his opponents could not have disagreed with him. But his argument is, that motive is that without which volition will not exist by the concession of his opponents and the verdict of common sense;—hence he infers the truth of moral necessity, or the infallible connection between motive as the cause, and volition as its effect. This reasoning assumes, that when one thing will not exist without another, the two are related as cause and effect. Let us try this assumption for a moment. Space is that without which body will not exist; therefore space is a cause of its existence. The position of a body in the line of another moving body is that without which the first will not move; therefore the position, simple *vis inertiae* is a cause of the motion. The existence of an agent is that without which he cannot sin; therefore the existence is a cause of sin. The reality of moral distinctions is that without which wrong cannot be; therefore the reality is a cause of the wrong. These enthymemes might

be multiplied to any extent. President Day saw the difficulty of this assumption. He says—"Every material substance must occupy a certain portion of space. But space has nothing to do in bringing matter into existence. It is not in the *proper* sense the *cause* of matter. A body cannot *move* except in space. But space though a *condition* of the motion is not the cause." See his Examination of Edwards, p. 33. Who must not feel the unsoundness of the assumption in view of these illustrations? To confound a condition, even though it be infallible, a *sine qua non*, with cause, is a great mistake in philosophy; it has done much to embarrass this discussion, and give an air of triumph to one side of the question.

If it be said that cause is to be taken in this general sense, and that it is so used by the advocates of necessity, I reply, that some things must then be included under the idea, which have not, and cannot have the nature of cause. Whatever space may be, let any man invest it with the idea of cause if he can. Non-existence of a thing is the logical condition of its creation,—that without which its creation cannot be. Is non-existence therefore a cause of its creation? Those who would use cause in so large a sense, cannot have explored their own consciousness on this subject. It is a serious error in classification by which the same term is appropriated to two ideas, between which there is nothing in common. No one can complete the idea of cause without that of power; and the idea of power is not possible without the idea of a subject in which it inheres. Remove these conceptions, and you have no cause—that which does not exist, and which has no power, certainly cannot be cause. How different these conceptions from that without which some other thing will not be!

4. But let us proceed with the work of interpretation:—Dr. Edwards denies that the mind is the efficient cause of volition; and we now propose to show that he makes the same denial in regard to motive. Hear what he says:—"I do not pretend that motives are the *efficient* causes of volition."—"When we assert, that volition is determined by motive, we mean not that motive is the efficient cause of it," p. 344.—"For moral necessity is a mere previous certainty of a moral action; and this is no more the efficient cause of the action, than the persuasive motive, which is the occasion of an action," p. 375.—"If it should be said, that motive in this case is not the efficient cause of the action or doing, this is granted," p. 381.

The reader who recurs to the ground over which we have already passed, is hardly prepared to expect such concessions from the pen of Dr. Edwards. As yet we have no efficient cause of volition. Mind is not; and he now tells us, that motive is not. Does he mean to leave the ground without such a cause? At the proper time we shall see.

It is very manifest, that Dr. Edwards contradicts himself, in the positions which he takes in regard to motive. But little skill in dialectics will be needed to convict him of self-contradiction. Standing on the platform raised by the Elder Edwards, he tells us, that "every cause of volition is included in President Edwards's definition of motive;" and yet he says, that motives are not the efficient causes of volition. Now "every cause of volition" must mean all cause. The term is fully *distributed*. What follows, when we compare his two positions? That in "every cause" of an event, the *efficient* cause is not implied. Surely Dr. Edwards could not have thought of one passage when he wrote the other; they make a palpable contradiction, not the less real, because they are found in separate parts of his work. What is an efficient cause, if it be not found under the category of "every cause" of an event? It may be said that Dr. Edwards uses the word motive in two senses in the different passages, which seem to contradict each other; that when speaking of motive as inclusive of "every cause," he meant the efficient cause also; but when denying the efficiency of motive, he uses the term in a more limited sense. My reply is, that Dr. Edwards has not said a word to indicate any such intention, and no man, in the absence of all evidence, has a right to assume it for him.

Again, these positions are not consistent, in view of the definition of cause which he adopts. That definition is intended to be so broad as to include all cause; it is the only one given in his dissertation; it is substantially the one adopted by every writer on the side of necessity. It is "any antecedent, with which a consequent event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason, why the proposition which affirms that event, is true; whether it has any positive influence or not." Motive he holds to be such an antecedent, and therefore it is a cause of volition. The phrase, *infallible connection between motive and volition*, is but another form of asserting this very doctrine of antecedence, as stated in the definition of cause. Now observe, that the doctrine of such antecedence contains the necessarian

doctrine of cause ; infallible connection is but another mode of stating this doctrine of antecedence ; and yet Dr. Edwards says, that motives are not efficient causes of volition, although he maintains the fact of infallible connection, and although this connection exhausts the whole necessarian idea of cause. The result is, that efficient cause is not included in the only definition he gives of cause ; or the word *efficient* has no meaning ; or infallible connection is the relation of efficient causation, which Dr. Edwards denies, by having said that motives are not efficient causes, although infallibly connected with volitions. Neither horn of this dilemma will be sufficient to save his consistency ; he does not agree with himself at all times any more really than with his opponents.

His positions, when thus brought together, make out a system of incongruous and repellant elements. At one time, motive exhausts the whole cause ; at another, it does not. Both cannot be true ; motive cannot be the whole cause, without being the efficient cause. For the purposes of this review, it is not necessary to go into a full account of the relation between motive and volition ; my design having been to show that Dr. Edwards's account of the matter is not satisfactory, and prepare the way for introducing another of his positions, which closes up the whole question of the causation of volition. The reviewer agrees with the reviewed in the denial, that motive is the efficient cause of volition. What is the *true nature* of the relation of motive in the sense of an antecedent, whether *subjective* or *objective*, to the resulting act of an agent, presents one of the gravest and most difficult questions in philosophy. It is no place for hasty assumptions, for vague and doubtful terminology. All agree that the relation is not identical with that of the mind. The advocate of necessity describes the two relations, under the epithet "*determines* ;" but he does not after all identify the relations, for in one case he means that motive determines in the sense of *causing*, and in the other, that the mind determines in the sense of being the *subject* of a change, not caused by itself. His opponent uses the word "*determines*" in a more definite sense ; by it he means that the mind causes the volition, and in this sense he denies that motive *determines*. Both agree that the relation of motive to volition, and that of the mind to it are not the same : they disagree in the account which they give of the difference ; here hinges the subject matter of the whole controversy. The advocate of necessity seems to me to have lost

sight of a very important point in his whole process of argument, i. e. *that the phenomenon, for which he assigns motive as a cause, has its existence in the bosom of an agent, the incompetency of which agent to cause that very phenomenon, it will not do to assume.* He reasons in regard to motive, just as he reasons in regard to other causes, that act upon simple recipients of efficiency. Now suppose the mind to be something more than a mere recipient; and the whole subject is placed in a new attitude, and all the previous logic is set afloat. The nature of the mind itself, the nature of its relation to its own acts, form very material inquiries—inquiries of the first importance in deciding upon the nature of the relation of other things to those mental acts. The very definition which is given of motive is a *petitio principii*. "*By motive, I mean the whole of that which moves,*" etc. Here it is assumed, that the thing intended is something "*which moves;*" then that something is called motive. This begs the whole question, and decides a controversy by the mere force of a definition. Would not the logical course be, to define the thing without involving the matter in dispute, and then prove that the disputed characteristic holds true of that thing? This would place the question upon fair and open ground. The nature of mind, and of so much of motive as is undisputed, would come up for examination, and in the opinion of the writer a very different theory from that of moral necessity would be the result. It would be found exceedingly difficult to invent *media* by which to connect the predicate of necessity with motive as its subject. I indicated to the reader the design of not going extensively into this subject; I must therefore leave it, and pass on to the next inquiry—

V. *Whether God be the Cause of Human Volitions?*

Having admitted that motive is not, and denied that mind is, the efficient cause of volition, Dr. Edwards says, "He who established the laws of nature, so called, is the primary cause of all things. What is meant by efficient cause in any case, in which an effect is produced according to established laws? For instance, what is the efficient cause of the sensation of heat from fire? If it be answered, fire is the efficient cause; I also answer that motive is the efficient cause of the volition and doing aforesaid. If it be said that the Great First Cause is the efficient cause of the sensation of heat, the same Great Agent is the effi-

cient cause of volition in the same way, by a general law establishing a connection between motives and volitions ; as there is a connection between fire in certain situations, and the sensation of heat," p. 381. "The cause, or series of causes, which is implied in the idea, that volition is an effect, is so far from excluding the first cause, and any efficient cause, as Dr. West says, that it inevitably leads to the first cause, and implies, that there is an efficient cause of all volition in creatures, as well as of every thing else, short of the first cause," p. 385. "We say, that fire is the cause of the sensation of heat ; that rain and sunshine are the causes of vegetation, etc. Yet they are no more than the stated antecedents. In the same sense motives, according to Dr. West (to which sense Dr. E. assents) are causes of volitions. Besides, all second causes are the effects of the first cause. Therefore ultimately, volitions are effects of the Great First Cause," p. 393. In speaking of moral necessity as constituted by God, he says, "that the connection between all causes and effects, and particularly the connection between motives and volitions, is established by the same Supreme agent," p. 439.

Here we have Dr. Edwards's theory of the Will, traced to its last analysis. He explains the philosophical ground of the fact of *infallible connection* between motives and volitions, on which he insists. This fact is a stated order of sequence ; its existence demands an efficient cause. That cause is neither the prior nor posterior terms of the sequence ; neither is it the mind in which the sequence occurs. Fire is nothing but the stated antecedent of the sensation of heat ; so motive is infallibly connected with volition ; this is but the invariable concomitancy of two things. The motive is nothing but the anterior of two connected terms ; it is not the cause of its chronological position as an antecedent. Where lies the efficiency by which the connection is established ? Dr. Edwards tells us that it lies solely and simply with the Great First Cause. God is the cause, and the only real cause of the event. All causes but the First are only modes of causation by the First. In relation to volition, neither motive nor mind is the cause ; God is its sole cause. This divine cause causes, by what is termed "a general law." What then is "a general law ?" It is not itself a cause ; it is the affirmation of an universal and invariable rule of divine causation. All the countless volitions of men are produced and caused by God, not in the sense that he created, sustains and gives men power to cause them, for this last idea Dr. Edwards rejects ; but in the sense

that he efficiently causes them, not in Himself as their subject, but in human minds as their subject. The phrases, "*infallible connection*" and "*general law*" simply state the rule of this divine causation; i. e. when what is called motive is presented to the mind, then God invariably causes the resulting volition; this constitutes the connection or law; the connection is infallible, in virtue of the infallible and constant causative energy of the Deity.

This is the theory to which Dr. Edwards finally comes. It has the merit of being simple. Man is created by God capable of a modification called volition, not of *originating* it, but of *being in* it. What is termed motive is an infallible antecedent of this mental state. The connection is not the cause of itself; neither are the terms its cause. God is the cause by "a general law;" that law is but the universal rule according to which God causes. This is the whole theory. We see precisely the relative positions of mind, motive, and the First Cause. Stated in a single sentence, it would be, *that God is the sole cause of every human volition.*

This theory has the merit of being a logical deduction from the system of Dr. Edwards. The system of moral necessity must in the end terminate at this point. Others may not have pursued it so far; but they differ from Dr. Edwards in being either less candid or less logical. If the logical condition of the mind's being a cause of any thing be, that it should be in a state of *willing*, it obviously cannot be the cause of the willing. If we turn to the antecedents of the willing, it is obvious that their connection with it cannot be self-constituted, self-originated; that upon strict analysis they cannot be the real cause. The mind travels on, and in its very next step arrives at the First Cause who established this connection, and is therefore the only real cause of volition. Here it stops; here ends moral necessity as a theory of the will; to this point it must always come. It is sometimes covered by a cloud of words, but analysis will always bring you to the goal. The speculator may go on, and undertake the difficult task of philosophizing upon the divine volitions, which cause the human. He has entered a new field of inquiry; he cannot find another cause before the First to meet the wants of his philosophy. We do not propose to pursue him there.

Again, this theory is substantially identical with the philosophical doctrine of Dr. Emmons. His was the scheme of Divine Efficiency. He, however, never contended that the Divine Agent caused volitions without any connection with motives. He says,

"Accordingly, when he works in us both to will and to do, *he first exhibits motives before our minds*, and excites us to act voluntarily *in the view of the motives exhibited*. And in thus acting voluntarily *in the view of motives presented* to us, we exercise the most perfect liberty, or moral freedom. For we can frame no higher idea of moral freedom than acting voluntarily, or just as we please *in the view of motives*." Emmons's Works, Vol. IV. p. 351. Here the doctrine of infallible connection, or co-presence of motives is allowed, and the necessarian idea of liberty is presented with perfect accuracy. The reader, however, must not suppose, that when Dr. Emmons speaks of men as *acting voluntarily*, he meant to admit that men cause their own volitions; he meant just what Dr. Edwards did, i. e. that men are the *subjects* of volitions. His doctrine was, that God is the efficient cause of every human volition, whether good or bad. This we have seen to be the position of Dr. Edwards. Dr. Emmons openly avows, that God causes the wrong as really as he does the good volitions of men. This has contributed to render his system odious. Against Emmonsism numerous caveats have been put on record. But what is it? Nothing but the system of necessity in real life. It is not to be blamed for the inference, for the fault lies in the premises. Dr. Edwards comes to the *generic* conclusion: Dr. Emmons affirms it in both of its *specific* branches, in relation to the bad, as well as the good volitions of men.

Pantheism is a term deservedly in bad repute among Christian philosophers. The term to a Greek scholar suggests its own definition. Of Pantheism there have been various expositions or schemes, which have been united by one common feature, i. e. *that God is the only cause in the universe*. Now let it be granted, for perhaps it is true, that all physical causation is by divine efficiency; that in reality a physical cause is not a cause at all, but a mere vehicle or mode of divine efficiency. Is this true also of the phenomena of the mind? Dr. Edwards's answer is unambiguous. What follows? That of all the events of this world, there is not, never was, and never can be but one cause, and that cause is the First Cause. Generalize this position, and you have a Pantheism that sweeps over the universe. It matters not whether you metaphysically confound the essence of God with other things, or distinguish between the two; one thing is certain, that there is but one cause.

Again, this position of Dr. Edwards, besides being liable to all the difficulties mentioned in relation to his denial of mental causation, states many others equally formidable in a new direction. Upon his hypothesis a divine government is possible; the events of that government may be certain; but the distinction between a *physical* and a *moral* government is annihilated, and the essential incidents of the latter are totally swept away. A moral government is not possible unless it be applied to *agents*. But an agent that causes nothing, no modification of itself, and consequently none beyond itself, all the modifications and changes of which are caused by the *first cause*, is not only a contradiction, but at war with common sense. The subject of these modifications may be called a *mental subject*; it does not therefore approximate to the idea of a cause or an agent; it is no agent in any correct sense. Leibnitz in his Theodicæa, called the mind a "spiritual automaton." What if it be spiritual? Does it come any nearer being an agent? Certainly not on this account. To set up a government of commands, rewards, and punishments, over a being that causes no phenomenon *within* himself, and none *without* himself; to make that being immortal, and endow him with the susceptibility of eternal pain; to make his destiny, whether of joy or wo, dependent on certain phenomena passing within him, to which he contributes nothing as cause, any more than if he did not exist; this contradicts all our notions of justice; it is a farce, which, if not so solemn, might be treated with ridicule. Between this supposition and atheism there is little ground of preference. The only just foundation for administering rewards and punishments, is the *rightness* or *wrongness* inherent in moral actions. But if a being cannot *act at all*, then it is manifest that he can act neither right nor wrong. If he cannot cause, then he cannot act, for no man can separate the idea of causing from the idea of acting. The remarks of Pere Buffier on this point are worthy of being mentioned: "For if it be a cause, it has an effect, and every thing that has an effect of course *acts*; as *to act* and *to have an effect* is precisely the same thing." "The action as impressed on or received by any being is called *passion*; and as received in an intelligent being *who produces it himself*, is termed *act*." Buffier's First Truths, p. 225, 229. If we deny that the mind acts in this sense, we deny action altogether; we might as well then go to the theory of Dr. Hartley, and generate all mental states upon the mechanical principle of vibrations.

Whatever causes, acts, and vice versa ; it must begin and originate the primordial movement, so far as it does either. As in the theory of Malebranche in respect to sensation, it may have historical occasions ; but after all, the efficiency to begin action or causation must be in itself, or that which is said to act does not in fact act at all. If volitions then are not caused *by* us as well as *in* us, the hypothesis of moral government as exercised over us, is an absurdity. No man can reconcile the two suppositions without interlocking them by another absurdity equal to the one in question.

It is farther to be observed, that moral evil is in the world. The question has been started, *Who is the sinner?* It has been urged against the Edwardean scheme, that the *divine authorship* of sin would be the true answer to this question. Both the son and the father deny this consequence : " If by *the author of sin* be meant the *sinner*, the *agent*, or *actor* of sin, or the *doer* of a wicked thing," they tell us, that God is not the author of sin, but man is. This by itself looks very well ; is sound both in philosophy and theology. But the question is, How could Dr. Edwards hold such language after divesting the reputed sinner of all causality in the matter, and investing the entire causality with God in the same matter ? I confess myself unable to see. That which is no cause is not a "doer" of *any* thing, and of course, not of a "wicked thing," and certainly is not the sinner or the author of sin. This absolutely forecloses so much of the question as pertains to man's authorship of sin ; he is rendered incapable of sinning ; the doing of a "wicked thing" is not and never can be *his* doing. One of two suppositions must follow : either there is no moral evil in the world, or if there is, God is the sole agent of that moral evil, by being the sole cause of the volitions, of which it is the predicate. The first is contrary to Scripture and experience ; the second supposition can be entertained by no consistent theist. There is some defect in an argument which necessitates the existence of such a dilemma. It lies in the position, that God is the sole and efficient cause of every volition. This is a very unpropitious world for such a theory ; there is too much sin in it ; it might do better in heaven. If it be said that this is the *best* account which can be given of the existence of moral evil, my answer is, that the position is not true, and if it were, then we had better have no account than to have this. If it be said, that man is the author of sin, as he is the *subject* of the wicked voli-

tion; I ask, in what sense is God its author? In the sense that he is the cause of it, although not its subject. Now which idea comes the nearest to proper authorship; to have a change wrought in a being by another, or to be the being who works and causes that change? The former is all that Dr. Edwards can predicate of man; the latter he must predicate of the Deity, to be consistent. He is logically shut up to this very point; there is no getting away from it; he must accept the necessary deduction of his own system, or abandon the system. The idea may be dressed in milder and more palatable terms; but it is still there—the latent poison penetrates the whole scheme.

I have now completed the outline of thought which was proposed in the commencement of this Article. If the discussion has been somewhat prolix, I have only to say, that it grew out of the nature of the subject. Charges made upon a writer by the *wholesale* system, without appealing to his own language, are very likely to do injustice to his views. Hence I have sought to discuss no position as being that of Dr. Edwards, without first showing that such was the fact. Both in statement and argument I have endeavored to do justice to his views. That he did much to carry this question upon one side, is very freely granted. The whole subject, however, which the father and the son were supposed to have settled, is destined to be placed a second time in the crucible. Perhaps a second Edwards will immortalize himself on the side which the first defended; and possibly a greater than Dr. Clarke is yet to untie the Gordian knot, which has long been the puzzle of philosophers. The intellectual world will probably settle down on a system, in many respects at least, unlike that of Edwards. In its present form it cannot survive the investigation of present and coming generations. Whether it will be succeeded by a system having more merits and fewer faults, remains to be seen.

ARTICLE IV.

THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN TRACT SOCIETY.

By Rev. W. R. Williams, D. D., Pastor of the Amity-street Baptist Church, New-York.

The Christian Library, 45 vols., 400 pages each. The Evangelical Family Library, 15 volumes. The Youth's Christian Library, 40 volumes.

THE American Tract Society has been for years a familiar and cherished name with our churches. But many, even of intelligent Christians, have probably scarce made themselves conversant with its varied publications, or considered duly the influence it was likely to wield over the religious literature of our own and other lands. They have thought, perhaps, of the Institution as furnishing a few excellent Tracts in the form of loose pamphlets, and supposed these, with some children's books, to constitute the entire sum of its issues; while, in truth, the Society, noiselessly following the beckonings of Divine Providence, has been led to undertake the publication of volumes, and to furnish libraries for Christian churches, schools, and households. These heedless observers have thought of it mostly in connection with a few favorite Tracts written in our own vernacular language; while, in fact, the Society has come to be engaged in the circulation of books and Tracts in more tongues than the richest Polyglott comprises, and is extending its operations through lands more numerous and remote than any one probably of the most widely-travelled of its readers has ever traversed. The moral and intellectual character of the religious literature thus widely diffused deserves some thoughts.*

* It was made recently the subject of examination. At a special meeting of the Society and its friends, convened in the city of New-York a few months since, several subjects were presented for consideration, as bearing on the character, plans, and duties of the Society. Amongst these was "THE EVANGELICAL CHARACTER OF THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE SOCIETY, AND THEIR ADAPTATION TO THE WANTS OF THE PRESENT GENERATION OF MANKIND, AT HOME AND ABROAD." Upon the subject so assigned to the writer, the following remarks were prepared.

The various publications of the Society in our own land, if we include its issues of every form and size, from the handbill and the broad sheet, up to the bound volume, already number one thousand. In foreign lands it aids in issuing nearly twice that number, written in some one hundred of the different languages and dialects of the earth. Amongst ourselves, in the seventeen years of its existence, it has already, by sale or gift, scattered broad-cast over the whole face of the land, in our churches and Sabbath-schools, through our towns and villages, among the neglected, in the lanes of our large cities, where misery retires to die, and vice to shelter itself from the eye of day, and amidst the destitute, sparsely sprinkled over our wide frontiers, where the ministry has scarce followed, and the church can scarce gather the scattered inhabitants, some two millions of books and some sixty millions of Tracts. This is no ordinary influence. It must find its way into nearly every vein and artery of the body politic. Whether it be of a pure and healthful character, is an inquiry of grave moment to the churches who sustain this enterprise, and to the country which receives this literature. If baneful, it is a grievous wrong to the community; if merely inert and useless, it is a fraud committed upon the benevolence of the churches.

I. Whether these publications deserve the confidence of Christians, may be ascertained by the answer which is given to one question: DO THEY PREACH JESUS CHRIST AND HIM CRUCIFIED? He must be the theme of every successful ministry, whether preaching from the pulpit or through the press. The blessing of God's Spirit is promised only to the exaltation of the Son of God, the Saviour of the world. "I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me." When Paul describes the peculiarities of his own successful ministry—a ministry that shook the nations—a ministry that carried the blazing torch of its testimony from Illyricum to Spain, he compresses these into a very brief space. He was determined to know nothing but *Christ Jesus and him crucified*. In Christ he found the motive which stimulated all his fervid and untiring activity, and the model upon which was moulded every excellence of his character. "To me to live is Christ." Only so far as the issues of this Society cherish this same principle does it ask, and only so far can it deserve, from the churches of our Lord Jesus Christ, that cordial support and that large extension of its labors which it solicits at the hands of the religious community.

And not only is it necessary to the success of such ministry of the press, that it should make the crucified Saviour the great theme of its teachings; it should also present this theme, as far as possible, in a scriptural manner. By this we mean, not a mere iteration of the words of sacred writ, but that the mind of the writer should be so imbued with the spirit of the Scripture, and so possessed by its doctrines, and so haunted by its imagery and illustrations, as to present, naturally and earnestly, the great truths of the scheme of salvation, in that proportion and with those accompaniments which are found in the inspired volume. His thoughts must all be habited, as far as it may be, in the garb, and breathe the spirit of that only book to which we can ascribe unmingled truth.

That the works of the American Tract Society are thus evangelical in their character, would seem scarce needing proof, since none, as far as we know, have yet questioned it. Amid the fierce and embittered controversies, from which the church has never been exempt, (and certainly not in our own times,) we know not that any, among the several bodies of Christians generally recognized as evangelical, have arisen to impugn in this respect the character of the Society's issues. This has not been because these books have been secretly circulated. They have been found everywhere, dropped in the highway and lodged in the pastor's study, distributed in the nursery, the rail-car, the steam-boat, and the stage-coach, as well as exposed on the shelves of the book-store, and they have challenged the investigation of all into whose hands they have come. Denominations of Christians, divided from each other by varying views as to the discipline and polity of the church of Christ, and even holding opposite sentiments as to some of the more important doctrines of the Gospel, have yet agreed in recognizing in these publications the great paramount truths of that Gospel, and have co-operated long, liberally, and harmoniously, in their distribution and use.

The names of the authors whose volumes are found in friendly juxtaposition, standing side by side on the shelves of the libraries the Society has provided for the Christian household and school, seem to furnish another strong pledge to the same effect. Doddridge, Baxter, Edwards, Owen, Flavel, and Bunyan, are names that seem to belong less to any one division of the Christian host than to the whole family of Christ. They are the current coin of the church, which have passed so freely from

hand to hand, that the minuter superscription of the sects to which they may have belonged, the denominational imprint, seems to have been worn away in the wide, unquestioned circulation they have received. And they have been acknowledged by evangelical believers, wherever the English language and literature have gone, as faithful and most powerful preachers of the Gospel of Christ. They have received higher attestation even than that of having their "praise" thus "in all the churches." The Head of the church has not withholden his benediction and imprint. The influence of His Spirit has long and largely rested on the written labors of these his servants; and, while the authors themselves have been in the grave, their works are yet following them in lengthening and widening trains of usefulness. Multitudes have been converted, and thousands of others have traced to these books their own growth in Christian holiness. Some of these writers were, while upon the earth, not inactive or unsuccessful as preachers with the living voice; yet it may be questioned whether all the seals of their living ministry would equal the tithe of the seals which God has continued to set to their posthumous ministry in the volumes they have bequeathed to the world and the church.

II. But how far are they adapted to the wants of THE PRESENT GENERATION OF MANKIND? We know that in the varying tastes and habits of society, and its ever-shifting currents of feeling, new channels of thought are scooped out, and new forms of expression become popular; and the writer whose compositions present not these forms and move not in these channels, may find himself deserted as obsolete. His works are consigned to the unmolested and dusty shelves of the antiquarian, while other and fresher rivals grasp the sceptre of popularity and usefulness that has passed from his hands. New conditions of society and new institutions also, may require another style of address and another train of instruction than those which, once indeed, were most salutary and seasonable, but are so no longer. If other classes of literature become antiquated, and the old give place to the new, may it not be so with religious literature? may it not be so with much of the literature from which the American Tract Society is seeking to supply the Christians of the present age?

1. What then are *the wants of the present age*? Religion, it should be remembered, if true, must be in its great principles unchangeable, and the same in all eras of the world's history.

"Can length of years on God himself exact,
And make that fiction which was once a fact?"

A revelation, from its source and the nature of its contents, possesses, therefore, a fixedness and constancy that can belong to no science of merely human origin. The Bible stands apart from all the literature of man's devising, as a book never to be superseded—susceptible of no amendment, and never to be made obsolete whilst the world stands. The book of the world's Creator and the world's Governor, the record of the world's history and the world's duty, the world's sin and the world's salvation, it will endure while that world lasts, and continue to claim its present authority as long as that government over the present world may continue. Religious works, therefore, the more profoundly they are imbued with the spirit of the Bible, will the more nearly partake of its indestructibility. Hence the Confessions of Augustine, written so many centuries ago, are not yet an obsolete book, nor can be while the human heart and the Christian religion continue the same that they now are. In their religious literature, the church and the world in the nineteenth century must, therefore, in most respects, have the same wants as the church and the world in earlier ages.

It will be allowed, however, that there are certain peculiarities in the history and character of an age that may make one form of address and one style of discussion much more useful and reasonable in its religious literature than another. Has our country at this period any such peculiar wants? We might refer to many circumstances in its government and its people, their pursuits and their character, which distinguish, and as it were, individualize our land and our age. But to sum them all in one word, we suppose the main distinction and boast of our people is, that they are a *practical* race. Others theorize; they act. Visionary reforms and schemes of society, that might in other regions be nursed for centuries in the brains of philosophers, and be deemed practicable only because they have never been reduced to practice, if they find proselytes amongst us, are soon brought to the test of actual experiment; their admirers here *act* upon the theories, which, elsewhere, are but reasoned upon, and the system, exploding in the trial, refutes itself. Our countrymen, the colonists of a wide and fertile territory, the mariners whose keels vex every shore, and whose sails whiten the remotest seas, inherit the solid sense, the sober judgment, the energy, daring, and perseverance of the Anglo-Saxon race;

and their political institutions and the broad territory yet to be subdued and peopled, here give full scope to these traits of character. We are as yet, though a nation of readers, not a nation of students ; but much more a nation of seamen, farmers, and traders. Our very studies are practical ; and the cast of character which distinguished the Roman from the Greek mind, and which made the former the masters of the world—the practical character of the mind and its pursuits—belongs, in all climes and on every shore, to the Saxon race. If we, as a nation, have in this era of our history specific wants, we want then a *practical* literature in religion, as in other branches of knowledge—a religious literature, adapted, with practical wisdom, to the peculiar duties and snares, the prevalent errors and the popular institutions of our time. Has this Society furnished such ?

That portion of its publications which are of American origin, and which its exertions have been the means of calling out, or of diffusing more widely where they already existed, all its books that are of recent and domestic origin, may be supposed naturally to possess some tolerable degree of adaptation to our own national wants, the prevailing sins and follies of the times, and the peculiar responsibilities and privileges of Christian churches in the United States, in the nineteenth century. The writers are of us, and wrote for us, and we may suppose that these productions at least are not wanting in such adaptation. Their currency and their usefulness, the souls which, by the blessing of God, they have converted, and their influence on the faith, zeal, and purity of the churches, afford evidence of the same kind. Of the 430 pamphlet Tracts in the English language, issued by the Society, more than one half are of American origin. It was not so in the earlier years of the Society's history. Of the first one hundred Tracts on the lists of this Society, more than two thirds were republications from works of British Christians, of the richest character indeed, but they were the siftings of a rich religious literature more than two centuries old. Of the last one hundred of these 430 Tracts, on the other hand, more than three fourths were by American Christians. We have not pursued the investigation into the bound volumes of the Society ; but we suppose that there a similar result would be reached, although the proportion of American authorship is not yet as large, perhaps, as in the pamphlet Tracts. Here also it is increasing, however, and one third of the volumes may

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be regarded as of domestic origin. It would be found, we suppose, that the Society, in the brief period of seventeen years, has done much to create a national religious literature.

To effect any literary changes, seventeen years, it should be remembered, is a very brief period. As far then as adaptedness to the special wants of this country can be decided by the domestic or foreign authorship of its publications, it would appear that the Society has, with great rapidity, exerted a most perceptible and powerful influence on the writers and readers of our churches. It has elicited and diffused a literature that is emphatically *for* us, inasmuch as it is *from* ourselves. The intelligent Christian can never wish to see his denomination or his country confining its sympathies and its studies to the literature of the sect itself, or of that one country, thus shut up in the narrow circle of its own writers. Christianity is free, genial, and philanthropic. It loves the race. Christianity is the only true citizenship of the world, and it hails the writings and the history of all lands and all kindreds, when imbued with the spirit of the common Saviour. But yet there may be certain evident advantages in having, for some purposes and within certain limits, a denominational and also a national literature in our churches. For this object of a national literature the American Tract Society may claim to have done much, and to have done it well. They have furnished a body of Tracts, popular in style, pungent and faithful, pithy, brief, and striking, that are singularly adapted to the moral wants of our community, and many of which, from their high excellence, would bear transplantation into the literature of almost any other Christian country.

2. As to the *adaptedness for usefulness* amongst our churches and people of those volumes and Tracts which the Society has derived from the rich Christian literature of Great Britain, it may be deserving of remark, that the more distinguished of these works are derived mainly from three memorable eras in the religious history of that country.

The first of these was *the age of the Puritans and Nonconformists*. Into the merits of their controversy with the Established Church of England it is no part of our design here to enter. They were, by the admission of the candid in every party, men of powerful intellect and ardent piety, whose principles had been tried and strengthened in the fierce collisions of their age, and whose character received in consequence an energy it might else have wanted. The measures of govern-

ment, that threw the Nonconformists out of their pulpits, were fitted to produce an admirable class of writings, such as the church has not often enjoyed. Many of these devout men, mighty in the Scriptures and incessant in prayer, had they been left to the quiet discharge of their pastoral duties, would have kept the noiseless tenor of their way, and the world would probably have heard little or nought of their authorship. Preaching would have absorbed their minds and consumed all their strength. The mere preacher has little leisure, and often little fitness to be a successful writer. Thus the published remains of Whitfield are of little value compared with the writings of many men far his inferiors in the pulpit and in its immediate results of usefulness. Had then the edicts and policy of the Stuarts left the Nonconformist fathers to their own chosen course, they would, many of them, have died and bequeathed no literary remains; or those remains would have been comparatively meagre and jejune, from the want of leisure in a life of active and unremitted pastoral toil. But, on the other hand, had the rich and varied writings of that class of men, who, from the prison or beside its very gate, sent out their treatises to their peeled and scattered churches, been composed by mere students, men of the lamp and the closet, they would have been deficient in their popular style, their earnestness, and their apt familiar illustrations. None but pastors, acquainted with the people and familiar with the popular modes of communicating religious truth, could thus have imbued the deepest truths of theology and morals with a racy vivacity, and surrounded them with such simple and every-day imagery.

Thus, only men who had been bred pastors could have written some of these works. And, on the other hand, had they continued pastors, they could not have written them for want of leisure, inclination, and even perhaps mental power. But when the prison and the pillory shut them in, and the pulpit had shut them out, these resolute and holy men resorted to the only channel left them for communicating with the hearts and consciences of men. It was the press. Had Baxter been a mere student and not a pastor, he would probably have made all his writings thorny, abstruse, and sterile, as the works of those schoolmen, whose writings he seems to have loved so fondly, and studied so closely. And, in that case, where had been the usefulness of the *Saints' Rest*, and the *Call to the Unconverted*? Had he continued always a pastor, he would have preached much more

to the men of the 17th century; but it is very questionable whether he would have preached as well or as much to the men of the 19th century as he now does. Here then is a class of writers, in whose history God seems to have made special provision that they should be trained to become effective as the practical writers of the church, bringing to the experience of the pastor all the leisure of the scholar, and grafting upon the meditations of the study all the unction, the simplicity, and the popular tact of the pulpit.

In addition to these peculiar preparations for general usefulness, the writings of the Puritans and Nonconformists come to us, as Americans, commended by considerations of singular force. The fathers of New-England were of that class of men. The Adam and Eve of those regions were fashioned of Puritan clay; and many of our peculiar institutions and our distinctive traits of national character may be traced, through that New-England ancestry, to the character of the Puritans of England. We have an hereditary right in their works and memory. Their writings are moulded by peculiar influences, that have yet left their traces upon our mental idiosyncrasy as a people. Connected then as the Puritans of the mother country were with our progenitors by every tie of piety and blood, their voice comes upon the ears of American Christians like a testimony from the graves of those revered forefathers, who planted upon our rugged northern shores the germs of our freedom, our knowledge, and our arts, while seeking only in the desert a refuge from persecution, and freedom to worship God; but who left, where they sought merely a shelter, the foundations of a new empire, stretching its territories already from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and shedding the influence of its commerce and its freedom over either continent.

The second of these eras, which have contributed to the Christian literature of this Society, is that of *the great revival of religion, under the labors of Whitfield and the Wesleys in England, and the elder Edwards and the Tennents in our own country.* It was a great religious movement, awakening from lethargy and recalling from perilous errors a portion of the English Establishment, infusing a new life of piety into the English Dissenters, as in our own country it supplied the destitute and awakened the formal from Georgia to New-Hampshire. It was an era, both here and in the parent country, of bitter controversy. The truths, recalled from their long con-

cealment and urged with new zeal, were to be defended from the press as well as from the pulpit, or the open field, where so many of those preachers delivered their testimony. To this day it is that we owe the works of Doddridge and Edwards, that work of Venn which the Society has very recently republished, and the memoir of Edwards's disciple and friend, the glowing, suffering David Brainerd. In the necessities of that time we see, though to a less extent, a combination of the same causes which made the Nonconformists' writings what they were. The preacher was grafted on the student. Had not Edwards had the experience of those glorious revivals God permitted him to witness and to record, he could perhaps still have written the work "On the Religious Affections;" but it would have been a very different book. Without the resources of his rich pastoral experience it might have been as profound as the immortal Analogy of Butler, and as little fitted as that work to be generally popular with the great mass of readers.

The third of these memorable eras may be designated as the era of *modern Christian enterprise*. We know no fitter epithet to describe its varied activity, and its aggressive action on the ignorance of nominal Christendom and the wide wastes of heathenism. It began shortly after the breaking out of the French Revolution. It was an age when God seemed for a time to allow a new "*hour and power of darkness*," akin to that which brooded over the world when its Redeemer was about to suffer. Then boiled up from the lower deeps of the human heart floods of corruption, that, in ordinary ages, slumber on, dark and unseen, in their quiet concealment. Then steamed up, as it were from the nethermost abysses of hell, strange and hideous errors, that generally avoid the light of day, and the world was aghast at the open appearance of atheism, and the rejection by a great nation, as in mass, of their old ancestral faith. But, as if to illustrate his own government of the universe, then, to meet this revolt, rose up, from quarters the most distant, and some of them the most obscure, designs for good and enterprises of benevolence, of which the world had long seen no parallel. The Foreign Missions of the Christian church, the Sabbath School, the Tract Society itself, and the Bible Society, burst up, as in quick succession, and ere the carnival of the pit was ended, and while Satan seemed yet triumphing in his anticipated conquest of the world to impiety, the Christian faith received a fresh impulse, and the cause of the Saviour assumed an aggressive energy

it has never since lost. To this period belonged Buchanan and Pearce. In this period Wilberforce published that *View of Religion in the higher classes*, which was, in the judgment of the commentator Scott, the noblest protest in favor of the gospel made for centuries—a book that consoled and delighted that eminent statesman Burke on his dying bed, and gave to the church of Christ the lamented and beloved author of that immortal Tract “the Dairyman’s Daughter,” Legh Richmond. Parr, who could have, unhappily, little sympathy with its spirituality or its orthodoxy, pelted it with learned Greek, as a book, the beginning of which he had forgotten, the middle of which he could not understand, and to which, as a whole, he could not assent. Belsham assailed it, amongst other reasons, because its excellent author had spoken of Unitarianism as “a sort of half-way house between orthodoxy and infidelity.” But the attacks thus made upon the work of the Christian senator, proved comparatively powerless, and the book held on its way of widening and enduring usefulness. Its influence was most decisive, under God, in aiding the great work of reform, the effects of which are visible in the middle and higher classes of England. Then, too, wrote and labored Hannah More, and to the same period may be added Henry Martyn.

All these three were periods of conflict. In the first and in the third, political contentions were intermingled with religious controversies. Wars and rumors of wars exasperated the fierce collisions between rival sects, or the strife that was waged between Christianity and those who cast off all fear, and mocked to his face their Maker and Judge. The second was indeed exclusively a period of *religious* controversy; but the points at issue were so momentous, and the zeal exhibited so ardent, that England and America were filled with the noise of inquiry and dispute, as the Gospel went on winning new and glorious triumphs amid fierce opposition. There was, as in the apostolic history, a wide door opened, and there were also “many opposers,” and both Whitfield and Wesley were more than once, in Christian Britain, on the eve of a summary and ferocious martyrdom.

All these three eras were then eras of moral revolution. It is a familiar fact that revolutions produce great characters. Their great emergencies, awaken feeling and develop talent. Some mighty crisis paralyzes the weaker crowd, and summons forth the master spirit who can meet its demands, and reveals thus to the world his merits and his powers. And it is also

true, that, although the highest works of science do not issue from such times, the most stirring and popular books are often the progeny of such an age of turmoil and conflict. These orgasms of feeling, that shoot through the whole frame of a nation, may bring out much that is crude and extravagant, but they also lead to exertions of more than wonted power, and results of more than vulgar splendor. The best efforts of the best writers are sometimes traceable to the excitement of some such stirring era. Pascal's Provincial Letters, in which wit, argument, and eloquence are so splendidly blended, and, leaning on each other, group themselves around the cross of Christ, could not have been produced in the holiday leisure of some peaceful era. It needed the fierce controversies in which Jansenism lay bleeding under the feet of triumphant Jesuitism, and struggling as for life, while it testified, as from the dust, in behalf of many of the great truths of the Gospel—it needed, we say, such a conflict and such a peril to draw out a production so powerful even from the mighty heart and the massive intellect of a Pascal.

There are works that seemingly can exist only as the birth of the throes and death-pangs of some great era of change and moral renovation. Such were the three eras to which we have alluded, and their character was imprinted on many of the works they produced, and which this Society reprints and disseminates. No other age, no lighter emergency could have called forth such intellectual strength and such depth of feeling, and made the volumes so well fitted as they are to tell upon the heart of an entire nation. Works then written have the energy of the conflict and breathe for ever its strong passions. Their words are often battles. Had Bunyan never inhabited a dungeon, there to pore over the martyr annals of Fox's Acts and Monuments, we question whether the Pilgrim's Progress would have had its beautiful pictures of the Land of Beulah, a land of freedom, light and beauty, and we doubt whether that allegory had ever existed. Had Baxter never been an army-chaplain, who must talk strong truths in plain terms, we question whether his works would have had all their passionate energy and their strong simplicity.

With regard, therefore, to those portions of the Society's publications which proceed from American authors, their origin is some evidence in favor of their adaptedness to our peculiar wants. With regard to all those works of *British* origin that

came from either of the great eras upon which we have remarked, we have in favor of their influence not only the character of the writers, but the character of the age in which they wrote and did battle for the truth of God as they believed it.

Taking now the literature of the Society, as prepared for this country in mass, we find in it evidently a variety and fullness of subjects that would seem to meet the varied demands of the church and the nation. For missionary literature, it has the memoirs of Brainerd, Buchanan, Schwartz, Henry Martyn, and Harriet Winslow. Does a pastor seek to train his flock to higher devotedness, where could be found a better manual than Baxter's *Saints' Everlasting Rest*, written, as it would seem, under the golden sky of the Delectable Mountains, and in full sight of the Celestial City? Where better companions than the biographies of Leighton, and Payson, and Pearce, and J. Brainerd Taylor? Against infidelity we have Bogue, (the work that was read, and with some considerable impressions of mind, by Napoleon in his last days,) and Morison, and Keith, and the treatises of Leslie and Watson, while others, on the same subject of Christian Evidences, commend themselves as the works of writers who were themselves recovered from infidelity, as the writings of Lyttleton, West, Jenyns, and our countryman Nelson. There is provision for every age. For the child, the Society has furnished the touching biographies of Nathan Dickerman, John Mooney Mead, and Mary Lathrop, with the juvenile works of Gallaudet, and some of those by the Abbotts. For those who love profound thought it has Foster, and for the lovers of brilliant imagination and glowing eloquence, the German Krummacher. Of the Nonconformists and of the cotemporaries of Edwards we have already spoken. Few writers of our time have caught so successfully, on some pages, the spirit of Baxter as J. G. Pike, three of whose works the Society republishes. As models of usefulness in the various walks of life, and in either sex, we have the biographies of Normand Smith, the example of the Christian tradesman; and of Harlan Page, the private church member laboring for souls; of Kilpin, of Hannah Hobbie, and of Caroline Hyde. The child just tottering from its cradle is met by the Society with the half-cent Scripture Alphabet, while, for the last stages of human life, they have Burder's *Sermons to the Aged*, printed in type that suits it, for the dimmer eyes of old age. Furnished at every variety of price, and in every form and size, as are the Tracts

of the Society, the Christian traveller who would scatter the seed of truth as he journeys, and the Christian father who would furnish his children with a library of devout and wise authors; the Christian minister who would train himself and others to higher devotedness and usefulness; the Christian mother desiring aid to order her youthful charge aright, and the young disciple requiring a guide to the formation of a character of intelligent and consistent piety—all find their wants met. Against Romanism and intemperance the Society have furnished a quiver of polished arrows in their bound volumes of Tracts on each subject, in addition to the separate volume of Beecher on the one, and of the lamented Nevins on the other. They have Mason's *Spiritual Treasury* for the family altar and the closet; and for the pilgrim gathering up his feet into his couch to die, they have the *Dying Thoughts of Baxter*. They leave behind, after the funeral ceremony has been performed, the *Manual of Christian Consolation*, by Flavel the Nonconformist, and Cecil the Churchman. They instruct the active Christian with Cotton Mather's "*Essays to do Good*," the book that won the praise and aided to form the usefulness of our own Franklin. They assail the covetous and hard-handed professor with the burning energy and eloquence of Harris's *Mammon*. But the time fails to review separately all the varied themes of their publications, and the varied channels through which they are prepared to pour the same great lesson of Christ the only Saviour, the Sovereign and the Exemplar of his people.

3. But what evidence have we that these volumes are fitted for the present generation of men *in other lands*? Many, then, of this class of publications are written by missionaries abroad, conversant with the field they till, and anxiously and prayerfully addressing themselves to its wants. In Burmah and Siam, in India and in China, the Society is thus assailing the favorite idols and delusions of the heathen, in the manner which men who have given their lives to the work deem most suitable. The Society is thus, at the same time, proclaiming the Gospel before the car of Juggernaut and around the Areopagus where Paul preached; and many of their Tracts have already been blessed, to the conversion of the readers, and to shake, in the minds of thousands besides, the old traditional idolatry received from their forefathers.

Others of these compositions are translations of works written in England or America, and many of them are in the number

of the Society's *English* publications. It may to some minds seem very doubtful that any work prepared originally for the Christians of Great Britain, or our own land, can, by any possibility, be intelligible or useful to heathen nations trained under different influences and strangers to our modes of thought and expression.

But it should be remembered that the good effects of some of these translations have been put beyond doubt by the testimony of missionaries as to the interest they have excited, and even by the conversion of some of the heathen. One of the works of Baxter, we believe it was his *Call*, was translated in his lifetime by our own Elliot for the use of his Indian converts; and a youth, the son of one of their chiefs, continued reading the work with tears on his death-bed. The pastor who talked to the carpet-weavers of Kidderminster could, it seems, speak as well to the savage hunters and fishermen of Natick and of Martha's Vineyard. The Dairyman's Daughter was early translated into Russian by a princess of that country, and has been acceptable and useful. The free-born English maiden that lived and died amid the delightful scenery of the Isle of Wight has told her tale effectively to the serfs and amid the snows of Russia. Fuller's *Great Question Answered*, another of the Society's Tracts, was crowned with striking success in a Danish version, and it was found that the pastor of the inland English village of Kettering was still a powerful preacher in the new garb and tongue that had been given him for the inhabitants of Copenhagen. Others have gone yet farther. We name the *Pilgrim's Progress* of Bunyan as an illustration, because none of the religious works of Europe has been so widely translated. In English the Society has printed it not only in the ordinary style but in the raised and tangible characters used by the blind. Little did the tinker of Elstow ever dream that his matchless allegory should be translated into the tongue of the false prophet Mahomet. Yet it has appeared in Arabic; and Joseph Wolff, in his travels in Yemen, distributed copies of the version in that ancient and widely-spoken language. In seven at least, if not in more, of the dialects of India and the neighboring countries it has made its appearance; in the Oriya, the Tamul, the Hindustani or Urdu, the Mahrathi, the Malay, the Bengali, and very recently in the Burman.

Fears, at the time when an Indian translation was first proposed, that its European ideas and imagery would be unintelli-

gible to the native of the East, led a popular female writer to prepare in its stead her *Pilgrim of India*, with its Hindoo phrases and metaphors. But the original *Pilgrim* has been permitted now to speak, and he has spoken not in vain. The number of the *London Evangelical Magazine* for the present month, (Oct. 1842,) contains the memoir of Daniel, a Hindoo convert, written by himself. From this it appears that the work of Bunyan was a powerful instrument in his conversion: "At this period a gentleman put into my hand a book called the *Pilgrim's Progress*, which I read. Partly by reading this book, and partly by the remembrance of all the labor which had been expended on me at Coimbatore, I began to feel that the Christian religion was the only true religion, and that Christ was the only sinless Saviour." This was, probably, the *Tamil* version.

A translation was made by the British missionaries into the *Malagasy* language, for the use of the Christian converts whom God granted to their labors in the island of Madagascar. Of the hold which the volume took upon their hearts we may judge from the language of the letters addressed by some of these converts to their missionary pastors when expelled from the island:—"We are impressed and delighted when we read the *Pilgrim's Progress*." And at a still later day, when the storm of persecution beat yet more heavily upon them, and some were executed for the profession of their faith, it is said that while awaiting death they felt inexpressible peace and joy, and said one to another, "Now are we in the situation of Christian and Faithful, when they were led to the city of Vanity Fair." An European book, thus quoted by African martyrs about to die, must be of singular merit.

The same book has been translated into *Finnish*, for the use of the region verging on Lapland, and printed in Dutch for the use of the missions in South Africa. A version has been made into Hawaiian at the Sandwich Islands; and one in Tahitian for the Society Islands, though we do not know that the latter has as yet been published.

A book which could thus interest the fur-clad peasantry of the frozen North in their smoky huts, and the tawny Caffer and Hottentot in the midst of his sandy, sunburnt plains; which delights, in the cabins of our own West and in the far Hindustan, must have some elements that fit it for use everywhere. The nature of man is one in all climes. Conscience may be

drugged and mutilated, but its entire extirpation seems impossible, and it lives under the pressure of error and amid torpor to witness for truth, and right, and God, in quarters where our unbelief and fear would expect to find it, if not utterly wanting, at least utterly inert. The same heart beats under the tattooed skin of the New Zealander as under the grease and ochre with which the Tambookie or Bechuana of South Africa delights to adorn his person, under the silks of the Chinaman and the furs of the Laplander. It has everywhere the same depravity, that no grade of civilization or refinement can so adorn as to lift beyond the need of the renewing gospel, and that no brutalism can so degrade as to put below the reach of the same efficacious remedy. Religion, it should be remembered again, is not mere abstract speculation; it is also emotion. With the heart man believeth. Now science and literature (strictly so called) may be an affair of certain civilized nations, and of them only; but poetry and passion are of all lands and of all kindreds of the earth. And how largely do these enter into the structure of the Gospel, of the book revealing that Gospel, and of all Christian writings modelled upon that Bible. There are, it must be allowed, in the production of Bunyan's genius, excellencies and peculiarities that do not exist to an equal extent in many of the other publications of the Society, adapting it to interest mankind in every grade of civilization and under all the varieties of custom and taste, that culture or neglect, error or truth may have produced. Yet it will, in all probability, be found, when the trial shall have been made by competent translators, that many other of the favorite books of British and American Christians are fitted to become nearly as much the favorites of the converts whom the grace of God shall gather in the ancient East or in the islands of the seas.

Our hope that much of the literature of European or American origin may thus become at once available for the spiritual wants of the converts from heathenism rests not on the peculiar talent of the works so much as on their subject and structure. Their theme is Jesus Christ, the character and the history devised by infinite wisdom, with the express intention of winning its way to the sympathies of man, under all the varieties of complexion, caste, language, laws and literature. This theme has proved its power to exorcise superstitions the most foul and inveterate, and to raise from the deepest and most hopeless degradation. Pervaded and saturated as so many of the Soci-

ety's works are with this subject, we have confidence that the divine grandeur of the theme will, to some extent, compensate for the defects of the human authorship. The idols of all lands shall totter from their shrines, and yet be broken before its might; and we look for the shattering of all by the faithful and full presentation of this truth—Christ and him crucified—a truth that is to be the great Iconoclast principle of the age; for it is God's own device, and carries with it God's own promise, and the irresistible energy of his benediction.

We have reason, again, to expect the adaptation of much of the religious literature of our own country and Britain to the wants of the foreign missionary, from its close assimilation to the character of the Scriptures. This is a book carrying one of the evidences of its divine origin upon it, and its power of interesting all grades of society and all ages of mankind. Far as any religious writer becomes penetrated by its spirit, and transfuses, as many of the Society's authors have done, its imagery and train of thought, into his own compositions, so far he prepares them for acceptableness and favor among every tribe of mankind. If the Scriptures look with special favor on any class of our race, it is on the Eastern portion of the world. The Bible is an Oriental book, as far as it is the book of any one region or race. It would have been, in style and imagery, a very different volume had the Anglo-Saxon race been left to prepare it. And as far as it should have partaken of their marked peculiarities it would have been less fitted for one great errand it has in this age to accomplish. The missions of our times are pouring back from the favored West and from the tents of Japheth the light of salvation on the long-neglected habitations of Shem, its original seats, and upon the millions of the East. It is some advantage, then, that we go to them with a book that, if it favor any class, is more Eastern than Western in character; and that we carry with the Bible a biblical literature that, from the book on which it has been founded, has, in many of its specimens, caught a tinge of similar feelings, and imagery, and style.

In that body of religious literature whose evangelical and practical character we have thus imperfectly examined, the Society have done much. But it would be doing them and their objects gross injustice to suppose that they present it as a complete body of religious reading for all the wants of the age. Its publications may have some inequality of merit. What

collection is otherwise? The lingering and fitful charities of the churches may forbid their enlarging it as they desire, and as the wants of our own and foreign lands require. The Non-conformist literature has many volumes they would gladly add to their existing collection. There are two other great eras of religious conflict and effort, from the literature of which the London Tract Society has drawn largely, and this Institution as yet not at all. We allude to the era of the stormy infancy of the Scottish National Church, and the works of its Rutherford, its Guthrie, its Binning, its Andrew Gray, and its Durham. The other greater and earlier era is that of the English Reformation. Of the works of the English reformers our British brethren have published several volumes. As to the present availableness of this latter literature we are aware that there is division of opinion; but its history would be valuable, if not its remains.

Nor is the American Tract Society to be judged as if it had completed its own designs, or finished its mission as respects a *native* religious literature. Its power to elicit works drawn up with peculiar reference to our position and habits as a people, has as yet been shown but in a small degree. The churches of this country are capable of much more, and need much more; and, if duly sustained, the Society may proceed in this work to a point far beyond the limit of its present attainments. Will the churches afford this aid? Here at least they will have—if they choose, by prayer, and effort, and liberality, to secure it—they will have a literature all that they can wish, as to its national adaptation.

And if our country and others that have been long favored with the serene and pure light of the Gospel are yet to know days of dark and stormy controversy with error; if over the once peaceful encampments of our churches is spreading the hum that betokens an approaching combat; if, as some fear, we are entering in our times upon a stern and close conflict with Romanism or with skepticism, or with both; or are to stand up for our national morals and national existence against the floods of a frivolous and profligate literature that now drowns the minds of our youth as beneath a rushing deluge of inanity, and filth, and venom, we have little fear as to the result. We cannot distrust the powers and the triumphs of Scripture, the safety and ultimate victories of the church. In the God of the Bible and the Head of the Church we need not fear to place

the most unquestioning and imperturbable confidence. He who gave the Bible will guard the gift; and He who built will watch, as with a wall of fire, around the city of his own chosen Jerusalem. And, from all the past history of the church, we augur that out of this or any other conflict that may be awaiting us in the interval between our times and the final glory of Christ's kingdom, there may grow some of the richest productions of that literature which the church is yet to enjoy; a literature as yet unwritten, and which this Institution, we trust, will, with others, aid in educating, diffusing, and perpetuating. Some of the richest legacies which sanctified genius has ever bequeathed to the Christian church are like that more cherished portion which the dying patriarch gave to his favorite son, his Joseph, "One portion above thy brethren, which I took out of the hand of the Amorite with my sword and with my bow;" the spoils plucked as out of the very teeth of the Destroyer, the trophies of a late and hard-won victory.

ARTICLE V.

MORAL AND LITERARY INFLUENCE OF NOVELS.

By E. D. Sanborn, Prof. of the Latin Language and Literature, Dartmouth College, N. H.

WHEN the human mind is in a healthy condition, there is a pleasure in mere intellectual activity. But it is the cultivated student only who can derive intense enjoyment from long-protracted and patient thought. To the undisciplined mind severe application is always painful. Hence a large proportion of mankind seek pleasure in novelty and variety. Any change is preferable to monotony. The more rapid the succession of strange events, which pass before the eye, the greater is the satisfaction experienced. In the gratification of this natural curiosity of untutored minds, the memory and imagination are chiefly employed. The other faculties are liable to remain weak and infantile from mere inaction. The imagination needs less stimulus than any of the other native powers of the soul. It

is usually most active in children, and of course the most difficult to control. It seems to occupy a middle ground between sense and the understanding. Its pleasures are not so gross as those of sense, nor so refined as those of the understanding. This faculty is peculiarly active among rude nations that are just breaking the fetters of sense, and aspiring to intellectual freedom. Imagination then has a boundless range of action, and an exhaustless supply of materials. With memory for her ally, she subdues and governs the whole empire of mind. Hoary tradition and youthful history alike wear her livery, and obey her behests. The most common events are clothed with mystery, and the ordinary exploits of heroes, under her magic touch, become feats of superhuman power. Every event, whose cause is not apparent to the untaught barbarian, is ascribed to the immediate interposition of a god. Mythology is the product of this unrestrained activity of the imagination. It requires ages of improvement to subdue this fondness for fiction, and to reduce the monstrous exaggerations of a youthful people to the just proportions of history. Invention always precedes judgment and taste in the progress of civilization. Passion appears before reason. Men feel and enjoy before they reason and judge. Hence poetry, which is the language of emotion, precedes prose. Romance is earlier than history. Every nation, in its infancy, has its age of miracles, and its tales of wonder. We need not, therefore, resort to northern Sagas, to Oriental fable, or to the fragments of classic superstition, to find the origin of romantic fiction in Europe. It is the natural product of the soil where it is found. "In reality," says Mr. Southey, "mythological and romantic tales are current among all savages of whom we have any full accounts; for man has his intellectual as well as his bodily appetites, and these things are the food of his imagination and faith. They are found wherever there is language and discourse of reason; in other words, wherever there is man. And in similar stages of civilization, or states of society, the fictions of different people will bear a corresponding resemblance, notwithstanding the difference of time and scene." These tales lose their hold upon the popular mind only through the influence of refinement and intellectual culture. The stories which please the child, become insipid to the youth, and offensive to the man of years. The traditions of a youthful people lose their charms when the higher faculties are developed, and are finally rejected from history as unworthy of credit.

Among the ancient Greeks fiction usually wore the poetic dress. Except the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon, we find nothing resembling the modern romance in the palmy days of Grecian literature. Fable and allegory were often used for the purpose of imparting instruction or admonition which might be offensive to the hearers. Epic and dramatic poetry was the ordinary vehicle of didactic instruction and romantic fiction. The ancient drama and epic afford but little *variety* of character and incidents. The materials were wanting for a complete delineation of human nature in all its phases. What we call *society* was scarcely known among the Greeks and Romans. Females were degraded, and, of course, the domestic virtues were not appreciated. Refined love, which is regarded as an essential element of the modern novel, was scarcely known. There was no middle class in the community from which the most interesting *originals* are usually drawn. Poetic characters were mostly taken from the higher classes. Persons of low rank, to be sure, were often brought upon the stage, yet they had nothing to distinguish them from other individuals of the same class. They generally acted as slaves or low buffoons. There was nothing in them decidedly attractive and *original*, as in the characters of "ancient Pistol," or "mine host of the Garter." Such characters as these become the personal friends of the reader, and he highly prizes their acquaintance. The old poet depended for success rather upon the *striking exploits* or bold *adventures of his heroes*, than upon their *peculiar characteristics*. *Time and place* were of more importance than *thought and sentiment*. A great variety of character could not be expected, where the persons represented were confined to one class, and mostly to one sex; and where there was no press to perpetuate, by memoirs, epistles and history, the peculiarities of individuals. Hence there is a certain air of uniformity and stiffness in the ancient drama. The exhibition of private life and the play of domestic affections, which give grace and interest to the modern drama and novel, were wanting. When classic literature declined, works of romance became more numerous. These also exhibited the peculiar characteristics of the age in which they originated. But few of them give evidence of profound thought or originality of invention. Indeed we could expect nothing more from an age of mental and physical decrepitude. In the dark ages monks and minstrels were the chief representatives of the literary world. In Italy, literature first revived. Her authors

first dared to break the trammels of the classics, and to clothe their thoughts in the language of the people. "It was there, too," says an English writer, "that those novels or tales were first cultivated which are fitted to attract every class of society, because they reflect the manners of all classes. This species of writing reached great perfection in Italy, before literature had attained that maturity, in any other country of Europe, which could enable it to emulate the excellence which that country so early reached in poetry. At that time, the poetry of most countries of Europe was confined to the rude though occasionally vigorous effusions of wandering minstrels, and their metrical tales were afterwards extended into voluminous romances, in prose, which reflected those notions of love, war and chivalry, that were universally prevalent, from the existing state of society." The age of chivalry abounded in works of fiction, or rather in monstrous histories of real adventures embellished by fancy. Every thing, in literature, as in real life, was wild and extravagant. Romance ruled the world. One mighty spell rested upon society. Men dwelt in fairy-land. Their castles were enchanted; their strong-holds guarded by dragons. Fair ladies were imprisoned, and brave knights encountered unheard-of perils, to deliver them. There was a strange commingling of passions. Love and valor were wedded. The weaker passion became the master, and proud and turbulent warriors submitted to its dictates. Of course, love and heroism were the principal themes of literary discussion. Poetry and romance united to celebrate feminine charms and masculine prowess. From this hybridous union of passion and folly arose the countless romances of chivalry. They were read, admired and imitated till the world was flooded with extravagant fictions, and men went mad with the delicious intoxication. The peculiar state of society and manners gave birth to these frivolous, absurd, and, in some instances, licentious productions, and they, in turn, reacted upon society and contributed materially to the continuance of those institutions which had already become useless and burdensome. But as the institutions of chivalry lost their hold upon the popular mind, this species of literature declined. The matchless wit and irony of Cervantes finally brought it into utter contempt, and restored men to the use and guidance of the understanding. When the romances of chivalry lost their popularity, authors sought a different species of entertainment for the public. As society

changed, new tastes were developed and new amusements became popular. As romance declined, the drama arose. The mightiest geniuses of Europe were devoted to it. It soon reached its acme. The success of a few gifted minds, in this department of literature, attracted a multitude of feeble writers to the same employment. The drama passed rapidly through all the stages of decline, from the loftiest tragedy to the lowest and most vulgar farce. The modern novel did not appear till the drama had passed the meridian of its glory. "It had ceased to be the mirror in which the age could contemplate itself and exhibit the license of a masque or the extravagance of a caricature, much more than the sobriety of actual life or the fidelity of a portrait." The novel was a new expedient to interest the populace and save public taste from utter abasement. The multitude had grown somewhat weary of their old idol. It had lost its power to excite. All the changes had been played upon it which human ingenuity could invent. The taste of the higher classes had become too refined to relish the entertainment which mercenary dramatists furnished for the rabble; and a change was demanded. A literary revolution was commenced. The English led the van. No very remarkable works of pure fiction appeared before the days of Richardson. This author seems to be at once the herald and representative of this new era in literature. He is certainly *primus inter pares*, among the early English novelists. He was the first who took the reading community by surprise and commanded their undivided attention and applause. The publication of his "Pamela," in 1740, commences a new epoch in English literature. It is probable that no work was ever published that was received with such unbounded enthusiasm by all classes of readers as this. It was recommended from the pulpit and lauded, in unqualified terms, by poets and literati. It was pronounced by Mr. Pope to be better than volumes of sermons; and another scholar observed, "that if all other books were to be burned, the Bible and *Pamela* should be preserved." The other works of this author were probably more extensively read than any contemporary publication. These same works, which were once the reigning amusement of the fashionable, the gay and the learned, are now almost forgotten. They are seldom read except by professed scholars. Like old portraits, whose dress and style of execution have become unpopular, they are rather forced into some dark closet than exhibited in the drawing-room.

It was once universally admitted that these works exerted a salutary moral influence on the community. It is now as universally *doubted*, to say the least. Those pictures which were then regarded as true to life, perfect in coloring and delineation, are now said to be stiff, overdrawn, unnatural caricatures. "There is," says a reviewer, "a certain air of irksome regularity, gloominess and pedantry attached to Richardson's most virtuous characters. His good people are too wise, too formal, to appear in the light of desirable companions, or to excite, in youthful minds, a desire to resemble them." This is by no means the opinion of mere puritans and bigots. Some of the warmest advocates of novels, express similar views. Charles Lamb remarks of this author, as follows: "The precise, strait-laced Richardson has strengthened vice, from the mouth of Lovelace, with entangling sophistries and abstruse pleas against her adversary, *virtue*, which Sedley, Villiers and Rochester wanted depth of libertinism sufficient to have invented." Tal-
fourd observes: "He had the power of making any set of notions, however fantastical, appear as truths of Holy Writ to his readers." Still this critic thinks the *general* impression made on us by his works is virtuous. It is acknowledged that the author himself was a man of high moral worth, and that he desired and intended to promote virtue and happiness by his writings. It is now very apparent that his works were better adapted to secure transient popularity to the author, than to improve the public morals.

This new path to fame, which he had so successfully struck out, was soon thronged with hungry authors. Few excelled him in talent; most fell far below him in morals. The genius of Fielding is unquestioned. The demoralizing tendency of his novels is equally unquestioned. "Fielding introduces us to the common ways of this bright and breathing world." His delineations of human nature are unrivalled; and it is precisely on this account that they are so *pernicious*. This is not a common fault of novelists. They are generally censured for drawing unnatural pictures of real life. It is not, however, a sufficient vindication of a character that it is drawn *as it really exists*; for many characters ought never to be drawn. The conduct of some men is too gross to be described, and real life affords many a vicious scene which common minds ought never to be acquainted with. It will not always justify a narrative, to say that it is true, or that it has verisimilitude. There is much of

the world's real history, which a virtuous mind cannot describe or contemplate with impunity. A knowledge of the world, as it is, rather tends to make men cunning than good. A minute knowledge of the worst vices of the world, cannot but taint the youthful mind. Fielding has chosen to represent human nature in its worst forms, and has thus lent to vice the aid of his mighty genius. His *Tom Jones* is perhaps the most perfect prose epic in existence. It is unrivalled in plan and execution; in the development of its subject, and in the originality and truthfulness of its characters. It is one of the most fascinating, and, at the same time, one of the most corrupting books in the English tongue. When Hannah More once alluded to a witty passage in *Tom Jones*, in the hearing of Dr. Johnson, the great moralist (who, by the way, was no enemy to novels,) replied, "I am shocked to hear you quote from so vicious a book; I am sorry to hear you have read it; a confession which no modest lady should ever make. I scarcely know a more corrupt book."

The few *virtuous characters* which Fielding has portrayed, are as amiable and winning as his ordinary characters are gross and corrupting. The existence of such an ideal as Parson Adams, only makes us regret the more the prostitution of his noble genius to purposes so vile.

The novels of Smollet exhibit less talent than those of Fielding, while they are, if possible, more vulgar and licentious. They are chiefly admired for their oddity and low humor. There is scarcely any thing in style, sentiment or character to redeem his numerous pages from the charge of obscenity and immorality. The works of the authors above noticed, were much sought after during the latter portion of the eighteenth century, and exerted a very injurious influence on the manners and morals of the last generation. They are now little read, not because they are less worthy of attention than more recent productions, but because the public, like a fickle mistress, is always most captivated with a *new favorite*. And the candidates for popular favor have not been few nor undistinguished. Novels have been multiplied indefinitely. They have been made the vehicles of every diversity of opinion and sentiment in philosophy, politics and religion. Some of them display genius, some wit, and some ribaldry. Some are remarkable for the high moral tone that pervades them; some are negative in their character, and others are positively infidel and licentious. Some exhibit in their heroes the finest traits of humanity; others exalt the cri-

minal to a hero, and endeavor to render vice attractive. The heroes of fiction, like the conscripts of Napoleon, have been taken from every class in society, from the footpad, who lies in ambush for the solitary traveller, to the mighty Autocrat, who aims at universal dominion. The subjects illustrated are as various as those of the ancient lays of Brittany :

"Some beth of war and some of woe,
And some of joy and mirth also,
And some of treachery and guile,
Of old adventures that fell while,
And some of bourdes and ribauldry,
And some there be of Faery ;
Of all things that men seeth,
Most of *love*, forsooth, there beth."

It is probable that there are more pages of ephemeral novels published yearly, throughout the civilized world, than of all other literary productions united. They are not only published, but *circulated* and *read* ; read too by that very class of persons who have no moral strength to resist their vicious influence. "Since 1814," says Menzel, (speaking of the German novel alone,) "there have been not less than 5 or 6000 new novels manufactured. Were they all good, they were too many. for the plain reason that nobody could read them all ; and if they are bad, then they should never have been written. They are, in fact, for the most part, *bad* ; probably there are not a hundred of them which a rational man can lay down without blushing for the people that produce such novels. There remain, therefore, more than 5000 novels, which, within a short time, have not only uselessly consumed a great capital of money and time of authors, publishers, printers, readers, etc., but by their demoralizing, at least enervating effect, have essentially injured the nation." The French press has been nearly as prolific as the German in this species of literature. There the moral standard is still lower than in Germany. Fifty years ago, a competent critic said of the French novelists, "they not only seduce the heart through the senses, and corrupt it through the medium of the imagination, but fatally strike at the root and being of all virtue, by annihilating all belief in that religion which is its only source and seminal principle." English novels, though less abundant, are still as numerous in proportion to the issues of the press, in that country, as in France or Germany. The facilities for printing and distributing cheap works of fiction, render them a very important agent in working out the

destiny of society in our own country. Their influence cannot be overlooked by the statesman, moralist, or philosopher. They are made the advocates of any sentiments in religion or politics which the authors wish to propagate, or which they suppose will be acceptable to the multitude. The unwary may imbibe the poison of vice or infidelity, when seeking only for amusement. Yet few seem to question the utility of such compositions. Most men commend them, or at least silently acquiesce in the arguments adduced in their favor. It may not be a profitless expenditure of time to examine some of these arguments. They are, frequently, defended upon the same ground as poetry.

1. It is said, *they are to be prized as works of art. Many of them are equal to the best poems in plot and execution, and some of them may even vie with Homer or Shakspeare.* "It is the object of the novel writer," says Scott, "to place before the reader as full and accurate a representation of the events which he relates, as can be done by mere force of an excited imagination, without the assistance of material objects. His whole appeal is made to the world of fancy and of ideas, and in this consists his strength or his weakness, his poverty or his wealth. He cannot, like the painter, present a visible and tangible representation of his towns, his woods, his palaces and his castles; but by awakening the imagination of a congenial reader, he places before the mind's eye landscapes fairer than those of Claude, and wilder than those of Salvator." As a work of art, the novel is composed upon principles similar to those which guide the statuary and painter. Individual traits are selected from different models to form the beau ideal of the artist. His design is to improve upon nature, to present an agreeable union of excellencies, without those apparent defects and blemishes which are usually found in all natural productions. The elements of any work of art or poetic description may all exist separately in different individuals or objects, and yet exist nowhere in combination, except in the imagination of the artist. Hence a picture, a statue or a poem may be true to nature, and yet false in point of fact. The statue of Apollo Belvidere never had an archetype, and yet every individual feature may have had its living representative. The same is true of works of fiction; the scenes portrayed, the characters described may all be *natural*, and yet not *real*, because the author, by the aid of fancy and taste, selects the materials from a wide range of observation, and from them *creates* a new whole. The entire his-

tory of any man's life cannot be interesting. Many passages in it must be commonplace. But by selecting the striking incidents of the lives of many men, or by feigning those which have a resemblance to reality, and weaving them into one harmonious narrative, the novelist may furnish a biography more entertaining than that of any real hero. A novel, therefore, becomes a species of Epic, and as such may be criticised by the same rules. It is acknowledged that the highest powers of genius are often displayed in the creations of the imagination. *Invention* is the noblest prerogative of genius. So far as works of fiction, whether in verse or prose, display great talents, *devoted to the best ends*, they justly command our respect and admiration. It should be remembered, however, that *prose fictions* exert a far more extensive and powerful influence upon the public mind than *poetry*. They are vastly more numerous, and they are more generally read. Besides, a prose narrative will produce a more complete *illusion* in the mind of the reader than a poem. It resembles real history, and wears the semblance of truth. The measured movement and dignified air of poetry, constantly remind the reader of its *artificial* structure. Men seldom mistake poetic embellishments for facts. Not so with the novel. They portray human life, if not as it is, at least, as it might be. The reader generally gives himself up to the impositions of genius, and derives real pleasure from the temporary belief of the truth of what he reads. There is force, therefore, in the objection that novels mislead and corrupt the young by presenting false views of life, and exhibiting characters such as never did and never *will* exist. When the painter or sculptor embodies his ideal creations in a material form, no one mistakes the picture or the statue for a real person, yet every individual feature may have its living original. So of the characters of a work of fiction. A real Falstaff probably never existed. Yet all his individual peculiarities might be found in different men. A real Caliban never had a being; still the superstitious notions of the age would furnish the materials for his formation. The genius of the author is displayed in the judicious selection of these materials. It must be admitted that the cultivated mind derives real pleasure from the contemplation of such ideal personages. When once acquainted with them, we become attached to them. They become our familiar friends. If such interesting associates as Sir Roger de Coverly, Monkbarns, or My Uncle Toby, were snatched from us, we should sincerely mourn

their loss. We should find our intellectual pleasure essentially abridged by their absence. Scott has drawn many characters that cannot fail, when properly studied, to refine and elevate the reader. Almost any person may derive pleasure and profit from the contemplation of the lofty enthusiasm of Flora Mac Ivor, the Christian purity and heroic daring of Jeannie Deans, or the angelic tenderness of Rebecca. The same is true of "little Nell," that ethereal vision of loveliness, portrayed by Dickens. If such fruit always grew upon this tree of knowledge, the tasting could never impart the knowledge of evil. We must admit, therefore, that *some novels* are defensible as works of art. But this class of novels is so *small*, that, as in the case of the cities of the plain, it may be doubted whether ten unexceptionable specimens could be found, in all the domains of pure fiction, for whose sakes the multitude should be spared. Some of the creations of Scott's prolific genius, will probably continue to be admired as long as the English language is read. But a great proportion of the popular novels of the age are miserable imitations of original works. The landscapes and beautiful sunsets of Scott have been copied for the thousandth time. His characters have been repeated, revised, and reproduced so often, that they have lost their identity. His strong good sense has been so often diluted with the feeble thoughts of wretched scribblers, as to become rapid and offensive to rational minds. The offspring of his princely intellect, dressed in the livery of others, have lost their nobility, and are compelled to do plebeian service for the multitude. The mass of novels now most read, are not valuable as works of art. They owe their popularity not to their merit, but to their *want of it*. They minister to the lowest tastes of the vulgar, and afford an unhealthy stimulus to the worst passions of human nature. The republic of letters has become a turbulent democracy, and authors no longer address "the learned reader," but humbly sue for the favor of the reading public. With such patrons, the noblest creations of genius cannot be appreciated. To please the public, works of fiction must be characterized by strong excitement, high-wrought passions, splendid crimes, wild adventures and bloody feuds, rather than by virtuous sentiment, vigorous argument, and elevated affection.

2. *It is often argued that novels are useful in imparting lessons of morality, inculcating virtue and preventing crime. If this were always true, or true in a majority of cases, their*

utility would be established beyond a doubt. Some novels are written with a direct reference to their moral bearing. But even when the intentions of the author are good, he often fails in the choice of means. This was true of Richardson, to whom allusion has been already made. When the ideal characters which genius has portrayed impersonate noble virtues, and are always made to act consistently with their professions, the study of them undoubtedly tends to lead the soul away from unworthy pursuits, and prompts to a virtuous life. When crime meets with its just reward, the tempted soul is sometimes deterred, by such exhibitions, from a course of vice. It cannot be denied, therefore, that works of fiction may be made useful aids to morality. But where one man writes fiction to correct the public morals, a hundred others write to feed the vices of the community. The labors of wickedness are always better rewarded by the world than those of virtue. Besides, the great mass of readers care very little for the moral bearing of a tale. If the story furnishes excitement, they seldom seek for any thing higher. "The professed moral of a tale," says Scott, "is usually what the reader is least interested in; it is like the mendicant who cripples after some splendid and gay procession, and in vain solicits the attention of those who have been gazing upon it." The moral of a tale depends more upon the conduct of the narrative than upon the catastrophe. It is not enough that virtue should ultimately triumph and vice be punished. There may be so much that is forbidding in the life of the good man, and so much that is attractive in the life of the bad man, that the reader will wholly sympathize with the latter. "If," says the writer above quoted, "the author introduces scenes which excite evil passions, if he familiarizes the minds of his readers with impure ideas, or sophisticates their understanding with false views of morality, it will be an unavailing defence, that, in the end of the book he has represented virtue as triumphant." If tried by the standard presented here by the great luminary of the modern world of fiction, few popular novelists would escape censure. Fielding, Smollet, Sterne and Swift seemed to think a large seasoning of vulgarity and filth necessary to render their works palatable to the reading public. No man can contemplate their obscene pictures without moral degradation. The virgin purity of an unsophisticated mind is soiled and polluted by them. The contagion of vice which thus enters the soul upon the wings of an idle thought, may fix

a plague-spot there which will ultimately prove its ruin. It is not good to be made familiar with vice. We soon learn to "*pity, then embrace.*" When highwaymen and courtesans are made the heroes and heroines of popular tales, who will be sponsor for the security of the public morals? The immoral tendency of Bulwer's novels is, I think, justly maintained. His heroes are generally great criminals, violating all the laws of God and man, and yet exhibiting in their conduct so much generosity and magnanimity that they inevitably enlist the sympathies of the unreflecting reader. His earliest work, called *Falkland*, is the history of an adulterer, the most noble and kind of his race, who was led, *by the force of circumstances*, to violate the sacred rights of hospitality and ruin the wife of his friend. Paul Clifford, the hero of another of his novels, is the commander of a band of robbers in Berkshire. He is conducted safely through his career of villany and escapes "unwhipped of justice." In *Devereux*, an amiable gentleman murders his brother's wife and afterwards becomes an interesting religious enthusiast in Italy. Eugene Aram was a veritable culprit, whose history is here embellished with the choicest ornaments of wit and fancy, and the very gallows is ennobled by the martyrdom of a *high-minded, large-souled, intellectual hero*. "The Disowned," professing the noblest creed, boasting of the purest philanthropy, becomes the murderer of his benefactor. Bulwer seems to delight in portraying the unsocial passions of men, and dragging out to view every thing that is dark, unlovely and misanthropic in the human soul. If his object is to make these vices odious, why does he exalt what is diabolical and elevate what is mean, by surrounding his robbers and murderers with a halo of glory? Why not leave the burglar to rot in his grave? Why attempt to rescue a real hero of the *Newgate Calendar* from merited ignominy? If he wishes to benefit the world, why does he hold true virtue so much in the background, and make mere selfishness, flattery and intrigue the chief means of success in life? "Bulwer's novels," says an eminent critic, "show us the virtues caricatured, vices seductively garnished, generous qualities degraded by paltry motives, petty objects magnified, vulgarities glossed by passion, and manners tinged with affectation. Whatever is veritable, honest, useful and truly noble, finds little place in this bizarre, fictitious world." We do not pretend that Bulwer vindicates the crimes he has so graphically depicted, in express

terms, yet the whole complexion of the plot is such as to leave the impression upon the reader's mind, that a man may commit such enormities and yet deserve our love and admiration. This covert method of teaching immorality is worse than open and avowed profligacy. But other novelists are less heartless. We may not include them all in one general category. The works of Maria Edgeworth, Scott and our own Cooper furnish perhaps a less objectionable entertainment to the lovers of romance, than almost any other authors of fiction. Scott has but little that is censurable in regard to morals, not because he directly inculcates virtue, but because he does not draw it in caricature, and cast reproach upon it by the oddity, bigotry and vulgarity of those who practise it. Wilberforce complained of Scott's novels, that they had so little moral and religious object. "They remind me," said he, "of a giant spending his strength cracking nuts. I would rather go to render up my account, at the last day, carrying with me 'the Shepherd of Salisbury Plain,' than bearing the load of all these volumes, full as they are of genius." It was impossible that an author whose chief object was the pecuniary reward, could entertain any very exalted notions of *doing good*. So far as religion and morality are concerned, we are rather indebted to him for what he has refrained from doing than for what he has actually done. "He is," in the words of Hannah More, "rather a non-moralist than an anti-moralist." Except a few bacchanalian scenes, which he has described apparently *con amore*, little can be said against the moral bearing of Scott's novels, while he is unrivalled in his descriptions of natural scenery, and in the originality and truthfulness of his characters.

Dickens is now the popular favorite. But few question the purity of his principles or the permanency of his reputation, and yet it would not be among the wonders of the times, if he should outlive his own celebrity. Some of his writings look like literary ephemera, abounding in genuine humor to be sure, but like a comic annual, doomed to oblivion, when a successor appears. Some good men hope that his unmerciful satires upon the English poor laws and upon English schools, will direct the attention of the great and the powerful to the abuses of those systems and gradually effect a reform. If the English overseers and schoolmasters really resemble Squeers and Bumble, their hope may be justly grounded. If the official personages portrayed in *Nicholas Nickleby* and *Oliver Twist* be any thing

but gross caricatures, then it is not strange that Lester should write of the *shame* as well as of the *glory* of England. It cannot be supposed that the statesmen and nobles of Great Britain want information respecting the true condition of their country; or if they did want it, that they would resort to the pages of a popular novel to find it. Dickens has drawn some few characters of high moral worth, but he never draws a religious character except it be in caricature. Does he design, by this means, to cast contempt upon genuine piety? Who could infer from his novels, whether he were a Christian, Jew or Mohammedan? Indeed, from the picture he has given us in Barnaby Rudge of the sour, fanatical and ferocious spirit that characterized Protestantism, at the period of the London riots, we should infer that he is a Catholic or Jew. But in his notes on America he has revealed his real opinions. His flippant remarks upon orthodoxy, his contempt for temperance, and his oft-repeated allusions to "brandy and water," prove him to be a heartless freethinker, and, at least, a prospective inebriate. I will quote but one passage in confirmation of this opinion:—"Wherever religion is resorted to as a strong drink, and as an escape from the dull monotonous round of home, those of its ministers who *pepper* the highest, will be surest to please. They who strew the eternal path with the greatest amount of *brimstone*, and who most ruthlessly tread down the flowers and leaves that grow by the wayside, will be voted the most righteous; and they who enlarge, with the greatest pertinacity, on the difficulty of getting to heaven, will be considered by all true believers certain of going there." He also takes occasion in his notes to sneer at temperance societies and temperance hotels, and at the principled opposition of good men in New England to theatres and other kindred amusements. Such miserable jesting will not increase his reputation for sound morality, or serve to perpetuate his present celebrity.

"The primary cause of this author's success," says an English writer, "we take to be his felicity in working up the genuine mother-wit and unadulterated vernacular idioms of the *lower classes* of London—for he grows comparatively commonplace and tame the moment his foot is off the stones, and betrays infallible symptoms of Cockneyism in all his aspirations at rural-ity." Those who seek only *amusement*, in a novel, will find it in his works; those who seek for instruction, for elevated thoughts elegantly expressed, will be compelled to resort to other sources.

3. *Novels are often defended as an agreeable method of inculcating truth.* An unpleasant truth may be conveniently taught by fiction. In ancient times fable and allegory were much employed for this purpose. The ear of despots was sometimes reached in this way, when the bold assertion of the undisguised truth would have cost the teacher his life. Some minds may be reached by the moral of a romance, or captivated by the loveliness of virtue, as it is exhibited in some faultless character, when they would turn, with loathing, from the same doctrines communicated in a didactic form. Such cases, however, are very rare. Who ever heard of the conversion of a profligate by the reading of a religious novel? Indeed it is only religious persons who read religious novels. To "the lawless and disobedient" for whose benefit they were expressly prepared, they are dull, uninteresting books. The propriety of thus *diluting* religious truths for squeamish appetites, is now generally doubted. Menzel censures the practice in no measured terms. Speaking of religious paraphrases and poetical versions of portions of the Bible, prepared by German authors for boarding-schools, he says: "These sentimental people think that, because they have young girls in view, towards whom one should always be polite and tender, God's word too must be spoiled by softening down, diluting and sweetening it for them. The language of the Bible seems to them too rude and unmannerly; and so they extract from it as from the powerful forest plants, a little drop of essence only, mingle it with sugar, put it up in fine post paper, with a neat device, and give it to the dear little babe of grace to swallow, as a godly sugar-plum. In this way the whole of religion is conveyed, smooth and sweet as sugar, to the delicate Flora of the city, the boarding-school or the court. The God of terror, the Thunderer from Sinai must not frighten the dear girls; and therefore he folds up his lightnings prettily, and muffles his thunder in an easily flowing, poetic measure. The terrors of the grave and the torments of hell must not frighten the dear girls; they are covered by an antique sarcophagus, with Mathison's bass reliefs, and a beautiful genius, with graceful attitude, holds his torch reversed." In another place he adds: "The half educated multitude have allowed themselves to be cheated into the notion that the old and vigorous language of Luther is indelicate, by these self-sufficient enlighteners and babblers about feeling, who wish to see the religious sentiment widely spread, in fine and fashiona-

ble forms of speech; and who finally become too much at ease to have any thing to do with religion otherwise than as a thing of habit; to whom consequently it must be desirable to have at hand a devotional ass's bridge, which in all cases thinks for them, feels for them—a religious machine which one needs only to wind up to play on it all favorite emotions—a book which one needs but to read in order to imagine he has thought or felt something himself." Those sentimental authors, in our country, who pant to do good, by writing religious novels, moral tales, and children's biographies to render the truths of the Bible palatable to the natural heart, may derive some useful hints from the vigorous good sense of this Hercules of modern criticism. Though we freely admit that such works may sometimes be profitable to the young, by arresting the attention and captivating the heart through the imagination, yet when we remember that false philosophy, bad morals and infidelity are far oftener disguised in fiction than genuine evangelical truth, we should be very cautious in commending novels as teachers of moral and religious truth.

4. *Novels are frequently recommended as valuable illustrations of national manners.* This is one of the strongest pleas that can be urged in their behalf. It is this which gives them some degree of permanency as literary productions. Works of fiction can, with propriety, describe the minute details of every day life, dress, customs and manners, which are too trivial for dignified history. Had we a novel written by Plato, descriptive of real life, in his own age, it would be invaluable to us in illustrating the domestic manners of the Greeks. It is now quite common for modern authors to write fictitious narratives, purposely, to illustrate the private history of the ancients. Many of these works present false or exaggerated views of their real life, and are worse than useless as guides to truth. Others may be read, with profit, by the student who is already well versed in ancient history. Such are the illustrations of Greek and Roman life, by Becker, Lockhart's Valerius, Bulwer's Last Days of Pompeii, and the "Letters from Palmyra" and "Probus" by Mr. Ware. All works of fiction are valuable which contain faithful pictures of the manners and domestic life of any people. It is this trait which renders the Homeric poems so captivating, and diffuses an inexpressible charm over these graphic pictures of living, acting heroes. For the same reason Don Quixote, apart from its inimitable wit, has acquired a title to

immortality. It will never cease to be read, till men forget or entirely neglect that portion of European history which it illustrates. The Arabian Nights are also valuable to us as pictures of Arabian life, modes of thinking and acting. But the value of such works diminishes as our knowledge of the age and country they represent, increases. In recent times the necessity of such works has been almost entirely superseded by improvements in our popular histories and biographies. Dress and manners are not only described but literally *delineated*. In the recent pictorial history of England, the dress of every age is portrayed from the "top-knot" to the shoe-latchet; and the amusements and occupations of the people are faithfully sketched, from the dignified divertissements of monarchs, to the nursery sports of children.

5. *The historical novel has been much commended.* It is said to throw great light upon dark passages of history, and to render what was once a severe study an agreeable recreation. The dramatic exhibition of real personages and real events is, undoubtedly, more captivating to young readers than the most elaborate rehearsal of the *mere facts*. For, if such works were confined simply to the truth, they would become *histories*, but just so far as they vary from the truth they become useless, or positively pernicious as historical aids. They are acknowledged to be more interesting than dry chronicles, and so are fictions generally. Their falsity constitutes their charm, and the errors they contain usually make a stronger impression than the truth which is associated with it. It is the drapery which is thrown around the real character, which strikes the fancy and captivates the heart. Facts are often distorted, misquoted or exaggerated. Dates and names must yield to the emergencies of the author. An anachronism of centuries is a mere trifle, in working out the mazy web of fiction from scraps of true history. Many of Scott's novels are professedly *historical*, and yet he pays little regard to historical accuracy either in facts, dates, names or characters. For instance, in the "Talisman," the romance of the "Squire of Low Degree" is quoted as familiar to English readers before it was written. In the "Betrothed," Gloucester is raised to a bishoprick more than three centuries before his actual existence. In his "Tales of the Crusaders," Edith of Plantagenet is married to Saladin, not only contrary to the Christian faith, but contrary to the fact. It may be said that these are slight discrepancies, and no one is so credulous as to

regard his tales as veracious chronicles. Let them not be commended then as true guides to historical truth. In the instance last alluded to, Scott not only introduces the falsehood into the text but confirms it in a note. Mr. Mills, in noticing this fact, remarks: "If this can possibly be done merely to heighten the illusion of his romance, it is carrying the jest a little too far; for the preservation of historical truth is really too important a principle to be idly violated. But if he seriously designed to unite the province of the historian with that of the novelist, he has chosen a very unlucky expedient for his own reputation; and thus, in either case, he has rather wantonly led his readers into error, and brought against others a charge of ignorance, which must recoil more deservedly upon himself." False impressions made, when the mind is intensely excited by the progress of the narrative, are not easily eradicated. They are seldom displaced by the truth. Hear "the great Magician" himself on this point. In his *History of Scotland*, speaking of Shakspeare's *Macbeth*, he says: "The genius of Shakspeare having found the tale of *Macbeth*, in the Scottish chronicles of Holinshed, adorned it with a lustre similar to that with which a level beam of the sun often invests some fragment of glass, which, though shining at a distance with the lustre of a diamond, is by nearer investigation discovered to be of no worth or estimation. Early authorities," he adds, "show us no such persons as Banquo and his son Fleance, nor have we reason to think that the latter ever fled farther from *Macbeth* than across the flat scene, according to the stage direction. Neither were Banquo and his son ancestors of the house of Stuart. All these things are now known; but the mind retains, pertinaciously, the impression made by the impositions of genius. While the works of Shakspeare are read and the English language subsists, History may say what she will, but the general reader will only recollect *Macbeth* as a sacrilegious usurper, and Richard III. as a deformed murderer." Men are always more strongly impressed by feeling than intellect, by passion than argument, by the imagination than reason. When once the wizard spell of fiction has clothed an historical character in an unnatural or unearthly garb, no power of truth can disenchant the victim.

6. *Novels are defended as valuable helps to the acquisition of a good style.* If the generality of readers ever thought of style, when in pursuit of the story, this argument would deserve more consideration. The most elaborate style is usually least inter-

esting to most readers. Few persons, under the excitement produced by strange incidents and an intensely interesting narrative, ever stay to contemplate beauties of style or sentiment. The work is usually hurried over, with the utmost rapidity, to reach the catastrophe and be relieved of suspense. No one can read a well-told story without becoming interested in the actors, and this interest increases as the plot becomes more complex, till, at length, it becomes even painful. In such a state of feelings the amateur novel-reader heeds not the beauties of style, or thought. He omits the long and prosy introductions which usually embody the grave reflections of the author, and are exhibited in his best style, and hastens on to the narrative. An *exciting story* is the *first, second and third* requisite of a popular novel. Style is a secondary consideration. It is a rare thing to see a polished style in prose works of fiction. Such attractions are far less sought than stirring incidents, unexpected reverses, hair-breadth escapes and triumphant love. In most of the popular novels we find a loose, slipshod style, adapted to the ephemeral character of the work. Barbarisms, anomalies and solecisms constitute the law of such compositions rather than the exception. When a large work is thrown off, in a few weeks, and volumes succeed each other as rapidly as articles of merchandise from a mechanic's shop, we can expect nothing better. Men who write so rapidly must write *carelessly*.

The works of Dickens are celebrated for their "matchless wit," and yet there is scarcely a repartee or jeu d'esprit of his that one would wish to repeat in a drawing-room. As he has generally chosen his characters from humble life, his most amusing descriptions and his best displays of humor, his *Wellerisms*, are better suited to the bar-room than the parlor. He is decidedly the most popular novelist of the age, and yet he has less to recommend him, *in point of style*, than most of his contemporaries in the same department of literature. The truth is, men care very little about style, if they can find stimulus for the passions, strong excitement. Novel-readers never ask whether a new work is *well written*, but the first inquiry is, *is it interesting?* If it can soothe sorrow, make the debtor forget his duns, the voluptuary his pleasures, and help the idle "to *kill time*," it is pronounced *good*, though it be no better than the "Pirate's Own Book" or the "Three Robbers." "The young," says Mr. Alison, "judge of composition not by its merits when compared with other works, or by its approach to any abstract

or ideal standard, but by its effects in agitating their imaginations, and leading them into that fairy land, in which the fancy of youth has so much delighted to wander. It is their own imagination that has the charm, which they attribute to the work that excites it; and the simplest tale or the poorest novel is, at that time, as capable of awakening it, as afterwards the eloquence of Virgil or Rousseau." While the attention of the reader is absorbed in the conduct of the story, the incidents and the fate of the actors, the beauties and blemishes of style and thought are forgotten. After Richardson had published the first four volumes of his *Clarissa*, which were devoured with the utmost eagerness by the famished crowd, it was reported that the catastrophe, in the forthcoming volume, would be unfortunate. The reading public were greatly excited by it. They had become so interested in these imaginary persons that they could not bear to part with them in a tragical manner. Remonstrances were poured in upon him from all quarters. Old Cibber, says Scott, raved about it like a profane bedlamite; and one sentimental young lady, eager for the conversion of Lovelace, implored Richardson *to save his soul*, as though there were a living sinner in the case, and his future destiny depended upon the decision of the author. This incident shows how strongly the sympathies may be excited for fictitious characters, and how greatly young affections may be modified by the contemplation of such unreal beings. In this lies the secret of the novelist's power. He sits enthroned in the feelings. The feelings are blind; and yet they either *lead* or *drive* a majority of the human race. Females are generally supposed to possess warmer hearts and keener susceptibilities than males, hence novelists find their warmest admirers among women. They are the first to kindle with the fires of love and sentiment, that glow upon the pages of romance. Their incense feeds the flame; and the author and his readers continue to act reciprocally upon each other. Richardson had unknown female correspondents who secretly lavished upon him the most fulsome panegyrics. Richter frequently received the most flattering communications from unknown ladies: indeed one young lady actually committed suicide under the excitement of a maddening passion conceived for this author simply from reading his books. An event very similar to this occurred also in Goethe's history. Richter owed his success, in Germany, to the applause of ladies. He was first encouraged by them to write, and afterwards elevated,

upon the wings of their love; to the very pinnacle of fame. He was first invited to Weimar by an unknown female friend. "Immediately upon his arrival," says his American biographer, who, by the way, is a lady also, "he visited his unknown correspondent, Madam Von Kalb, and through her was his presence made known to the distinguished literary characters of the day. All wanted to see this wonderful man. The men received him with open arms, the women *with beating hearts*. They vied with each other in their attentions to him; even the Dutchess Amelia, who had given orders that they should immediately inform her of his arrival, flattered him by many expressions of sympathy and admiration." "This wonderful man" wrote somewhat less than one hundred volumes of novels and miscellanies, all in a style which none but a madman or transcendentalist would imitate; and, *in a language which native Germans cannot understand without a new dictionary or glossary*. In all his novels, he has repeated the changes of his own variegated life, and made himself, his relatives and friends the heroes of his epics; so that the Germans, with the help of a new lexicon, and foreigners, by learning a new language and wading through half a hundred volumes of fiction, may learn what a *strange* and "wonderful man" Jean Paul Richter was.

7. *Novels, it is said, ought to be encouraged because they increase the sum of human happiness, by the real pleasure which they afford to the reader.* To the cultivated mind, the best novels, when viewed as works of art, furnish a high intellectual treat. The pleasure is of the same kind as that derived from the contemplation of a finished statue; a beautiful picture; or a sublime poem. This pleasure is innocent. It is also invigorating to the intellect and taste; but to the reader who seeks only excitement from the story, the perusal of the most unexceptionable novels is enervating and demoralizing. It is not desirable to excite strong sympathy for imaginary beings. The mind having nothing to act upon, like a surcharged musket, recoils upon itself. When the heart is warmed with pity for real woe, it is made better; when its best feelings are wasted upon mere phantoms, it either becomes callous, or prematurely sensitive. When there is no real object for the excited affections to cling to, the moral constitution is usually enfeebled and the sensibilities blunted, and a more pungent stimulus is required at every successive excitation. The effect of this unnatural activity of the emotions upon the soul, is similar to that of narcotics upon

the body. In both cases, the nervous energy is exhausted. Constant attendance upon the theatre, where the strongest passions are appealed to, or habitual novel-reading, destroys all genuine sensibility. No heart is so cold as that of the languid sentimentalist, who has often wept for unreal wo. One single pulsation of pity, accompanied by the smallest act of beneficence to a real sufferer, outweighs all the factitious sorrow and unavailing tears which a life of devotion to the tragic exhibitions of the theatre can produce. Sympathy and affection, like faith, are only valuable *in action*. It is in vain to *talk* of human suffering, or even *feel* for it, if we do not *act*. Real life demands our best affections. It is not *right* to lavish them upon fancied distress. Besides the injury done to the heart in the loss of sensibility, occasioned by familiarity with imaginary sufferings, many novels fill the mind with groundless fears and absurd superstitions. Those authors who choose for their favorite themes the varieties of the supernatural,

Somnia, terrores magicos, miracula, sagas,
Nocturnas lemures portentaque,

distress the young reader with imaginary terrors. When we read Mrs. Radcliffe's wild and fearful tales, the real world seems to disappear, and we live in an enchanted region of her own creation, "where mouldering castles rise conscious of deeds of blood," where deep vaults and lonely halls echo with the tramp of the disturbed dead. Few men can enjoy quiet slumber after reading, late at night, the "Mysteries of Udolpho," or the "Romance of the Forest." The timid reader trembles, in his solitary couch, at the creaking of a shutter, expecting, every moment, to see the midnight assassin enter from some concealed passage. The spectres and ghosts, with whose history he has become so familiar, come uninvited to the dormitory of their new acquaintance. They clank their chains and utter their dismal groans in his hearing, to confirm the truth of the horrid history to which he had devoted his waking hours. Few young persons can read tales of such terrific interest, without being haunted with "thick coming fancies," by day, and troubled dreams, by night.

8. *Novels, it is said again, afford to the mind a relief from severer employments.* This is sometimes true. But it is far oftener the case, that the novel-reader neglects all his appropriate duties for this amusement. The class of minds which absolutely need re-

laxation from severe application is very small. Such men seldom read novels. They have no time to devote to such recreation. They generally seek their solace in works that can *instruct*, as well as *please*. The sober, strong-minded man has little love for fiction. Those scholars who are passionately fond of novels in their youth, generally lose all relish for them when they have acquired a taste for solid learning. There is so much to be learned, and so much to be done, in this short life, that few men who justly appreciate their duties, and the worth of time, will come down from their high vocations to seek pleasurable excitement in fictitious tales, or turn aside from the wants of the suffering poor, "who are always with them," to shed unavailing tears over imaginary wo. It is the excitable, the gay, the idle, the devotees of fashion, who seek new stimulus for their exhausted sensibilities in works of fiction. It is not those who "think too much," but those who think too little, the absolutely *thoughtless herd*, that waste time in this species of beggarly day-dreaming, in which, says Mr. Coleridge, "the mind of the dreamer furnishes nothing but laziness and a little mawkish sensibility; while the whole materiel and imagery of the doze is supplied, ab extra, by a sort of mental camera obscura, manufactured at the printing-office, which, pro tempore, fixes, reflects, and transmits the moving phantasms of one man's delirium, so as to people the barrenness of a hundred other brains, afflicted with the same trance or suspension of all common sense and all definite purpose." It is sometimes regarded as a sufficient vindication of novels, that they furnish employment for vacant minds; that they occupy the thoughts of the idle and dissolute, who would else be plotting mischief. Theatrical amusements, public spectacles, and games of chance, have probably served the same *noble end*. Miller, in his "History Philosophically Illustrated," has shown us that card-playing, when it was first introduced, was greatly useful in quelling the turbulent passions of ferocious knights, and turning their thoughts from lust and sensual indulgence. Will Christian philosophers advocate the continuance of *card-playing* and *gambling*, to prevent crime, and refine libertines and epicureans? When men have become so debased as to derive an *upward impulse* from reading Paul Clifford or Jack Shepard, or any of those numerous "splendid fictions," which show to the astonished world that an adventurous warfare upon all that men hold dear, is the most glorious, as well as the shortest road to romantic immortality, then it is

time that the schoolmaster and missionary "should be abroad," in our own land. Many of our most popular modern novels, in which there is a miserable effort to excite curiosity, by giving fame, or at least notoriety, to the meanest and vilest of our kind, cannot furnish an innocent recreation to any class of readers, least of all to those who are already inclined to desperate deeds. They stimulate the worst passions of our nature. They give new interest to great crimes, and rouse the fainting courage of abandoned youth to deeds of reckless daring. The American Tract Society, in their recent report, speaking of such works, uses the following language: "It became a grave question how far the increasing catalogue among us of shameless crimes whose names are "Legion"—of peculation, of murder, and of suicide, was traceable to the corrupting influence of such publications! Corvosier, the murderer of Lord William Russell, confessed, and wished the sheriff to let it be known to the world, (and the murderer's dying message has reached our land,) that the *idea* of his work of blood was first suggested to him by reading and seeing the performance of "Jack Shepard." This book was lent to him by one of the servants of the Duke of Bedford, and he lamented that he had ever seen it. Oxford, too, who sought the Queen's life, it is said, made substantially the same statement respecting the influence upon his mind of the "Bravo of Venice." Jack Shepard has been dramatized and acted, many nights, at "the Adelphi," in London, with great applause, and the exploits of this gay highwayman were represented before the eyes of a *brilliant* and *sympathizing* audience. The story of Madame Lafarge, who was convicted of poisoning her husband, has also been translated from the French, dramatized and exhibited for the edification of the sentimental ladies of England and America. Her autobiography will furnish all the stage directions as well as hypocritical disguises, which even an amateur female assassin could desire. But, for the present, theatrical exhibitions and novel-reading have been cast somewhat into the shade, in our large cities, by popular lectures. By this means, those weak minds which cannot endure the fatigue of thinking, are furnished with a small capital of information for a small pecuniary reward, and those highly sensitive souls that cannot resist temptation, are, for the time being, restrained from the commission of crime by the presence of respectable society. For a time, this mode of occupying those who could not rationally and virtuously employ

themselves, seemed to promise great good to the community. But it is to be feared that this system, like every thing else *human*, is destined to degenerate, and that infidelity and quackery will soon find more champions in the lecture-room, than religion and science.

The evils of novel-reading are confined principally to the young and thoughtless. The old hack, whose sensibilities are dead, can scarcely be made worse by false rhetoric, bad taste, or corrupt morals. But when a passion for romance seizes a young mind, it is ruinous. It destroys all relish for the serious duties of life, and renders its victim unstable and giddy. His reason is subjected to feeling. He lives in an unreal world. He dreams of Elysian fields amid the very deserts of life. He speaks and writes in the borrowed sentiments of the novelist. Affectation takes the place of ingenuousness. His manners are artificial, his plans a mere dream of romance. He imagines himself a hero, and the object of his young affections a heroine. Nothing but sad disappointment can enlighten such an enthusiast. All, to be sure, are not equally injured by promiscuous novel-reading, but very few escape unscathed. It requires the strongest minds, the very highest order of intellect, to resist its enervating influence; for there is no mental discipline in it, no mental nutriment is derived from it. It is only the profound critic, who studies a novel as a work of art, analyzes its plot, and duly estimates its characters, that derives intellectual improvement from it.

The common reader is excited (perhaps wrongly) and pleased for the hour, then left in a state of languor and mental imbecility. The understanding, thereby, loses its healthy tone, and the young romancer becomes a sickly sentimentalist. No man could appreciate the influence of novels better than Sir W. Scott. It may be supposed that he would certainly view them in the most favorable light. I conclude in his words: "Excluding from consideration those infamous works which address themselves directly to the grosser passions of our nature, we are inclined to think, the worst evil to be apprehended from the perusal of novels is, that the habit is apt to generate an indisposition to real history and useful literature; and that the best which can be hoped is, that they may sometimes instruct the youthful mind by real pictures of life, and sometimes awaken their better feelings and sympathies by strains of generous sentiment and tales of fictitious wo. Beyond this point, they are

a mere elegance, a luxury contrived for the amusement of polished life, and the gratification of that half love of literature which pervades all ranks of an advanced stage of society, and are read much more for amusement than with the least hope of deriving instruction from them."

ARTICLE VI.

LIFE, CHARACTER, AND WORKS OF JOHN WESLEY.

By Samuel G. Brown, Professor in Dartmouth College, N. H.

MORE than twenty years ago, the Poet Laureate of Great Britain, somewhat to the surprise of all parties, wrote "The Life of Wesley, and the Rise and Progress of Methodism." The work was variously criticised. By some it was condemned, as much too favorable to Wesley; by others, as being quite unjust. Some were surprised at its liberality; others at its narrowness. From the censures of parties so widely sundered, we might with some safety conclude, that its virtues are very great. It would however be quite out of place to criticise, at this late day, the merits of the very comprehensive and interesting work of Dr. Southey, but we hope it may not be amiss to review again the life of so singular and distinguished a man as Wesley with such aids as subsequent publications may offer.

The latter part of the seventeenth and the first part of the eighteenth centuries were distinguished in England, for a general declension of spiritual religion. It is not necessary here minutely to inquire the reasons of a fact which no one denies. It was owing in part, perhaps, to the loose morals of the court, subsequent to the restoration, which, after infecting the higher classes, sent down the streams of its poisonous influence to the very dregs of the populace. In part it was owing to the violent convulsions of the civil wars, which unsettled the minds of the people; in part, to a natural opposition to all priestly influence, induced by years of ecclesiastical tyranny; and in part, to the

inefficiency of the clergy and the inadequate provision for the religious instruction of the people. Some of the wisest and best of men lived during these times, but they are single stars in the overcast firmament. The irreligious spirit had pervaded the universities; and the cloisters of Oxford and Cambridge, which the church had founded for the diffusion of religion and learning, were filled with men, destitute of faith themselves, and intolerant of it in others. The Chancellor of Oxford was obliged in a program to exhort the tutors to discharge their duty by double diligence, and had forbidden the undergraduates to read such books as might tend to the weakening of their faith; but fashion and wit drove the tide against argument and authority. So late as 1736, Bishop Butler wrote in the advertisement to the "*Analogy*," "It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry, but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat it as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among all people of discernment, and nothing remained but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world."

Meanwhile Providence was preparing an agency destined to exert a marvellous and permanent influence upon those great bodies of the people which were not refined enough to be carried away by the gay and licentious skepticism of the day, nor learned enough to be much affected by the logical treatises of learned prelates; an agency destined ultimately to startle from their spiritual lethargy all classes in the kingdom.

Had a stranger visited Oxford about the year 1732, he would probably have been called to notice a small company of young men, singular in their manners and their dress, studious and exact in their habits, strict in obeying the injunctions of the Rubrick, economical and devout. They went to receive the sacrament at St. Mary's, through a crowd of ridiculing fellow-students, but the laughter only united them more closely to each other, and drove them to a more cautious and earnest study of the Bible and books of practical piety. They were called Bible-bigots, Sacramentarians, the Holy Club. Every day increased the bitter scorn with which they were assailed; every day cemented more strongly their mutual attachment, and made wider the chasm between them and their fellows. They became

more methodical in their lives: they watched, and fasted, and prayed; they waited more carefully on the sick and the prisoners, and gave money to the poor. "One of them had thirty pounds a year; he lived on twenty-eight and gave away forty shillings. The next year he received sixty pounds; he still lived on twenty-eight and gave away thirty-two. The third year he received ninety pounds and gave away sixty-two. The fourth year he received one hundred and twenty pounds; still he lived as before and gave to the poor ninety-two." This one was John Wesley, the great statesman of Methodism. In this company too was his brother Charles, the "sweet singer" of the sect that was to be, and Whitefield, its eloquent preacher, who had come up from washing mops and cleaning rooms at the Bell Inn in Gloucester, to enter as a Servitor at Pembroke College.

It could not be presumed that such a band would restrict themselves within the limits of the utmost prudence. They were compelled to learn by experience what no one was able or willing to teach them, and that experience was sometimes bitter, as their course was sometimes erratic and visionary. They determined to live for another world and to mortify themselves in this. They multiplied their good works, and bound themselves by rules which Loyola or St. Francis would have been pleased with. They journeyed on foot in order to save money to give to the poor. Wesley would not have his hair dressed, for the same reason. They framed minute questions for self-examination, such as, whether they prayed with fervor on Monday, Wednesday, Friday and Saturday at noon; whether they used a collect at nine, twelve and three o'clock; whether they meditated on Sunday from three to four on Thomas à Kempis, or mused on Wednesday and Friday from twelve to one on the Passion. They regularly visited the sick and the prisoners; they fasted two days in the week and sometimes three; they received the sacrament every Sabbath; during the six weeks of Lent they ate no flesh except on Saturdays and Sundays. Whitefield chose the worst sort of food in order to humble himself the more; he went out in stormy nights, into the walk of Christ-Church and prayed for two hours; sometimes kneeling, sometimes lying on his face, because Christ was tempted in the *desert*. He thought it unbecoming a penitent to have his hair powdered, or to wear a clean dress, and his gown was patched, his shoes were dirty, his whole apparel mean.

The enthusiasm of such men would not be likely to be checked by the ridicule of wittlings from whose society they had the courage to break off, nor even by the arguments of more sober men who had never experienced such depths of sorrow as were stirred up in their own bosoms. Their growing asceticism, however, which opposition might only have strengthened, was rebuked in a more effectual way. Whitefield became so emaciated that he could scarcely creep up stairs, and finally a fit of sickness confined him for seven weeks. Others of the company suffered in like manner, till their number, which was never more than twenty-five, was reduced to five or six. Although Wesley was not the originator of the austerities which they thought fit to practise, yet from his age, experience, learning and office, (he was at this time Fellow of Lincoln College,) no less than from his natural fitness for the place, he became the head of the company.

The father of Wesley was Rector of Epworth, a man of considerable learning, great force of character, and devout piety. His mother was a remarkable woman; well educated, at a time when to be well educated implied a knowledge of Latin and Greek, independent in her opinions, when independence required sacrifices, of strong understanding and fervent piety. During the absence of her husband from his parish, she used to assemble her family on Sabbath evening, and read prayers and a sermon. When some of her neighbors wished to join the circle, she did not object, for, in the absence of the proper minister, "she could not but look upon every soul which he had left under her care, as a talent committed to her trust by the great Lord of all the families of heaven and earth." "If I am unfaithful," she wrote to her husband, "to him or to you, in neglecting to improve these talents, how shall I answer unto him, when he shall command me to render an account of my stewardship." Mr. Wesley was, however, somewhat alarmed by the report which reached him, that a conventicle was held at his house, and he wrote to her a decided disapprobation of the meetings. She replied to him with a representation of the good effected in this humble way, and of the evil which would follow if they were broken up, and concluded in these forcible words: "If you do, after all, think fit to dissolve this assembly, do not tell me that you *desire* me to do it, for that will not satisfy my conscience; but send me your *positive command*, in such full and express terms, as may absolve me from guilt and

punishment for rejecting this opportunity of doing good, when you and I shall appear before the great and awful tribunal of our Lord Jesus Christ." How much influence such a mother must have had on the future leader of a great sect, no one can fully estimate. The same energy, good judgment and earnestness remained with her through life, and made her the wise counsellor of her son when he was assailed at Oxford, and still later, when thousands regarded his will as law.

The early life of Wesley was attended with more than common dangers and prodigies. When he was six years old, he was rescued from the flames of their burning house a single moment before the roof fell in. He was the last of the children saved, having been forgotten in the hurry of the midnight escape.

When he was at school, his father's house became the scene of disturbances so singular as to be considered supernatural. Although not included in the common histories of demonology, they are among the most remarkable and well attested of those events which have so frequently satisfied the credulity (not to say sober judgment) of men. The supernatural visitants made their presence known, by appealing, as usual, to the sense of hearing, rather than to that of sight. Now there was a knocking on the table, on the shelves, about the beds, a heavy footstep was heard in a room which had long been locked up. Now the sound seemed as though the pewter had been hurled into the middle of the room, but not a platter had been moved; now as though a basket of glass bottles had been shivered at once; now as though a quantity of silver fell into Mrs. Wesley's lap and ran jingling to her feet; now it was like the creaking of a saw or a windmill. The iron casements of the windows rattled; the door-latches moved up and down, though no one was near; the hand-mill whirled swiftly, though no one touched it; the trencher danced on the table, and, on these occasions, the wind rose and whistled about the house. The elder Wesley, who had no fear of the devil, on one occasion rated their unknown tormentor soundly for his contemptible conduct in trying to frighten the children, and dared him to come into the study to him who was a man. Old Jeffrey (so they had named him) immediately gave a loud and peculiar knock, as if to say, "with great pleasure, sir," and the next evening when Mr. Wesley went to the study, of which he alone had the key, the door was thrust back upon him with great violence. He pressed in, however, and

there was nothing there ; but the knocking began now on one side and then on the other. Wesley adjured the imp to speak, but there was no reply. One of his daughters was with him. "Nancy," said Mr. Wesley, determined to be fair with the spirit, "two Christians are an over match for the devil. Go all of you down stairs ; it may be, when I am alone, it will have courage to speak." They went. Wesley repeated the adjuration, but the devil remained deaf and dumb. They soon lost all fear of their mysterious visitor, and the children had no pleasanter frolic than to chase the knocking about from room to room. For two months this continued by night and by day, and no clew to its real cause was ever discovered. All the family believed it to be supernatural. The credulity which John Wesley sometimes showed in after life, may be in part ascribed to his firm belief in the agency of spirits in the affairs of men, so early and forcibly impressed upon him. Nor should we smile with too much self-complacency on the folly of that good family, when we remember their devout spirit, their serious view of life, their habitual communion with the invisible and the future, or the general belief of even many fine scholars of the time, in that last "lingering fiction of the brain."*

Of the bearing of John Wesley at the Charter House School in London, we have very meagre accounts. He was starved and fagged by the older boys, according to the custom of the English schools at that time, while by his quietness, regularity and application, he became a favorite with the master. At seventeen years of age he was transferred to Oxford, and subsequently became fellow of Lincoln College. It was to the discipline of the university, and especially to his duties as Greek lecturer and moderator of the logic classes, which obliged him to attend the disputations of the students six times a week, that he owed much of that thorough scholarship, and that power of clear and subtle discrimination, and expert argument, which fitted him for the great employment of his future life. Here he began that diary which acquaints us with the feelings and opinions and daily employments of one of the most active men, for nearly seventy years. Here he began to apportion his time. Every day had its fixed occupations. Monday and Tuesday were allotted to the Classics ; Wednesday to Logic and Ethics ;

* See Scott on Demonology and Witchcraft.

Thursday to Hebrew and Arabic ; Friday to Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy ; Saturday to Oratory and Poetry ; Sunday to Divinity ; and a good deal of time somewhere to Mathematics. He soon learned, however, the sorrowful lesson, that to know some things well, we must be contented to be ignorant of a great many more. Over his pupils he exercised a stricter control than had been common at the university, and showed the germ at least of those "disciplinary habits," for which he became so famous. He obliged them to rise early in the morning ; he superintended their reading ; he regulated their morals ; he controlled their general conduct.

But Oxford was to be remembered by him for still weightier reasons than for the sound scholarship she gave him. His brother Charles had joined him as member of Christ-Church, and the religious feeling of both became most thoroughly aroused. Their earnest and awakening minds were deeply affected by the writings of Thomas à Kempis, Jeremy Taylor, and William Law. The Imitation of Christ, the Holy Living, and the Serious Call, left them in no doubt as to the great duty, the great labor of life, without directing them with sufficient plainness to the only means through which man can "be just with God." The world was nothing to them ; eternity, every thing. With their own hands they must painfully work out their own salvation ; with their own hands they must roll up the huge Sisyphean rock which every moment recoiled upon them with new weight. Hence their seclusion ; their rigorous self-denial, their pharisaical peculiarities, which the friendship of Law and the fellowship of Whitefield and Hervey and Morgan only exasperated. It was not the age of asceticism, or Wesley would certainly have gone to the wilderness and lived a hermit : it was not an age of religious enthusiasm, or he

* "When I observe," wrote one of them, "how fast life flies away, and how slow improvement comes, I think one can never be too much afraid of dying before one has learned to live, I mean even in the course of nature. For were I sure that 'the silver cord should not be violently loosed ;' that 'the wheel should not be broken at the cistern' till it was quite worn away by its own motion ; yet what a time would this give me for such a work ! a moment, to transact the business of eternity ! What are forty years in comparison of this ? So that were I sure what man never yet was sure of, how little would it alter the case !"

might have preached another crusade. England was not a country for monks, or he would certainly have founded a new and rigorous order.

In 1732, the charter of the province of Georgia was granted by George II., and in 1735 Oglethorpe, the leader of the colony, returned to England for a reinforcement. The enterprise was everywhere regarded with favor, and the trustees sought for men to go out as ministers to the colonists and the Indians. They turned their eyes to the Wesleys. Who else had so much of the missionary spirit? After some hesitation the brothers concluded to accept the invitation. Two years before, a band of Moravians, amid hymns and prayers, had left the little community of Herrnhut, and "floating down the Maine, and between the castles, crags, the vineyards and the white-walled towns that adorn the banks of the Rhine," had embarked at Rotterdam, and settled in freedom and hope near Savannah. On board the vessel in which the Wesleys embarked, they found a number of Moravians going to join their brethren. The whole company might honestly have adopted the seal of the corporation of the colony, "a group of silk-worms at their toils," with the motto *non sibi sed aliis*, not for themselves but for others. The leaven of selfishness was not mingled with their motives. "Are you one of these knights-errant?" said an unbeliever to Wesley. "You have a good provision for life, must you leave all to fight windmills?" "Sir," replied the missionary, "if the Bible be not true, I am as very a fool and madman as you can conceive, but if it be of God, I am sober-minded; for he has declared, "There is no man who has left houses, or friends, or brethren, for the kingdom of God's sake, who shall not receive manifold more in the present time, and in the world to come, everlasting life."

The conduct of the Moravians during the voyage, full of patience and forbearance under vexations, full of confidence in danger, exhibited to Wesley a new feature of the Christian life. A sudden storm came on as they were singing the psalm at the commencement of their worship. The sea broke over the ship and rushed down between the decks. A dreadful screaming was heard among the English: the Moravians calmly sang on. Wesley asked one of them if he was not afraid,—if the women and children were not afraid? "No," he replied, "thank God, no; our women and children are not afraid to die."

The labors of Wesley in Georgia were the least prosperous

and satisfactory labors of his life. John was stationed at Savannah and Charles acted as secretary of Oglethorpe at Frederica. Both were honest and faithful, both spent their time in works of charity and mercy,—both were unsuccessful. They were better fitted for stirring up the minds of various classes in the old country, than for ruling the rather independent spirit of the infant colony. The mind of Oglethorpe became prejudiced against Charles through the misrepresentations of his enemies, to such an extent, that the unfortunate secretary was left actually to suffer for want of the bare necessities of life. He lay upon the ground in a corner of the hut, and could not obtain the luxury of a few boards for a bed, and at last fell into a fever. This alienation between himself and the governor was subsequently healed, and in a few months he was sent to England as bearer of despatches. John came near being married to a lady in the colony; but the negotiation was somewhat abruptly broken off. The attachment on neither side seems to have been very extravagant, since we find the lady shortly marrying another, and Wesley soon after excluding her from the communion table, according to certain rules of ecclesiastical discipline which had long lain dormant. He does not appear to have chosen the happiest moment for reviving them, nor to have done it with an excess of Christian courtesy. This ecclesiastical proceeding produced a difficulty which ended in his leaving America for England, after having spent in the new world a year and nine months.

But though so little was effected for the colony, a great influence was exerted on Wesley. He began to perceive that there were most important religious feelings which he had never experienced. He began to conjecture that the path which he was painfully pursuing was delusive and vain. His intercourse with the Moravians strengthened these convictions. They had a faith unfelt by him: he never had the serenity in trouble, the joy even in great perils, the lively hope "full of immortality," which they had. His voyage home afforded him time for a solemn review of his religious experience, which ended in the painful though salutary conviction that he had "no such faith in Christ as prevented his heart from being troubled." He had labored with some fidelity to convert others, but now he had to be converted himself. In London he met with Peter Bohler, a Moravian minister. The conversation turned on "saving faith." Wesley pressed his objections. "My brother," said Bohler to

him, "that philosophy of yours must be purged away." Another day brought another conversation, and fresh amazement to Wesley, as Bohler assured him of the "fruits of a living faith, the holiness and happiness which attend it." The next morning he began his Greek Testament anew, determined to abide by the law and the testimony, and confident that a humble and honest inquirer would not seek in vain. He listened with wonder to the testimony of living witnesses. He read Luther on the Galatians, and learned to his astonishment that the English church "was founded on this important article of justification by faith alone." The two years which followed his return from America were painful in their experience, but rich in their fruits. He had the sentence of death in his own soul, and struggled by a perfect obedience to reverse the terrible doom, till he found the law too high for him, and that by its deeds shall no man living be justified; till he found too another great doctrine which gradually revealed itself to his groping mind, "*Believe*, and thou shalt be saved." The whole current of his thoughts was changed. "Now, sir," says he in a letter to his former friend and adviser, Mr. Law, "suffer me to ask, how you will answer it to our common Lord, that you never gave me this advice? Why did I scarcely ever hear you name the name of Christ; never so as to ground any thing upon faith in his blood? I beseech you, sir, by the mercies of God, to consider deeply and impartially whether the true reason of your not pressing this upon me was not this, that you had it not yourself?" He proceeds with a tone of equal vigor and more asperity, which would seem to indicate that he had some other spirit quite as active as the "catholic charity" which in after life he was inclined to. But his mind had evidently been undergoing a deep change. He called it *conversion*. "Oh what a work," said he, "has God begun! such a one as shall never come to an end, till heaven and earth pass away!"

No one ever produced a great moral revolution whose heart was not the seat of painful struggles and a glorious victory: who did not feel in the profoundest depths of his soul, the life-giving truths, which it were better to die than not to publish. Luther did not go forth on his mission, was not *fitted* for his mission, till he had suffered the agony of a soul, struggling in blindness and doubt onward to salvation: till he had prayed and wept over the word of God, and had rested his buffeted and weary spirit on that foundation rock of the Reformation, the

doctrine that man is justified by faith in Christ. After that, his whole duty was clear before him as noonday. He had but one thing to do, and that he must do,—to bear the flaming torch of truth through the world, to proclaim from every housetop everlasting liberty to those who are bound in the chains of the law. So it was with Wesley. He must preach the gospel: necessity was laid upon him; a bitter experience, a joyful hope had enlightened his way and made the rough places plain.

In the year 1722 a company of Moravians under the guidance of Christian David, had left the country of their fathers where nothing remained for them but persecution and distress, and sought the protection of Count Zinzendorf, in Lusatia, one of the Protestant provinces of Germany. The Count assigned them a spot on his estates for their settlement, to which they gave the name Herrnhut, 'the watch of the Lord,' a name which has become famous in the history of their community. They came poor indeed in the wealth of the world, since the little which they had in Bohemia they were for the most part obliged to abandon; but they were rich in the recollection of an ancestry, who through many dark centuries had cherished on their altars the flame of a pure religion, who had suffered all that men can suffer for the liberty of conscience, and were at last borne down by the brute force of their enemies. They remembered the spirit awakened among them by the writings of Wickliffe. They remembered how the gentle and heroic Huss had been treacherously betrayed, and made to lead the van of the "noble army of their martyrs:" how the intrepid Jerome had sung a hymn in the midst of the flames. They remembered the bloody wars which followed the Council of Constance, and the relentless persecutions which forced some to a denial of their faith, and more to meet in secret at midnight to encourage each other and receive the sacrament. Some of them had come out of Moravia singing the same hymn which their fathers had sung a hundred years before, on *their* exodus for the same reason, from the house of bondage. This little community, "persecuted, but not forsaken! cast down, but not destroyed!" chastened and humbled by their trials, lively in faith and peculiar in their manners and discipline, Wesley determined to visit, that he might learn something more of a people whose daily life illustrated the great doctrines which he had begun to feel.

The intercourse of Wesley with the Brethren (as they were called) was interesting, and to him very profitable. He ad-

mired the simplicity of their character, their meekness and love, and charity and contentment. He gathered many hints from their policy which were of considerable use in the future organization of his own societies. But it is impossible not to suppose that the germ of that dissatisfaction was at this time implanted which led him at a future time to withdraw entirely from the Moravians. Count Zinzendorf was the patron of the community, and wished to receive Wesley as a pupil. The self-confidence and spirit of authority in the great Methodist were just shooting out into a vigorous maturity, and the Count was to him but a man, subject to the same rules of logic and argument with other men. Our sympathies are more subtle and swift than the deductions of the understanding, and probably the two great and good men found their enthusiastic admiration of each other somewhat tempered by the free intercourse of a month, though neither might be willing to acknowledge it. But nothing prevented Wesley from feeling that he would willingly "have spent his life in Herrnhut, if his Master did call him to labor in another part of the vineyard."

The work to which he was destined was indeed far greater than he or any one could anticipate. He returned to London to engage actively in preaching and other religious labors. He joined his brother Charles, who had visited the prisoners at Newgate and accompanied them to Tyburn. The effect of their efforts was decided, and the poor prisoners were brought to a state of penitence and faith. Their fame spread as holy men: the sick desired their prayers, and were healed by them. Frenzied lunatics became calm under the kind words which they spoke, and the impressive language of their petitions. Their meetings in Fetter-lane—the central point of their operations—became larger, and the scenes exhibited there tended to increase the enthusiasm of Wesley, to strengthen his confidence in his own resources, and render him skilful in controlling the increasing body of his followers. He gradually yielded to the conviction that he was selected under Providence for a great work, and though he may not have looked far into the future, still he was probably revolving those plans which fourscore years found him consummating. Here too began those singular physical results which have clung so tenaciously to Methodism, wherever preached, but which will be better noticed hereafter.

In the history of Methodism, Bristol deserves a prominent place, and will ever be remembered with interest. Whitefield

had returned from Georgia full of zeal for his new orphan-house at Savannah, and was preaching to crowded houses. A thousand stood about the doors of Bermondsey church, and could find no admittance. Shall all these (thought Whitefield) hunger for the bread of life and not receive a crumb, because the stone walls are too narrow to contain them? Does the Most High dwell only in temples made with hands? Are not the disciples authorized to go into the highways and hedges? Did not our Saviour preach on the mount and in the desert? These inquiries show whither was tending the current of his thoughts, and how the multitude of his hearers was suggesting to him a wider theatre for his eloquence. Near Bristol was a rough tract called Kingswood. Once a royal chase, it had fallen into disuse, till the discovery of its coal-mines converted it at once into the inexhaustible treasury from which the city drew its stores of fuel. The colliers were a wild and savage set, who seemed almost to belong to another race. Upon them the first experiment of field-preaching was made. The heart of Whitefield was moved by the thought of the heathen at his own door when he had gone so far to preach to the Indians. He stood upon a mount called Rose Green; and a few hearers gathered around him, attracted and astonished by the novelty of the message. His second audience numbered two thousand, the third, four or five thousand, and so on to ten, fifteen, and twenty thousand hearers at once. This example of field-preaching was soon followed by Wesley, though somewhat reluctantly, for he (and yet more his brother Charles) still clung with affectionate respect to the time-hallowed usages of a venerable church. The die however was cast; the step was taken which inevitably led to such important results. Pulpits were shut against them for their irregularity, but they never lacked for church-yards or open fields. One of the most affecting scenes of Wesley's life occurred some years later than this on one of these occasions. He came in his journeying to the little parish of Epworth, where he was born; where his venerable father had spent his long and useful life. Years had passed since he had been there: his friends and acquaintances were mostly gone, and the curate refused him permission to preach in the church. He could not endure to depart from *that* place without delivering his message. Notice was given that he would preach in the church-yard at six o'clock. "Accordingly," he says, "at six I came, and found such a congregation as I believe

Epworth never saw before. I stood near the east end of the church upon my father's tombstone, and cried, 'The kingdom of heaven is not in meat and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.'" John Wesley preaching on his father's grave presents an almost unequalled subject for the pencil that would portray the early scenes of the rising denomination. The time, the place, the people, kindled his ardent enthusiasm to the utmost. Upon that hallowed spot he was inspired, as Southey says, "like the Greek tragedian, who, when he performed *Electra*, brought into the theatre the urn containing the ashes of his own daughter." The most affectionate, the holiest, the profoundest feelings of his nature were touched. "Seven successive evenings he preached upon that tombstone," with a power and effect nowhere ever exceeded.

But we return to the order of the narrative. Kingswood became a very prominent and important theatre of the labors of Wesley, and the scene of certain exhibitions which it is much easier to describe than fully to explain. We refer to those convulsions, and agonies, and paroxysms which attended the preaching of Wesley, and unfortunately were not exhibited here alone. Men were suddenly struck down to the earth as if dead; they were thrown into violent fits; they were attacked with pain so excessive that they could not help crying out in agony; they were seized with trembling and sunk down powerless. Wesley had seen fits of epilepsy and hysteria, but these were unlike, and his ready faith ascribed them to the power of the devil,* and sometimes to the miraculous agency of the Most High. They did not come upon the followers of Wesley alone. 'A Quaker who was present, and inveighed against the dissimulation of those affected, was himself seized, even while biting his lips and knitting his brows, and fell as if struck by lightning.' A stranger passing by stopped to listen to the preaching, and suddenly felt himself grasped by the unknown power and fell prostrate. An honest weaver, 'zealous for the church,' and against dissenters, went about 'to convince his acquaintance that it was all a delusion of the devil,' but as he was reading a sermon he changed color, fell from his chair, and screamed so terribly that the neighbors were alarmed and ran into the house; 'his breast

* In this he was not altogether peculiar. We find the same opinion suggested by Ralph Erskine, of Scotland.

heaved as in the pangs of death, and great drops of sweat trickled down his face.' These things were not the result of dishonesty in the sufferers. They were no doubt in part owing to the amazing power of the speaker over his audience, many of whom regarded him, from his commanding attitude, his imposing appearance, and his awful message, like an inhabitant of another world. A part of the effect may be ascribed to the erroneous doctrine which led the hearers to *expect* some visible token or some sensible effect, as a sign of their conviction and conversion. A part may be ascribed to the power of enthusiasm, of fear and sympathy, and general nervous excitement; and a part, no doubt—though a small part—to a desire of attracting the notice of the great preacher, and even to deception. Wesley's frank and generous nature allowed him to be deceived by his friends much more readily than by his enemies. Still, some things we may suspect to remain unexplained, and destined to illustrate a chapter in physiology or psychology, not yet fully written. The personal influence of the preacher is exhibited by the undoubted facts that these appearances showed themselves under Wesley much sooner than under Whitefield; that Wesley did not discourage them, while Whitefield did; and that under the later preaching of Wesley, when he had, to a considerable degree, changed his opinion of them as indications of a spiritual power, they diminished very much, if they did not entirely cease.

Wesley's enthusiasm was now at its height, and not as yet tempered by experience. The scenes which he was passing through were so strange and exciting, that he did not always stop to 'examine the spirits, whether or not they were of God.' That the sick were healed, that devils were cast out, that the lunatics were brought to their right mind, when he stretched out his hands over them in prayer, he does not seem to have doubted. His journal is filled with examples of cures wrought upon himself, upon his friends, upon his *horse* even, in answer to his petitions. Almost every day witnessed some surprising intervention of Divine Providence for his safety or his happiness, and the most remarkable of these supernatural events are related with a simplicity, and sometimes quaintness, worthy of good old Isaak Walton, or George Herbert. We are not careful to pick out the little flaws in the character of such a man, but it must be confessed, his credulity is no inconsiderable one. We have no sympathy with the harsh vituperation of Warburton

however vigorous and witty, but there were some things which provoked it. We are very far from that cold, mechanical philosophy which removes God from all concern with the world, and sees in all events only the agency of second causes, but Wesley was apt to see a special providence in almost every wind that blew, or drop of rain that fell. We do consider a 'believing spirit,' far, very far better than a skeptical spirit, but Wesley believed when the evidence was chiefly his feelings. We condemn this enthusiasm and credulity as wild and mischievous—perhaps in after life he regarded them somewhat in the same light—but we may question whether they were not needful to him, absolutely essential for accomplishing the work he had in hand. He never could have labored as he did, to effect an earthborn or selfish project. Nothing but a divine work 'which should never come to an end, till heaven and earth pass away,' and a belief in the favor of the Most High daily communicated to him, would have urged him, in the absence of all worldly honor and emolument, to his long, laborious and self-denying service. A calm philosophy, carefully analyzing the mysteries of truth and falsehood, exactly adjusting the righteous balance, whatever great good it may accomplish, does not impel men to such courses. Zeal has its work to do in the renovation of the world as truly as prudence.

Wesley was far too vehement to plod along in the old path. His sympathies might cling to the past, but his mind rushed on to some new order of things in the future. He deceived himself when he thought or said otherwise. His determination was now made up for the course of his life, and occasional extravagances, even when he felt them, would not deter him from what on the whole seemed a great and necessary work. He had suffered too much and reflected too deeply, not to have opinions of his own, which the opposition of clergymen and the authority of bishops could not overthrow, and he was too active to allow those opinions to become a dead letter in the statute-book of his soul. No family confined him by domestic wants and responsibilities; all his time was cheerfully devoted to the duties of his weighty calling. Societies were everywhere formed, but as yet he meditated no separation from the established church. He only urged his followers to live like immortal beings, to be faithful servants of the Most High God. He asked no man for his creed, demanded no subscription to articles, no forsaking of a former mode of worship. "I am sick of

opinions," he said some time afterward, "give me solid and substantial religion: give me an humble and gentle lover of God and man: a man full of mercy and good faith, without partiality and without hypocrisy: a man laying himself out in the work of faith, the patience of hope and the labor of love. Let my soul be with these Christians, wheresoever they are, and whatsoever opinion they are of. * * * We may die without the knowledge of many truths, and yet be carried to Abraham's bosom; but if we die without love, what will knowledge avail? Just as much as it avails the devil and his angels!" No one could accuse him of idleness. He built chapels, holding the right to them vested, not in trustees, but in himself. He appointed, or as he said, *tolerated* lay preachers, not to administer the ordinances but to preach the word. To this he came reluctantly, but he could not help it. The spirit which he had raised he could not allay, but only guide, and the great crowd which he sent out looked up to him for counsel as to a father. He demanded in them first of all, zeal. This covered a multitude of faults, and if it cooled, or Wesley became for other reasons dissatisfied with his preachers, he found another service for them, or they dropped back noiselessly to the common herd. Thus he had the great advantage of easily getting rid of the troublesome or weary spirits. He sought to improve the singing of his congregations, and in this, his brother Charles, with the beautiful melodies of his hymns, rendered him the greatest assistance. Sternhold and Hopkins were banished. Their famous (or infamous) compositions were a part of the service of the establishment, for which he retained not a particle of lingering attachment. He fitted up a large building in Moorfields, London, which had been used during the civil wars as a foundry for cannon, and henceforth the Foundry became the centre of the meetings in town. In the mean time the 'doctrine and discipline' spread through every county from Cornwall to Newcastle upon Tyne, and extended into Wales, Scotland and Ireland, so that in the year 1765, there were thirty-nine circuits in these countries.

It must not, however, be supposed that "all went merry as a marriage bell." Many were the perplexities, and bitter and dangerous sometimes the persecutions with which they met. All sorts of calumnies were heaped upon the head of Wesley and his associates. He was charged with being a Papist, a Jesuit, a follower of the Pretender. He was assailed by mobs who used freely the weapons best suited to them, stones and dirt,

while he replied with weapons most familiar to him, expostulation and argument. Sometimes one prevailed and sometimes the other. At one time he was pelted from the town, bruised, wounded, and half dead. At another, his mild manner, his dignified and fearless address awed and delighted even his rude assailants. The magistrates themselves encouraged the mob now by their pusillanimity, and again, through worse motives, by assurances of forbearance. The congregations fared almost as hard as the preachers. They were stoned, and thrown into ponds, and rolled in the mud. Women and children were exposed to the brutalities of an ignorant populace. They sometimes received indignities where they might have expected kindness. Dissenters even—themselves under disabilities for conscience' sake—joined with virulent churchmen to oppress the rising community. Dr. Doddridge was subjected to severe criticism and unworthy suspicions from his familiarity with Whitefield.

Notwithstanding all, Wesley pursued his way without hesitation. The history of his itinerancy is replete with scenes of romantic and fearful interest; full too of marked and strange effects of his preaching and that of his followers. He was thrown into contact with men of all classes, the high and the low, the learned and the ignorant, and always showed his ability and self-possession. We can give but a very brief account of a few circumstances among a thousand, which show his own power, and illustrate the force of truth upon minds excited to feel it. He was attacked at Bath by Beau Nash; but the king of the gay watering place found it one thing to direct festivities, and quite another to interfere with men engaged in the most solemn business which mortals can attend to; one thing to decide matters of honor and etiquette, and a far different thing to control the liberty of conscience and the laws of God. "By what authority are you preaching?" said Nash to Wesley. "By that of Jesus Christ," replied the priest, than whom no one ever better knew his position; "by that of Jesus Christ, conveyed to me by the present archbishop of Canterbury, when he laid his hands upon me and said, 'Take thou authority to preach the gospel.'" "What do these people come here for," said Nash. "Let an old woman answer him," cried one of the congregation. "You, Mr. Nash, take care of your body, we take care of our souls, and for the food of our souls we come here." The master of ceremonies had nothing more to say.

A preacher said in his sermon, "There are two witnesses dead and buried in dust, which will rise up against you. These are the two witnesses," he continued, holding up the Bible, "the Old Testament and the New, that have been dead and buried in the dust upon your shelf." "I remembered," said John Furz some time afterward, "that my Bible was covered with dust, and that I had written my name with the point of my finger upon the binding. I thought I had signed my own damnation on the back of the witness." He went home in terror. The struggle was a strong one, but he became a preacher for the rest of his life.

A party met at an alehouse in Rotherham, to amuse themselves by mimicking the Methodists. They preached for a wager. John Thorpe jumped on the table last in great glee, opened the Bible, and his eyes fell on the passage, "Except ye repent ye shall all likewise perish." He became serious and preached in earnest; "his hair stood erect at the feelings which came upon him, and the awful denunciations which he uttered." When he ceased, the wager was forgotten: he left the company and went home an altered man, and subsequently became an itinerant preacher.*

* Were we seeking for *curious* conversions, the annals of no sect would furnish more. A young man at Norwich, with a number of his gay companions, had his fortune told by a wandering fortune-teller. According to the usual style of such predictions, he was to live to a great age and see about him grandchildren and great-grandchildren. The prophecy so far affected him that he determined to lay up a rich store of entertaining knowledge for his future posterity, and to begin by hearing the wonderful preacher Whitefield, who was then in the city. In the course of the sermon, Whitefield paused, burst into tears, and lifting up his hands and eyes, exclaimed, 'Oh, my hearers, *the wrath to come, the wrath to come.*' These words sank into his heart like lead in the waters, and resulted in his conversion. Still more odd was another instance which is recorded. An innkeeper fond of singing, went to hear the music, and in order not to hear the sermon sat with his fingers in his ears. Suddenly a fly stung his nose, and just as he took down one hand to brush away the intruder, the preacher thundered out the text, "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear." The impression was irresistible; this was the beginning of a new life to him. Music was as serviceable in another singu-

From one of his busy circuits, Wesley was called home to the death-bed of that excellent mother to whom he owed so much for counsel and sympathy. His account of the last scene and of the funeral service is very characteristic, and affords another insight into his character. "I sat down on the bedside. She was in her last conflict, unable to speak, but I believe quite sensible. Her look was calm and serene, and her eyes fixed upward, while we commended her soul to God. From three to four the silver cord was loosing, and the wheel breaking at the cistern; and then without a struggle, or sigh, or groan, the soul was set at liberty. We stood round her bed and fulfilled her last request, uttered a little before she lost her speech: 'Children, as soon as I am released, sing a psalm of praise to God.' * * * Almost an innumerable company of people being gathered together at the funeral, about five in the afternoon I committed to the earth the body of my mother to sleep with her fathers. The portion of Scripture from which I afterwards spoke was, *I saw a great white throne, and Him that sat on it, from whose face the earth and the heaven fled away, and there was found no place for them. And I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God; and the books were opened, and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the book, according to their works.* It was one of the most solemn assemblies I ever saw, or expect to see, on this side eternity."

We may here pause a moment to inquire the cause of the rapid and extensive spread of Methodism in England; so ex-

lar case. At Wexford in Ireland, the Catholics sought to annoy the Methodists who met in a barn. One of them endeavored to secrete himself in the barn, in order that he might open the door to his companions at a proper time, but could find no hiding-place except a sack near the door, into which he crawled. The mob collected, but the singing of the Methodists was so good that Pat thought he would not disturb it, and when the hymn was done, he felt a curiosity to hear the prayer; but during the prayer he became so confounded and distressed that "he roared out, and not being able to get out, lay bawling and screaming, to the great dismay of the congregation, who supposed that Satan himself was in the barn. Somebody at last let him out, and he confessed his sins and cried for mercy." The change seems to have been genuine and the account well attested, though the circumstances of the case are probably unique.

tensive, that in a few years its followers were numbered by thousands, and there was hardly a considerable town in England or Wales which did not have its chapel. They were everywhere spoken against; they were everywhere more or less successful. Neither ridicule nor persecution, neither the neglect of the magistrates nor the opposition of prelates, neither the authority of Lavington nor the learning and asperity of Warburton, could stop the advancing opinion. The tide flowed up to the very foot of the frowning rocks, and insinuated itself into almost every hamlet in the kingdom. The causes are several, and some of them not difficult to be detected.

The class of people from whom the first converts were gathered, was a very ignorant class, unaccustomed to preaching of any kind; hence the word which they heard at fairs and market-places, in the fields and the collieries, startled them like a new revelation. They were heathen in a Christian country. A few words of truth at long intervals had come to their ears, just enough to awaken their suspicions and fear of a future wrath, just enough to afford a ground for the appeals of the preacher, but for not much more. They were as if under an enchantment, and when the terrible shell was shattered, they came out in all the bewilderment and fear of men who had been ignorantly sleeping on the brink of eternal destruction. It was the misfortune as well as the folly of the English church, to be bound so strictly by the customs of the fathers. To the poor the gospel was *not* preached, because the poor could find no room in the parish churches, which were not by any means sufficiently numerous for the population. There was little of that zeal for church extension which now animates nobles and prelates, and yet to preach elsewhere than within consecrated walls, shocked all their notions of order and propriety. The consequence was unavoidable, that great masses scattered over sparsely populated regions, or clustering about the centres of commerce, and in the mining regions, were left to ignorance and degradation. But this was one great class for which Wesley and his associates labored. Moorfields, "a royalty of the rabble, a place for wrestlers and boxers, mountebanks and merry-andrews," and Kingswood near Bristol, Kennington Common and Blackheath, were prominent scenes of their labors. The lawless and brutal inhabitants of the collieries, the dissolute and reprobate who resorted to the fairs to be trained up in vice, were their hearers. It should not then be wondered at, that

when Whitefield first preached to the colliers, ignorant, but too careless to be prejudiced, they stared upon him in utter astonishment, nor that they trembled as he warned them, with his awful power, of 'temperance, righteousness and judgment,' nor that the tears made white grooves down their sooty cheeks, as he told them of the love which Christ had for *them*. From these circumstances it happened that many societies were formed, not from the ordinary worshippers in the established church, but from those who worshipped nowhere.

Another reason is to be found in the nature of the doctrines preached. The great truths that men must be born again, and that conversion is instantaneous; that they must be justified by faith; that none who come to God through Christ will be cast away, were the cardinal points in their creed. Some doctrines were in dispute, such as free will and predestination, but these were not dwelt upon in their sermons. The burden of their exhortation was "flee from the wrath to come;" flee from the city of destruction; awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee life. They felt the absolute necessity of *regeneration* as something entirely different from resolutions, from Pharisaical obedience, from external humiliations and the performance of ceremonies, from a sombre countenance and a monkish life; of regeneration, as a mysterious change of the heart, wrought by the Spirit of God, which no one can explain, for none can comprehend, but as real and undeniable as our own existence. The liturgy and the creed were as full as ever of sound and wholesome doctrine. The Articles still read that "every man is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh always lusteth contrary to the spirit; and therefore in every person born into this world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation," and "that we are accounted righteous before God, only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ by Faith, and not for our own works or deservings;" but these comfortable truths were to a great extent a dead letter in the Prayer Book. Ministers resorted to the church for a living, with not even an intellectual apprehension of the truths they professed to teach. But these truths came to many a suffering and panting soul, like bread to the famished, like cold water to the dying of thirst. There were many who were travelling and groaning in bondage, and freedom could not be more delightful to the captive, than the liberty of Christ to them.

Another reason may be found in the character of the early Methodist preachers. The most remarkable and gifted of these was Whitefield, whose popularity renders it hardly worth the while to speak of his eloquence. In winter mornings he gathered a crowd at five o'clock, to hear his discourses in the Tabernacle. At night when he preached in the open air, "Moorfields was as full of lanterns as the Haymarket is of flambeaus on an opera night." A thousand notes were sometimes sent to him during the week by those whom his appeals had awakened. These surprising accounts may render us in some danger of judging a little unfairly of his real merits, when we find in his printed sermons so little to account for these effects, so little profound thought, so little argument, so little even of what we should most expect to find, bursts of feeling, a rush of startling imagery, an excessive vividness of appeal. He was emphatically a speaker, not a writer; a speaker whose instruments were not only his thoughts and words, but his eye, his hand, his unequalled voice, his whole frame; a speaker the most plain and direct, and simple to the comprehension of the meanest, of the liveliest sympathy, of the quickest perception, wise to conform to the peculiarities of his various audiences, and adroit to avail himself as by instinct of every casual circumstance which could enhance his power. To judge of such a man by the *remains* of his discourses will not do at all. "The books do *not* preserve the purest efficacy and extraction of that living intellect that bred them." The same may be said, though not perhaps with equal force, of other great orators, whose *just* fame would be belied by the record of their speeches. Neither the speeches of Patrick Henry nor the sermons of the late Dr. Mason, admirable as they are, would bear such a partial scrutiny. The man who could charm Dr. Franklin and Garrick, Hume and Doddridge, Bolingbroke, John Newton, Chesterfield and the rabble of Moorfields, must have had a virtue in him, which remains no more upon earth. It was the depth of his heart which spoke; hence when he first preached to polite audiences, accustomed to fine discourses,—that is, to lifeless ones,—his familiar language, his earnest tone, his genuine feeling, his plain exhortations, without learning or art but full of sincerity, caught hold irresistibly of the feelings of his audience. They perceived that he was speaking to *them*, on very serious matters, and their

whole sympathies flowed out towards the preacher. They flocked to hear one who told them such new things, new in fact to many, and in the manner of the telling, new to all.

Wesley himself, though better known to us as the founder of a sect, was no mean preacher. His labors in this part of his vocation were prodigious, and no one knew how to turn them to better effect. His earnest address, his self-possession, and his logical acuteness, sometimes carried conviction when the appeals of Whitefield were entirely ineffectual. "As soon as he got upon his stand," said one of his hearers in Moorfields, who afterwards became one of his preachers, "he stroked back his hair, and turned his face towards where I stood, and I thought fixed his eyes upon me. His countenance struck such an awful dread upon me, before I heard him speak, that it made my heart beat like the pendulum of a clock; and when he did speak, I thought his whole discourse was aimed at me."

Charles Wesley too, by his great fervor and sincerity, by his rich thoughts and copiousness of expression, attracted hearers of education and refinement, while the fervor of his devotion went to the deepest hearts of the serious. A dissenter who heard him thus described the effect: "Never did I hear such praying; never did I see such evident marks of fervency in the service of God. At the close of every petition a serious amen, like a gentle rushing sound of waters, ran through the whole audience, with such a solemn air as quite distinguished it from whatever of that nature I have heard attending the responses in the church service. * * He was standing on a table board in an erect posture, with his hands and eyes lifted up to heaven. He preached about an hour in such a manner as I scarce ever heard any man preach: though I have heard many a fine sermon, according to the common taste or acceptance of sermons, I never heard any man discover such evident signs of a vehement desire, or labor so earnestly to convince his hearers that they were all by nature in a sinful, lost, undone state. * * * And though he used no notes, nor had any thing in his hand but a Bible, yet he delivered his thoughts in a rich variety of expression and with so much propriety, that I could not observe any thing incoherent or inanimate through the whole performance. * * * * * If there be such a thing as heavenly music upon earth, I heard it there. As for my own part, I do not remember my heart to have been so

elevated in divine love and praise as it was then and there for many years past, if ever; and an affecting sense and savor thereof abode in my mind many weeks after."

Besides these, was a chosen company of preachers selected by Wesley himself, than whom no one ever judged more wisely of the fitness of the men for their office. Napoleon could not better select his generals than Wesley his preachers. Both were sometimes deceived, but not often. Whatever be the faults of democracy it usually has the virtue of giving "the tools to those who can use them." It may be foolish, may be passionate and rash, may be ungenerous and ungrateful, but seldom weak. In Wesley's scheme of government, there was a skilful mixture of freedom and constraint, of authority and independence. He himself was amenable to no man. He did not appoint himself the head of the sect, but came to it by the providence of God, and he bore himself like a King and Priest. His preachers did not choose him but he chose them. They were not obliged to bear the burdens which he laid upon them. Were they grieved at his measures? there was an easy remedy: when they entered the society they gave no pledge, and they might leave it without opposition. Did they become restless under his orders and seek to subvert his plans? they *must* leave the society. He gave them permission to preach in his chapels, and when they abused that permission, he withdrew it. His magnanimity never descended to annoying restrictions, nor to a capricious exercise of authority for the sake of authority, but neither would it allow the great plans which he had formed to be thwarted by the folly or pride of those who had no plans at all beyond the present day, and their own congregation. No dictator was ever more jealous of authority, yet none ever assumed it with a stronger feeling of his divine right to rule, nor used it more wisely. He did not justify himself by arbitrary determination, but by appeal to the course of Providence, and he sustained his measures by unanswerable arguments, by the power of a strong mind over weak ones. He selected his preachers wherever he could find them. Did a man who gave evidence of conversion find himself gifted with the power of speaking and feel impelled to call his fellow men to repentance, he had an opportunity to display his gifts before Wesley, and if approved, was forthwith sent to some of the widely extended circuits. No pride of birth, no previous education, no want of it, stood in the way or prejudiced the ca-

reer of the candidate for these irregular orders. He who was unfit for one service, was found useful in another.

It is doubtless one mark of the profound policy of the Roman Catholic church, that it affords to individuals in all classes, who are moved to devote themselves to the extension of the faith, an appropriate sphere for their labors, and each is sure of honor according to what he does. The monk who goes bare-foot, and wears nothing but a gown of coarse serge, may be doing a great duty for which the benignant mother smiles upon him. Though born in poverty, he may aspire to the Papedom.* The passion of every man and every woman is turned to a wise account. Every one feels a personal interest in the triumph of the faith. Thus are secured the distinguishing virtues of despotism and democracy, unity and perseverance in design, vigor and self-devotion in execution.

This was the plan of Wesley. He was the head and heart of the association, but his instruments, chosen wherever and whenever presented, were directed with consummate prudence, inspired by the most untiring zeal. Hence the most earnest and sincere and self-devoted flocked to his standard. Their own experience was many times most affecting, sometimes terrible. They seemed to be expressly called of God; they had been snatched from the jaws of the bottomless pit; they had been mysteriously turned from courses of desperate and heart-hardening sin; they had felt the terrible burden of a wounded conscience; they had bent under the prostrating load for months or years; they had agonized in prayer; they had wrestled with the angel even till break of day; they had rejoiced with joy unspeakable; they had heard and seen and felt what no man could tell to his fellow-man. Why should we doubt the reality of such joyful or bitter experience? Its truth and their honesty were sometimes attested by a laborious and almost uncompensated career of twenty years. The self-devotion, the enthusiasm, the fidelity and boldness of some of the early preachers would have secured them, in the Papal church, honors, authority, and perhaps a saintship. They sought and obtained only a decent (we should think scanty) subsistence, a humble and useful life. Their own experience made them ardent and fearless. They warned men of dangers which they themselves had seen; of sorrows which they themselves had

* See on a kindred subject Macaulay's review of Ranke.

felt. There was no affectation, no illusion. They did not gather their feelings at second hand; all was real and most painfully personal to them. They were like the man whom Christian saw at the house of the Interpreter, just rising from his bed all shaking and trembling, for he had dreamed of the day of judgment, of the flames of a burning world, and the yawning pit of hell. They had more than dreamed of them. They had hung over the gulf of despair, expecting every moment that the brittle thread would be cut and they fall forever. But now they were saved, and while they walked soberly, as in constant remembrance of the fearful past, they could not help calling upon men with tears to save themselves from a doom whose bare anticipation was so terrible.

The power of Wesley's preachers was economized by the system of itinerating. They must be emphatically pilgrims, without an abiding place. At first he allowed them to preach at one station but one or two months; subsequently, one, or at the utmost, two years. They must always stand ready to be sent to the barren wastes of Cornwall, or the mountains of Wales, or the great Riding of Yorkshire. We might suppose that such a restless and harassing life would deter men from the office of preacher. It did no such thing. It afforded the very trial into which many an enthusiastic mind was ready to leap. He afforded them very little which would allure a selfish heart, but very much to stimulate a magnanimous one. "Do you ask me what you shall have?" he had once written to Whitefield; "Food to eat, and raiment to put on; a house to lay your head in, such as your Lord had not; and a crown of glory that fadeth not away." The honor of the conquest is proportioned to its difficulty. The same lofty feeling of self-devotion animated his preachers, which would prompt the soldier to volunteer as one of the forlorn hope. Many a soldier has applied the torch to the mine which would destroy him as well as the enemy, not from a fear of punishment if he failed, but under the deep impulse of the heroic self-sacrifice to which his duty called him. Many a missionary, among the mingled feelings which find a home in his bosom, has been somewhat sustained by a high sense of the perilous service in which he has enlisted, and a conscious freedom from all the ordinary forms of selfishness. There is a peculiar joy in being truly disinterested; in undertaking any service, however severe, which we know to be uncontaminated by the bane of selfish-

ness. We very much mistake, if we suppose that a luxurious and effeminate life will attract the best minds. A sense of degradation attends a life of mere pleasure, that few can submit to, while intrepid exploits and laborious services bring with them a satisfaction which is their greatest reward. Danger itself has a charm. We rush into it, not to risk our lives or our happiness, but to conquer it, and enjoy the glory and delight of victory. Make the object difficult of attainment and worthy of effort, if you would excite ardent and lofty minds. Ease and comfort would no doubt seduce many, but they were not the sort which Wesley wanted. His followers must shrink from no labor, and be deterred by no danger. He himself avoided nothing which he imposed upon others. After his eightieth year he used to travel four or five thousand miles annually.

Besides this, the system of itinerating was necessary both for the success of his measures and the real advantage of his preachers. It was necessary for the preservation and extension of the sect. Like many other of the peculiarities of the order, it had sprung from the necessities of the case, and when time had proved its usefulness was incorporated into the rules. The preachers must be itinerants, for otherwise the founder of the order would soon lose control over his subordinates. They would become independents and schismatics, instead of useful parts of one grand whole. The great design would thus be entirely frustrated. No less useful and important was it for the preachers themselves to improve their resources by the opportunities which change of place would necessarily offer. For the most part, men of no education, men who trusted to their feelings and the plainest truths of the Bible, they could not be expected to interest or instruct any congregation for many years in succession. It was well for them to exchange the listless countenances of an old audience for the curious faces of a new one. Thus they would feel that they were doing good, and their sermons were unquestionably improved by repetition. Franklin tells us that he heard Whitefield repeat the same discourse to different audiences, and could witness the progressive improvement in thought and delivery, in metaphor and illustration. Not till after he had preached it twenty times did he rise to the highest pitch of fervor and freedom; and so far were his high-wrought pleadings and expostulations, and his consummate action from appearing theatrical though heard a score of times, that they were expected and received with as much delight the

twentieth time as they were listened to with surprise at the first. The process of re-preaching was like that of re-writing, correcting and enlarging a composition. It might not, in the case of the ministers generally, greatly multiply the weapons of their armory, but it would render those which they already possessed more highly polished and doubly effective.

Perhaps in no other country than England could Methodism have been established in the form which it first took. In no other European country would the necessary liberty of conscience and of worship have been allowed; and in none but a European country would the requisite spirit of obedience, and habits of submission, have remained in the minds of men, who by breaking off from the established church, seemed to become the freest of the free.

The middle and later life of Wesley were spent in directing the continually increasing affairs of the circuits. In 1751 he married a shrew, and fared even worse than the majority of similar unfortunates, for, as his life was a very public one, his wife, besides opening a very vigorous domestic battery on his peace, intercepted his letters, and having interpolated them, read them openly to his enemies, and even published some in the public prints. He entertained the most ancient and approved notions on the respective duties of husband and wife, which he did not hesitate to express very explicitly. 'It is the duty of the husband,' he thought, 'to keep his authority and to use it. It is the special duty of a wife to know herself to be inferior, and to behave as such.' These pleasing propositions, which some married men are not active to discuss, he maintained and elucidated with all the prudence and ingenuity of one who daily *felt* their importance. Mrs. Wesley seemed to have quite a different view of the subject, and she exercised her skill in practically refuting his doctrines, with an energy and perseverance which left few discoveries in the art of teasing for the future Katharinas who may choose to exercise so estimable a calling. Wesley seems to have borne all with much good nature and inflexibility, and to have contented himself with administering reproofs and exhortations rather generously, and, when at last she left him, with briefly recording in his journal, *Non eam reliqui, non dimisi, non revocabo.*

Shortly after his return from Germany, Wesley had separated from the Moravians. A later period brought a more trying

disunion between himself and his early friend Whitefield. Personal causes for a while estranged them, but such men "carried anger as the flint bears fire." In their confiding and generous hearts was no room for continued resentment, their differences were soon reconciled, and they continued warm personal friends to the last. On points of doctrine and ecclesiastical polity, however, their paths divided. Whitefield became a Calvinist, Wesley an Arminian. Whitefield, free from the ambition, as well as the ability of ruling, looked to the Countess of Huntingdon, as patroness of the Calvinistic Methodists, who then assumed the name of Lady Huntingdon's Connection. Wesley, receiving his authority as in the course of nature *his* and nobody's else, acknowledged no patron and gave his own name to the sect. Wesley sometimes ventured unguarded assertions respecting full assurance of faith, and Christian perfection, which Whitefield did not dare assent to. Wesley wrote against the "horrible decree of predestination;" Whitefield defended the doctrine. Hardly a passage in the whole range of theological literature can be found of such tremendous vehemence (we by no means say *truth*) as a portion of Wesley's sermon on Free Grace. He brought the whole concentrated energy of his mind to bear on a subject in which his heart was most deeply interested. After a course of powerful remarks, he appeals in a strain still more vivid and terrible to "all the devils in hell." "This is the blasphemy for which I abhor the doctrine of Predestination; a doctrine, upon the supposition of which, if one could possibly for a moment suppose it, call it election, reprobation, or what you please, (for all comes to the same thing,) one might say to our adversary the devil, 'Thou fool, why dost thou roar about any longer? Thy lying in wait for souls is as needless and useless as our preaching. Hearest thou not, that God hath taken thy work out of thy hands, and that he doth it more effectually? Thou, with all thy principalities and powers, canst only so assault that we may resist thee; but he can irresistibly destroy both soul and body in hell! Thou canst only entice; but his unchangeable decree to leave thousands of souls in death, compels them to continue in sin, till they drop into everlasting burnings. Thou tempest, he forceth us to be damned, for we cannot resist his will. Thou fool! why goest thou about any longer, seeking whom thou mayest devour? Hearest thou not that God is the devouring lion, the destroyer of souls, the murderer

of men? Moloch caused only children to pass through the fire, and that fire was soon quenched; or, the corruptible body being consumed, its torments were at an end; but God, thou art told, by his eternal decree, fixed before they had done good or evil, causes not only children of a span long, but the parents also, to pass through the fire of hell; that fire which shall never be quenched; and the body which is cast thereinto, being now incorruptible and immortal, will be ever consuming and never consumed; but the smoke of their torment, because it is God's good pleasure, ascendeth up forever.

"Oh, how would the enemy of God and man rejoice to hear these things were so! How would he cry aloud and spare not! How would he lift up his voice and say, To your tents O Israel! flee from the face of this God, or ye shall utterly perish. But whither will ye flee? Into heaven? He is there. Down to hell? He is there also. Ye cannot flee from an omnipresent, almighty tyrant. And whether ye flee or stay, I call heaven, his throne, and earth, his footstool, to witness against you; ye shall perish, ye shall die eternally! Sing, O hell, and rejoice ye that are under the earth! for God, even the mighty God, hath spoken, and devoted to death thousands of souls, from the rising of the sun, unto the going down thereof. Here, O death, is thy sting! They shall not, cannot escape, for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it. Here, O grave, is thy victory! Nations yet unborn, or ever they have done good or evil, are doomed never to see the light of life, but thou shalt gnaw upon them forever and ever. Let all those morning stars sing together, who fell with Lucifer, son of the morning! Let all the sons of hell shout for joy: for the decree is past, and who shall annul it?"

This fearful passage illustrates Wesley's power better than his general spirit. He was not eager for controversy, and for many years after his opinions were fixed, wrote very little on the subject, and Whitefield still less. Indeed an agreement was entered into between the most distinguished of the two parties, to avoid the disputed points as much as possible in their sermons, and when speaking of them to adopt a temperate phraseology, if not the express language of Scripture. It was vain, however, to expect a permanent peace when the differences were so radical, and some unguarded expressions in the minutes of the General Conference of 1770, fanned the smouldering embers into a vehement flame. Fletcher and Berridge,

Toplady and Thomas Oliver, exhausted their store (and it was not small) of sarcasm and irony and argument and entreaty, and Wesley himself now and then hurled an anathema and appeal, but little less powerful than what we have already quoted from him. A great deal of acrimony, and some wit was shown on both sides, on a subject where Christian courtesy and charity would have availed much more to heal the breach, or, if that were impossible, calmly to define and settle the differences. One unlearned in the history of theological controversies, would suppose that a knowledge of many of them would tend to assuage the violence of religious parties, especially when remembering the extremes to which almost any doctrine may be driven by a partisan theologian, when that theologian, at the best, is an erring and short-sighted mortal.

Another disunion still was before Wesley, more marked and more trying, the separation of the sect from the established church. On this point Charles Wesley could not agree with his brother, jealous although he was of his honor. Men of foresight had long seen to what the previous measures must necessarily lead. The schism was not fully accomplished till after Wesley's death. An urgent demand was made in America for men to administer the sacrament to the widely spread community of Methodists. That community had once elected three of the elder brethren to ordain others by the imposition of hands, though the conference afterwards declared this ordination to be unscriptural. The moment was critical. It was evident that all the Methodists in the colonies would become independent, unless their reasonable wants were supplied. No ordination could be obtained in England from the bishops, or, if any were ordained, they would be under the *control* of the bishops. Wesley had studied Lord King's account of the primitive church, and now became convinced that bishops and presbyters were the same. He was himself a presbyter. The next step followed of course. "The apostolical succession was a fable," the "Wesleyan succession," of the utmost importance. With the assistance of one or two others, he ordained presbyters for America. What was done for America was done soon after for Scotland; but Wesley refused still to ordain presbyters for England, moved by a love of peace, and a desire not to violate unnecessarily the order of the church to which he belonged. Even after this time, the conference voted

not to separate from the establishment ; but the radical step was already taken.

Never since the days of Paul, was a man more assiduous in labor than Wesley. Not a day was given to repose, not an hour to unnecessary leisure. For more than sixty years, he rose at four in the morning, preached at five and frequently in the evening. In his eighty-fifth year, he speaks of that day as a day of rest, in which he preached only twice. Before the latter years of his life, he usually journeyed on horseback, and read poetry, history, and philosophy as he rode, having no other time for such employments. "Leisure and I," he said, "have taken leave of one another. I propose to be busy as long as I live, if my health is so long indulged to me," and fortunately he was always well. For seventy years, he did not lose a night's sleep. He attended the conference ; he directed the preachers ; he kept a steady eye on Scotland and Ireland, on the West Indies and America ; he founded schools ; he inspected the circuits ; after his eightieth year we hear of him in Holland, in Guernsey and Jersey, in Wales, in Scotland, in Ireland, and every considerable town in England ; he systematized the rules of his order, and established that discipline which shows his foresight and energy and wisdom ; he purchased ground and erected chapels ; he wrote sermons, and essays, and tracts, treatises on Primitive Physic and on Theology, memoirs of good men, and notes on the New Testament, besides his numerous letters and copious diary. Sixteen octavo volumes of his works were published some time after his death. Always calm and cheerful, curious and acute, he read new books, and looked upon novel and strange things to the very last with all the interest of youth. At the age of eighty-five, we find him criticising new works in his brief and acute manner, visiting the wax-work at the museum in Spring Gardens and "the man who played so wonderfully on the glasses."

Amid these complicated labors the solemn drama of that earnest, cheerful, and laborious life drew to its serene close. Already had one and another of his earliest and best friends lain down to his eternal rest. The affection of Charles Wesley for John was most sincere and profound. It never lost the freshness of youth. "My heart is as your heart," were his words in a letter ; "what God hath joined, let no man put asunder. We have taken each other for better, for worse, till

death do us—part? no, but eternally unite. Therefore, in love which never faileth, I am your affectionate brother.” This loving brother, blessed to the very end of his fourscore years, in the church and in his family, had calmly and joyfully met the change whose last pangs he had always dreaded. Mr. Fletcher too had gone. So gentle and pure a life as his, so cheerful and holy a character, so tranquil an end, the world has rarely seen. He was born at Nyon, on the shore of lake Geneva, and the many vicissitudes of his early life, seemed to indicate that Providence was guiding him to an object that he knew not. Unsatisfied with the clerical profession to which he was early devoted, he left Switzerland and entered the military service of Portugal, destined for Brazil. What a beautiful soul seemed on the point of being lost! An accident (so men call it) changed his whole destiny. On the eve of embarkation, a servant overturned a kettle of boiling water upon his leg. He was left behind on the sick list. Recovering, he sought active service in Holland, but peace was declared and he passed into England. After a time he took orders in the Episcopal church, joined the Methodists, and by his holy life has made the little parish of Madeley, to which he was appointed, a name always to be heard with joy. His account of himself as he drew near the close of his useful but not protracted life, is too “beautiful,” as Southey justly calls it, to be passed over. “We are two poor invalids,” he says of himself and wife, “who between us, make half a laborer. She sweetly helps me to drink the drops of life, and to carry with ease the bitter cross.” “I keep in my sentry-box till Providence removes me. My situation is quite suited to my little strength. I may do as much or as little as I please, according to my weakness; and I have an advantage which I can have nowhere else in such a degree; my little field of action is just at my door, so that if I happen to overdo myself, I have but to step from my pulpit to my bed, and from my bed to my grave. If I had a body full of vigor and a purse full of money, I should like well enough to travel about as Mr. Wesley does; but as Providence does not call me to it, I readily submit. The snail does best in his shell.”

A man averse to authority and the honors of office, but full of gentleness and benevolence, after a life of self-sacrifice, was now about to end his connection with the world and seek his home in heaven. ‘His death was as remarkable as his life.

The hand of disease arising from previous exposure pressed heavily upon him. As he was performing the services of the Sabbath, he nearly fainted, but recovered and insisted on going on.' After the sermon he walked to the communion table, saying, "I am going to throw myself under the wings of the cherubim, before the mercy-seat." "Here," says his widow, "the same distressing scene was renewed, with additional solemnity. The people were deeply affected while they beheld him offering up the last languid remains of a life which had been lavishly spent in their service. Groans and tears were on every side. In going through this part of his duty, he was exhausted again and again; but his spiritual vigor triumphed over his bodily weakness. After several times sinking on the sacramental table, he still resumed the sacred work, and cheerfully distributed with his dying hand, the love memorials of his dying Lord." From that long service, made longer to him by hymns and exhortations, he retired to his chamber, never to leave it again. The next Sunday, the whole parish were in mourning: the poor whom he had befriended, and many of whom had come from a distance, wished once more to look upon their beloved pastor and friend. Permission was granted, and they passed along by the open door of his chamber, and looked in upon the sick man, who sat supported in bed "unaltered in his usual venerable appearance." A few hours later his earthly career was ended. "I was intimately acquainted with him," says Mr. Wesley, "for above thirty years. I conversed with him morning, noon, and night, without the least reserve during a journey of many hundred miles, and in all that time I never heard him speak one improper word, nor saw him do an improper action. Many exemplary men have I known, holy in heart and life, within fourscore years, but one equal to him have I not known, one so inwardly and outwardly devoted to God; so unblamable a character have I not found, either in Europe or America. Nor do I expect to find another such on this side of eternity." "Wesley," adds Mr. Southey, "had the temper and talents of a statesman; in the Romish church he would have been the general, if not the founder of an order, or might have held a distinguished place in history as a cardinal or a pope. Fletcher, in any community would have been a saint."

And now the messenger came for Mr. Wesley himself, and brought the token that he was a true messenger. "Those that

look out of the windows shall be darkened, the grasshopper shall be a burden." Fourscore years found him still active, travelling four thousand miles annually, preaching, writing, and directing the extended business of the society. Six years more, and he began to feel that the machine was wearing out, that the "weary wheels of life must stand still at last." He could not well preach more than twice a day. His service at five in the morning, continued for so many years, was given up. He wrote in his cash account book with a tremulous hand, "For upwards of eighty-six years I have kept my accounts exactly. I will not attempt it any longer, being satisfied with the continual conviction, that I save all I can and give all I can, i. e. all I have." Thus closed the accounts of one, who, never being rich, gave away during his life thirty thousand pounds! "Time has shaken me by the hand," he said in the words of his father, "and death is not far behind." The second day of March, 1791, came at last. Sixty-five years of his ministry had passed away. The horologe had pealed out the eighty-eighth year of his life, and the hands of the dial stood still forever.

The body, dressed in his clerical habit, with gown, cassock, and band, lay "in a kind of state" in the plain chapel of the denomination, and multitudes flocked to look once more upon the mild and venerable features. The mourners were many, and at the funeral, early in the day for fear of a crowd, when the preacher read that part of the service, "Forasmuch as it hath pleased Almighty God to take unto himself the soul of our dear brother"—his voice changed and he substituted the word *father*. The whole congregation burst into weeping. Thus ended the life of one of the most influential men of his age; whose authority at the time of his death, extended over more than a hundred and twenty-five thousand followers; and whose influence will reach down a thousand years.

ARTICLE VII.

BAPTISM.

By the Rev. Edward Beecher, President of Illinois College, Jacksonville, Illinois.

[*Continued from p. 109.*]

AT the close of my last article I made the following remarks. "It was my intention to finish the discussion in this article; but the reception of Mr. Carson's violent attack, and the general interest now felt in the subject, seemed to indicate the propriety, not to say necessity, of a discussion more thorough and extended than is consistent with the limits of one article." I proceed, therefore, to complete the discussion thus announced.

§ 59. *Reasons for a further notice of Mr. Carson.*

It may perhaps be alleged by some, that it is needless to take any further notice of Mr. Carson. For if his fundamental principles are false, as I have shown, then all that grows out of them is false, and therefore there is no need of exposing his errors in detail. Besides, the spirit of his work is so bad, that it cannot exert any power over a candid mind: indeed Mr. Carson has completely exposed himself, and totally destroyed his own power by the manner of his reply. Besides, it is humiliating to argue with an antagonist who so far forgets the laws of honorable controversy, as to indulge in such assumptions of superior wisdom, and such gross personalities as fill his reply. Such an antagonist is more properly answered by a dignified silence.

Such things may be said, and I freely admit with much plausibility; indeed such considerations have often occurred to my own mind in reading Mr. Carson's reply.

But it must be remembered that no organized body of men is willing to see the truth of principles which are at war with the fundamental principles on which they are organized; and if principles which they are unwilling to see are established, they are always more desirous to overlook and forget them than to apply them and carry them out to their ultimate results. And if we would correct errors which are kept alive not by logic,

but by organic power, we must not only develope principles, but seek from God the discretion and energy needed in order wisely and efficiently to apply them. Then by his aid may we hope to see such errors finally and thoroughly destroyed.

Moreover, the fact that a work is written in a bad spirit, is not always a sufficient reason for not giving it a thorough and detailed answer. The bad spirit of a work may operate in two ways. It may either react upon the author, and destroy his power, or it may infect and corrupt the body in whose behalf it was written, and bring them down to its own low standard. But so strong are the temptations of party spirit, and so powerful is the unsubdued pride of organized bodies even of good men, that a zealous partisan, though he writes in a bad spirit, is notwithstanding applauded and hailed as a leader if he seems to argue the cause of the party with power. In short, organic bodies are always in danger of preferring intellectual power and the victory of their own peculiar principles to holiness and truth. And if they do, a work written with intellectual power, but in a bad spirit, will corrupt the whole body: like poison it will diffuse itself through the whole system. Hence, to write in a bad spirit is the highest sin which a man of great intellectual power can commit, for it is throwing poison most malignant into the very springs of spiritual life. Nor can any one body of Christians be corrupted without endangering the spiritual life of others. For pride in one body tends to beget both pride and anger in all others, and to lead to a spirit of bitter and malignant recrimination, by which the Spirit of God is grieved and provoked to take his flight.

In all such cases it is our duty to seek for grace and wisdom from God, not only to resist in ourselves the infection of the bad spirit which is poisoning the body politic, but also to destroy its malignant power, by stripping off the garb of piety in which it seeks to veil itself, and exposing its true and pestilential nature. Then, by the blessing of God, will its infectious power be destroyed by the fire of divine truth and holy abhorrence, and thus will the moral nature of the community be restored to soundness, and the plague be stayed.

Had any person in the Baptist denomination undertaken to do this work in the case of Mr. Carson, it would have indicated a moral soundness in that body which would have been cheering to any holy heart. It is therefore with no small grief that I have noticed the fact, that on both sides of the Atlantic some

of the leading Baptist presses have bestowed on Mr. Carson's works on baptism, and especially on his reply to me, absolute and unqualified praise. Nor have I ever seen or heard even a subdued whisper of censure, or even a remote intimation that fully to sympathize with the spirit of his works would create the least danger to individuals or to the denomination. Indeed some have written as if they were so thoroughly infected and pervaded by that spirit, that no standard was left by which a bad spirit could be detected, and no moral energy remained by which it could be resisted or abhorred.

Indeed if it were now the design of the admirers of Mr. Carson on both sides of the Atlantic, to recognise and exhibit him as the great leader and champion of the Baptist cause on earth, the great incarnation, so to speak, of the Baptist spirit and Baptist principles, they could not use towards him language of higher praise than they have already used.

The following piece exhibits the opinion of the Christian Watchman, the leading Baptist paper in New England, in connection with the opinion of the London Baptist Magazine.

DISCUSSION ON BAPTISM.

"The London Baptist Magazine for May notices a late pamphlet from the pen of Alexander Carson, the celebrated Greek scholar, entitled "Baptism not Purification," in reply to Edward Beecher, President of Illinois College, who has undertaken to show that the word *baptize* is synonymous with the word *purify*. Mr. B.'s article, which was originally published in the Biblical Repository, was published in a separate pamphlet in England, and the reviewer, referring to this newly-received theory says: 'Mr. Carson has seized it with both his hands, divested it of every particle of covering, torn it limb from limb, dissected it with the minutest accuracy, and then, without the slightest token of tenderness or pity, committed the fragments to the flames. If its admirers who extolled it so loudly in its prosperous days, now look on in silence, pronouncing no funeral panegyric, and leaving its relentless destroyer unpunished, it will give the public a poor opinion of the value of their friendship. We cannot follow Mr. Carson through his triumphant course. He shows, to use his own language, that Mr. Beecher proceeds on an axiom that is false, fanatical, and subversive of all revealed truth, namely, that meaning is to be assigned to words in any document, not from the authority of the use of the language as-

certained by acknowledged examples, but from views of probability as to the thing related, independently of the testimony of the word.'

"Mr. Carson, with his vast critical resources, is the very man to perform such a work as this, and we have no doubt he has done it thoroughly; and, perhaps, it was needed in England, as quite a flourish of trumpets was made when this new theory was broached there, but it is scarcely needed in this country, for Mr. Beecher's theory is a very harmless thing here. It is probable that it would hardly have been noticed at all but for the respectability of the periodical through which it appeared."

In the preface to the American edition of his work on Baptism it is stated, "No one, it is believed, has made that deep and thorough research into the writings of the Greeks, in order to settle the *usus loquendi* of the words *βάπτω* and *βαπτίζω*, as has Mr. Carson."

In the Scottish Guardian the following character of Mr. Carson is given: "As a profound and accurate thinker, an able metaphysician, a close reasoner, a deep theologian, Mr. Carson can stand the ground against any rivalry." It is also stated in the papers, that in England the Baptist convention or general association has requested Mr. Carson to prepare a work on the Ecclesiastical Tradition of Baptism.

Mr. Hague, also, in his reply to Messrs. Cooke and Towne, speaks of Mr. Carson's acute mind in a manner adapted to convey high praise entirely unmingled with censure.

I have not the least disposition to depreciate the original powers of Mr. Carson. On the other hand, I think he does possess uncommon powers, of a certain kind. I would only remark, that the greater his powers, the greater his responsibility to use them aright, and the greater the danger to the Christian community if he employs them to disseminate false opinions and malignant emotions; and this, I am fully satisfied, he has done.

Notwithstanding, therefore, the bad spirit of his works, and the extreme weakness of his arguments, I think there are sufficient reasons for a further notice of his reply. Indeed, to treat it with contempt is virtually to treat with contempt the Baptist denomination itself.

Not that I suppose that there are not in that denomination many Christian brethren, whose spirit is entirely unlike Mr.

Carson's, and not that I hold my Baptist brethren individually responsible for all that Mr. Carson has said and done, but after all that has been so publicly said by leading organs of the Baptist denomination, giving him a prominence as the advocate of their cause such as is given to no other man, and uttering no word of censure, I am authorized to regard him as the leading representative and expounder of Baptist principles in the present age. And he plainly writes as if this were his own view of the case.

Besides this there are other reasons for still more thoroughly examining Mr. Carson's grounds. He is so perfectly confident of his own correctness, that his statements are made in a bold, palpable, and definite form. He seems to be deterred by no fear from making assertions the most rash and unlimited, if they are needed to carry out his principles logically to what he deems the true results. Indeed his great power as a leader lies mainly in this, taken in connection with the fact that he really does know more than those whom he leads.

In his works there is a great show of learning, and as we have seen he has, at least among his own denomination, the highest reputation as a learned man, and his assertions are made with an energy designed to be overwhelming and annihilating, and on his own partisans they have certainly exerted and still exert vast power. Thus it is that he carries his party with him. Now although this characteristic of Mr. Carson is productive of much evil, still it is not without its beneficial results; it tends to place the real points at issue in the clearest possible light, and to concentrate the whole energy of the mind on them. They become focal points of illumination and burning points of discussion.

His universal affirmations as to the use of the word *βαπτίζω* in the whole range and history of the Greek language, we have already noticed p. 78, Jan. 1843. No less definite and remarkable are his specific assertions as to the use of the word in the Fathers. I shall proceed to notice these, and then consider more in detail his reply to my argument from Scripture and from the Fathers.

§ 60. *Mr. Carson's attack on the Patristic argument.*

These relate to two points, their accurate knowledge of the scriptural *usus loquendi* of *βαπτίζω* and the sense in which they actually understood and used it.

On the first point he states explicitly, that they could not be mistaken as to the apostolic *usus loquendi*. His words are these: p. 56, "They knew the meaning of the language which they spoke." p. 57, "To suppose that persons who spoke the Greek language might understand their (i. e. the apostles') words in a sense different from that in which they used them, would be to charge the Scripture as not being a revelation. Whatever was the sense of the word must have been known to all who heard them or read their writings." The truth of this position I freely admit. It is clear that Patristic Greek is based upon the Septuagint and the writings of the New Testament, and it is no less plain that they had minutely studied every thing in the Greek Scriptures that seemed to have any relation to the subject of baptism, so that nothing could be more interesting or instructive than a philosophical analysis of the formation of all parts of the language of the Fathers on the subject of baptism from various passages in the word of God, supposed by them to allude to it, but which to us convey no such allusion. Inasmuch, therefore, as the Scriptures were written in the living language of the Greek Fathers, and all their idioms were by them so carefully studied, there can be no doubt that they used the word in its true and apostolic sense. Still further, the Latin fathers who understood and read Greek, must also have used it in the same sense; and therefore the Latin Fathers, if any such there were, who did not understand the Greek well enough to judge originally and independently, must also have received it in the same sense, for the *usus loquendi* would be fixed by those who did understand it. Still further, all writings composed in the Patristic age and ascribed to the leading Fathers in order to gain authority by their names, must have used it in the same sense, for it was their aim both to be understood, and not to be detected by those for whom they wrote, and of course they must have used the word in its current and usual sense. For example, though the list of some baptisms ascribed to Athanasius is probably not his, yet as it was written in his age and name, it truly represents the *usus loquendi* of that and also of preceding ages. Indeed all of it can be found in substance in the authentic works of preceding fathers, and in later days it re-appears in the authentic writings of John of Damascus. So also whether the commentary on some of the first chapters of Isaiah, found in the works of

Basil is the real work of Basil, or whether it was written as Garnier judges by some Cappadocian ecclesiastic in the name of Basil soon after his death, and was taken chiefly from the works of Eusebius of Cesarea and of Basil; still as it was written in the name of Basil, and in the age of Basil, and was universally regarded as the work of Basil and quoted as such, it must have correctly exhibited the *usus loquendi* of that age on the subject of baptism. In quoting it I follow the universal ancient usage in speaking of it as Basil's work, though in truth the opinion of Garnier seems to me most likely to be correct. Still, however this question is decided, the worth of the testimony of the work as to the *usus loquendi* of βαπτίζω is not at all affected. Indeed, as is the case in the work ascribed to Athanasius, it but represents and embodies the usages of previous writers, such as Origen, Eusebius, and Basil, if the writer was not Basil himself.

Hence, if these views are correct, and of their correctness there can be no reasonable doubt, the materials are ample for settling the apostolic usage of the word in question, including all the Greek and Latin Fathers, and all the works written in their name in their age; and my only wonder is that Mr. Carson did not resort to them first of all, instead of laboriously examining the writings of authors who knew nothing of the rite in question, and had, so far as appears, never seen or read the Greek, either of the Old Testament or of the New.

Let us now consider Mr. Carson's statement as to the sense in which the Fathers understood and used the word βαπτίζω. After attempting to answer my biblical argument, he thus proceeds: p. 48, "Mr. Beecher next professes to find proof in the Fathers. Proof from the Fathers that βαπτίζω signifies to *purify*! As well might he profess to find in them proof for the existence of rail-roads and steam-coaches. There is no such proof. There is not an instance in all the Fathers in which the word or any of its derivations are so used. Without exception, they use the word always for immersion." This surely is sufficiently definite and explicit, but it is not all, for he afterwards teaches that to assert otherwise is not only false, but also an act of presumptuous hardihood: p. 58, "What is the hardihood of men who can presume to allege the Fathers on the other side?"

Those who have carefully examined the evidence which I have already adduced on this point might be amused by the ex-

treme ridiculousness of these assertions, if the subject were not too serious for ridicule. But assertions of this kind have a moral as well as an intellectual character, in the sight of God. Can any one believe that Mr. Carson had ever made the investigations necessary to qualify him to make such assertions? And is this the way in which he is wont to make statements on subjects so momentous? An extended circle of minds rely on him for information on topics beyond their reach. Over them his opinions and unlimited assertions have a sway almost absolute. And is this the way in which he uses his intellectual powers, and repays their confidence? I hesitate not to say, that he could not more totally mislead all who rely upon him. Instead of that iron uniformity of use which he claims, there are few words which have in the Fathers a usage more diversified and various. I have hitherto aimed simply at one point, to prove that it has the usage that I claim. To exhibit all the Patristic uses of the word I have not attempted. And yet perhaps the time has come in which it ought to be done, for it will give a more elevated point of vision from which to survey the whole subject, and to study its symmetry and proportions. After adducing, therefore, some further evidence on the main point, I shall attempt to give a general view of the Patristic uses of the word:

§ 61. *Additional facts.*

Compare, then, with Mr. Carson's contemptuous denial of my position, and his unlimited and overbearing assertions, the following passage from Ambrose, a Father who was not only a student of the works of Basil, but drew the materials of many of his own works from them. Apol. David, § 59, "Per hyssopi fasciculum adspergebatur agni sanguine, qui mundari volebat typico baptismo." "He who desired to be purified with a typical baptism was sprinkled with the blood of a lamb by means of a bunch of hyssop." Compare this now with the passages from Ambrose, Cyril, and others, in § 53, and who does not see with absolute and intuitive certainty that baptism has the sense of sacrificial purification? Sprinkling with blood was a typical purification, but certainly it was not a typical immersion.

Indeed, so far did the Fathers carry the idea of sacrificial purification, that they gave the name baptism to cases in which the expiated person was not touched by the purifying fluid. All that they required was, that it should be so sprinkled or otherwise used, that expiation should be actually made; whenever

this was done in any way, they regarded the person as baptized, i. e. purified, or expiated, or absolved.

Hence when the blood of the Paschal Lamb was sprinkled on the posts of the door, they regarded all in the house as baptized, i. e. purified or expiated by blood. So both Theodoret and Ambrose regard the purging with hyssop in Ps. 51: 7. In the Septuagint it is, Thou shalt sprinkle me with hyssop. They both applied it to baptizing, i. e. purifying by the blood of a lamb. Hence also one, who wrote in the name of Chrysostom, speaks of the thief on the cross as baptized, because expiation was made for him by the water and blood that came out of the side of Christ. He also intimates in the same passage, that if there had been a shower of rain it would have been sufficient to baptize the thief, but as there was not, he was baptized by the issuing of water and blood from the side of Christ. All this is perfectly plain the moment we assign to βαπτίζω the sacrificial sense to purify. For the actual making of an expiation justified the application of the word to the person expiated, and also by metonymy to that by which it was made. And hence Origen states in general terms that Christ calls the shedding of his blood a baptism. Hence also, as we have seen, the water and the blood that issued from his side were called baptisms. See § 52. p. 93 Jan. 1843; also §§ 25, 26, Jan. 1841. Compare now Mr. Carson's positive and contemptuous assertions with all these facts, and what shall we say? It is not the province of the human mind to create facts in history or philosophy, but simply to discover and advance them. But Mr. Carson proceeds as if it were his province, by intense assertions, to create them. But after all his assertions, they stand calmly and simply just as they did before. I find in the Fathers no evidence at all of the existence of rail-roads and steam-coaches, but abundant evidence that βαπτίζω means to purify.

Let me now add some further evidence on the subject of moral purification. Repentance, sorrow for sin, the trials of God's providence, and the truth, all purify the mind from sin. They do not make expiation or atonement, but they purify in a moral sense. Accordingly in the usage of the Fathers all these things are said to baptize. One writing in the name of Chrysostom enumerates five kinds of baptism. Of these I shall notice the baptism by the truth, and the baptism by fire. By fire he understands the trials of life by which God purifies his children, calling and choosing them in the furnace of affliction. In proof

of this he refers to Is. 4 : 4, "The Lord shall purge by the spirit of burning;" and Ps. 66 : 10, "Thou, O God, hast proved us, thou hast tried us as gold and silver is tried." "For," says he, "as gold or silver is purified in the furnace, by consuming the dross, so a man, placed in the furnace of affliction, is sanctified by the removal of his sins." To be thus purified, i. e. baptized, by fire, he regards as a peculiar privilege of the sons of God. "But the servants of the devil are not baptized by fire. Wherefore? Because he who is wholly polluted cannot so lay aside his filth as to be made clean. Begin to wash a brick in water, does it ever become clean? No; but by stirring up the clay it becomes more polluted. For he is made pure in whom is something good, by means of which he can be made pure." Now all this argument is powerless to prove that the servants of the devil cannot be immersed in fire. That can be done whether they are purified or not. The argument proves only that the servants of Satan are not purified by the fire of trial, because they are all dross, there is in them no gold to be purified. But the sons of God are purified by the fire of trial, because in them there is gold, and the fire of trial consumes the dross and leaves the gold more pure. Baptism by the truth he illustrates by a reference to John 15 : 3, "Now are ye clean (*καθαροί*) through the word that I have spoken unto you." Faith purifies, it does not immerse.

Anastasius, Bib. Pat. Vol. IX. 1030, says that he "should dare to call mourning, with reference to God, another baptism." In Op. Isaïæ Abbatis, Bib. Vet. Pat. And. Gallandii, Vol. VII. p. 292, it is said, "Affliction with humility and silence is a baptism, for John was clothed in camel's hair, and had a leathern girdle around his loins, and lived in the desert, which is a sign of affliction and penitence, which purifies a man." In all these cases the idea of immersion is out of the question. The fire of trials, the truth, sorrow for sins as against God, affliction with humility and patience, all purify a man, but they do not immerse him. Hence in all these cases, the idea of immersion is absolutely and unquestionably excluded from the word baptism. No meaning but purification is possible.

I have before me six lists of different kinds of baptism, by six different Fathers, Gregory Nazianzen, Chrysostom, Athanasius, Maximus, Isidore Hispalensis, and John of Damascus. The one passing under the name of Athanasius is probably not his, but is a decisive proof of the *usus loquendi* of the age, and it reappears enlarged in the works of John of Damascus. From it

I take the following passage: *ἐβαπτίσθη Ἰωάννης τὴν χειρὶ ἐπιθεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν θεῖαν τοῦ δεσπότου κορυφὴν, καὶ τῷ ἰδίῳ αἵματι* John was baptized by placing his hand on the divine head of his master and by his own blood.

The Fathers held that Christ, by touching the waters, purified them and gave them a purifying power.

So also they held that by touching John he purified him, and this purification by touch he expressed by *βαπτίζω*. Surely all idea of immersion is excluded here. Indeed he expresses the same idea by *ἀγιάζω*, in another part of the passage. Christ was baptized that he might purify (*ἀγιάζῃ*) the baptizer. John was also clearly regarded by the Fathers as purified by his own blood, not immersed in it.

From these lists we also learn that the eternal punishment of the wicked is a baptism, because it will purge the holy universe from sin. The flood was a baptism, for two reasons; it purified the world from sinners and sin; and it also purified and saved those in the ark. But the wicked who were immersed by the flood were not baptized. So also the whole process of legal purification under the law, including the washing of the clothes as well as that of the body, was called a baptism. Viewing it as a complex whole, it was proper to call it a purification, but not an immersion. So too the washing of the disciples' feet by Christ is regarded by another Father as a baptism; and by still another, the anointing of the blind man's eyes with clay and spittle, and his washing in the pool of Siloan, because the spittle of Christ purifies as well as the washing in the pool.

What now shall we say to all these things? If Mr. Carson had asserted that the Mississippi ran from the Gulf of Mexico with an impetuous current towards the cold regions of the north, and there descended by one vast cataract towards the centre of the globe, and had charged all with presumptuous temerity who dared to call in question the truth of his assertions, he could not be more utterly at war with the facts of the case than he is in his assertions as to the Patristic use of *βαπτίζω*.

§ 62. *Other errors of Mr. Carson.*

It was with reference to assertions such as these that I remarked, Jan. 1843, p. 77, that Mr. Carson had made assertions that I knew not how to explain if he had ever read the Greek Fathers.

Indeed Mr. Carson has elsewhere made assertions as to other words with the same inexplicable disregard of facts. On pp. 22,

23, he thus speaks: "Mr. Beecher's criticism on the word (*περικλυιάσθαι*) here (Tobit 6 : 2) employed for washing, is *entirely false*." I translated it to wash all around. He proceeds, "The simple word signifies to deluge, to overwhelm, to inundate, to flow over any thing." "Mr. Beecher criticises from imagination, not from knowledge of the language. Has he justified his criticism by a single example?" He then remarks with great taste and refinement, "The word does not signify that the young man in bathing splashed about like a duck, or rubbed himself like a collier, but that he threw himself into the river, that the stream might flow over him." Again, "There is no friction nor hand-washing in this word. It performs its purpose by running over either gently or with violence." So much learned minuteness and such bold charges of inaccuracy on me would lead an incautious reader to suppose that Mr. Carson must have first made sure his facts before daring thus to commit himself before the learned world. Indeed, when I first read his remarks it produced a temporary impression that I must be wrong, or he would not dare to make such assertions. But the moment I looked at facts the illusion vanished. It is indeed true that *κλύω* has in some cases the meaning that he assigns to it. But it is not true that it has not the meaning that I assign to it. The facts are these: 1. It is applied by Euripides to washing the body with sea water, where *νίπτω* is applied to the same operation which Mr. Carson admits denotes hand-washing.

2. It is applied to the washing of children, by Aristotle—*τὸ παιδίον ὕδατι περικλύζειν*—to wash the child all around with water.

3. In Geoponica 17, 22, it is applied to washing an ulcer by a fluid, *ἐλκος κλύειν ὄργῳ*. Here is no deluging, overwhelming, or inundation.

4. Epiphanius applies it to the purifications of the Jews, *κλυζόμενοι ὄργῳ*, where deluging or overflowing is out of the question.

5. By Pollux it is applied to the washing of clothes, and also of cups, and is given as a synonyme of *πλύνειν*, and *ρύπτειν* and *καθαίρειν* and their compounds with *διὰ*, *ἀπὸ* and *ἐκ*. What can be more decisive?

6. It is applied to the washing of head, hands and body, after an unlucky dream.

7. It is used by Plutarch to denote the washing off blood from armor, *αἷμα τῶν ὀπλῶν ἐτι θερμὸν ἀποκλύζεται*. Plut. 7. 283. 11.

8. It is applied by Lucian to an object wet or sprinkled on all sides with *spray* by rapid motion through water *at rest*. ἀφρῶ περιχυζόμενον. Lucian, V. H. 1. 31. Here surely is no flowing of water over an object.

9. Like καθαίρω, it has a medical use to cleanse or purge—ἱατροὶ πικρὰν πικροῖς κλύζουσι φάρμακοις χολήν. Plut.—Physicians purge out bitter bile by bitter medicines. Indeed its medical use gave birth to our English word clyster.

10. All lexicographers of any note sustain my use of the word, e. g. Stephens, Scapula, Damm, Hedericus, Ernesti, Passow, Schneider, etc. etc. Hence it is plain that assertions more contrary to fact than Mr. Carson's criticism on me cannot be made, even if I were to say that Mr. Carson criticises from imagination, and not from a knowledge of the language in translating ὕδωρ water or πῦρ fire. And whatever Mr. Carson's talents, they cannot enable his character as an accurate scholar long to survive such criticisms as he has here given.

In like manner when I say that Josephus uses βάπτισις to denote the rite of baptism, Mr. Carson denies it, and says, "The ἡ βάπτισις is the immersing—βαπτισμός is the rite of immersion." And yet it must be notorious to any one who has ever read the Fathers, that they do not hesitate to use βάπτισις to denote *the rite*, in opposition to καταδύσις, *the act of immersing*, as in Sozomen, μὴ καταδύσει ἐπιτελεῖν τὴν θείαν βάπτισιν. "To perform the *sacred baptism* by *one immersion*."

Many of Mr. Carson's assertions as to tingo, βάπτω, λούω, and νίπτω, are of the same kind. Indeed I do not remember that I ever read a writer so many of whose most positive assertions were so totally at war with facts. But success in such an assault on facts is hopeless. The highest talents are entirely unequal to such a war.

§ 63. General view of Patristic uses of βαπτίζω.

But enough has been said to show the entire incorrectness of Mr. Carson's theory of the Patristic uses of βαπτίζω. I shall therefore conclude this part of the subject by a brief general view of what that usage is.

1. Of course I need not say that they sometimes use the word in the sense to immerse any thing in water, or to denote the state of any thing that sinks in the water or is overflowed by it. And also that from this are derived metaphorical uses to denote immersion in sorrow, ignorance, darkness, sin, pollution,

afflictions, and misery. All this I have before noticed at large. See §§ 3 and 4, and 10 and 28.

2. To wash, implying an *effort to cleanse*, but not including the effect. In this sense they use it as a translation of the Heb. *קָטַף*, just as they use *λούω*. In this case *βάπτισμα* is taken in connection with *κάθαρσις* or *καθαρισμός*; thus, commenting on Is. 1: 16, "Wash you, make you clean," Basil, to denote the idea of washing, uses *βάπτισμα*, and to denote purification, he uses *κάθαρσις*. So in the Apostolic Constitutions we find washings and purifications expressed in the same way.

3. To *cleanse or purify by washing*, i. e. to wash, including the effect.

4. To purify in the most generic sense, either by water, or by truth, or by atonement and expiation, or by trials, or by mourning and sorrow. After what has been said there is no need to offer any proof of the real existence of this sense. But here it is peculiarly important to bear in mind the distinction between sacrificial purification, or expiation, and moral purification, or sanctification, to which I have so often referred. For without a clear apprehension of it, much of the language of the Fathers cannot be understood.

5. *βαπτισμός* and *βάπτισμα* by synecdoche denote means of purification, e. g. water, blood, fire, oil, air, etc.

6. *βάπτισμα* is also used to denote, comprehensively, a system designed to effect purification in various ways, e. g. *βάπτισμα Μωυσέως*, or *νομικόν* or *Ἰουδαϊκόν* which Chrysostom interchanges as synonymous with *καθαρίσιον Ἰουδαϊκόν*, to denote not an act, nor one rite merely, but a complex system, involving and comprehending various kinds and modes of purification. So Basil says of the Jewish baptism, it recognised a difference of sins, not forgiving all; it required various sacrifices, it made minute regulations as to purity, it separated the polluted and unclean for a time, it observed times and seasons. In all this he is plainly illustrating a system of purification involving many parts, but having one great end, i. e. to purify, either by expiatory sacrifices, or in some other way. So too, the baptism of John or of Christ is often used in like manner to denote a system of purification.

7. They also used it to denote, comprehensively, the actual processes involved in conferring absolution; e. g. if exorcism, divesting of all clothing, immersion, unction, and robing in white, the pronouncement of certain words, and a benediction,

were supposed to be involved in conferring a legal and valid absolution, then the term *βάπτισμα* was comprehensively used to include all these processes. Any part of the process that purified was also called by the same name. So Origen speaks of baptizing, i. e. purifying with oil. And the Apostolic Constitutions speak of unction as a type of spiritual baptism, i. e. spiritual purification.

8. The result or effect of these processes they also denote by the word baptism or purification, i. e. absolution, remission of sins. It is in this sense that Zonaras, in his *Lexicon*, defines baptism as being the remission of sins by water and the Spirit. This remission of sins was effected, in their view, not by any energy of the water in itself, but by some mysterious, sanctifying power given to it when the Spirit brooded upon it at the creation, or when Christ was baptized in it, or when the bishop or priest consecrated it, operating in concurrence with the energy of the Holy Spirit, who, according to a divine constitution, diffused and exerted his mighty energies in and through the water. In this way, in their view, was effected the baptism of the Holy Ghost; and the superiority of the baptism of Christ to that of John lay in the fact that John used the simple fluid water, but in that of Christ, a compound fluid, so to speak, was employed, composed of sanctified water, and the influence of the Holy Spirit. On no topic is the eloquence of Chrysostom so fervid, as when he unfolds the purifying, nay, regenerating powers of this semi-material, semi-spiritual compound. As quick as the ocean extinguishes a spark that falls into it, so soon does this mighty compound extinguish the sins of the sinner that falls into it, and makes him pure as the angels and brilliant as the sunbeams of heaven. To symbolize this spotless whiteness of the soul thus miraculously and suddenly obtained, the baptized person was robed in purest white. His being stripped perfectly naked before was designed to give to the miraculous energies of the fluid full scope to penetrate every part of body and soul. And in the opinion of some of the Fathers, these waters also had a miraculous power even to heal bodily disease, of which they give us some examples, as true, no doubt, as all other of the lying wonders of that age of fraud and delusion. The word baptize, used in this sense, denoted not merely a transient act, but a permanent and abiding moral change effected by the rite. The soul was conceived of as invested in a robe of spotless purity. Hence baptism is likened to spiritual robes, and the Fa-

thers speak of *putting on* the baptism of Christ, and of preserving their baptism unspotted. Origen preferred the baptism of blood to that of water and the Spirit, because few keep this unspotted till death, but the purity gained by the baptism of a bloody death is polluted no more. The leading idea in this usage of the word is a permanent state or character of purity, and not the act of immersion at all. Indeed, what sense is there in such an expression as keeping the act of immersion unspotted till death? The act is soon over, and all possibility of polluting or making it pure is passed by. And yet Mr. Carson again and again asserts that baptism always denotes the mode of an act, and nothing else.

9. The word baptism is also used as the appropriated name of the rite of Christian Baptism. In this case it approximates in its use, towards a proper name, or a technical term, i. e. the attention of the mind is abstracted from the meaning of the word, though it is in fact significant and is fixed upon the rite for which it stands. So the words Fowler, Fisher, Coffin, White, Black, Green, etc. are in fact significant, and yet when appropriated as names of individuals and families, the attention of the mind is withdrawn from their meaning and fixed upon those whom they represent. In this case the things predicated of these persons have no reference to the meaning of their names, but to their own personal qualities and relations which these names recall. So in speaking of Baptism, though the word signifies purification, the object often is merely to call to mind a given Christian rite. And what would seem to be incongruous uses, if referred to the sense merely, are not so if referred to the rite; e. g. to speak of the blackness of Mr. White, or of the whiteness of Mr. Green, or of Mr. Fisher as a hunter, or Mr. Coffin as a physician, would be verbally incongruous, but not in the nature of things. So to speak of the purification of baptism would not be tautology, but would denote the purification effected by the rite bearing that name.

- 10. Finally, the Fathers gave the name baptism to any transaction regarded by them either as typifying baptism or producing similar effects; e. g. when Elisha raised the axe out of the water by throwing in a stick, Ambrose regards it as a baptism, because as the axe was immersed in the water, so was the sinner in sin—and as the stick raised the axe out of the water, so does baptism, i. e. remission of sins, raise a sinner out of his

sins. The stick, according to him, is of course a type of the cross of Christ. So when Moses, by throwing in the branches of a tree, made the bitter waters of Marah sweet, Ambrose regards it as another kind of baptism, because as the branches made bitter waters sweet, so does baptism make sweet the bitterness of the human heart. Origen regards the passage of Elijah over Jordan, as he was taken up in a chariot of fire, as a wonderful baptism, because he thus passed over Jordan and went to heaven; and baptism does something like this for the pardoned soul. Passing through the Red Sea was a baptism, because it purified the Israelites and drowned Pharaoh by immersion, just as the rite of baptism purifies Christians and leaves Satan and the old man immersed and strangled in the baptismal pool. The flood was a baptism, because it purified and saved Noah and his family—and also purified the world—and immersed and strangled the enemies of God—just as the rite of baptism purifies all who come by it, into the ark, i. e. the church—and as the waters of the flood immersed, strangled and purged off the wicked, so will an eternal baptism of fire purge out the wicked from the kingdom of God. They are the chaff to be burnt up with unquenchable fire, when the Redeemer thoroughly purges his floor.

Hence, in the days of the Fathers, the narrow view that βαπτίζω means only to immerse had no being. The great idea before their minds was purification or absolution. This they applied to means of purification, or a system of purification, or to the processes involved in being purified, or to the supposed result of these processes, or to the rites viewed as an ordinance of Christ, or to any supposed or real typical transaction producing what they deemed similar effects.

§ 64. *General View applied.*

By thus throwing off the shackles of arbitrary canons and leaving the mind perfectly free to watch the actual evolution of the facts of language in the writings of the fathers, we find ourselves enabled to solve without difficulty all their various modes of expression. For example when Photius says *αἱ τρεῖς ἀνάψεις καὶ καταδύσεις τοῦ βάπτισματος θάνατον καὶ ἀνάστασιν σημαίνουσιν*, we see at once that βάπτισμα refers to the rite of absolution, and ἀνάψεις and καταδύσεις to acts involved in it. Thus “the three immersions and emersions of the rite of purification (or absolution) symbolize death and resurrection.”

Again Theophylact says, *βάπτισμα ὡς περ διὰ τῆς καταδυσέως θανάτου οὕτω διὰ τῆς ἀναδυσέως τὴν ἀνάστασιν τύποι*. "As the rite of absolution shows forth death by immersion, so by emersion it shows forth resurrection."

Again he says, *ἐν τρισὶ καταδύσει τοῦ σώματος ἐν βάπτισμα τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μαθηταῖς παραδίδωκε λέγων πόρευθέντες μαθητεύσατε* etc. Matt. 28: 19. He gave to his disciples one rite or ordinance of absolution, by these immersions of the body, saying, go ye therefore and teach all nations, etc.

I would here call attention once more to the fact, that to denote the act of immersion *κατάδυσις* is used, reserving to *βάπτισμα* the sense purification or absolution as the name of the rite. But inasmuch as *βάπτισμα* could be used to denote the act of immersion, it was sometimes though rarely so used, of which in § 28. 4, I have given an example from the Apostolic Constitutions, Can. L. *τρία βαπτίσματα μὲς μύησης*; three immersions of one initiation. This was so clearly a departure from common usage, that both Zonaras and Balsamon deemed it worthy of a note. That of Zonaras I have given in the section referred to. That of Balsamon is this, *τὰ δὲ βαπτίσματα ἐνταῦθα ἀντὶ καταδυσέων ὑποληπτέον μοι*. This note is still more remarkable and decisive than that of Zonaras—for he merely gives it as his opinion that *βαπτίσματα* means immersions here—"It seems to me that *βαπτίσματα* is to be taken for immersions here." Indeed! If it never means any thing but immersions, as Mr. Carson says, both the note itself and this modest expression of opinion are quite out of place. But Mr. Carson's theory of this word is entirely a modern invention. No one had ever dreamed of it in the patristic age. Balsamon well knew that in common usage *βάπτισμα* meant purification and not immersion.

It may be well here to notice the sophistical reasoning by which the author of this canon endeavored to make out the doctrine of trine immersion. It was this: Christ did not enjoin it upon them to purify into his death, in which case there would have been one immersion, but into the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost; hence it being assumed that immersion is the mode, there must be one act of immersion for each person. In this reasoning, *βαπτίζω* in the command retains its usual sense, but when from the three persons the inference is drawn that there ought to be three acts of immersion, it leaves its usual sense, and denotes to im-

merse, and this usage was thought by two Greek commentators, to be so likely to mislead as to need an explanatory note to prevent confusion.

In Gregory Nazianzen occurs a striking passage, of peculiar interest, as showing at once that immersion was in fact the usual practice, but not the meaning of the word: *βάπτισμα καλοῦμεν ὡς συνθαπτόμενης τῷ ὕδατι τῆς ἁμαρτίας*—"We call it (i. e. the rite) baptism, i. e. absolution or purification, because OUR SINS are buried with us in the water." Whilst this clearly implies that in the rite THEY were in fact buried in the water, it no less clearly implies that it was not called baptism for this reason but because THEIR SINS were buried with them. The burial of sins in the baptismal pool, was a common mode of expressing absolution or purification from sin, taken from Micah 7: 19, Thou wilt cast all their sins into the depths of the sea. So that the sense is plainly this, we call it purification, because when we are buried in the baptismal pool, OUR SINS are buried with us, and we of course come out perfectly pure. If the word had meant immersion, he must have said simply: We call it immersion, because we are immersed.

We now come to a case of inconsistent usage, inconsistent at least with the present systems of philology. In a few cases Chrysostom uses the principle of a double sense in commenting on this word. Inasmuch as both meanings, i. e. purification and immersion coexist in the language, and immersion was the common mode; on this principle the word can be expounded as having both meanings in one and the same place, in order to give greater fulness to the passage. At this we need not wonder in the Fathers. A certain class of modern commentators have not hesitated to do the same thing. On this ground Chrysostom in a few instances gives a two-fold exposition of the passage in which Christ says, I have a baptism to be baptized with, etc.

One exposition is based on the sense purification. As in Hom. 65, al 66, on Matt.—Speaking of his death on the cross, he says he calls it baptism, *βάπτισμα*, indicating that a great purification *κάθαρμον* should be made for the world by the things then transpiring.—De petit fil. Zebedai. Vol. I. p. 520.

Again he says "he calls it baptism, because by it he *purified* the world, and *not only so*, but on account of the ease of his resurrection, for as he who is immersed *βαπτίζομενος* in water arises with great ease, being nothing hindered by the nature of

the waters, so he having descended into death arose again with ease, for this reason he calls it baptism: and again, on Mark, 10: 39, "he calls his cross baptism, for as we are easily immersed and arise again, so he having died, easily arose again when he would." On p. 34, Jan. 1841, I say, "Nòr have I found any evidence that the passages in Luke 12: 50, Mark 10: 37, 39, Matt. 20: 22, 23, were ever understood by any of the Fathers in the sense either of immersion or overwhelming." This usage of Chrysostom is an exception, and it is the only one that I have yet found. He plainly uses the word in both senses, purification and immersion. And yet even in these cases the sense purification can be retained as the name of the rite, and the illustration be taken from the well known mode of its performance, though the view that I have taken seems to me most likely to be correct. I have already twice stated that cases of inconsistent usage may exist, without at all destroying the force of my argument, § 27, Jan. 1841, § 21, April, 1840, p. 371, yet after extended research, my greatest surprise has been that I have found so few such cases. I have been surprised, because when I considered how general was the practice of immersion among the Fathers, and how natural it was that their practice should react upon their language, and that immersion was in fact an existing meaning of the word, it seemed strange to me that this meaning should so rarely be given to the word βαπτίζω in speaking of the rite. But when I reflected that the great idea of purification, i. e. absolution, or remission of sins, was ever uppermost in their minds, and that immersion, though the common mode, was not deemed essential to it, I saw a sufficient reason for reserving to βάπτισμα this great idea, and introducing the terms κατάδυσις and ἀνάδυσις to denote immersion and emersion.

The real nature of this idiom will become clearer by a passage of Gregory Nyssen, in which he uses κάθαρσις so as to show the force of βάπτισμα when used with ἀνάδυσις and κατάδυσις: "omitting things beyond our power let us inquire τίνος ἔνεκεν δι' ὕδατος ἡ κάθαρσις; καὶ πρὸς ποίαν χρείαν αἱ τρεῖς καταδύσεις παραλαμβάνονται for what end is the rite of purification by water, and for what use the three immersions are employed?" All see in this case a usage of κάθαρσις exactly equivalent to the use of βάπτισμα just illustrated. The use of the preposition διὰ after κάθαρσις and equivalent words illustrates the use of the

same preposition after βάπτισμα etc. I will by parallel columns still farther exhibit this similarity of usage to the eye.

The following uses of καθαρσις, ἁγισμός, etc., are taken from Cyril of Alexandria : The following are from Gregory, Thaum. Athanasius—Clemens Alexand. :

τὸν ἁγισμὸν δι' ὕδατος—	βάπτισμα διὰ δάκρυων
τὴν καθαρσιν δι' ὕδατος	βαπτίζειν δι' ὕδατος
τὴν διὰ πυρὸς καθαρσιν	βαπτίζειν διὰ πυρὸς
τοῦ δι' αἵματος ἁγισμοῦ—	βάπτισμα δι' αἵματος
ἡγιασμένοι διὰ πνεύματος	βάπτισμα διὰ μαρτύριον
τὴν διὰ Χριστοῦ καθαρσιν ἢ δι'	βαπτίζειν διὰ πνεύματος
ὕδατος τε καὶ πνεύματος	βάπτισμα νοητὸν διὰ πνεύματος—
αἰνάζων δι' ὕδατος	βάπτισμα ἁποθητὸν δι' ὕδατος

This comparison of similar idioms could be extended to other prepositions, as ἐν taken in the instrumental sense as equivalent to διὰ—and also to the use of the dative in the instrumental sense after both words, showing by an extended induction of particulars such an exact similarity in the use of prepositions and cases after βάπτισμα and καθαρσις, etc., as proves them at a glance to be synonymous, for the word καθάρσις, immersion, is never followed by such prepositions and the dative case in such a sense. See also § 56, on the same point.

§ 65. *Commission to baptize.*

I will conclude this general view by noticing its bearings on a question relating to the commission to baptize. It is this. Why is there a commission given to baptize in Matthew and Mark, and none in Luke and John? This is a question for those to answer who deny the correctness of the view that I have given—for on this view it presents no difficulty at all. The reply is that a commission to baptize is in fact a commission to purify, that is, a commission to remit sins—and in Luke and John, the disciples do receive a commission to remit sins. Luke 24: 47, 48—"That repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations—and ye are witnesses of these things," that is, that repentance and baptism should be preached in his name among all nations—for according to Zonaras and the Fathers, baptism is the forgiveness of sins by water and the Spirit.

This view of the passages in Luke and John occurred to my mind before reading the Fathers, as furnishing a test of the soundness of my views, and on reading them I found that they did in fact regard the commission to remit sins in Luke and John as a commission to baptize as really as that in Matthew and Mark. They regarded it in short as merely another mode of expressing the same idea. In John the phraseology is different from that of Luke: "Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them, and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained," John 20: 23. In short, Christ died as the Lamb of God to take away the sins of the world, and the great business of the apostles was to publish to the world the great doctrine of the remission of sins, through his death, and the terms on which it could be obtained, and to establish the rite by which this purgation from sin should be shadowed forth and commemorated in honor of the Trinity, and especially of that Spirit by whom this atonement was made effectual to purge the conscience from dead works to serve the living God. Go ye therefore, teach all nations, purifying them (that is remitting to them that repent and believe their sins) into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Amen.

§ 66. *Mr. Carson's dissertation on λούω.*

A few words ought here to be said on the meaning of the words λούω and λούτρον. I have affirmed that by their own force they denote simply washing or purification, and not bathing. To prove this I referred, in § 16, to the fact that the vessels for washing the hands in the vestibules of ancient churches were called λουτήρες as well as πηγές. Mr. Carson sees fit in view of this, to devote nearly nine pages to a dissertation on λούω. He opens his dissertation as follows: p. 66, "The philosophical linguist, Dr. Campbell, of Aberdeen, in distinguishing the words λούω and νίπτω, makes the first signify to wash or bathe the whole body, the last to wash or bathe a part. This distinction has been generally received since the time of Dr. Campbell. Mr. Beecher calls it in question, yet he does not touch the subject with the hand of a master. He merely alleges an objection which he thinks calculated to bring confusion into what is thought to be clear; but he gives no additional light by any learned observations of his own. I shall endeavor to settle this question by evidence founded on the

practise of language as well as the practise of the New Testament." Parturiunt montes! Mr. Carson is about to touch the subject with the hand of a master—and to settle the question!

Let us look at his results. He proves abundantly that *λούω* can be applied to bathing, which I never denied. Does he prove that it cannot be applied to sprinkling? Not at all. He asserts it, but nowhere proves it. I assert the contrary, and this is my proof: Porphyry asserts, in libel. de antro Nympharum, that it was customary for married women to purify maidens by sprinkling or affusion, before marriages, with water taken from fountains and living springs. Photius tells us that the water used for this purpose at Athens, was brought in a pitcher from certain fountains which he specifies, by the oldest male boy of the family. Here bathing is excluded, and yet the water thus used is called *λουτρον*, or *λουτρα νυμφικὰ*, and Zonaras defines *λουτρα* thus, *τά εἰς λύσιν ἀγόντα τῆς ἀκαθαρσίας*. Those things which produce the removal of impurity, that is, means of purification. The boy who brought the water was called *λουτροφόρος*.

Again, Basil applies the term *λουτρον* to a clinic baptism by sprinkling or affusion. The prætor Ariantheus, converted by his wife, was also baptized by her on his dying bed. Of this Basil says, letter 386—He washed away all the stains of his soul at the close of his life by the washing of regeneration *λουτρον παλιγγενείας*. There was no bathing nor immersion; but sprinkling or affusion.

Again, in Corpus Hist. Byzant., Nicephoras Gregoras, Lib. 24, p. 573, Venice, 1729, uses *λουτρον* to denote the complex rite of purification, including unction and the influence of the Holy Spirit. Since it is customary with men to wash themselves with water and to anoint themselves with oil, God has joined to the oil and the water the grace of his Spirit, and made them (i. e. oil, water and spirit,) the cleansing of regeneration, *λουτρον παλιγγενείας*—anointing with oil is a part of the process of purification—it is no part of bathing, and here *λουτρον* must be taken in the most generic sense given to it by Photius, that is, a system of means of purification or a process of purification.

Mr. Carson hints that the *λουτήρες* in the temples might be for bathing the hands, and the *νιπτήρες* for washing them! p. 73. Here is the force of theory with a witness. Let us then listen to Julius Pollux, Leg. 46, Lib. 10, Cap. 10. The

caption is, concerning vessels used in washing hands and face, *περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ νιπτιέσθαι σκευῶν*.

It is necessary, he proceeds, for one arising from sleep to wash his face *τὸ πρόσωπον ἀπονιπτιέσθαι*—here is no bathing as yet. Let a boy, he proceeds, bring an ewer or pitcher, and pour out fresh water, *κατὰ λέβητος ἢ λουτήριον τίτος*, in a vessel or wash-basin. He justifies himself in using *λουτήριον* in this sense by quoting a line from Anaxilas, in which he says, in baths *τοῖς βαλανείοις* there are no wash-basins, *λουτήρια*, i. e. vessels for washing hands and face. Can *λούω* mean to bathe by its own force, when *λουτήριον* is thus used to denote a vessel in which to wash (*νίπτειν*) hands and face, and not only so, but is placed in pointed antithesis to bathing vessels? for in baths surely there are vessels for bathing, though there are none for face and hand-washing. Pollux also gives *λουτήρ*, (the word quoted by me from the Fathers), as a synonyme of *λουτήριον* to denote a wash-basin, for washing hands and face. All idea of face and hand *bathing* is therefore excluded.

Mr. Carson says, p. 67, that "*λούω*, like our word bathe, applies to animal bodies only—we do not speak of bathing cloth."

Nevertheless Origen applies *λουτρον* to wood, and Gregory Nazianzen applies *λούω* to clothes and to a couch—and Eupolis, see Pollux, applies *άλουσία* (i. e. want of washing) to a cloak. Surely these are not animal bodies.

Again, Mr. Carson says, p. 67, in order to justify the application of *νίπτω* to the whole body it must be all successively washed—as *νίπτω* involves friction or hand-washing. And yet Euripides applies it to bathing a whole herd of oxen in the sea, where friction, hand-washing, etc., are all out of the question. Strabo too applies it to the bathing of Diana in a river, where there was no probability of hand-washing.

Perhaps I have said enough to illustrate the nature of "the learned remarks of his own," which Mr. Carson has added, and his mode of "touching the subject with the hand of a master." I could add much more, did my room permit, and the patience of my readers allow. I will not complete the quotation with which I began, by adding "*Nascitur ridiculus mus*," but only state that I see no reason either to add to or take from my statement, after all of Mr. Carson's effort to settle the subject.

Mr. Carson says, I added no learned observations of my own. I answer, the case seemed to me too plain to need any. Nothing

is easier than to make a useless parade of learning. But it is of no use to waste time by needless citations to prove points which no one denies, and at the same time to deny points without proof, on which the whole question hangs.

I conclude then by saying, that *λούω* of its own force denotes to wash, or to purify; that in fact it is more generally used to denote a washing or purifying of the whole body, whether by sprinkling, affusion, or immersion—but that it is also applied to washing hands, face, and feet—also to wood, clothes, couches, cloaks, etc., though but rarely in this last sense.

Νίπτω applies generally to washing of hands, face, and feet, also sometimes, but more rarely, to bathing the whole body, in the case of both men and animals. It is also often used by the Fathers, with its compounds, to denote the cleansing of the mind from sin, excluding the idea of hand-washing. Sometimes also it is applied to the washing of cups, vessels, (*σκεῦη*) and tables.

Πλύνω is generally applied to clothes—but also to the body and all its parts, also to cups, metals, and various animal substances. Proof of all these statements is at hand and could be produced if needed. But I think that the case is clear enough as it is.

Mr. Carson's principles and general assertions, as to the Fathers, have passed under review: let us now briefly notice his application of them to the details of my argument. I shall now consider the manner in which he has assailed the Biblical argument.

§ 67. *Mr. Carson's attack on the Biblical argument.*

The Biblical argument is contained in §§ 8—18. The course of the argument is this: (1.) In John 3: 25, the expression, a dispute concerning purifying (*καθαρισμοῦ*), proves that *καθαρισμός* and *βαπτισμός* are synonymous, when applied to the rite of baptism. (2.) This view explains the expectation that the Messiah would baptize, for it was foretold that he should *purify*, but not that he should *immerse*. (3.) In the baptism of the Holy Spirit, the subject, the agent, the means, and the effect, demand the idea to purify, and exclude the idea to immerse, for the subject is the spirit of man, the agent the divine spirit, the means spiritual, and the effect purity; and in such relations the idea to immerse is absurd; purify is the only reasonable sense. (4.) The end of baptism is to indicate sacrificial purification,

i. e. the remission of sins. We should naturally expect to find this idea in its name, and we do find it so used as clearly to indicate that it has the sense καθάρσις, i. e. sacrificial purification or remission of sins. (5.) In the expression, divers baptisms, in Heb. 9: 10, the word βάπτισμοι is obviously taken in a generic sense to denote Mosaic purifications of any kind. (6.) The baptism of couches in Mark 7: 4, 8, and the baptism expected of Christ, in Luke 11: 38, were obviously purifications merely, and not immersions. (7.) In speaking of the nightly baptism of Judith (Jud. 12: 7) in the camp of Holofernes, no doubt a mere purification is spoken of without respect to mode, and not an immersion. (8.) In referring to a baptism from a dead body (Sirach 31: 25) no doubt the word is used in the generic sense to denote purification. (9.) The account of purification from sin in the baptism of Paul (Acts 26: 16), and Peter's effort to guard the mind against the idea of mere external purification, and to direct the mind to the purging of the conscience by the atonement, show that purification was the usual religious sense of the word. (10.) In that part of the Greek language in which alone we ought to look for decisive evidence on this subject, there is no opposing evidence to be found; hence the case is decided in favor of the sense to purify, and against the sense to immerse.

In weighing the force of this argument it is necessary to remember, that whatever the practice was in fact, even if it was immersion, it does not in any sense disprove this argument as to the meaning of the word; but only shows that under a command to purify, they did in fact purify by immersion. But I do not at all concede that in the Apostolic days it was customary to baptize by immersion. The fact I am persuaded was directly the reverse. But I mention this consideration, that no illogical imaginations or associations of ideas may entangle the mind or break the force of the argument.

Let it also be borne in mind that the argument is strictly cumulative, and that its force is to be tested by the coherence and accumulated force of its parts.

How, then, does Mr. Carson attempt to answer it? First, by attempting to break it up into disconnected fragments; then, in each fragment trying to prove that the highest possible evidence of my position is not given; that the sense immerse is possible; and then bringing in what he calls the testimony of the word βαπτίζω.

The illogical nature of this whole process I have fully shown. I have also, by evidence most unanswerable, shown that the word βαπτίζω does not in these cases testify as he alleges, but that it testifies directly against him, and most fully and decidedly in my favor. Hence,

1. On the ground on which I first put the argument, i. e. the principles of moral and cumulative evidence, it remains unanswered and with unbroken force.

2. On Mr. Carson's own ground it remains unanswered and with unbroken force. I add,

3. That the truth of every main point in the argument can be sustained by direct philological evidence from the Fathers, and that to any required degree of strength.

To illustrate this last assertion, let us consider the leading points of the argument.

1. Mr. Carson assails my argument from John 3: 25. He denies that the "question" spoken of had any reference to baptism at all. On the other hand Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa; Cyril of Alexandria, and Theophylact, expressly testify that the question concerning *purification*, was simply and only a question concerning *baptism*. Nor is this all; Theophylact expressly gives βάπτισμα as an equivalent of καθαρισμός. For, after stating the subject of the question just as I do, he proceeds to say of the disciples of John and the Jews, ζητοῦντες δὲ περὶ καθαρισμοῦ ἦτοι βαπτίσματος προσῆλθον τῷ αὐτῶν διδάσκαλῳ, "disputing concerning purification, that is, baptism, they came to their master." Nor are these words equivalent merely as names of the same rite, as Mr. Carson suggests, but they are equivalent in idea, as I have elsewhere often and fully shown. Hence purification is not a mere name of the rite like "illumination," "anointing," "the gift," "grace," "the seal," etc. It is the meaning of the word baptism; and baptism is purification and not immersion.

2. Again, Mr. Carson treats with very great contempt the second point, that this view explains, by a reference to Old Testament prophecies, the expectation that the Messiah would baptize. This I illustrated by a reference to Malachi. He thinks the argument so contemptible that it "deserves no attention." "It requires more than the patience of Job to be able to mention such an argument without expressing strong feeling." "This argument manifests such a want of discrimination, and confusion of things which differ, that the mind on which it

has force must be essentially deficient in those powers that qualify for the discussion of critical questions."

What, then, are the facts? They are these. The Fathers, in commenting on those passages in the Old Testament, in which it is predicted that the Messiah should purify, do regard them as predictions that he should baptize, and state explicitly that the words βαπτίζω and καθαρίζω mean the same thing. Of this, Basil's comment on Is. 4: 4, § 55, is an unanswerable proof. In the Old Testament it is said concerning the Messiah ἐκπλύνει and ἐκκαθάρει. In the New, John says βαπτίσει, and Basil says they mean the same thing; and then defines βάπτισμα as meaning καθαρισμὸς.

Nor is this all. Eusebius, of Cesarea, sustains the same view. Commenting on this passage, he says that the preposition ἐν is used in the causative sense, when applied to the Holy Spirit, not only in this passage, but in the New Testament too; for he says that the expressions ἐν πνεύματι κρίσεως καὶ ἐν πνεύματι καυσέως, sy the spirit of judgment, and by the spirit of burning, in Is. 4: 4, are equivalent to the expressions ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ καὶ πυρὶ, sy the Holy Spirit and fire in the New Testament. Hence he pointedly excludes the idea of immersion in the Holy Spirit, and gives in its place purification by the Holy Spirit. The whole comment of Eusebius is this: "Observe whether this passage is not, to a remarkable degree, coincident in sense with the evangelic testimony concerning our Saviour. He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire; for the expression by the spirit of judgment and the spirit of burning, does not at all differ in sense from the expression by the Holy Spirit and fire. In the one case (Is. 4: 4) fiery words reproofing them, produced a purification (κάθαρσιν) of sins, and in like manner, of our Saviour in the gospel it is said, he shall purify, βαπτίσει, not with water but by the Holy Spirit and fire."

In regarding Is. 4: 4 as a prophecy of baptism, Origen, Eusebius, Basil, Jerome, Cyril of Alexandria, and Theodoret, all coincide. And just as clearly do Theodoret and Cyril of Alexandria regard Mal. 3: 3, to which I referred, as a prophecy of baptism; and the same is true of other passages in the Old Testament, in which it is foretold that the Messiah shall purify.

Inasmuch, then, as it was foretold that the Messiah should purify, and inasmuch as purify and baptize are, by the testimony of the Fathers, synonymous, it was of course foretold that the Messiah should baptize. And predictions that he should

baptize would of course awaken an expectation that he would baptize. Hence this expectation is accounted for as I stated.

In what manner he should baptize is not foretold, and no doubt all these predictions had primary reference to spiritual purification, and could have been fulfilled had no external rite of purification been ordained. But so soon as a rite of purification was established by the forerunner of the Messiah, it would at once call up to the minds of all the great purifier, so long foretold, so long expected, and raise the inquiry, Is John he? If not, why does he purify?

And when the attention was thus aroused, it would of course lead John to unfold to the people the nature of that spiritual purification, of which his purification by water was but a type.

What struck my mind, was this. The language of the New Testament, as to baptism by the Messiah, is exactly such as is used in the Old Testament with reference to purification by the Messiah. In the Old Testament, a *purification* by the Spirit and by fire was spoken of, in the New, a *baptism* by the Holy Spirit and by fire. An immersion in the Holy Spirit and fire was manifestly absurd; hence I could not resist the conviction that the Old Testament and New Testament modes of expression were equivalent. And it appears that this mode of reasoning led me to the truth, notwithstanding Mr. Carson is pleased to treat it with such utter contempt.

Indeed, I would not fear to risk the whole question on the comments on Is. 4: 4, of the six Fathers named above. In some minor particulars they disagree, some referring the purification by fire to this world, others to the world to come, some to literal fire, others to spiritual, but all agreeing in one point, that to baptize and to purify mean precisely the same thing. Even, therefore, though Mr. Carson should continue to despise this argument, still the truth will nevertheless continue to be justified of her children.

3. The testimony of the Fathers on the third point, the baptism of the Holy Spirit, is no less abundant. All the evidence produced on the last point applies with equal force to this, for it is to the baptism of the Holy Spirit that they refer these predictions of purification in the days of the Messiah. Moreover they saw types of this baptism in the fire that came down from heaven and consumed the sacrifice of Elijah, and in the fire kindled by Nehemiah, according to the 1st book of Esdras, by sprinkling water.

Thus, said they, in the baptism of fire, a divine and heavenly fire descends from above, and enters into the heart, and purges out the dross of sin, and makes us pure.

Nor is this view sustained by the Fathers alone. It originates from the very nature of things. The Holy Spirit is neither figuratively nor literally a river, lake, or pool, but a living, intelligent being, from whom an illuminating and purifying influence goes forth as light and heat from the sun. Hence we are not spoken of as immersed in him, but purified by him; hence, too, it is proper to speak of his influences as poured out or descending as the rain, or going forth as the light or fire.

A few illustrations of these views from Cyril of Alexandria must suffice. He refers, Mal. 3: 1—3, to the baptism of Christ, and thus proceeds: "This divine fire from heaven, that is, gracious influence, through the Holy Spirit, when it enters into the heart, then, then indeed it cleanses away the pollutions of our former transgressions, and makes us pure, *καθααίρεινός*. This divine and spiritual fire the inspired John clearly announced, saying, "I indeed purify (*βαπτίζω*) you with water, but he shall purify you with the Holy Spirit and fire." Here the fiery influence is conceived of as coming from the Holy Spirit, and entering and purifying the heart. Moreover Cyril here agrees with Origen, Basil, and others, in considering the language of John as referring to and taken from those passages in the Old Testament which predict of the Messiah, purification, and that alone. And Cyril oft repeats the same ideas in other parts of his works. But his comment on Is. 4: 4, is still more striking. He first refers the passage, as Basil does, to the baptism of Christ, and then explains the spirit of burning thus: "We call it grace which comes into us at the holy baptism, not without the agency of the Holy Spirit. For we are not baptized by mere water, nor by the ashes of a heifer; indeed we are sprinkled for the purity of the flesh alone, as says the blessed Paul, but by the Holy Spirit, and by divine and spiritual fire, which consumes all the pollutions of wickedness in us, and melts out the pollution of sin. Such a coming of our Saviour also another of the holy prophets foretold, saying, "Behold he shall come as a refiner's fire, and as fuller's soap, and he shall sit and purify as gold and as silver." His reference to baptizing by the ashes of a heifer I have already noticed; and I now remark that through the whole passage he refers to a divine influence proceeding from God, which he calls spiritual fire,

ροητόν, which enters the heart and consumes and melts out the pollution of sin. He also in this passage unites both Is. 4: 4, and Mal. 3: 1—3, as predictions of the baptism by the Holy Ghost and by fire, to be introduced by Christ.

But how does Mr. Carson hold his ground against my position, that the sense immerse is never transferred in any language to denote effects like the agency of the Holy Spirit? By giving me a lesson in Rhetoric. Let us hear it. "Mr. Beecher has adopted some of my philosophical doctrines. I will give him another lesson which will prevent him from again alleging such an objection. Metaphor is not bound to find examples to justify its particular figures, but may indulge itself wherever it finds resemblance. It gives words a new application but does not invest them with a new meaning. It is not then subject to the law of literal language, which for the sense of every word needs the authority of use. This I have established in my treatise on the figures of speech, in opposition to the common doctrine of the rhetoricians. With respect to the point in hand, I would maintain my ground if a single other example of the figurative use of this word could not be adduced." I do not doubt it. Any thing sooner than to admit that βαπτίζω means to purify. But with all due deference to my teacher in rhetoric I would say, that this lesson does not exclude my objection. He says metaphor may indulge itself wherever it *finds resemblance*. This is well said: it is the truth. But my objection is that *there is no resemblance* between the operations of the Holy Spirit and immersion. The Holy Spirit illuminates and purifies. Immersion as such does neither. It signifies mode, and nothing else—and it may pollute as well as purify. For this reason I deny the propriety of its application to the Holy Ghost, and claim the sense to purify, for this is his glorious, grand, peculiar work. Mr. Carson's lesson in rhetoric therefore is of no avail. But does he make no effort to illustrate the usage which he claims? Yes; his cases are "steeping the senses in forgetfulness"—"steeping the soul in the milk of human nature"—"be not drunk with wine, but be filled with the Spirit." Here I ask, are the verbs to steep, to be drunk, and to fill, verbs denoting the mode of an action, and that alone? or are they words denoting an effect? If the latter, and such is the fact, the cases are not in point. Mr. Carson thus virtually confesses that he can find no case parallel with the use of the word immerse, a word of mere mode. If his cases satisfy

any, it can be only those who have an intense desire to be satisfied that βαπτίζω does not mean purify. Hence Mr. Carson's desperate resort to what he considers a new doctrine of figures of speech. Whether it is new or not is of small importance. It is enough, that whether new or old, it is nothing to the purpose.

4. No less clear is the testimony of the Fathers as to the fourth point, namely, that βάπτισμα denotes sacrificial purification, or the remission of sins. Indeed, I have adduced already so much of their testimony on this point, that to add any thing more is needless. See §§ 25, 26, Jan. 1841, and §§ 53, 54, Jan. 1843. Mr. Carson is pleased to treat with great contempt my remarks in § 12, Jan. 1840, designed to illustrate the difference between sacrificial and moral purification. "Mr. Beecher," he says, "gives us a dissertation on purification which is no more to the purpose than a treatise on logarithms." That Mr. Carson did not comprehend the nature or importance of the distinction made by me, or its extensive bearings in the discussion of the whole question, I freely admit. But ignorance and contempt of what we do not understand are not arguments.

So far is it from being true that my distinction is nothing to the purpose, that on the other hand, without it, it is impossible that much of the language of the Fathers on baptism should be understood at all. Sprinkling with blood is not an immersion, nor is it a washing, nor is it in the common sense of the term a purification, for blood of itself defiles. But the shedding of blood secures the remission of sins, and the sprinkling of blood is an expiation, that is, a sacrificial purification. And if it were not for this view, the language of the Fathers, when they speak of sprinklings of blood as baptisms, could not be understood. But take this view and all is plain. Indeed, it furnishes an argument against the sense immerse, of irresistible power. And although this is not much to Mr. Carson's purpose, it is very much to mine. Let any one trace this usage out, in all its applications to the baptism of blood, and the Mosaic and heathen expiations, and he will then be able to judge, both of the indispensable necessity and extensive application of the principles laid down in the dissertation, in § 12, of which Mr. Carson speaks so contemptuously.

5. On the fifth point, the divers baptisms spoken of in Heb. 9: 10, the evidence from the Fathers is absolutely overwhelming. As we have seen, they include without hesitation all the

sprinklings of the Mosaic ritual, whether with blood or with the ashes of a heifer. Indeed, one passage from Ambrose, of itself, were there no other, would be enough to settle this question forever. Apol. David, § 59: "Per hyssopi fasciculum adaspergebatur agni sanguine qui mundari volebat typico baptismo." He who desired to be purified with a typical baptism, was sprinkled with the blood of a lamb, by means of a bunch of hyssop. Compare now with this other similar cases in § 53, Jan. 1843, and all occasion for doubt must cease.

These are the leading and most important points in the biblical argument, and on them all, the testimony of the Fathers is as full and explicit as could be desired.

I was peculiarly struck with the commentary of Theophylact on John 3: 25. I had not read it when I gave my view in § 8, Jan. 1840. And yet the coincidence is nearly as perfect as if I had taken his exposition as the basis of my own. It was peculiarly gratifying to me to find the argument from this passage so clearly and fully sustained by the Fathers, as it was by means of this passage, that the Holy Spirit, as I humbly trust, first gave me an insight into the true meaning of this word. Mr. Carson's only argument against this view is a series of unproved assertions; that the question about purifying was not a question about baptism, and that it had no reference to the claims of Jesus or John; and that the disputants said nothing to John as to the question about purification, but stated one entirely different. In all this not only are the Fathers against Mr. Carson, but the most mature results of modern criticism are against him. Schleusner, Wahl, Vater, Rosenmüller, De Wette, Bretschneider, Kuinoel, and even Professor Ripley himself, are against him on these points. They all agree that baptism was the subject of the question; and Rosenmüller, Vater, Kuinoel, and Schleusner give baptism as the translation of *καθαρισμὸν*. Doederlin takes the same view. The following translation of the passage will present the true sense and the argument at once to the eye.

"After these things came Jesus and his disciples into the land of Judea, and there he tarried with them and *purified*. And John was *purifying* in Ænon, near Salim, because there was much water there, and they came to him and were *purified*. THEREFORE, there arose a question concerning *purification* between some of the disciples of John and the Jews, and they came unto John and said unto him, Rabbi, he that was with

thee beyond Jordan, to whom thou barest witness, behold the same *purifieth*, and all men come to him! As if Christ was improperly drawing men away from John's purification. In reply to all this John clearly avowed the superiority of Christ to himself, and justified his course."

Having considered the chief points, let us now review the remainder.

6. As to the baptism of couches, in Mark 7: 4, we have seen that the Fathers not only speak of this, but of baptizing men on couches; so that all possibility of evading the sense to purify is taken away. Moreover, in the Apostolic Const. 6: 6, a certain Jewish sect is spoken of concerning whom it is said, "unless they baptize themselves daily they eat not, still further, unless they purify—*καθαρῶσι*—with water their couches, and plates, and cups, and goblets, and seats, they will not use them at all." That the author of these words did not believe in the immersion of couches is plain from the fact that he obviously takes pains to use *καθαίρω* in place of *βαπτίζω*. That in this passage there is a direct reference to Mark 7: 4, is too plain to need proof. It is no less plain that in Luke 11: 38, the Fathers regarded the baptism required of Jesus as a purification, and not an immersion, for Theophylact says of Christ, that he was deriding their foolish custom of purifying themselves before they ate, and takes particular pains to substitute *καθαρίζω* in place of *βαπτίζω*. "Deriding their foolish custom, I mean their purifying—*καθαρίζεσθαι*—themselves before eating, he teaches that they ought to purify their soul by good works." He then adds, for washing the hands—*νίπτεσθαι*—by water purifies the body only, not the soul. This use of *νίπτεσθαι* clearly denotes that Theophylact regarded the baptism expected of Jesus as a washing of the hands. More proof could be added, but surely this is enough.

No one can any longer doubt what is meant by baptizing from a dead body, in Sirach 31: 25, after reading in Cyril of Alexandria of a baptism by the ashes of a heifer. Cyril also uses *κάθαρις* in the same relations. Ashes with water is a purification—*κάθαρσις*—to the defiled. Here, too, I remark, in passing, is an idiom of the same kind as that noticed in § 52, in which purifying agents are called baptisms. Here ashes with water is said to be a purification, i. e., a baptism. Mr. Carson's objection from *λουτρον* I have fully answered.

Nor is there any reason to doubt the sacrificial sense alleged by me in Acts 22: 16, and 1 Peter 3: 21. Arise, be purified or expiated is the import of the command, and refers manifestly to the rite. Wash away thy sins, refers as plainly to the result prayed for when the name of God was invoked, and which is shadowed forth by the rite, and in true believers comes to pass, i. e., the purification of the mind from sin. Mr. Carson says, this makes the pardon of sins to be confirmed at baptism. So it is if forgiveness is prayed for in faith. Sins are washed away by calling on the Lord for pardon, and the same is true of sins committed after baptism. We need forgiveness of sins daily, and daily we pray for it and receive it; and at the hour of baptism sins are no less forgiven, if the prayer of faith is offered, than at any other time, and the external rite is designed to announce and show forth this fact. This is not baptismal regeneration, nor any thing like it. The *usus loquendi* is plainly on my side. Mr. Carson's philosophical and theological objections are of no weight. As to 1 Pet. 3: 21, the Fathers are decidedly against Mr. Carson. He says, "Noah and his family were saved by being buried in the water of the flood; and after the flood they emerged as rising from the grave." Now it is not true in fact that Noah and his family were ever buried in the waters of the flood, nor that they emerged from them, nor did the Fathers ever so regard it. The wicked were buried in the waters of the flood. Noah and his family, according to the Fathers, were purified and thus saved. See § 28, 6. So also Cyprian says "*Qui cum Noe in Arca non fuerunt, non tantum purgati et salvati per aquam non sunt, sed statim illo diluvio perierunt.*" Those who were not in the ark with Noah, not only were not *purified* and *saved* by water, but perished at once by that deluge. According to the Fathers, those in the ark were saved by purification, those out of it were destroyed by immersion. All this perfectly accords with the *usus loquendi* of *βάπτισμα* which I have clearly established, and with the obvious import of the passage.

§ 68. *Mr. Carson's reply to the arguments from the Fathers.*

Mr. Carson's mode of meeting my arguments from the Fathers (in § 21.) next demands notice. "Well, how does Mr. Beecher bring out his proof? If the writings of the Fathers prove that they understood this word in Mr. Beecher's sense,

must not Mr. Beecher prove this by alleging examples of the use of the word in this sense? Common Sense, What do you say? But Mr. Beecher *attempts no such thing*. He does not appeal to the use of the word by the Fathers, but to other words applied by the Fathers to the same ordinance." And yet my argument stands thus. 1. The earlier Christian writers do not so often use the word βαπτίζω, as some synonyme derived from the sense to purify e. g. ἀναγεραίω, as before stated. 2. They often use βαπτισμός in the legal and sacrificial sense so as to exclude any idea but καθαρισμός. 3. They sometimes in describing the rite use καθαίρω or καθαρίζω alone. How then does Mr. Carson dare to say that I attempt no such thing as alleging examples of the use of the word? Do not the three examples from Chrysostom and Theophylact each contain the word βαπτισμός? And do I not argue to prove that it means purification? All this was before Mr. Carson's eyes. Nay, after six pages, he refers to it and tries to answer it. Mr. Carson may be able to explain all this. I frankly confess I cannot. After this false statement of my argument he proceeds: "Now I do charge my opponent with dishonesty in the use of this argument. I do him the justice to believe that he is the dupe of his own sophistry. But it is a sophistry childishly weak. I have already disposed of this argument. It assumes as an axiom that words that apply to the same ordinance are identical in signification." To this I reply, I make no such assumption. My argument is moral and cumulative. If βαπτίζω means to purify, we should expect to find καθαρίζω and other synonymous words used in its place. It would be strange if we did not. It could be used as an argument against us if it were not so. If we do, then this class of facts is as we should reasonably expect to find them. And this in its place and relations is a true and powerful part of a cumulative argument. Another view of the matter is indeed possible, for I never denied that one word *could* be used in the place of another, and yet not be synonymous with it. Thus in arguing on John 3: 25, there arose a question between some of John's disciples and the Jews about purifying. I first prove by the context that this dispute related in fact to baptism; and inasmuch as καθαρισμὸν is used in its place, I infer in view of all the facts of the case, that καθαρός and βαπτισμός are synonymous—because all probabilities tend this way. I then remark, "It is of no avail to talk of possible senses. The question is not what is possible, but

what is a rational inference from a fair view of the facts of the case; and this I do not hesitate to say is that *βαπτισμὸς* and *καθαρισμὸς* are synonymous." In this language I plainly intimate that another view is possible, but not probable. Hear now Mr. Carson: "I could admit that purification here refers to baptism specifically and still defeat President Beecher. He has labored in vain. He builds on a false first principle. He assumes that if two words refer to the same ordinance they must be identical in meaning. Nothing is more unfounded—palpably unfounded. There are situations in which two words may be interchanged at the option of the writer, while they are not perfectly synonymous. They may so far argue that they may be equally fitted to fill a situation while each has a distinct meaning. This is so obvious a truth, that I am perfectly astonished that it should lie hid from the President of the College of Illinois," pp. 5 and 8. To this I reply, I had well weighed the principle before writing my articles. It is simply the second of Mr. Carson's canons of trial as I have numbered them. No man who had ever noticed the pomp and authority with which Mr. Carson introduced it in his work on baptism as a profound discovery, could ever forget it again. I shall not pretend to decide whether a profound truth had laid hid from the world until Mr. Carson arose. I shall not dare to affirm that I had ever thought of such a thing before reading the pages of Mr. Carson. But surely after a repeated examination of his work on baptism, my ignorance must have been dispersed. And yet in full view of this canon I did dare to affirm, and do still affirm, that a rational inference from a fair view of the facts of the case is, that *βαπτισμὸς* and *καθαρισμὸς* are synonymous in John 3: 25, and *βαπτίζω* and *καθαρίζω* in the passages from the Fathers. I was not trying to render any other view *impossible* but *highly improbable*, and this I did accomplish; and I have since shown by other evidence that what is announced as highly probable, in view of all the facts, of these cases is certainly true.

The fact is that, through my whole argument, I avowedly reject Mr. Carson's demands as to the degree of proof needed, and claim decidedly and earnestly that I have proved the sense which I assign to the word, although another view is *possible*. I refuse to be cut off from using the lower grades of moral evidence. I refuse to give up the aid to be derived from a sense of propriety, beauty, harmony, and verisimilitude. I refuse to

introduce into the world of rhetoric and taste the iron rules of rigid demonstration. I insist that, in the interpretation of language, the mind shall be left open to the full power of all the influences that conspired to form that language. For example, in the exquisite passage quoted from Proclus, to translate *βαπτίζω* immerse, to a sensitive mind, alive to the beauties of style, would be worse than ten thousand discords in music. I refuse to be haunted by the ghost of an absurd canon of evidence through all the regions of poetry and eloquence, and compelled to reject all probable evidence of secondary senses, however striking, till I can succeed in hunting up one case of the impossibility of the primary sense. Whether I could find one such case or not, I did insist, and still do, that the laws of moral and cumulative evidence shall have their rightful sway, and that language shall not be tortured, wrested, and tormented for party purposes, and under the guise of zeal for the glory of God, and with charges of childish sophistry, or of unitarian or papal reasoning, or even of blasphemy, and giving the lie to the Holy Ghost, merely because I duly regard rational probabilities in deciding the sense of words. As to the passages from Chrysostom, Theophylact, and Gregory Naz., in which I assign to *βάπτισμος* the sacrificial sense *καθαρισμός*, I have fully vindicated that sense in my remarks on the baptism of blood, in §§ 25, 26, Jan. 1841, and in the present article; and to these remarks I refer the reader.

Let us now consider what Mr. Carson, with his usual urbanity, calls my original nonsense. Concerning this, he says, "He gives us eight lines of philosophy. I will give a premium to any one, who will produce me a greater quantity of absurdity in the same compass, under the appearance of wisdom. The only merit this nonsense can claim, is that it is original nonsense." With all due deference to Mr. Carson's award of the palm of originality to me, I am obliged to resign it to Basil, Clemens Alexandrinus, Jerome and others of the Fathers; for what I stated as philosophically probable, I find by their writings that they had seen long before me as a matter of fact. My eight lines of original nonsense are these: "In a case where analogical senses exist, one external and material, and the other spiritual, it is natural that they should run into each other, and terms applied to one, be applied to the other. Thus if *βαπτίζω* means to purify, then there is natural purification and spiritual purification, or regeneration, and there would be a tendency to use *ἀναγεννάω* to

denote the latter idea, and also to transfer it to the external rite. And at first it would be so done as merely to be the name of the rite and not to denote its actual efficacy."—Hear now Basil: "Since, then, the Lord has connected both baptisms, namely that from water to repentance, and that from the Spirit to regeneration, are there not three significations of baptism, purification from filth, regeneration (*ἀναγέννησις*) by the Spirit, and trial, i. e. purgation by the fire of judgment. Here now the senses are analogical. Purification by water is external and material, purification by the Spirit is internal and spiritual, that is, it is regeneration. Hence also *βάπτισμος* runs into that sense, i. e. regeneration is one of its meanings: so Basil expressly testifies. Again, this name regeneration was transferred to denote the external rite, and yet so transferred as to be merely the name of the rite and not to denote its actual efficacy. Of this the mere fact that it was applied to Christ, is proof enough. That he had no sin, and needed no spiritual purification, they all with one voice affirm, and yet they fully speak of him as regenerated. What sense is here possible but the sense baptize? Clemens Alexand., speaking of the baptism of Christ, says, *σήμερον ἀναγεννηθεὶς ὁ Χριστός*, Christ, being regenerated to-day, etc., and in the context interchanges that mode of expression with *βαπτίζομενος*—so Jerome says of Christ that he was born of a virgin—and born again, (*renatus*) of a virgin—i. e. John the Baptist. All then that I stated is true. *βάπτισμος*, i. e. purification, has analogical senses, one external and material, the other internal and spiritual. Spiritual purification is regeneration. This became a sense of the word baptism. It was also applied to the external rite to denote its name, but not its efficacy. The view that I advocate explains all this. It led me to expect it; and facts are as I expected to find them. Hence to Basil and to the Fathers I must resign the palm of originality. I cannot, however, give them the premium for more nonsense than mine. Their nonsense and mine seem in quantity exactly to coincide. Mr. Carson's a priori reasonings against my views, are therefore merely reasonings against notorious matters of fact. This is as I expected. His principles are at war with facts, and to what else can they lead him? If then his reasoning is good, what has he proved? Simply that the actual facts of language, and the actual operations of the human mind are nonsense. All this may be; and this state of things may call loudly for reform. Let not Mr. Carson

then be discouraged. It merely opens to him a new field of reform. Let him follow his high vocation, and having reformed philology, commentary, rhetoric and logic, let him next reform the human mind itself, and human languages, the offspring of that mind. Then he will have all things to his liking. Then, and not till then, will his favorite principles have full scope. What kind of languages he will form it is not for me to say. I enter not a sphere so high. They may be the tongues of angels: certainly they will not be the tongues of men. As for me, I am willing to take facts as I find them, even at the hazard of being charged with nonsense, for so doing. I leave the tongues of angels to Mr. Carson. I am contented to study the tongues of men.

§ 69. *Result.*

The conclusion of the whole matter then is this. The testimony of the Fathers, according to Mr. Carson, is absolute and decisive, for they must have known the apostolic usage of the word; to say otherwise is virtually to say that the Scriptures are no revelation. But the testimony of the Fathers is as full against his positions and in favor of mine, as is in the nature of things possible; and, therefore, the question is decided in my favor, and that not by the opinions of modern critics, but by men from whose opinion there is no appeal.

But before closing the argument, I desire to repeat what I have often said before, that I appeal to the Fathers simply as witnesses to the meaning of words. Many of their opinions which I have stated, as for example, those on baptismal regeneration, holy water, etc., are clearly false. But this does not at all invalidate or weaken their testimony as to the use of words, or hide the great fact which blazes through their pages like the sun in mid heaven, that they habitually used βαπτίζω to denote purification of every kind. So that with the proposition, which I laid down at the opening of this discussion, I bring it to a close. § 3, p. 46. Jan. 1840.

"The word βαπτίζω, as a religious term, means neither dip nor sprinkle, immerse nor pour, nor any other external action in applying a fluid to the body, or the body to a fluid, nor any action that is limited to one mode of performance. But as a religious term it means, at all times, to purify or cleanse,—words of a meaning so general, as not to be confined to any mode or agent, or means or object, whether material or spiritual, but to

leave the widest scope for the question as to the mode. So that in this usage it is in every respect a perfect synonyme of the word *καταβιβάζω*."

This proposition I at first derived solely from an examination of the New Testament usage, and I here repeat it as a true view of the import of the language of that supreme law of the Christian church. And I value the appeal to the Fathers simply as helping us, by their testimony to the *usus loquendi*, to reach a true interpretation of the word of God. Such then, as I have just stated, is the religious usage of the New Testament, and if so, all attempts to enforce on the church obedience to a command to immerse, is a manifest invasion of the great principles of religious liberty. IT IS TEACHING FOR DOCTRINES THE COMMANDMENTS OF MEN.

§ 70. Conclusion.

With four remarks I will close.

1. The present position of the Baptist denomination towards the rest of their fellow-Christians on earth, is exceedingly dishonorable to God, injurious to themselves, and injurious to the highest interests of the whole Christian community.

2. There is no higher duty at this time resting on the church than that of bringing this long-protracted and exceedingly injurious controversy to a close.

3. It can be brought to a close.

4. The responsibility of terminating it rests mainly, if not entirely, on the learned scholars and leading minds of the Christian world.

The truth of these propositions must be so obvious to every thinking mind, that I might almost leave them without remark. But to guard against all misunderstanding, I would remark by way of more full illustration,

1. That to have real Christians, who are alike in all fundamentals, divided in communion and action by a mere question of form, is, and must be, at all times, dishonorable and painful to God—for in practice it treats non-essentials as more important than essentials, and arrays holy men against holy men, to weaken each other's power, and injure each other's character and usefulness. And what more could even the devil himself desire?

It is injurious to the Baptists, for it has injured them. Among them are eminently pious men, but a bad system has ensnared

and betrayed them. How else can we account for it that they should have dared solemnly and formally to arrogate to themselves that they are DIVINELY AND PECULIARLY SET for the defence of THE GOSPEL, and that the heathen world must look to them alone for an unveiled view of the glories of THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST. Has it then come to this? Take away immersion, and is the gospel shorn of all its glories? Yea, is the gospel itself annihilated? Is immersion the gospel? What more can the most bigoted defender of baptismal regeneration and sacramental sanctification say than all this? But do our pious Baptist brethren mean all this? No! a thousand times, no. They know and feel, as well as we, that immersion is not the gospel. These facts only show, what all experience has shown, the danger of holding a system which makes a mere form of so much moment in practice as to outweigh holiness of heart and of life. In spite of all reasoning and professions to the contrary, it will as a general fact concentrate on itself a disproportioned, an unhealthy interest, narrow the range of Christian feeling, chill it and check its expansion, and distort and derange the intellectual perceptions of the mind. Men of uncommon native nobleness of character, as Robert Hall, or men of great piety may hold these tendencies of the system in check. But multitudes will not. Taught to regard themselves as distinguished from the rest of the Christian world by a form, the spirit of formalism will have scope. The pernicious idea of divine favoritism, on the ground of forms, will grow up, and this will breed arrogance, censoriousness, exclusion, and the spirit of proselyting in its highest degree. Nor do I speak of tendencies merely, these tendencies are embodied in public official results. How else can we account for it that even evangelical Baptists, not Campbellites, or Mormons, but even evangelical Baptists, have dared to arrogate to themselves a peculiar divine appointment to defend and promulgate the gospel of Christ, and have dared to charge two leading Christian Bible Societies, the American, and British and Foreign, as "virtually COMBINING TO OBSCURE a part at least of divine revelation," and to say, that in the translations of other denominations "the real meaning of words is PURPOSELY kept out of sight." Is it no injury to pious men to be so ensnared and deluded by a false system as to say and do such things as these? These are not the promptings of their Christian hearts, for that they have

Christian hearts I will not doubt. No ; it is the poison, the delusion of a false system that has done this.

No less is the Baptist system injurious to the highest interests of the whole Christian community. The implications of the Baptist system, and the proselyting spirit generated by it, and their charges on the rest of the Christian community, tend directly to irritate and alienate, to cherish the spirit of hostility, to nourish unholy controversy, to corrupt the love of truth by the desire of victory, and to breed an unchristian contempt towards our Baptist brethren, as exclusive, narrow-minded and contracted. All this is wrong, and it is an infinite evil. Over it all true Christians ought to mourn ; against it they ought to strive and pray. But the Baptist system tends directly to produce it. For it is based on a mere external act which has in itself no importance, except what is supposed to be created by a positive command. It is not like the law of God, and holiness founded in the nature of things ; and yet it cuts with the sharp edge of exclusion, and with charges of rebellion against God, as keenly as if it were as important as the being of God himself. Now, though to yield to temptation is wrong, and Christian endurance ought to rise superior to every trial, yet it is and ever will be an infinite calamity to the church, to be harassed and tried by a system so exquisitely adapted, both in theory and practice, to irritate and provoke ; and the cessation of an influence so malignant would be to the church almost like life from the dead. Of course,

2. There is no higher duty resting on the church at this time than that of bringing this long protracted and exceedingly injurious controversy to a close. The last great Papal war is coming on ; our own civil and religious liberties are in danger ; and is this a time still more to embitter the divisions of real Christians at home, and to sow the seeds of future discord, by translations unintentionally but really erroneous, in all parts of the heathen world ? The power of Satan's harlot church lies in organic unity on false and worldly principles. But still unity gives power, and till the true church discovers the true law of Christian unity and unites, the power of Satan cannot be and will not be overcome. He knows the full worth of the maxim, divide and conquer. The worth of the maxim, unite and conquer, the church has yet to learn ; and to learn it and reduce it to practice is the great work and duty of the present age.

3. This controversy can be brought to a close. The real issue is one and simple. False issues can be avoided—false principles rejected—and the real issue decided; for it all depends upon a simple question in philology, and with regard to that question there is abundant proof.

The settlement of this question has been greatly hindered by attempts to prove that *βαντίζω* means to sprinkle or pour. I have never seen the least evidence that it has either of these meanings, and to attempt to defend the cause of sprinkling or pouring on such grounds is, in my judgment, to make a false issue, and in effect to betray the cause; and yet it has been often done, and is still done. I shall not wonder if Baptists remain forever unconvinced by such arguments as these.

The settlement of this question is also greatly hindered by admitting that *βαντίζω* in the command means to immerse, and yet claiming the right, on the ground of expediency, to practise sprinkling, because in our judgment it retains the essence of the command. Especially, if it is at the same time conceded that Rom. 6: 3, 4, and Col. 2: 12, relate to the external rite, and that the early church understood *βαντίζω* as meaning immerse, and practised immersion for that reason. When all this is conceded, the whole question is conceded. It is perfect logical demonstration in favor of immersion. But I have abundantly shown that none of these things are so. Hence, to concede them is to give up the whole question, and thus, on grounds of expediency, to claim the right to alter a command of God. This is placing the defence of the right to sprinkle on a false principle, for no such right as is claimed exists. Nor shall I wonder if the Baptists remain forever unconvinced by such reasoning as this.

The real and the only issue is this. Is the command an open command? Is it a command to purify, or a command to perform an external specific act? One or the other it is. Which? If the latter, then let us all obey. If a command to purify, then let us all cease to dispute about forms, and obey in that mode which seems to us most significant, decorous and solemn.

This brings the whole question to an issue definite and simple, and as it regards every point upon which this issue depends, there is abundant proof, and that of a kind which is in its nature absolute and decisive.

4. The responsibility of terminating this discussion rests

mainly, if not entirely, with the learned scholars and leading minds of the Christian world.

It depends upon a question in philology. On such questions original investigation is and must be limited to a few. It extends over a wide field, and calls for nice discrimination, and accurate principles of philology. Hence, the mass of the Christian community are peculiarly in the power of their leaders—and their leaders are exposed to peculiar temptations. By bold and united assertions, and by overlooking or suppressing evidence, they can keep their parties together, and inspire them with zeal even against the truth.

Hence, on no class of men do such responsibilities rest as on the learned leaders in this cause, to make themselves fully acquainted with the evidence on which a decision depends, to avoid all false issues, to reject all unsound principles, and sincerely and honestly, as in the sight of God, to meet the main question, avoiding all personalities, and all unchristian excitement, and suppressing and concealing no part of the truth. If they will do this, and look to God for the illumination and guidance of the Spirit, then he will cause the watchmen to see eye to eye, to lift up the voice together, and together to sing. If not, let them fear lest they become not merely blind leaders of the blind, but treacherous guides of confiding but dependent minds. All error in the discussion of this subject is not on one side. There have been false defences of the truth, which need as really to be abandoned, as positive error. And a supreme regard to the glory of God should lead each to inquire, not how can I prove that all my past positions have been true, but how can I discover all errors which I have incautiously embraced, and retain the truth alone? So soon as leading minds agree on this point, the mind of the community will be at rest, and not till then.

Much evil has been done by speaking of this discussion as a mere dispute about forms, and as unworthy of the attention of an expanded and liberal mind. It relates indeed to a form, but as I have shown it affects immense spiritual interests, and it is in its essential nature a question in philology—to be decided just as all other philological questions are—and the real difficulty has been not that it has been discussed too much, but that the discussion has not been sufficiently radical and extensive, and that much very important evidence has been sparingly used,

if used at all. Let this state of things cease, and the sanctified intellectual energies of the Christian community be brought to bear on this subject with humble prayer for divine guidance, and the clouds of error will pass away.

The present state of things ought not to continue, nay it cannot. The cause of God can never triumph whilst his church is so painfully divided and her energies so paralyzed, and so long as such errorists as the Campbellites and the Mormons are shielded, in their most pernicious formalism, on a point so vital to them as baptism, by the influence of the Evangelical Baptists.

Nor does it seem to me possible that all leading minds, through power of conviction, should ever accede to the Baptist position in all its rigor and extent, giving to the word but one sense, and that to immerse; and making this an iron rule for translation and practice. It is a system more rigid than that of the Fathers, even in the ages of the highest formalism. So rigid a system never did prevail in the church, nor can I believe that it ever will. There are not the elements of logical proof in existence. It disagrees with all of our ideas of fitness; there is no reason to wish it true, and its fundamental position can be logically destroyed.

The position defended by me, takes nothing from any one but the right to think others wrong and to censure and exclude them, and in itself considered there is every thing to recommend it. For

1. It is more adapted to the varying conditions of men, and to all changes of climate, times, seasons, and health.
2. It is more accordant with the liberal and enlarged spirit of Christianity, as a religion of freedom, designed for all countries and all times.
3. It better agrees with our ideas of what is reasonable and fit.
4. It offers no temptations to formalism, nor does it tend to foster arrogance and exclusion.
5. It is perfectly adequate to harmonize the church.
6. It is susceptible of any necessary degree of proof.

I have by no means exhausted the proof that exists, nor even what I have on hand. To much I have not had time even to allude. But what I have produced is sufficient, I trust, by the blessing of God, to secure the end that I proposed, "to furnish some small share of the materials which God may use in producing the unity of his own church." But for faith in God, I

never should have dared to undertake this work. But for his sustaining grace I could not have brought it thus far. Almost exhausted by efforts to sustain the college over which I preside, in a time of unparalleled pecuniary embarrassment, without an adequate library at the college, compelled to visit distant libraries, some more than a thousand miles distant, and to make researches at long intervals, loaded with pecuniary cares and anxieties, compelled often to write on journeys, in steam-boats, and canal-boats, and taverns, no one can be more deeply sensible than I am of the necessary imperfections of my performance. Yet, I have looked to my God to save me from hurtful error, and to guide me into the truth, and it is my humble persuasion that he has heard my prayer. To him, in conclusion, I commend all that I have written, imploring him to pardon all its imperfections, to correct all its errors, and to use all its truth to the glory of his own great and holy name.

ARTICLE VIII.

CHRIST PREACHING TO THE SPIRITS IN PRISON.

*Οτι καὶ Χριστὸς ἅπαξ περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν ἔπαθε, δίκαιος ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων, ἵνα ἡμᾶς προσαγάγῃ τῷ θεῷ, θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι, ἃ ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν, ἃ ἀπειθήσασί ποτε, ὅτε ἀπεξεδέχετο ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ μακροθυμία ἐν ἡμέραις Νῶε, κατασκευαζομένης κιβωτοῦ, εἰς ἣν ὀλίγοι τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅκτι ψυχαὶ διεσώθησαν δι' ὕδατος· ὃ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀντίτυπον νῦν σώζει βάπτισμα, οὐ σαρκὸς ἀπόθεσις ῥύπον, ἀλλὰ συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα εἰς θεόν, δι' ἀναστάσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.—1 Pet. 3: 18-21.

By Rev. Thomas H. Skinner, D. D., Pastor of Mercer Street Church, N. Y.

THE course of Christianity from the beginning has been one of great conflict. That a religion from God should encounter such opposition was a mystery, and the apostles were not without the apprehension that it might shake the faith of some of their inexperienced disciples, as appears from the care which they show in their writings to guard them against defection on that account.

This obviously is the design of Peter in the preceding context. He is there endeavoring to fortify Christians against discouragement from the sufferings to which they were exposed for the sake of the gospel. To this end, he tells them that it is better, if the will of God be so, that they suffer for well-doing than for evil-doing; assuming that all suffering for adhering to the gospel is suffering for well-doing. He cites, in confirmation of this, the example of Christ, who suffered as a well-doer, the Just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God;—the highest instance that ever was or will be, both of well-doing and of suffering on account of it. What the apostle would have them particularly remember was, that the sufferer in this instance found ultimately no disadvantage from the unparalleled injuries which he endured. Though he suffered to the greatest extremity, even to his being put to death in the flesh, the ignominious death of the cross, yet he was quickened by the Spirit, by which he went and preached to the spirits in prison, etc.

“This place is somewhat obscure in itself, but as it usually happens, made more so by the various fancies and contests of interpreters, seeming or pretending to clear it.” The fact, however, that efforts to explain it have been unsuccessful, will not and should not preclude continued attempts. It is relied upon to support unsound and dangerous doctrines, and it should, if possible, be shown by just exposition, that it lends them no countenance. Its affirmation concerning Christ’s preaching to the spirits in prison, is interpreted to mean that he went after his death to the abode of departed sinners, “the proper hell,” and “that as he revealed here on earth the will of God unto the sons of men, and propounded himself as the object of their faith, to the end that whosoever believed in him should never die; so after his death he showed himself unto the souls departed, that whosoever of them would yet accept of him should pass from death to life.” This and other dogmas contrary to the catholic faith, appeal to this scripture as their warrant, and so long as they do so, the friends of truth, certainly, should not cease looking for the key to its true interpretation. Whether there be any conclusive force in the following remarks, is with deference submitted to the decision of the reader.

We would first ascertain the meaning of the phrase rendered in our version, “quickened by the Spirit.” So far as we know, what we take to be the sense of the original words, has never

been given. If this can be established, we think a new ray of light will be thrown on the passage.

Our translation, it is admitted, is not the only one the original will bear. Nay, much as we desire to honor the received English version, we are constrained to say that it has in this instance given a reading which the original will not bear. The true reading is not, quickened *by* the Spirit, but quickened *in* the Spirit. So it is given by Wickliffe, by Tyndale, by Cranmer, and in the versions of Geneva and Rheims, and so, but for certain theological antipathies, it would probably have been given by our translators. Both the prepositions, in the clause, "put to death *in* the flesh but quickened *by* the Spirit," have been supplied. The words flesh and spirit stand in the original without any preposition whatever, and it is obvious from their antithesis, that if the word "spirit" denote *the active cause* by which Christ was restored to life, the word "flesh" must equally denote *the active cause* by which he was put to death; which, therefore, must have been the flesh of his own body, an interpretation too manifestly absurd to be admitted.*

The important phrase before us must have one of the five following significations. 1. That Christ, after his death, was invigorated as to his human soul as distinguished from his body; that, though as to his body he was dead, he was more vital than before as to his soul. We cannot adopt this as the true sense, though the thing affirmed may have been true, for a reason, which will hereafter be given. It may seem to be required, at the first view, by the law of antithesis, but besides that it is a feeble sense, it does not, as we shall see, fall in with the scope of the context.

2. That Christ, after death, was made more vital as to his deity, as distinguished from his human nature. This sense must be rejected, as being inconsistent with the essential immutability of the Godhead.

3. That Christ suffered death indeed as to his body, but was resuscitated or quickened again into bodily life, by the Holy Ghost. This, however true, is not what the words were intended to express: (1.) Because, as we have shown, the original cannot be justly rendered so as to give this sense; it must be translated quickened, not by, but *in* the Spirit. (2.) Because

* Horsey.

the resurrection of Christ was not more the act of the Holy Ghost, than that of the Father; nay, than Christ's own act. It is ascribed to the Father in Eph. 1 : 20. It is ascribed to Christ himself in John 2 : 19, and John 10 : 18. If it is anywhere ascribed to the Holy Ghost, it is not as his act exclusively or peculiarly; and no reason appears from either the text or context for introducing the Holy Ghost here as the agent in raising the body of Christ: nay, (3.) the raising of his body cannot have been referred to in this quickening, for the very reason that the context on that supposition cannot be explained. Indeed all context, i. e. connection, between the parts of the passage is destroyed by it. For where is any connection between Christ's being raised from the dead, and his preaching to the antediluvians?

4. That Christ, after being put to death as to his body, quickened himself into bodily life by his own eternal Deity. This cannot be what is intended, because, to mention no other reasons, the original cannot be so translated as to admit the preposition *by*.

5. The only remaining sense of the phrase is, that Christ, after his death, was quickened in reference to his great work, the salvation of mankind;—quickened as to that efficacious agency, by which this work was to be carried forward:—an agency by which Christ made himself to be felt among men in his power to save; an agency which diffused new and mighty life through his body the church, and, by means of his church, thus vitalized, throughout the world. This agency was specifically that of the Holy Spirit. The propriety of speaking of Christ as quickened, because of the increased influence and exertion of this agency, appears from this, that the Holy Spirit, according to the representations of Scripture, is the Spirit of Christ. So he is called in Rom. 8 : 10, and elsewhere, (1,) because, the Holy Spirit, in reference to the accomplishment of our redemption, is possessed by Christ above measure; John 3 : 34, Acts 4 : 38, Is. 42 : 1; and, (2,) because, for the same purpose, the Holy Spirit is given or sent by Christ; John 1 : 33, 15 : 26, Luke 24 : 49. The distinguishing mark of our Lord, as the Messiah, was, *that he baptized with the Holy Spirit*. So he baptized his disciples on the day of Pentecost; and so, by their instrumentality, he baptized great multitudes throughout the world, or in the language of the prophet, "sprinkled many nations," Is. 52 : 15.

Thus, though Christ suffered unto death in the flesh, in ac-

completing the redemption of man, yet relatively to that work, he was quickened in the Spirit, became efficaciously vital and life-giving, in the influences of the Holy Ghost, which were thenceforward so abundantly bestowed. In the Spirit, thus understood, he was "straitened" before his death, according to his own complaint, Luke 12: 50; after his death he was "quickened;" life flowed from him, filling his church with vitality, and the world too became conscious of his life-giving energy; agreeably to his own forcible illustration, John 12: 24, "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit;" and agreeably also to his prediction, John 12: 32, "And if I be lifted up from the earth, I will draw all men unto me."

We propound this, then, as the true sense of the expression, as being, 1, the worthiest and greatest sense, and on that account preferable, other things being equal; 2, accordant with a manifest and wonderful fact, which was then filling the world with excitement, namely, the outpouring of the Spirit in his divinely vivifying influences; and, 3, coincident with the scope of the place, in connection with which it stands, as follows: No damage comes from well-doing: Christ suffered extremely on that account, and the result is known. To redeem man, he was put to death in the flesh; but his death was the means of life to his cause. Before he died, to use his own simile, he was like an unplanted grain which abideth alone; after his death, he was like a corn of wheat, which having yielded its life in the midst of a fruitful soil, is now producing an hundred-fold increase. To vary the form of speaking, he was *straitened* before he suffered; he was *quickened* afterwards. Filled himself with the Spirit above measure, he poured it out from on high, baptized his church with it, and diffused, through his church, a heavenly life among the nations.

Such is our understanding of this very important phrase "quickened in the Spirit." Irrespective of the light which the remaining part of the text receives from this interpretation, it commends itself, we think, as the only one the place will bear. It will appear, however, as having new claims to our adoption, when it is seen how it elucidates the following context. We proceed with our exposition.

The apostle having mentioned Christ's becoming thus quickened in consequence of his death, as to the life-giving power of the Spirit, goes on to speak of his having exerted himself, in

an office of the Spirit, among those who perished by Noah's flood. He expresses this in the following language: "By which he went and preached unto the spirits in prison, which sometime were disobedient, when once the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah." But why does he mention this ancient fact in this connection? What has Christ's ministry to the antediluvians, in the person of Noah, to do with the subject which the apostle has in hand, namely, his being put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the Spirit? This, at the first view, seems exceedingly abrupt, and some persons, probably, have been inclined by this appearance of dislocation and irrelevance, to question, if the apostle be in fact speaking of what we have said, namely, the preaching by means of Noah to the disobedient men of his day. The dogma, as we have before mentioned, has been advanced that Christ, after his death, went to the place where the antediluvians were now confined, for the purpose of preaching to them; and in accordance with it this text has been explained; and the explanation has, it may be said, this at least to recommend it, namely, that it makes the apostle less disjointed and incoherent in his discourse. For it is what one would be naturally enough led to inquire about, after being told that Christ, when lying dead in the grave, was, in spirit, more vital and energetic than before. Where was Christ's disembodied spirit, and how was it exerting its invigorated powers during the three days and nights, which intervened between his crucifixion and his resurrection? An inquiry which it has been supposed the apostle, in the words following, proceeds to resolve. Is this so?

Was the soul of Christ in fact thus employed, while his body was in Joseph's tomb? If there is any testimony in Scripture in favor of this, it is in the present text. There is no parallel place, no hint, no trace of evidence, direct or indirect, besides. Presumption certainly is against it: for why should these antediluvians, above all mankind who have departed in disobedience, be distinguished by such a privilege as it is said they had? It is moreover fatal to this exposition, that it gives a feeble sense to the great expression, "quickened in the Spirit." The spirit, according to this interpretation, means Christ's human soul; but to say that Christ did not die as to his soul when his body was dead, but was rather more vigorous, were but to make a commonplace remark, and to say what is doubtless true of every one who dies, as well as of our Lord. We shall see yet further reason for not adopting this exposition.

But, after all, is the alleged objection against the commonly received meaning of Christ's "preaching," etc. true? Is it impossible to trace a connection between this interpretation and Christ's being quickened in the Spirit? A connection there doubtless is, if the interpretation be the true one. Confessedly it is not apparent at the first glance, but may not a connection be discovered by close attention to the drift of the apostle's discourse, and by comparing scripture with scripture? We humbly hope we have made this discovery.

The connection in question is, a connection or link of union in the apostle's thought, between Christ's being quickened in the Spirit after his death in the body, and his preaching through Noah to the antediluvians, then disembodied spirits in prison. Can no reason be conceived of, why the apostle should mention these things as he has done, in close conjunction? We know the following fact, namely, that there was an important connection in the mind of this apostle between that flood, in foresight of which Noah, filled with the Holy Ghost, lifted up his warning voice in the ears of his disobedient contemporaries, and that eternal destruction which is now coming upon the world of the ungodly, and in prospect of which Christ, after his death, sent the Holy Spirit upon his disciples, and through them thus qualified for the work, called men to repentance. These two floods, (if for convenience sake we may so call them,) though distant in time—the one long since past, the other yet to come—stood together in the apostle's illumined mind, closely related the one to the other. We see this in the following passage from the third chapter of his Second Epistle. "By the word of God, the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water; whereby the world that then was, being overflowed with water perished: but the heavens and the earth which are now, by the same word, are kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men." The flood of water, the first flood, pointed in the apostle's view to the second, the flood of fire, by which the world's final destruction is to be effected. He could not therefore well be thinking of the one without being reminded of the other. Now this final destruction held a lofty place in the apostle's present meditation. It was to deliver men from this destruction, that Christ, as quickened in the Spirit, according to the interpretation of this phrase, which we have given, was now employed. This was the end of that movement now go-

ing forward through the ministrations of the apostle and his fellow-laborers in the work of Christ: and that the apostle had this in mind, appears from what he says in our 21st verse. Having remarked that the result of Noah's ministry was the salvation of few, that is eight souls, by water, he adds, "the like figure whereunto, baptism, doth now save us by the resurrection of Jesus Christ." Baptism, in its signification and design, was no other than the great work of recovering mercy, which Christ, as now quickened in the Spirit, was accomplishing among men. This baptism, not the outward ceremony so called, not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience towards God—this name for the great salvation now everywhere proclaimed, was the antitype of the water of the deluge—that water which, while it destroyed the world, saved, as the apostle affirms, Noah and his house. Baptism, we say, was the antitype (*ἀντίτυπον*—*ἀντίτυπον**) of that water which floated and defended the ark while it submerged the earth. The antitype baptism, the great blessing which Christ, as now quickened in the Spirit, is giving to men—this baptism, saith the apostle, doth now save us—namely, those of the present generation, who, as did Noah and his house, have obeyed the warning voice of the Divine mercy. As the eight souls were saved in the ark, so we are saved by the antitype baptism, now appointed as the world's only hope. Another flood is approaching—a flood of devouring fire, which is to sweep erelong over the face of the earth, and dissolve the elements with fervent heat. In view of this overwhelming destruction, of which Noah's flood was a foreshadow, Christ, quickened in the Spirit, and exerting himself in the anointed ministers of his grace, is rousing mankind from the slumber of sin, and warning them to make their escape, and proposing to them "baptism" as the means; and they who hear his voice and fall in with his proposal, are saved from this infinite ruin, even as they were saved from the flood, who according to the Divine premonition took refuge in the ark.

We see, then, that this great and terrible destruction, the flood of fire, was in the Apostle's thought. Christ, being quickened in the Spirit, the religious stirs and movements of the times—the developments of the saving virtue of the antitype

* See MacKnight's version.

Baptism, implied this: but the flood of Noah stood in his thought, (as we have seen, and as it well might have done, from its prelusive and prefigurative relations,) associated with this other coming storm of wrath; it was to him a proof and a pledge, that this more dreadful storm was truly coming. How natural was it, therefore, that when he thought of the one, his second thought should have been of the other; that as he beheld the evidences of Christ's being quickened in the Spirit, in the great exertions which were then made to save men from the infinite destruction then impending,* he should remember that when the first destruction was at hand, the same benevolent Being (not indeed, as now, quickened in the Spirit, not in that fulness of power which he was then displaying, yet) by the Spirit in some measure of his influences, by the same Spirit, by which he was then striving so mightily with mankind, sought, through the instrumentality of his prophet, to bring the infatuated men of that age to repentance, and so deliver them likewise? And if it was natural for him to be reminded of this, it is not surprising that he spoke of it.

There is one expression in our English translation of the passage, which some persons, probably, would lay stress upon, as being favorable to the interpretation which we reject: "By which, *he went, and preached,*" etc. (*πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν*). But there are examples to show, both in the Scriptures and in classic authors, that no special emphasis should be given to this form of expression. Among Scriptural examples see Eph. 2: 17, "Having abolished—the enmity—and came and preached (*καὶ ἐλθὼν εὐηγγελίσατο*) peace to you who were afar off, and to them who were nigh."—"It is certain that our Lord, after his resurrection, did not go personally to the Gentiles to preach peace to them. He preached to them by his apostles only. But if Christ is said by Paul to go and do, what he did by his apostles only, he may with equal propriety be said by Peter, to go and do, what he did by his prophet Noah." He went and preached, is but a pleonasm, for he preached.

According to the exposition now given of this passage of Scripture, the sense and connection of it may be expressed in the following paraphrase.

* Dr. Owen thinks the Apostle's primary reference was to the approaching destruction of the Jewish Church and State, but that he also embraced in his view the destruction of the world.

Christians should not be discouraged by their sufferings on account of well-doing. No ultimate evil will come to them from these sufferings. They may convince themselves of this by considering the example of Christ. In order to save mankind, to bring us to God, he underwent the greatest extremity of suffering, having been put to death in the flesh. Yet his unparalleled sufferings were no detriment to him in respect of his great undertaking. So far from this, they were the foundation of his success: all thenceforth was life in his body the church, and the world also felt his vitalizing power. By what abundant manifestations of the Spirit, and what glorious triumphs, hath he since then been carrying on his mighty work of saving men from that infinite wrath, which is so fast coming on the world? And this reminds me, how this same mighty deliverer exerted himself by the Spirit through the ministrations of Noah, when the deluge was at hand. He then preached, by his faithful prophet, to the disobedient persons of that generation, whose disembodied spirits are now in the prison of hell, bearing the just punishment of their incorrigible impenitence. The great patience of God once waited on those unhappy persons for a long period, even one hundred and twenty years, during which time the ark was being built. The result, though small, was not an entire failure. Eight persons were saved in the ark by that water which bore it up and defended it, while it drowned all the world besides. The salvation of these few was the fruit of that same divine grace, which is now discovering itself in our deliverance from the greater wrath to come, and of which baptism, in its signification and purport, is the compendium;—baptism, the antitype of the water which saved the family of Noah. I do not mean the external rite merely, but the thing thereby represented, the answer of a good conscience toward God, a conscience purified through the blood of Christ, and following its convictions in piously observing the sacramental ordinance of the Christian church: baptism, another name for the influences and effects of Christ, as quickened in the Spirit—this antitype baptism, through the resurrection of Christ, which is the consummation of his work, and the grand proof of his redeeming virtue—baptism, I say, doth now save us from the coming eternal vengeance of God, even as Noah and his household were saved from the flood which drowned the world, by the typical ark and water.

ARTICLE IX.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

- 1.—*A Residence of eight years in Persia, among the Nestorian Christians; with Notices of the Muhammedans.* By Rev. Justin Perkins. *With a Map and Plates.* Andover: Allen, Morrill & Wardwell. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1843. pp. 512.

WE have received from Mr. Dodd this interesting volume. It can no longer be said, that missionaries are a useless set of men, that money expended on their support is wasted. For, independently of the blessing which accompanies their labors, in fitting immortal souls for an eternal home in heaven, they now stand before the world with claims on its regard for the valuable contributions they make to literature and science. To those, who feel little interest in the conversion of souls to God, by the regeneration of the Spirit, but much in the advancement of scientific and literary knowledge, missionaries must now appear as a class of men highly worthy of respect.

Not to mention others, here is a volume contributed to the literature of the world, of which any one might be proud to have been the author. The colored plates, originally drawn by a Persian artist, under the supervision of Mr. Perkins, are in themselves not without value as specimens of art, and as presenting before the eye the most correct delineations of the costume and features of the various classes of Persians anywhere accessible to us.

No American, before Mr. Perkins, was ever a resident in the ancient country of the Nestorians; and the report he makes has this attribute, wanting in many others, that it can be relied on with the utmost confidence. The materials for the work were collected on the ground, but in respect to their arrangement and filling out, Mr. Perkins says, "I have sometimes written an hour at a public house, while waiting for a stage-coach; at other times in a cabin of a steam-boat, among scores of passengers; and have often revised my manuscripts, while travelling in rail-road cars." Yet, we could not help comparing the result here accomplished with that presented in Dickens's "Notes," who makes somewhat of a similar statement about his opportunities for doing his work. Whilst the latter will soon have passed away as the morning cloud, the former will live, an honor to its author and a treasure to the Christian and literary world.

The volume contains twenty-seven plates, and a rich fund of interesting information in respect to Turkey, Persia, and especially the Nestorians. They who read will find themselves abundantly rewarded. The style is easy, the narrative well conducted, and many of the incidents thrilling. The visit of Mr. Perkins and Mar Yohannan, his companion, will be long remembered; and when they both shall be slumbering in the dust, or rather rejoicing in heaven, the little ones of the land, who have been so eager to see and to hear them, will still talk of them, after they have grown to manhood, and will then inquire for this book, that they may see their portraits and read of their labors to revive the spirit of Christianity among the Nestorians. By that time, too, we trust that ancient church will have returned to the simplicity of the Gospel, and will be going forth as messengers of good to the lost around them.

Our limits in the present number will not permit us to give an analysis of the work: but our hope is that it will be widely circulated.

2.—*The Religious Instruction of the Negroes, in the United States.* By Charles C. Jones. Savannah: Thomas Purse. 1842. pp. 277.

Mr. Jones, the author of this volume, has for years manifested a deep interest in the religious improvement of his colored fellow-men. He is a minister of the gospel, resident in Georgia, and connected ecclesiastically with the Presbyterian denomination.

This is an interesting volume in many respects. The class of people of whose instruction it treats, is an interesting one—the historical facts it contains—the plainness of speech it exhibits—the plans it proposes—its coming from one so personally familiar with the state and relations of those for whose welfare he pleads—its connection with great questions of duty to the slave, and its tendency to direct the attention of slaveholders to topics which they have too much excluded from their circle of thought. It contains an historical sketch of the religious instruction of the negroes from 1620 to 1842—treats of the moral and religious condition of the negroes; of the obligations of the church to improve that condition by giving them the gospel—and proposes plans for securing their religious instruction.

It appears that the Moravians were the first to attempt missions exclusively to the negroes, and that direct and continued efforts for their religious improvement were first made

by Presbyterians in Virginia, encouraged by Pres't. Samuel Davies. The moral and religious condition of the poor negroes in the United States is portrayed in the blackest colors. It is enough to make a Christian weep and pray earnestly for their deliverance from the thralldom of sin, the yoke of a moral slavery. Under the head of the obligations of the church to the negroes, the author speaks out plainly and forcibly, first to the church in slaveholding states on their duties to the slaves, then to Christians in the free states on their duty to afford the gospel to free negroes within their limits. To the former he says: "We cannot cry out against Papists for withholding the Scriptures from the common people, if we withhold the Bible from our servants, and keep them in ignorance of its saving truths, which we certainly do whilst we *will not* provide ways and means of having it read and explained to them."

"John Randolph found a female friend busy, with sem-stresses, making up garments. 'What work have you in hand?' 'O, sir, I am preparing this clothing to send to the poor *Greeks*.' Seeing some of her servants in need of just such clothing, he exclaimed: 'Madam, madam, *The Greeks are at your door*.'"

Mr. Jones weighs well all objections to the course proposed and meets them on Scriptural grounds: so that it must be difficult for a minister of the gospel or a private Christian to read and not be reproved. Oh, if the principles of this book were inculcated and adopted in the Southern States, for which it is principally intended, how much of the curse of slavery would be removed, and how many of our reasons for emancipation would lose much of their force.

Whilst we freely acknowledge ourselves unfriendly to the system of slavery as it exists in the United States, and indeed to all slavery; whilst we deem freedom to be the right and privilege of every son and daughter of Adam, and that no one may compulsorily enslave his fellow man, we think appeals, such as Mr. Jones makes, to the consciences of Christians in the South, adapted to prepare the way, as rapidly as any other preparatory measures, for the ultimate breaking of all the fetters of bondage and letting the oppressed and captive go free. We long for the day, when no slave shall set his foot on Columbia's pure soil, when the shout of *universal* freedom shall go up from all the multitudes of its people, and its star-spangled banner float in an atmosphere untainted by the breath of bondage.

- 3.—*Sketches of Modern Philosophy, especially among the Germans.* By James Murdock, D. D. Hartford: John W. Wells. 1842. pp. 221.

This small duodecimo volume is a valuable contribution to the history of philosophy. True, there are more extended ones in German and French; but this contains a concise and, we think, correct view of the modern philosophies, especially of Germany. Freedom of thought is the birthright of a Protestant German, and he is apt to exercise it; whether always well or not, is another question. For our own part, we find in them volumes of mysticism beyond our ken, and far too ethereal for this common sense world,—much that is transcendently transcendental. By the way, as Dr. Murdock intimates, there is a distinction between *transcendentism* and *transcendentalism*. The latter is that philosophy which goes beyond the boundaries of sensuous, empirical knowledge; the former that which expatiates in the region of imaginary truth, and goes beyond the entire limits of human knowledge. This is unscientific: that strictly scientific. The school of philosophy, therefore, to which Rev. G. Ripley, Rev. O. A. Brownson, Rev. R. W. Emerson, and others of like tissue belong, is not, properly speaking, the *transcendental*, but the *transcendent*. The latter term should be retained and applied to such: for they are truly *transcendentists*, surpassing in their speculations all the landmarks of knowledge, and running wild and unbridled through the airy domains of fancy.

We can do nothing better to recommend the book than to specify the subjects of the chapters:—Two modes of Philosophizing—Empirical—Metaphysical.—First German Philosophy.—Kant and his Critical Philosophy.—The Critical Philosophy.—Anti-Critical.—Pantheistic.—Instinctive.—French.—German Philosophy in America.—American Transcendentalism.—Philosophy of Dr. Rauch. The last chapter deserves to be well pondered by those who have adopted Dr. R.'s Psychology as a text-book for young men. Its tendency is unquestionably to Hegelism and Pantheism, and to the confusion of all right distinctions in morals.

- 4.—*Manhood, or Scenes from the Past; a series of Poems.* By William Plumer, Jr. Boston: Tappan & Dennet. 1843. pp. 148.

This is the second volume of a series intended to trace the advance of human life from infancy to old age. The first volume

was devoted to youth, and the third, should it follow, will be on age. The volume is dedicated to John Quincy Adams, attributing to him a special influence in rousing the ardor and directing the genius of the author. Among the portraits of celebrated men, written whilst Mr. Plumer was in Congress, there is one of this same celebrated and honored sage, from which we beg leave to make an extract :

"Thy large and liberal nature comprehends
All interests, rights and duties of mankind :
Cold in the crowd, convivial with thy friends,
Gentle and peaceable, to mirth inclined,
Yet prompt, intrepid, stern, where guilt offends,
Or wrong calls down rebuke ;—thy genius blends
In union rare, the rugged and refined,
The light and lofty ; learning, fancy, skill,
Wisdom to guide and courage to fulfil ;
Courage, not merely of the camp and field,
But nobler far, the rarer courage shown
In halls of state.—that, throwing wide its shield
O'er truth assailed, disdains to fly or yield ;
By hosts beset, yet victor, though alone."

There are also sketches of John Marshall, Wm. Lowndes, John Sergeant, John Randolph, Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, and Daniel Webster.

The thoughts of these poems are generally elevated, the sentiments pure, and the tendency good. Those entitled "The Daughter," "The Boy," "Children," strike us as rich in sentiment. The publishers merit commendation for the style of execution.

5.—*The Christian Citizen. The Obligations of the Christian Citizen, with a Review of High Church Principles in relation to Civil and Religious Institutions. By A. D. Eddy, Newark, N. J. New-York, J. S. Taylor & Co. 1843. pp. 164.*

The thoughts contained in this volume were originally presented, by the Rev. Mr. Eddy, to his congregation, 'on the occasion of the last State Thanksgiving.' They are now published, by request, in an expanded form ; and the reader will discover that the author has not spoken unadvisedly with his lips, but confirmed his own statements by well selected appeals to original authorities.

The former part of the work is appropriated to a consideration of government—in its foundation, its principles, its evils, the mode of correcting them, and the duties incumbent on all Christian citizens in respect to governmental matters. Mr.

E. dwells on the rage of party-spirit, its dangerous tendency, and the necessity of the prevalence of Christian virtue, in order to its counteraction—on the importance of sustaining the supremacy of law, the faithful fulfilment of contracts—and on the duty of selecting men of unimpeached moral integrity as rulers. Here, he by no means advocates a sectarian organization, but contends, rightly, that Christian men of all parties are bound to exercise their political rights, and to throw all their influence into the scale of good morals and good order.

On this point we entirely coincide with him, and we believe that good men could compel all parties to nominate only worthy candidates, by simply saying: "If you select men as candidates, who are wanting in moral integrity, and have no regard for the institutions of Christianity, you must not calculate on our support. We cannot vote for such, because we think them not qualified to administer wholesome government."

The latter part of the volume is occupied with the author's views of High Church principles, their bearing on republican government, and consequently on the proper exercise of Christian citizenship. Of course he enters into the questions of "Divine Right," of "Apostolical Succession," "Liturgies and Forms of Worship," etc. etc.

We think he shows up these High Church claims well, and exposes the tendency of Puseyism as it merits. It was our intention to extract some passages on both branches of the subject, but as we expect a review for our pages, we shall not anticipate that, but close by recommending the book to the serious consideration of all Christian citizens.

6.—*The Advancement of Religion the Claim of the Times.* By Andrew Reed, D.D. With an Introduction, by Gardiner Spring, D.D. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1843. pp. 312.

The Author of this volume is well known to American Christians: nor will his labors of love amongst us soon be forgotten. His books, too, so rich in sentiment and beautiful in diction, have been read by many in this land both with pleasure and profit.

We are glad that he thus speaks to us again, and speaks on topics equally interesting to the church in the United States as in Great Britain—the *advancement of religion the claim of the times*. What greater, what more important claim! Time never was, perhaps, when the advancement of genuine piety was more needful. But Dr. Reed will portray that much better than we should.

He represents the advancement of religion, as desirable—in the person—by personal effort—in the family—by the ministry—in the church—by the church—in the nation—in the world—and concludes with the certainty and glory of the consummation.

In the first lecture we find the following beautiful and forcible passage: "Religion then, as we have to regard it, is not various, but one. It is not a form, or a ritual, or a creed, or a catechism; but the life of truth and of God in the soul of man. It divides nothing with false religions; and it knows nothing of the divisions which men have sought to fasten on the true. It knows nothing of Arminius, or of Calvin, or of Luther. It is not of Paul, or of Apollos, or of Peter. It is not from Jerusalem, or Rome, or Oxford. It is from heaven; it is one. In the Bible it is one; in Christ it is one, in the Christian it is one, undivided and indivisible. Its simplicity is its sublimity; and both are the clear and indubitable evidence of its divinity." How true, but how little heeded! When will the day appear, in which Christians shall be absorbed in the feeling of their unity with Christ and in Christ!

In these times of God's presence in our churches, Christians and ministers of the gospel will find here many admirable and helpful suggestions.

We wish for the book a large circulation, because it is precisely one of those, which call off the attention of God's people from the world and from the mere framework of Christianity, and direct it to the weightier matters of the gospel, holiness, peace and love.

7.—*Missionary Labors and Scenes in Southern Africa.* By Robert Moffat, twenty-three years an agent of the London Missionary Society on that Continent. New-York: Robert Carter. 1843. pp. 405.

The review of this work, furnished to the readers of the Eclectic Museum, must have awakened a desire to possess the volume itself. Mr. Carter now offers it to the public, and we doubt not his enterprise will, in this case, be amply repaid. We have Campbell and Phillips on missions to Southern Africa, but we have no book on missionary operations in Africa comparable with this. It is written, indeed, in a plain style, but the narrative of events is stirring, and the scenes through which Mr. Moffat himself passed unusually interesting. He became emphatically all things to all men. As Mr. Campell says, "To master the language, he wandered the de-

serts with the savage tribes, sharing their perils and privations. He *outdid* Paul in accommodating himself to all men, in order to save some. Paul never became a *savage* in lot, to save savages. Many might, indeed, thus stoop to conquer, but few could retain both their piety and philosophy in such society."

Let those, who would follow the vicissitudes of a hero, read Moffat, and they will see a man who, for Christ's sake, dared dangers the most impending, and entered into conflicts the most severe. There are few men in the world as well qualified to be a missionary to the degraded sons of Africa as the author of this volume. Twenty-three years of his life have already been spent in pouring in light upon the darkness of that benighted land, amid self-denials and toils which scarce any else could endure. Yet he is not weary nor worn out. And God has abundantly rewarded his labors in leading many a poor ignorant African to the foot of the cross, and imparting to him the hope and peace of the gospel.

The mere literary and scientific man, as well as the christian, will find a compensation for the perusal of this work, in the new and strange aspects of human society there presented, and its copious contributions to natural history.

We shall soon begin to feel that there is no better scientific corps abroad on the earth, than the corps of missionaries of the gospel of Jesus Christ.

8.—*The Bible in Spain, or the Journeys, Adventures, and Imprisonments of an Englishman, in an attempt to circulate the Scriptures in the Peninsula.* By George Borrow, author of "*The Gypsies of Spain.*" Philadelphia: James M. Campbell. New-York: Saxton & Miles. 1843. pp. 232.

This is an extraordinary book of an extraordinary man. Mr. Borrow's *Zincali* met with great acceptance, and was read with great avidity; but this surpasses even that in interest. In style it is vigorous and easy; in narrative, minute, veracious, and vivacious; in adventure, of the deepest, most animated interest; and altogether an exceedingly captivating volume.

Like Moffat of Africa, Mr. Borrow in Spain mixed with almost every class, and passed through almost all sorts of scenes. He talked and associated with gypsies, robbers, priests, and ministers: you can find him in the forest, the field, the posada, the hut, the palace, the prison; and everywhere the same sincere, good-natured, honest, decided man.

On his way to the prison at Madrid, crossing the court where others had suffered before him, he bethought him thus : "Here am I—I who have done more to wound Popery than all the poor Christian martyrs that ever suffered in this accursed square,—here am I, merely sent to prison, from which I am sure to be liberated in a few days with credit and applause. Pope of Rome ! I believe you as malicious as ever, but you are sadly deficient in power. You are become paralytic, Batuschka ! and your club has degenerated into a crutch."

Now hear his description of a young American, a native of South Carolina : "His appearance was remarkable : he was low of stature ; exceedingly slightly made ; his features were pale but well formed ; he had a magnificent head of crispy black hair, and as superb a pair of whiskers of the same color as I ever beheld. He wore a white hat, with broad brim, and particularly shallow crown, and was dressed in a light yellow gingham frock, striped with black, and ample trousers of calico : in a word his appearance was altogether queer and singular." He then proceeds to relate the young man's conversation with "a man of the rock," on the subject of slavery, which is quite amusing, but we cannot transfer it to our pages.

9.—*The Works of President Edwards, in four volumes. A Reprint of the Worcester Edition, with valuable additions, and a copious general Index.* New-York : Jonathan Leavitt and John F. Trow. Boston : Crocker & Brewster. 1843.

We think the publishers have done a good deed in offering to the public the complete works of Jonathan Edwards. Some of his Treatises and his Life have been published separately : but the rising ministry will be thankful for the opportunity of enriching their shelves with a reprint of the Worcester Edition of his Works complete. And now is a propitious period for the sale of them, when so many are talking and writing about his philosophical opinions, especially on the Will.

Whatever may be thought of the truth of his views on this subject, it will ever remain an indisputable fact, that he had a giant mind, and that few could equal him in argument. The man, who intends to read his treatise on the Will, must make up his mind beforehand to bend down his powers to the subject, and give it an undivided attention. No superficial thinker can master him, or even hope to understand him. Many probably have misapprehended him, and attributed to him the faults of their own misapprehension.

Yet, the probability is that President Edwards has laid him-

self open to objection by an occasional, at least apparent, inconsistency. But instead of expressing opinions or entering into discussion in this necessarily brief notice, our readers will accept a statement of the general subjects treated in the four volumes. Vol. I. Memoirs of President Edwards—Farewell Sermon—Concerning Qualifications for Communion—Reply to Rev. Solomon Williams—History of the Work of Redemption—Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God—Observations on Important Doctrines—Account of the Life of David Brainerd.—Vol. II. Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will—The End for which God created the World—On the Nature of True Virtue—Doctrine of Original Sin Defended—Divine Decrees in General and Election in Particular—Efficacious Grace—Concerning Faith.—Vol. III. Religious Affections—Surprising Conversions—On the Revival in New England—Explicit Agreement in Extraordinary Prayer—Perseverance of Saints—Pre-existence of Christ's Human Soul—Mysteries of Scripture—On Particular Passages of Scripture—Theological Questions—Six Occasional Sermons.—Vol. IV. Forty Sermons on Various Subjects.

- 10.—*Puseyism Examined.* By J. H. Merle D'Aubigné, D. D., author of the "*History of the Reformation in the Sixteenth Century.*" Introductory Notice of the Author, by Robert Baird. New-York: John S. Taylor & Co. 1843. pp. 79.

Dr. Merle, so well known, through his History of the Reformation, again appears before us in this small treatise, as the advocate of a spiritual religion, expressing itself in a few instituted forms, and resting on the basis of justification by faith. The times demand it, as there is a manifest tendency, in certain quarters, to return to the bondage of rites and ceremonies, and bury a crucified Christ in external pomp. How truly does Dr. Merle say: "Man always seeks to return, in some way, to a human salvation; this is the source of the innovations of Rome and of Oxford. The substitution of the Church for Jesus Christ is that which essentially characterizes these opinions. It is no longer Christ who enlightens, Christ who saves, Christ who forgives, Christ who commands, Christ who judges; it is the Church, and always the Church, that is to say, an assembly of sinful men, as weak and prone to err as ourselves. 'They have taken away the Lord, and we know not where they have laid him.'"

The whole lecture merits the attention of the church. It is written in a vigorous style, and well sustains the three great

principles of Christianity. "The Word of God, ONLY"—"The Grace of God, ONLY"—"The work of the Spirit, ONLY."

Dr. Baird, in his Introduction, has made us better acquainted with this defender of the faith than we were before: for which our thanks are due.

11.—*Thoughts for the Thoughtful.* By Old Humphrey. New-York: Robert Carter, 1843. pp. 240.

Old Humphrey paid us a visit in our January No., and we are right glad to see him again amongst us. He is an old man, he says, but seems to possess, notwithstanding, much of the sprightliness and activity of youth. He was once a soldier, we believe, then a merchant, now retired from business, to spend his latter days in doing good—imitating his divine Redeemer in conveying cups of cold water to the parched lips of the poor and thirsty. His "Thoughts" will live after him, and be doing good to others in inciting them to go and do likewise, when he shall be resting from his earthly labors in the paradise of God.

"Thoughts for the Thoughtful" begins with "A Sweet Spirit," intended briefly to illustrate and enforce the cultivation of a spirit much needed in this sinning world—that of kindness, forbearance, charity. If any Christian is murmuring, let him read "The Broken Thread." If any is comfortably housed in a warm, quiet home, on a cold, stormy night, let him read "Sympathy for Sailors." Is any given to fault-finding, he may read "The too hasty Reproof." Does any one too readily yield to indolence, let him read, "Have you wound up the Clock?" If Old Humphrey should take up his "stump of a pen" again, we hope Mr. Carter will not fail to let us know it.

12.—*Greenwood Cemetery and other Poems.* By Joseph L. Chester. New-York: Saxton and Miles: Boston: Saxton, Pierce & Co. 1843. pp. 132.

Mr. Chester's Dedication—"To his Wife, (not knowing a better friend,) the author dedicates this book," speaks well for his heart and for the sweets of his domestic life. It is kindly and becoming. And this is not the solitary beauty of the book. There is poetry in it: some charming. "Greenwood Cemetery" is beautifully conceived and delightfully executed: and he that reads it will wish to see the spot itself, and might well say with the author: "Already am I half in

love with Death." But while the body shall repose in so enchanting and peaceful a retreat, ought not the spirit that leaves it there, to be breathing the pure atmosphere of heaven, that it may be fitted to await its resurrection from a resting-place so sweetly charming? There is sweet poetry in the "Spirit's Communings"—"The Warrior's Prayer"—"The Motherless," and others are emanations of genius.

Nor must we forget to say that the publishers have "got up" the book in a beautiful style, for which, we trust, they will be appropriately compensated.

- 13.—*History of Europe from the commencement of the French Revolution in 1789, to the Restoration of the Bourbons in 1815.* By Archibald Alison, F. R. S. E. Advocate. In four volumes. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1842.

We are indebted to the enterprising publishers for Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, of this interesting and valuable work. We could wish that their presses were exclusively appropriated to works of a similar character, at least to such as would not exercise an unhappy influence on the rising generation. We must say, whilst we rejoice in *very much* which they have done, we cannot but regret that, perhaps inadvertently, they have permitted some things to go out endorsed with their names, the tendency of which is far from wholesome.

Of their Alison's History, we spoke favorably in our Jan. No., and we can only repeat our belief that, notwithstanding its errors, it is one of the most elegant and useful histories extant. With No. 5, commences the second volume: the whole to be completed in four, each comprising as many numbers, 16 in all, at 25 cents each, or four dollars for the entire work.

- 14.—*The Apostacy predicted by Saint Paul.* By Mortimer O'Sullivan, D. D., Rector of Killyman. Part First and Part Second. Dublin: William Curry, jun. & Company. London: Longman, Orne & Co. pp. 340.

This is a work sent to us from beyond the Atlantic, and we thank the donor for it. It is timely; but its chief recommendation to us is, that the first part is entirely expended on a consideration of the precise *language* of the prophecies, as the true and only basis on which correct interpretation can rest. The sense of Scripture is distinguished from the signification of comments, which things are too often confounded.

These essays were originally called forth by lectures of Dr.

Todd, who maintains the literalist view of the prophecies of Paul in 2 Thess. 2: 3—12; 1 Tim. 4: 1—3. Dr. O'Sullivan contends,—and builds his argument on critical analysis and comparison—that neither the Romanist's nor Literalist's interpretation is warranted by a proper view of the passages under consideration, but that what he calls the "Protestant" view is the correct one—that which applies these predictions to the Papacy. We think he shows, with great force, that the attributes of the predicted apostacy are all found in the Papacy, and that they cannot be assigned to any other "falling away," either past or future.

The argument is dignified, generous, lucid, and forceful.

There are many passages we should be pleased to transfer, but must be content with one which we find under the exposition of "forbidding to marry." It is a quotation from an anonymous article in the Dublin University Magazine, Nov. 1841, p. 597, written by a Roman Catholic priest, who has given his name to the editor:

"I would most strongly urge on the attention of the rulers of our church—the rescinding of the law of clerical celibacy. I am, as I before stated, 'in the sear and yellow leaf,' and would have little to gain by this change; and I am fully aware that even one sentence spoken or written on this or any other subject may have an influence to be felt at the end of time. Well, then, in the presence of that God who is yet to judge me, I make, after the maturest judgment, the following declaration, which I wish should be proclaimed through the world:—The law of the Roman Catholic church which obliges our clergymen to live single—no matter what advantages may be ascribed to it, I believe to be one which has at all times wrought, and still works, incalculable mischief. It is my unalterable conviction that this rule is, and has ever been, productive of sins most offensive to the Almighty; and that the Lord has often poured out his wrath upon the nations in consequence of those offences against him, which I should almost say have followed necessarily from this unnatural restriction. I have experienced the evils of this system in myself. Many things have I heard of priests in this country, and in other countries, which I did not and do not believe, for taking all things into account they are more moral than what they got credit for; but enough have I known, enough have I heard on unquestionable authority to convince me, forever, that this law has done immense harm in the church, and that the sooner it be removed the better. I believe that no clergy-

man of ours could employ himself better than by seeking through all means in his power to procure its repeal; and finally, I do declare in the presence of Him in whose hands is my lot, by whose indulgence I breathe, and am enabled to pen these lines, that I would be willing at this moment, or at any other moment, to lay down my life in defence and in confirmation of this my opinion.

"The rule of clerical celibacy ought to be rescinded. Time and custom are no arguments for its continuance. The tyranny of zeal was necessary formerly. Rude society should be struck with terror and astonishment in order to effect any great change. The mind of Europe, of the world, has since changed: and in my internal conscience I do believe there never was any law in the church, whose repeal would produce such holiness in the ministers of God. I think our church would be *now* as much raised in public estimation by the repeal of the law as it was heretofore advanced by its establishment."

15.—*The New Englander*, Vol. I. Number I, January 1843.

This is a new Quarterly, set on foot at New Haven, under the editorial conduct of Rev. E. R. Tyler, aided by a number of highly respectable contributors. Its design is to occupy a field of free and fearless review in the literary world. "Its conductors will utter their own opinions at their own discretion. And if the circulation of the work, conducted on such principles, does not show that there is a demand for it on the part of the public, the undertaking will of course be abandoned." "It will be found on the side of order, of freedom, of progress, of simple and spiritual Christianity, and of the Bible as the infallible, sufficient and only authority in religion." The present No. contains some sprightly and profitable articles, and, if the times permit, the undertaking will doubtless succeed. Why should it not? We cannot but be obliged to the conductors for saying: "That the American Biblical Repository is an honor to the American name." "No well furnished library of a clergyman can be without it." "We heartily commend it to scholars in every profession."

ADDITIONAL NOTICES.

We have also received from the same publishers, Parts III. and IV. of "*Brande's Encyclopædia of Science, Literature, and Arts*," which has been already twice noticed in the Repository.

Mr. Carter has sent us his cheap form of *D'Aubigne's History of the Reformation*, ninth edition. Three volumes, bound, for one dollar. It contains all the notes, and is as perfect as the first edition, except in the style of getting up. It was well thus to bring it within reach of all. The first edition was noticed at length.

A Manual on the Christian Sabbath, embracing a consideration of its Perpetual Obligation, Change of Day, Utility and Duties. By John Holmes Agnew, (former Professor of Languages, Washington College, Washington, Pa. Third edition.) Philadelphia: W. S. Young. N. York: Robert Carter. 1842.

It would ill become us to say, any thing of this Manual, except that it was originally delivered in a course of Lectures to the Students of Washington College, and, at their request, committed to the press. The only wish of the author is, that it may promote the sanctification of the Lord's Day. He has no manner of peculiar interest in it.

Capital Punishment. The Argument of Rev. George B. Cheever, in reply to J. L. O'Sullivan, Esq., in the Broadway Tabernacle, on the Evenings of January 27th, and February 3d and 17th. New York: Saxton & Miles. Boston: Saxton & Pierce. 1843. pp. 108.

This Argument, as it merited, is published in a very neat style, with paper cover: so that while it is cheap, it is also readily readable. There is contained in it a body of argument, both on the biblical and expediency-question, which will require more logic than most men possess to overthrow. The question ought to be settled by it, and, we think, would be, if men yielded to their honest convictions.

Our Country safe from Romanism. A Sermon delivered at the opening of the Third Presbytery of Philadelphia, at its sessions in the Western Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, April, 1841. By Rev. Thomas Brainerd. L. R. Bailey, printer. 1843. pp. 45.

Mr. Brainerd contends: I. That the political influence of Romanism in North America and elsewhere has greatly waned in the last century. II. The relative proportion of Romanists to the Protestant population of this country, furnishes no ground of alarm. III. The moral power of Romanism in

this country does not so transcend our evangelical agencies as to justify alarm. IV. This country, with its present characteristics, furnishes extraordinary and inexorable obstacles to the controlling prevalence of Romanism. Inferences: (1.) If there is no imminent danger, we should be careful not to give Romanists the benefit of such an assumption. (2.) If no cause of fear, then it is unwise, as well as unkind, to employ our influence in denouncing the Romanists.

ARTICLE X.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Russia.

In St. Petersburg, for 1843, seventy German, fifty-one French and twenty-one English journals are allowed to circulate. In Wilna the list includes 192 in all; 104 German, 69 French, 19 English. The number of periodicals in Russia is annually increasing. Fifty-four new ones already announced for 1843; some of which are German, French, English and Polish.

Germany.

Prof. Lepsius is now in Egypt, under commission from his Prussian Majesty, at the head of an expedition of architects, modellers, and artists, for the purpose of further investigations into the antiquities of Egypt.

Dr. Hermann of Marburg has been appointed ordinary professor in the Philosophical Faculty at Göttingen.—Dr. Otto Jaen of Kiel has accepted an extraordinary professorship of Philology and Archæology in the University of Greifswalde.—At Leipzig W. A. Becker has been appointed professor of Classical Antiquity.—Who is to succeed Gesenius at Halle is uncertain. Hupfield of Marburg has been written to on the subject. Guerike, author of a Manual on Church History, has published an Introduction to the New Testament.—The first volume of Hengstenberg's Commentary on the Psalms, announced in our last number, has appeared: and Tholuck promises a practical commentary on the same.—Umbreit's Jeremiah has also appeared.—Professor Ficht has been transferred from Bonn to Tübingen; and Prof. Ewald has left the faculty of Philosophy for that of Theology.—Hävernicks, a pupil and friend of Tholuck and Hengstenberg, has met with much opposition in his post, as professor of Oriental Languages, at Königsberg. Von Bohlen, his predecessor, was a rationalist of the muddiest water, and many of the class demanded another like him. Hävernicks was at first almost deserted;

but the skies begin to wear a calmer aspect, and Hävernicks will probably maintain his position.—Ast, author of the *Lexicon Platonicum*, died at Munich, on the last day of last year. The Universities of Tübingen and Leipzig have received from the directors of the East India Company seventeen works on oriental literature, principally in the Sanscrit.—Of new books in Germany, we have Flügel's Concordance of the Koran. H. E. G. Paulus's Exegetical Manual on the first three Evangelists, announced in our last number. Erdmann's History of Philosophy.—The *Codex Rescriptus* of Ephraem Syrus, of the sixth century, deciphered by a chemical process, is now in press at Leipzig.—The society at Stuttgart for the republication of old works, is publishing the earliest chronicle known to exist, written in German; date 1360.

France.

Professor Liebig has been appointed corresponding member in the Chemical section of the Royal Academy of Sciences.—Count Leon de Laborde, author of a Commentary on the Bible, succeeds his father as a member of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres.—Abulfeda's Arabic Geography, translated by M. Reinaud, is about to be published. A catalogue of Silvestre de Sacy's library, in 3 vols., has appeared.—Messrs. Didot will publish a new edition of R. Stephens's Latin Thesaurus.

Greece.

The Polytechnic School flourishes. The names of 460 applicants for admission are recorded. Prof. Fournet, of Lyons, has presented it with a very valuable collection of minerals.

England.

Dr. Tattam has secured to England between two and three hundred Syriac MSS., on vellum, of the greatest age and interest.—The same gentleman is editing the Scriptures in Coptic and Arabic, the Arabic of which is to be corrected at Cairo from the best MSS. in the country.

United States.

Allen, Morrill and Wardwell, of Andover, will publish Kühner's "School Grammar of the Greek Language," translated by B. B. Edwards, and S. H. Taylor. This will be a valuable acquisition for our students of Greek.

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ERRATA.

In Vol. VIII. p. 405 note, for *con* read *con*.

" " " " *Rôces* read *Pieces*.

" 410 line 7 " *books* read *broths*.

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